
Key words: the USSR, Turkey, Treaty of Kars, Treaty of Moscow, border demarcation, border delimitation, Armenian-Turkish relations

Introduction

In the international practice the demarcation and delimitation of borders between neighboring countries is a regular and, in fact, a mandatory procedure. The set and mutually acknowledged borders being an outcome of political arrangements (negotiations, treaties) and military situations (wars) later acquire technical characteristics, which sometimes preserve the historical-political component. This can be manifested in the re-demarcation of borders, when certain problems of technical nature (changes in the riverbeds, other natural phenomena, etc.) arise, making parties refer to the borders again, which in its turn may refresh or activate certain historical-political memories and complexes connected with the border. The aforementioned utterly characterizes the border set between the former USSR and Turkey, part of which is presently the Armenian-Turkish border.

The Formation of Complex over the Kars Treaty in Turkey

It is common knowledge that the border between the USSR and Turkey was set due to the Treaties of Moscow and Kars (1921) the legitimacy of which is vulnerable. These treaties in some sense haven’t been fully acceptable for the wide Armenian scientific, political, public circles up until now. The issue of the
Kars Treaty was inconclusive even for the USSR elite, and this was officially and publicly manifested in 1945. After WWII the USSR, taking into consideration Turkey’s explicit support of Nazi Germany as well as referring to the necessity of re-establishing historical justice, made claims to Turkey, concerning the status of the Black Sea canals and the return of the two seized Armenian provinces of Kars and Ardahan. On June 7, 1945 Turkey’s ambassador Sarper in Moscow met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Molotov. At the meeting Molotov introduced new terms with regard to the extension of the treaty signed between the USSR and Turkey in 1925, namely - to review the status of the canals in the Black Sea and the Soviet-Turkish borders which have been set in accordance with the Kars Treaty. Otherwise stated, the USSR officially questioned the legitimacy of the Kars Treaty. And despite the fact that further international processes and certain Western powers did not allow the USSR to win its claims, the vulnerability of the Kars Treaty became an issue on the world agenda.

We can undoubtedly state that the Kars Treaty has always been one of the most sensitive issues for the political and public circles of Turkey and the latter has continued preserving its status and perception up to now. Moreover, the issue of the Soviet-Turkish borders on the shaky legal basis of the Kars Treaty and the possibility of changing the situation at any moment has created a state in Turkey which, in our opinion, can be described as “The Complex over Kars or the Kars Complex”. Although further on the USSR completely dropped its claims, the Turkish complex continued to grow, making the Turkish side on any possible occasions strive for the USSR’s reaffirmation of its intransigence in regard to the inviolability of the Kars Treaty and, thus, of the Soviet-Turkish borders. This issue or the complex has been transferred to the agenda of the Armenian-Turkish relations since 1991.

Within the frames of the relations between the USSR and Turkey, the re-establishment of the Kars Treaty and the unchangeability of the Soviet-Turkish border was put on the agenda by the Turkish side either during the visits of the Russian and Turkish high-rank officials or at interstate events, commemorating certain anniversaries. Turks strove to draw their cherished announcement out of the Soviet side at all costs. However, as facts have come to evidence the Turkish

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1 For more details see Киракосян, 2010, Ուժիրքիչ, 2013: Ուժիրքիչ, 2013, 6:
2 Ուժիրքիչ, 2013, 70, compare with Киракосян, 2010, 75.
political elite showed its complex over the Kars Treaty even in the regulation of technical problems between the two countries (the USSR and Turkey). One of the most obvious examples was connected with the treaty aimed at concluding the process of border delimitation initiated at the end of the 1960s. When the issue of border delimitation between the USSR and Turkey emerged in the 1960s rather than emphasizing the technical aspect of the matter, the Turkish side started to pursue its traditional goal, i.e. the announcement of the re-acknowledgement of the Kars Treaty, thus getting insurance on the absence of the Soviet claims to the border and the inviolability of it.

