HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE ARMENIAN-BRITISH MILITARY COLLABORATION, 1918–1920

Key words: the First Armenian Republic, Great Britain, Armenian-British military collaboration, military policy, British troops, Armenian forces, George N. Curzon.

Introduction

The establishment of the Soviet rule in Armenia, and the development of science and academia being restricted by the framework of the centralized Soviet ideology, did not allow for the proper historical study of Armenia’s First Republic. Even after the establishment of independence, the study of some topics remains incomplete, or, at least, they remain inadequately presented. This has resulted not only in our misunderstanding of our relations with various nations and states, but also in misattributing causes of certain gaps in our history during that period. During its short existence, the First Republic of Armenia paid great attention to the establishment of foreign relations. Suitably, it is very important to study the history of Armenian-British diplomatic relations during that period, including military cooperation. The sources for this study are the works by both Armenian and British figures as well as archival documents available on the subject. Also valuable to this study are the works of authors whose viewpoints were not constricted by mold.

Armenian-British Military Collaboration

On the face of it, the history of Armenian-British military collaboration does not seem rich, or, at least, not much has been written on the subject. Yet, in reality, Armenian-British military cooperation was on strong footing during the
short life of the first Armenian Republic, between 1918 and 1920. We know that in 1918, after independence, Armenia was an ally of Great Britain, a member of Entente. This alliance is accounted for by the fact that Armenia continued to wage war against Turkey, which was among the most active opponents of Entente, and Turkish troops had suffered undisputed defeats and bypassed Armenia.

Among Armenian historians of the Soviet era, there is a commonly accepted viewpoint that the British government, as an ally, was not quite reliable for Armenia, and though it gave many promises to assist Armenia (including the military matters), it failed to keep its promises, and Armenia ultimately did not get tangible support from London. This reinforced viewpoint successfully placed itself in the Soviet academic literature and continues to hold its position until today, yet it remains groundless.

Let us try to understand what the situation was with regard to this relationship, specifically with respect to military cooperation. Officials have made many references to British troops being with officers in various subdivisions and missions, yet we find the first significant reference to a more or less considerable force in Alexander Khatisyan’s work (in Armenian) “The Origin and Development of the Armenian Republic.” In the ninth chapter of his work, the author in this regard mentions: “The Expansion of Armenia’s Borders and the 1919 Act of May 28th: With regard to Armenia’s expansion, most important were the unifications of Kars, Zangezur and Nakhijevan.” All of these regions were reunified with Armenia with the participation of Great Britain.

The author continues: “The reunification of Kars happened the following way: In December of 1918, when the Turks withdrew from Alexandrapol, they left their main station in Kars, which, according to the notes of Shukri Pasha, became a regional autonomy named Shura. Besides the local Turks, two Russian Molokans also entered Shura.

At the same time, in Alexandrapol, Tiflis, Yerevan as well as a number of other places, the Armenian refugees from Kars region, numbering nearly 100000, were making appeals to the Armenian government as well as to representatives of Europe, requesting to make it possible for them to return to their birthplaces in Kars, Ardahan and Kaghzvan.

1 Խատիսեան 1968, 149–169:
The Georgian claims were also apparent with respect to the region of Kars. It seemed that they too would make demands. To get ahead of misapprehension and complexities, I went to Tiflis, to see General Walker, England’s Supreme Commander. Our dispute with the Georgians was especially over the northern parts of Kars, the provinces of Ardahan and Oltisi. The Georgians had no claims to the city of Kars, Kars Province or Kaghzvan Province.

To make the situation clearer, I do not find it redundant to recall that up until the World War, the state of Kars had a population of 404,000, of which 123,170 were Armenians, 4,266 Georgians, 102,860 Turks and Tatars, 54,931 Kurds, and the remaining 118,000 were Russians, Greeks, Bosha, Qarapapaks, etc. With this, Armenians made up a third of the entire population and formed the largest of all the groups when taken separately.

My trip to Tiflis resulted in a border being drawn with Georgians in the following manner: Ardahan Province’s northern part, above Ardahan city, the other side of the Poskov River, went to Georgia, and temporarily, the western part of Kars, from Merdenek westward, would stay under English command as a zone that directly shares a border with the state of Batumi. With this, evidently, the provinces of Kars and Kaghzvan, along with the Kars fort, as well as the city of Ardahan, were to be turned over to Armenia, which included the Alexdrapol-Kars-Sarikamish-Karaurgan railroad. Oltisi Province, evidently, was to remain to the Turks.

Yet the areas that belonged to Armenia were not in the hands of Armenians, even though resolutions were made in Tiflis. Those resolutions still needed to be executed. And, thus, Colonel Temperley who was England’s representative in Yerevan at the time was assigned to this task.

"Besides that, General Beach came from Tiflis to Alexandrapol. At the start of the month of March, at midnight, I met with him, and Generals Hovsepyan, Perumyan and Dro were also present. English General Davie also participated in this discussion. It was decided that our detachments had to mobilize to Kars in two directions, along the railroad and highway. Armenian forces were to be 1,200 in number, and English forces would initially be 1,500 and eventually reach 3,000. Colonel Temperley was appointed as military governor, while Stepan Ghorghanyan was appointed civilian governor (who had governed the region of Kars during the czarist times).

It goes without saying that in the life of our Republic it was a very big deal for the Armenian forces to enter Kars. It was an occasion that created much
enthusiasm among the people. Naturally, following the Armenian soldiers the refugees were returning to the state of Kars.

The Shura chose not to hand over the leadership to the Armenian governor voluntarily. Colonel Temperley even gave orders to arrest Shukra Pasha, who, however, was able to escape. Colonel Temperley called before him the entire Shura group, and gave them three minutes to hand over the leadership voluntarily, otherwise he would resort to weapons. The Shura expressed that before violence, they would yield. On that night, English special military units arrested 153 local suspects and sent them to the island of Malta”.

This case provides significant proof in showing just how much military cooperation existed between the Armenian and British governments and armies. During intergovernmental military-political and economic discussions, issues of financial, economic, military and other assistance to the newly independent state of Armenia had continually been put on the table. Military-political leadership visits took place on both sides, during which a range of issues related to military assistance and cooperation were discussed. Particularly important were issues pertaining to weapons and ammunition assistance, likewise with other material supplies, logistics involved delivery, the issue of getting them across Georgian territory, etc. In the second half of 1919, the General of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, Gabriel Ghorghanyan (Korganov), spent six weeks in London, having meetings with representatives of Britain’s foreign and military offices as well as military industry professionals. The main issue at hand was military assistance2. The same issue was also discussed with the delegates appointed by Admiral de Robek in April, 1920, upon visiting Yerevan.

Dr. Richard Hovannisian, an American-Armenian scholar who has studied the matter, notes (in the referenced work) that only after General Ghorghanyan’s six-week visit, on January 19, 1920, did the Allied Supreme Council decide to assist the Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

At first glance, that seems like a long period, given that Armenia was living through hard times. However, we must note that it was just a matter of two or three months, and quite naturally so, given that all the while, during the same period, military operations were taking place, the three republics had leaders that didn’t have a complete handle over the situation, there were many riots taking

2 Ованнисян 2007, 538.
place, etc. Let us also remember that during this period there was no direct link between London and Yerevan, and in the entire region the British contingent had less troops than even a single regiment, and those troops didn’t even have a proper billeting. There were two light infantry battalions in Batumi, whose withdrawal was continually insisted upon by the British War Office. The closest British troops were in Iraq, but their number and capabilities were significantly reduced after the war.

On the other hand, it was evident that Great Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord George N. Curzon, continually insisted that it was necessary to assist the newly independent Armenian Republic. In the House of Lords and Government, a view was growing in popularity that after the defeat of the “whites”, at a minimum, Georgia and Azerbaijan cannot confront and resist “red” Russia, yet even in this very difficult political situation, Lord Curzon insisted on assisting the Armenian people, saying that Britain had a moral debt to pay to the Armenian people. On March 11, 1920, a discussion took place on the Armenian question in the House of Lords, and there Viscount James Bryce asked the lords to assist the Armenians, saying that Britain had an obligation to do so. There, Lord Curzon came forth with a special speech. After praising the bravery of the Armenians, and insisting that they would be able to secure themselves if they were supplied with adequate weaponry, he went on saying that the suffering of the Armenians should be reduced, and promises by the warring nations towards the Armenians should be kept. Seven days after this discussion, at the Allied Supreme Council, Lord Curzon announced that Great Britain’s government was making preparations to assist the Republic of Armenia.