How is this issue topical nowadays? Even if Armenia manages to evade the recognition of the Kars Treaty while establishing interstate relations with Turkey, then in case of initiating border demarcation and delimitation between Armenia and Turkey the issue of mentioning and acknowledging the Kars Treaty is sure to rise either directly or indirectly, the latter being a known precondition for the Turkish side. Thus, we think it is essential to refer to the process of Soviet-Turkish border delimitation carried out in 1967–1973 as this is where the Kars complex, namely - the Turkish endeavors to re-acknowledge the Kars Treaty and the unchangeability of the existing borders is manifested. Nevertheless, the issue will be addressed in the context of honorable Armenian Colonel Gurgen Nalbandian’s activity, who being involved in re-delimitation of the border, acted in accordance with the state interests and national characteristics. It is also important to state that the first concise research on this issue was carried out by the historian Avag Harutyunian. In 1973, Avag Harutyunian published Colonel Gurgen Nalbandian’s secret missives addressed to the Soviet leadership with a lengthy introduction and references, in which the whole process of re-delimitation of the Soviet-Turkish border was thoroughly introduced.

The Border Re-delimitation between the USSR and Turkey in 1969–1973 and the Political Implication of the Technical Process

Thus, the border demarcation between the USSR and Turkey was carried out in 1924–1926 by the Soviet-Turkish “Mixed Committee” based on the Treaties of Moscow (1921) and Kars. In 1926 “Major Protocol” on the border demarcation was signed between the USSR and Turkey, where detailed, technical
descriptions\textsuperscript{5}, typical of such interstate documents, were included. In the subsequent decades of border demarcation certain changes related to the natural phenomena occurred on the Soviet-Turkish border, as the riverbeds of the Araks, Akhuryan, Karakhan-chay and Chorokh had changed and the necessity to undertake border re-delimitation arose. On February 28, 1967 the parties agreed to start border re-delimitation works and a corresponding protocol was signed. In 1969 the Soviet Turkish Joint Committee\textsuperscript{6} was formed. In addition to the Protocol of the border re-delimitation the Technical Protocol defined the membership\textsuperscript{7} of the delegation, consisting of 12 people – a chairman, a deputy chairman, 5 members, 3 expert-members, a secretary, a translator\textsuperscript{8}. Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia each represented one member in the delegation. Colonel Gurgen Nalbandyan was involved in the process, representing Soviet Armenia\textsuperscript{9}.

The Soviet-Turkish Joint Committee was to solve the issue of the re-delimitation of the state border of 616.5 km length based on the demarcation of 1926. That process was initiated in 1969 and completed in December, 1973. Afterwards a corresponding document was signed in Ankara. One of the principles of re-delimitation is the territorial proportion, i.e. exclusion of territorial losses for either parties. After the re-delimitation 760.5 hectares of the Turkish territory was passed to the USSR, while 787.7 hectares of the Soviet territory to Turkey\textsuperscript{10}. Hence, in accordance with the principle of equity, the Turkish side conceded 27.2 hectares of its territory to the Soviet side from another part of the border (which is thoroughly described\textsuperscript{11}). Moreover, the territory to be

\textsuperscript{5} Ŷůž, §. 326, g. 2, q. 165, p. 2;
\textsuperscript{6} Ŷůž, §. 1, g. 53, q. 83, p. 48;
\textsuperscript{7} Ŷůž, §. 326, g. 1, q. 480, p. 54;
\textsuperscript{8} Զարգարյան, 2009, II:
\textsuperscript{9} Gurgen Nalbandyan was born in the city of Great Gharakilisa (currently Vanadzor) in 1920. His father was a participant and martyr of the epic of the Gharakilisa battle. G. Nalbandyan had a military education, serving many years in the frontier troops of Soviet Armenia. After demobilizing in 1951, he worked in different state bodies, also being the honorary President of the Council of the veterans of frontier troops in the Republic of Armenia. He died in 1998 at the age of 96. During his long service he received numerous medals, Orders, awards. He was quite popular in the Turkish frontier structures and according to some evidence, Turks addressed to him with the honorific “Nalband pasha” (its literal translation from Turkish is General Nalband).
\textsuperscript{10} Ŷůž, §. 326, g. 2, q. 165, p. 7;
\textsuperscript{11} Ŷůž, §. 326, g. 2, q. 165, p. 7:
compensated was to have the same quality as the one handed over to the other party.