On March 25, 1920, Prime Minister Lloyd George specifically made a note about the Armenians, saying:

“With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia, it depends entirely on the Armenians themselves – whether they protect their independence. They must do so; they must begin to depend upon themselves. They are an intelligent people; they are an exceptionally intelligent people. In fact, it is their intelligence which gets them into trouble sometimes, from all I hear. That is what is so obnoxious to the Turks. I am told that they could easily organise an army of about

3 British Archives FO 371/4932, E1287/111/58, minutes.
5 FO 371/4953, EI613, E1981/134/58, WO to FO, 10.03.1920, Tille minute, 16.03.1920.
Historical Notes on the Armenian-British Military Collaboration, 1918–1920

40,000 men. If they ask for equipment we shall be very happy to assist in equipping their army. If they want the assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing to assist in that respect. That is by far the best thing for themselves. It would increase their self-respect. It would make them a manlier and more virile people. Instead of always casting themselves upon other countries and sending supplications and appeals, let them defend themselves. When they do so the Turk will have too much respect – not for them, but for himself – to attempt any more massacres in that quarter.  

With these words, it is evident that the pro-Armenian influence peddlers had overcome the difficult political challenges within the British Empire’s government, and there is a clear decision to assist Armenia. Yet, naturally, it would all come down to depend on the Armenian people and Armenia. Later, according to Dr. Richard Hovannisian, artificial difficulties were invented by Great Britain’s War Office, because at first they kept postponing the delivery of weapons, then they were trying to sell the weapons rather than to give them a way, and later they insisted that delivery means were unavailable, and various other excuses were given. To the view that those weapon transfers must be in the form of a sale, and that the government loan must be with prepayment and commensurate interest percentages, Lord Curzon replied that such an approach is unacceptable. At the start of April, this issue was discussed amongst the treasury, foreign, military and maritime communications departments. On April 17, it was definitively decided that 48 field gun units, 400 machine gun units, 25,000 rifle units, 40,000 units of military outfits, etc. were to be sent to Armenia. It is understandable that many discussions and internal communications needed to take place before such a decision could be reached. Avetis Aharonian, the chairman of the parliament of Armenia, expressed gratitude upon hearing this news (despite the 200,000 pound payment). This issue of payment was once again criticized by the foreign secretary, noting that the shipment could have been sent to General Denikin, who had already paid for it in full, yet it was being sent to Armenia instead. Simultaneous with the discussion pertaining to weapons and ammunition, the

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7 E2352/134/58, WO to FO, 27.03.1920.
8 FO 371/4955, E4051/134/58, Aharonian to FO, 27.04.1920.
9 FO 371/4955, E3385/134/58, WO to FO, 17.04.1920, FO minutes.
discussions pertaining to allocating military advisors\textsuperscript{10} and supply of aircraft were held. For the whole of April in Great Britain, along with the discussion of weapons supply, there was discussion of sending 40 English officers to serve in Armenia, and, to pay for that, the Republic of Armenia would be extended a loan of half a million pounds\textsuperscript{11}. Let us note that this figure did not include the number of officers who voluntarily stayed behind in Armenia and had already been serving in the Armenian army for two years.

Simultaneously, there was also a discussion on the issue of obtaining respective equipment for the production of bullets. General Ghorghanyan, during his November visit, had already visited factories and studied equipment that produced from 50,000 to 120,000 bullets daily, yet, because of the hefty prices, it was not possible to purchase that equipment. And later, when there was a discussion on the armament that was already to be sent to Armenia, the War Office hindered the transfer of such a factory due to political considerations\textsuperscript{12}. Armenia’s internal situation, changes within the government, the war with Georgia as well as other issues, continually brought forth problems also in these matters. The 1920 May uprising in Alexandrapol brought forth further obstacles and doubt in the eyes of Great Britain’s government. Although the issue of weapons supply was already decided upon, the decision concerning matters of sending officers and supplying airplanes had been delayed. The powerful pro-Armenian lobby in the British parliament continued to stress the importance of assistance.

On June 10, the member of Parliament Aneurin Williams once again reminded everyone of the moral debt Britain had towards the Armenians, and there was even a talk of 200 officers, making official trips\textsuperscript{13}. Finally, on that same day, the renovated ship, Hornsey, was sent off to Batumi\textsuperscript{14}. It contained 48 field gun units with projectiles, 400 machine gun units with 57.5 million bullets, 25,000 Canadian rifle units, 40,000 units of complete military outfits (which included 80,000 units of undershirts and socks), 1077 first aid kits, various military hardware, telescopes, etc.

\textsuperscript{10} FO 371/5209, E1473/1214/44, Aharonian and Nubar to Lloyd George, 8.03.1920; Malcolm to Nubar, 26.04.1920.
\textsuperscript{11} FO 371/4955, E3891/134/58, minute, 27.04.1920.
\textsuperscript{12} FO 371/4956, E4638/134/58, minutes.
\textsuperscript{13} FO 371/4957, E6297/134/58, Williams to Curzon, 10.06.1920.
\textsuperscript{14} FO 371/4957, E6619/134/58; E6745; WO 33/1000, 11.06.1920; E6361.
Historical Notes on the Armenian-British Military Collaboration, 1918–1920

compASSES, gun repair kits, canned food, etc15. For this to be delivered to Batumi, Armenia’s leadership was made to sign for a debt of 850,000 British pounds. Moreover, for the cargo to be delivered from Georgia to Armenia, the Georgian side demanded 27 percent of the cargo, to which the Armenian government agreed16.

The issue of specialists and other armaments once again came to be discussed and evaluated. Once again, proposals were made, along with their corrections, and no definite deadline was set. It was already the month of August, and those proposals seemed to become less likely to reach fruition because of the unfolding developments both within and around Armenia, all of which made British leaders have a grimmer view of Armenia’s future. British intelligence was reporting to their government that the Armenian authorities were planning to hold talks with the Russian Bolshevik leaders. Naturally, the discussion on sending military specialists could not take place in line with such dire reports. Many in the British government and parliament pointed out that War Secretary Winston Churchill, was in fact correct when he kept insisting that any British assistance to Armenia would eventually end up in the hands of “reds” or nationalist Turks17. Yet, throughout this period there remained a number of assigned British officers in Armenia, along with many volunteers that had travelled to alleviate the suffering of the Armenian people, remaining faithful friends. Among these great friends of Armenia, the most famous is perhaps Oliver Baldwin, who was the son of Great Britain’s future prime minister Stanley Baldwin.

At the very beginning, the discussion concerning aircraft supply, or rather their sale, was quite heavy. Towards the end of March, 1920, Egypt’s Armenian community, having many supporters of the allies, and even party members, made an appeal to the British leaders, regarding airplanes stationed in Alexandria which were no longer being used18. During prior discussions, the British forces commander Field Marshal Allenby had argued that Britain already had some 700 decommissioned air vessels, some of which could be provided to the Armenian side. However, the War Office replied that doing so would be pointless, and

15 FO 371/4957, E6745/134/58, enclosure.
16 ՀԱԱ, ֆ. 200, ց. 1, գ. 607, թ. 15: ՀԱԱ, ֆ. 200, ց. 1, գ. 488, թ. 76: FO 371/4938, E5091/1/58, enclosure.
17 Ованнисян 2007, 539.
18 FO 371/4956, E4466/134/58, enclosure.
further, that if the Armenian side had the finances for such purchases, then it would be best for them to pay for the foreseen weapons and ammunition so that at least the matter would be resolved quickly. Aside from that, such a step would be technically very difficult to take, and the Armenian side would likely lack the expertise required for their use, as well as other issues\textsuperscript{19}. Here, once again, a heated debate started between the Foreign and War offices, yet the situation would not change.

Only near mid-July did the War Office, under the pressure of the Foreign Office, finally agree to transfer the vessels to Armenia on condition that other departments would also be able to make the necessary allocations\textsuperscript{20} (since, at the time, there were many agencies involved in technical matters connected with airplanes). However, the execution of this decision continued to be delayed until the events in August, although in 1920 there had been many aviation specialists, visiting Armenia from various countries. Armenia had purchased two airplanes from England, yet they had been standing in Batumi since early 1920 and were not being delivered to Armenia\textsuperscript{21}. Those two vessels were finally delivered by train dispatched on June 16, 1920, on wagons 303532 and 804592 respectively, accompanied by Ghulyan-Rilsky\textsuperscript{22}. There is information that there were also two other airplanes purchased from France, but we should not leave out the possibility that this information could in fact be about the same two planes.

On July 5, 1920, the said English ship arrived in Batumi, and the cargo reached Armenia approximately a month later. For the Armenian army, this was assistance of enormous significance, both in the quantity and variety of the items mentioned. Even so, here too have many Armenian contemporaries and historians found various issues. Among them is one such item from the cargo, a rifle referred to as “Bosh” which continues to carry a legacy with mixed reviews in the works of many historians. In reality, those were the Canadian manufactured Ross Mark II or Ross Mark III branded rifles, which did in fact have issues of reliability (and such issues are even recognized by English and Canadian sources).