However, during the whole process Turkey’s main and perhaps sole goal, as already mentioned, was not the technical issue of the border re-delimitation but rather the historical-political implication. Historian Avag Harutyunian rightly mentioned that the Joint committee was originally entitled to only deal with technical issues and announcements with political implications, concerning the inviolability of the USSR-Turkish borders and re-acknowledgement of the 1921 Kars Treaty, was beyond its power. Nevertheless, judging by the steps and course of action of the Turkish delegation, it mainly prioritized that particular issue, trying to achieve the USSR’s re-recognition of the Kars Treaty and re-acknowledgement of the inviolability of the Soviet-Turkish border in all possible ways. The Soviet delegation was both unprepared and indifferent to such a manifestation of Turkish state policy and the collective fixed idea. Colonel Gurgen Nalbandian, the Armenian member of the delegation showing exceptional political insight and driven by the state interests of Armenia, clearly uncovered the Turkish aspirations and warned the Soviet delegation about them. In all possible ways he fought to disrupt the Turkish plan.

Being part of the delegation of the re-delimitation of the Soviet-Turkish state border as a representative of Soviet Armenia, Gurgen Nalbandian introduced a lengthy report to A. Kochinyan, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Armenia, N. Harutyunian, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Soviet Armenia G. Arzumanian, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, K. Udumyan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia after the Joint Committee’s works were finalized on December 31, 1973. In the report he comprehensively described the work that they had done, made observations on Turkey and its policy, making a special reference to Turkey’s oversensitive attitude to the inviolability of Soviet-Turkish border and the Kars Treaty of 1921. All along the activities of the Joint Committee Gurgen Nalbandian attentively observed the Turkish course of action and its ill-disguised state complex over the Kars treaty

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12 Հայրենիքի 2009, իր: 19–47: In the present paper the citations of the report are taken from Avag Harutyunian’s abovementioned article.

13 ՀԱՆ, թ. 1, էջ. 83, թ. 19–47: It should be noted that during the activities of the committee G. Nalbandian consistently sent reports to the leadership of Soviet Armenia where he described the characteristics of the
and the re-acknowledgement of it. Nevertheless, it was more obviously expressed in the conclusion of the work, in December, 1973 in Ankara when the border re-delimitation treaty between the USSR and Turkey was to be signed. The Turkish side suggested that along with the Treaty a Communiqué should be made. It is in the Communiqué that the emphases on the Kars Treaty and unchangeability of the Soviet Turkish border were included. Whereas, the Soviet side suggested that a standard text of announcement, devoid of any references to historical or political facts, be issued. It was the given question that led to a problem between the delegations, and it was at this point that Gurgen Nalbandian made unimaginable endeavors to disrupt the Turkish plan. However, the honorable Armenian officer was soon to remain alone in his fight as the Soviet delegation and the high-rank diplomats would easily give in, agreeing on the Turkish proposal.

The Diplomatic Manifestations of the “Kars Complex” and the Armenian Colonel

In December, 1973 when the work of the Joint Committee was finalized in the Turkish capital Ankara preparations were made for signing the treaty of the border delimitation by the USSR and Turkey as well as adopting a joint Communiqué. Before those activities were initiated at a joint session of the two delegations the Chairman of the Turkish delegation Mustafa Kenanoglu in his speech of greeting emphasized the importance of such a document “which would secure the unchangeability of the Turkish-Soviet state border”\(^\text{15}\). In his report G. Nalbandian interprets the Turkish official’s speech and its almost overt hints in the following way: “From Mustafa Kenanoglu’s speech it became obvious that within the activities of the session, the main goal of the Turkish delegation would be leaving covertly the Joint Committee’s technical jurisdiction and creating a new political document which would serve their interests. The document would define the Soviet-Turkish relations in general and more importantly would ensure “the
unchangeability of the Turkish-Soviet border”\textsuperscript{16}. Moreover, the Turkish side declared that the formulation on the inviolability of the borders was also the Turkish society’s expectation. This evidences not only the state mentality of Turkey but also the “Kars Complex” spread among the wide circles of the public.

Soon the Turkish side handed their draft of the joint announcement to the Soviet delegation, and, as G. Nalbandian mentions, “The Turkish draft naturally made me beware”\textsuperscript{17}. He immediately turned to the head of the Soviet delegation P. Yermoshin, introducing his approaches and the ill-disguised Turkish aspiration. The Soviet and Turkish delegations agreed that the drafts of the Communiqué presented by the two parties should be studied and adopted at the joint session on December 20. Up until then on December 19 a secret discussion was held by the Soviet delegation in P. Yermoshin’s hotel room “with the corresponding measures to avert Turkish interception”\textsuperscript{18}. At the meeting G. Nalbandian defended his stance, supporting the Soviet draft, which being absolutely consistent with the specifics and authority of the Soviet-Turkish Joint Committee was mainly of technical character. He suggested that any possible means should be used to omit the political emphases in the Turkish text on the formulations, concerning the Kars Treaty and the unchangeability of borders. The members of the Soviet delegation A. Bessonov and O. Guiguineishvili basically agreeing with some of G. Nalbandian’s concerns, claimed that the Joint Committee undertook technical work and the draft of the Turkish announcement, evidently being of political nature exceeded the Committee’s authority. Initially, in our opinion, influenced by Nalbandian’s substantiations the Soviet delegation decided to fight and omit the political accentuation from the text of the Turkish announcement, sticking to the text of the announcement originally accorded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, i.e. the Soviet draft. At the end of the delegation’s discussion Gurgen Nalbandian held secret talks with the head of the Soviet delegation Ambassador P. Yermoshin, the details of which were also presented in the report. Nalbandian made an attempt to introduce Turks’ goals to Yermoshin, given that the ambassador was very familiar with the Armenian Question. In Nalbandian’s words “Turks intend to grab a document which would suit their interest and

\textsuperscript{16} Գուրգեն Նալբանդյան 2009, IX:
\textsuperscript{17} Գուրգեն Նալբանդյան 2009, XI:
\textsuperscript{18} Գուրգեն Նալբանդյան 2009, XI:
reinforce the seizure of Armenian territories”¹⁹, commanding special attention to the phrase “the unchangeability of the Soviet-Turkish border”. It should also be stated that Gurgen Nalbandian’s viewpoints and arguments were sometimes pronouncedly abrupt. On the other hand supposedly the devoted Armenian, proposing the sharpest options to the Soviet delegation, tried to make the Soviet authorities be more attentive to the anti-Armenian proposals of the Turkish side. In response to G. Nalbandian’s concerns, Ambassador Yermoshin stated that he himself was well-aware of the implication of the Turkish aspirations, emphasizing that it would be complicated to leave out the proposition on the unchangeability of the borders from the Turkish project: “This would alarm the Turks, making an opposite impression”²⁰. In his conversation with the ambassador the honorable Armenian officer with straightforwardness informed that in case the text of the Turkish announcement was adopted he, being a member of the delegation, would not sign that document and attend any official event²¹. According to G. Nalbandian, the reason for such an approach was that he as a representative of Soviet Armenia, would in fact agree on the 1921 Kars Treaty’s violent seizure of the Armenian territories: “A diplomatic blunder with regard to that question will lead to a backlash among all Armenians worldwide”²².

From Nalbandian’s report it becomes obvious that the opinions voiced during the discussions of the Soviet delegation, despite the undertaken measures, were known to the Turkish side, its most probable explanation being the interception. At the next meeting when the drafts of the joint Communiqué were discussed again the Turkish side came up with certain new proposals, presenting them as if the concerns of the Soviet delegation were taken into account. However, in fact, Turks’ main goal - the re-acknowledgement of the Kars Treaty and unchangeability of the borders remained inviolable. Moreover, the head of the Turkish delegation, addressing his Soviet counterpart stated: “Mr. Ambassador, the documents on border delimitation are being signed in Ankara, thus, in accordance with the traditions of the international diplomacy and norms the Turkish bill should be accepted as the basis for the Communiqué”²³.