Armenian sources primarily viewed those Canadian rifles negatively with respect to their use in combat. The soldiers and leadership found them to be heavy,
uncomfortable and rubbishy\textsuperscript{23}. Those rifles truly did have some problematic aspects, even though the rifles were using the excellent 7.7x56R mm (303 British) bullets, which were also being used in other rifles. In fact, during WWI, Canadian forces discarded the rifles and gladly accepted the English Lee-Enfield rifles instead, which also took the same bullets\textsuperscript{24}. However, it seems that the Armenian sources also exaggerate the negative aspects of the rifle, possibly as a means to justify future defeats. I should mention that the author has personally had the opportunity to fire this rifle in Great Britain and has found it to be powerful and especially accurate, though it has some problems connected with its bolt action and requires some skill and practice to be used successfully. Of course, the Armenian army had a difficulty with weapons, nevertheless these nearly 20,000 Canadian rifles, along with the other weapons delivered, should have been enough to conduct combat operations at least\textsuperscript{25}. Securing that quantity was extremely important for the Armenian side\textsuperscript{26}.

Let us try to summarize the issue of Britain’s weapons supply in the following way:

1. Britain had taken concrete steps in rendering aid to Armenia since the establishment of Independence.

2. Great Britain was nevertheless fulfilling its allied obligations. There was a strong Armenian lobby in the country that continually pushed the question of assistance to Armenia. The government wanted to supply weapons to Armenia, and that is explicitly stated by the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and other high ranking officials. In any case, they were certain about the Armenian army fighting against the Turkish nationalists.

3. It is obvious that Great Britain did not wish to arm Azerbaijan or Georgia, as they believed that the weapons would end up in Turkish hands\textsuperscript{27}.

\textsuperscript{23}ՀԱԱ, ֆ. 200, ց. 1, գ. 442, մաս 2, թ. 378:

\textsuperscript{24}France, too, discussed selling Lebel rifles to Armenia at the time. ՀԱԱ, ֆ. 204, ց. 1, գ. 237, թ. 5:

\textsuperscript{25}British Documents, vol. XII, p. 575–576; FO 371/3933, E2055/1/58; FO 371/4934, E2762, E2763/1/58, WO to FO, 5.04.1920; E2763/1/58, MacDonell minute; FO 371/4939, E5596/1/58, WO to FO, 31.05.1920.
4. Despite multiple difficulties, Armenia was supplied with a significant amount of arms, ammunition and gear even though for credit, and if used effectively, that could solve the major problems. The quantity of the supplied weapons was quite large for the Armenian army. The cost of it in today’s value would be about 80 million British pounds, which is quite a significant amount of loan for a single year even by today's standards. And all of this was accomplished despite the numerous subjective and objective obstacles:

✓ There were serious technical issues with respect to diplomatic ties between the Republic of Armenia and Great Britain. Means of communication were missing. Even within the country, documents being sent by mail from one department to another took quite long.

✓ WWI had just come to an end, and Great Britain was economically rundown. They were spending large amounts in various fields, and thus, expectation of much free assistance was quite naïve.

✓ The internal issues in Armenia, as well as its regional surroundings, were plentiful: Armenian-Azerbaijani war, Armenian-Georgian war, combat against Mohammedans, various internal problems in Batumi, Javakhk, domestic Armenian issues including revolts, political changes, etc.

✓ The Armenian populace did not have a friendly attitude towards the British. This attitude of distrust was especially apparent with regard to the military, and talk of relying on the Russians continued to prevail.

✓ At first glance, especially in the case of airplane supply, it appears that the British War Office was quite indifferent towards the Armenian nation, as they truly did not want to supply the planes to Armenia. On the other hand, we must realize that those airplanes were very expensive, and their actual use by the Armenian side raised serious technical problems. In fact, that same amount would be better spent in aiding Armenians with other weapons, which were much more useful. This also substantiates that the War Office was not against supplying weapons to the Armenians. It can also be factorized that at the time, airplanes were mainly viewed as strategic-political weapons, and they should not be viewed in the same light as artillery. On the other hand, supplying such weaponry as aircraft was quite problematic, and the British leadership feared that such weaponry could end up in the hands of Bolsheviks. It is not a mere coincidence that the two vessels Armenia purchased from the British reached Batumi and were basically nabbed by the
Englishman in charge and were not released and transferred to Armenia until after long and numerous diplomatic complaints.