¹⁹ Հայաստան 2009, XI:
²⁰ Հայաստան 2009, XII:
²¹ Հայաստան 2009, XIII:
²² Հայաստան 2009, XIII:
²³ Հայաստան 2009, XIV:
After the new proposal of the Turks the Soviet delegation again held a secret discussion in the hotel room of the head of the delegation where Gurgen Nalbandian declared: “Turks’ first and the so-called second drafts are identical and do not correspond to the jurisdiction of the Soviet-Turkish committee. The proclamation of the drafts steps into the authority of governments, determining the principles of the Soviet-Turkish relations. Turks’ drafts cannot even be accepted as a basis. Proceeding with the idea, Nalbandian offered: “To accept the Soviet draft as basis, leave out the political proclamation from the Turkish drafts, especially the phrase on the unchangeability of the Soviet-Turkish borders. Inform the embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR about my proposal”\(^{24}\). We can claim that the Soviet delegation did lack a desire and motivation (which would vanish altogether later on) to fight against the issue but it was decided to introduce the Turkish draft to the Soviet embassy in Turkey and send to Moscow to receive a comment. In addition, Colonel Nalbandian’s proposal was also to be sent to Moscow. Nevertheless, the next day on December 21 it turned out that the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey V. Gryubakov not only declined to send Nalbandian’s proposal to Moscow, but also defined the announcement text of the Turkish drafts as valid, moreover calling it “grand”\(^{25}\). Concurrently, some members of the Soviet delegation, who had agreed on Nalbandian’s approaches (e.g. the Georgian representative O. Guiguineyshvili) in regard to the unacceptability of Turkish emphases, started to waver and stopped defending his proposal.

**From Nalbandian to Nalbandian, 1973–2009**

On December 21, at the meeting held by the Soviet delegation Yermoshin said: “Turks insist too much, they don’t make any concession, demanding that their draft be adopted as basis and include the paragraph about the “border security, territorial integrity and inviolability”\(^{26}\). Not giving in and trying to find a way out of that complicated situation, Nalbandian said that if Turks insisted that much, then the formulation\(^{27}\) on “border security and inviolability of legitimate, appurtenant territories” (italics by R.M.) should be included in the text. Moreover,
Nalbandian as a member of the delegation “decisively opposed” Ambassador Gryubakov’s suggestion, insisting that his special comment be sent to Moscow, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^28\). It can be surmised that by proposing to include the formulation “legitimate appurtenant territory” Nalbandian essentially made a diplomatic, even scientific hint to the fact that not all of the borders determined by the Kars Treaty were absolutely legitimate in their entirety.

Another parallel can be drawn here, which on one hand evidences the Turkish political style and on the other the Armenian experience to confront the latter. At decades’ interval this was manifested in 1973 and 2009 in almost the same situation. Thus, in response to Turkish claims, G. Nalbandian again tried to explain that accentuating the border inviolability was beyond the jurisdiction of the given delegation. As an alternative he suggested that rather than making a joint announcement for the press after signing the documents each side should make their own Communiqué\(^29\). In 2009 before signing Armenian-Turkish protocols a scandal broke, as the Turkish side having concealed the text of the Communiqué, in the end was forced to disclose it. Having reneged on the agreements and distorting the general logic of the negotiations and protocols, Turks tried to include the well-known Turkish preconditions related to Artsakh, Armenian Genocide and the Kars Treaty and voice them. In 2009 another Nalbandian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RA (Republic of Armenia) Eduard Nalbandian, adopting a principled and decisive stance averted the Turkish initiative and finally after signing the Armenian-Turkish protocols none of the parties made an announcement. Turkey’s strategy of voicing their fundamental formulations that were non-existent in the protocols failed. Years later Eduard Nalbandian referring to the issue, stated: “Even at the ceremony of document signing Turkey made an attempt to voice these preconditions (put forward even before the start of negotiations) as a “commentary” declaration. It was because of this that the signing ceremony was delayed for more than two hours. However, that attempt also failed thanks to the firm stance of the Armenian side supported by our international colleagues. As a result, the protocols were signed without any oral Communiqué by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs as the organizers of the ceremony had planned. Furthermore, the high-ranking international

\(^{28}\) Հայաստան 2009, XVI:

\(^{29}\) Հայաստան 2009, XV:
representatives present in Zurich both on the day of signing and later on stated that the protocols should be ratified and enacted without any preconditions.”