**Conclusion**

Thus, we can conclude that the prevalent, one-sided negative view of the Armenian-British military cooperation and that of failures to meet promises, especially with respect to weapons and ammunition supply, is in fact not quite reasonable. We can say this because, as shown above, significant military aid did in fact arrive in Armenia, all within a matter of six months, and those weapons were incredibly significant for Armenia. At first, those six months seem very long, but we have to realize that even in today’s world of instant and unrestricted communication means, intergovernmental weapon transfers are quite time-consuming, especially considering the volumes involved. It should also be noted that during the two years of continuous war the Armenian Republic lived through, no other ally supplied weaponry of such volume as Britain, and additionally, no one supplied weapons free of charge. Further, Great Britain played a large role in the work related to reuniting the territories of Kars, Nakhijevan as well as other smaller territories with Armenia. There is clear evidence that the British troops worked hand in hand with the Armenian forces to liberate those territories. In fact, the liberation of Kars was organized by Armenian-British joint forces on the basis of a contract signed between the Major-General of the Allied Forces in the South Caucasus, George Foreistier-Walker, and Armenian Foreign Minister Sirakan Tigranyan.

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ՀԱՅ-ԲՐԻՏԱՆԱԿԱՆ ՌԱԶՄԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՄԱԳՈՐԾԱԿՑՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՇՈՒՐՋ (1918–1920)
ՀՈՎՀԱՆՆԻՍՅԱՆ Ա.
Ամփոփում

Բանալի բառեր՝ Հայաստանի Առաջին հանրապետություն, Մեծ Բրիտանիա, հայ-բրիտանական ռազմական համագործակցություն, տարածաշրջանային ցուցանիշներ, հայկական ուժեր, Ջորջ Ն. Քերզոն.

Հայաստանի Առաջին հանրապետություն իր կարճատև գոյությունից ի վեր այնտեղ է գտնվել բարձր դատարանի համակարգում, ինչպես նաև իր ներքին կառույցում։ 1918-1919 թթ. աշխարհամարձակչական միջոցներով, Հայաստանի Առաջին հանրապետությունը ճանապարհին էր անցնում իր տեսնություններից և պատմություններից հետ։ Հայաստանի Առաջին հանրապետությունը իր պատմությունը մեծ ազդեցության է կրում, որը հակառակորդ նշում է իր կարևորությունը իր մասին զգացնելու համար։

Հայ-բրիտանական ռազմական համագործակցության 1918–1920 թթ. աշխարհամարձակչական միջոցներով, Հայաստանի Առաջին հանրապետությունը մեծ ազդեցության է կրում, որը հակառակորդ նշում է իր կարևորությունը իր մասին զգացնելու համար։

Հայ-բրիտանական ռազմական համագործակցությունը 1918–1920 թթ. տալիս է իր մասին զգացնելու համար։

Բանալ կերպով, Հայաստանի Առաջին հանրապետությունը իր պատմությունը մեծ ազդեցության է կրում, որը հակառակորդ նշում է իր կարևորությունը իր մասին զգացնելու համար։

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ОБ АРМЯНО-БРИТАНСКОМ ВОЕННОМ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ
(1918–1920)

ОВАННИСЯН А.

Резюме

Ключевые слова: Первая Республика Армения, Великобритания, армяно-британское военное сотрудничество, военная политика, британские войска, армянские силы, Джордж Н. Керзон.

За короткий период своего существования Первая Республика Армения прошла сложный путь развития, нередко насыщенный драматическими событиями. В 1920 г. с установлением советской власти в Армении начался новый исторический цикл, в течение которого наша история редактировалась в контексте новых реалей и общесоветской идеологии. Это является основной причиной необходимости пересмотра истории отношений между Первой Республикой Армения и Британской империей. Изучение работ армянских и британских деятелей того времени и архивных документов свидетельствует о важности военных отношений между Первой Республикой Армения и Британией. Хотя и вопрос помощи Армении вызвал разногласия в британских кругах, но тем не менее Великобритания оказалась огромную поддержку Республике Армения. Особый интерес является собой информация о поставке оружия и других предметов в Армению в 1920 г. Данная информация проливает свет не только на историю дипломатических отношений, но и на реальные причины военных неудач армян осенью того же года.