Touching upon the developments of 1973, we should single out Colonel Gurgen Nalbandian’s another display of an officer demeanor. Encountering Nalbandian’s principled stance on the unacceptability of Turkish demands, the head of the delegation wanted to find out whether Nalbandian had received a specific instruction from the leaders of Soviet Armenia, in response to which the Colonel intending to dispel the looming danger and allegations on nationalism from the Soviet leadership, claimed that his approaches rose from the power granted to the delegation and he hadn’t got any special instructions. “Firstly, the leadership of Soviet Armenia could not have predicted the committee’s transgression of its function defined in the Soviet-Turkish protocol of February 28, 1967 in order to give its representative a certain instruction. Secondly, and more importantly, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in Soviet Armenia, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have viewed the complex of the initiatives on the Soviet-Turkish state border delimitation only in the light of the Soviet interests and not in terms of narrow national concerns of the Republic. They placed utter trust and support in the Soviet delegation ...”

Nalbandian reiterated his claim that with such steps Turkey pursues just one goal “to get a new recognition of its violent seizure of Armenian territories.” However, unfortunately under obvious pressures and compulsion the Turkish side reached its goal and on December 29, 1973 the solemn ceremony of signing the documents on the re-delimitation of Soviet-Turkish border and the joint Communiqué took place at the Ministry of Turkish Foreign Affairs. Colonel Gurgen Nalbandian refused to take part in the ceremony with regard to which he wrote in the report: “At 8 o’clock, December 29 the representative of Soviet Armenia officially notified the leadership of the delegation that he wouldn’t be present at the ceremony and participate in signing the documents. This was done in protest to the illegal act of the Soviet-Turkish Joint Committee and most
The Re-Demarcation of the State Border between the USSR and Turkey...

importantly for making Turks and our diplomats understand that the issue on the Armenian territories is still on the agenda”

In the joint Communiqué, concerning the completion of the state border delimitation, due to Turks’ demand and persistent endeavors, the following wordings were included: “The re-delimitation of Soviet-Turkish border defined by the 1921 Treaties of Moscow and Kars and demarcated in 1926 ...”, “parties are convinced that the protocols being of historical significance and signed as a result of joint work, with the intention of preserving peace and security between the USSR and Turkey, record their unchangeable border...”. Two days later, after signing this document on December 31, in his report Colonel Nalbandian made a matter-of-fact and daring evaluation on the whole process, on the genuine nature of Turkish intentions and the significance of their further implications: “Thus, while solving a technical issue in 1967-1973, during the Joint Soviet-Turkish Committee’s activities on the state border delimitation (the crossing of which was demarcated in 1924-1926 and ratified with the main protocol in 1926) Turks due to our diplomats’ weakness, their incomprehensible pliancy grabbed another important, more imposing document according to which, the USSR re-acknowledges the seizure of Armenian territories by Turks. The murderer and the robber got another pardon. Nobody can interpret that document otherwise”. “Turks, the experienced gamblers of diplomatic games, never despise extra cards”.

The Transformation of the USSR-Turkey Border into Armenian-Turkish Border and Unsolved Technical Issues

After this last event of border re-delimitation between the USSR and Turkey the corresponding bodies of the two countries kept in touch to work on the supervision of borderlines and possible natural changes (e.g. change in riverbeds). So on December, 20, 1983 according to the inter-governmental “Protocol”, a joint supervising Soviet-Turkish committee was founded. The supervising committee, consisting of the representatives of the two countries held

34 Հայաստան
35 Հայաստան
36 Հայաստան
37 Հայաստան
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more than 10 joint sessions, discussing various matters on the border. The Soviet
co-chairman of the committee Yuri Sholmov wrote in his account that the
committee planned to finish works with the River Araks on the Armenian-Turkish
border by the middle of 1992. However, the Turkish side broke the arrangement,
and thus, the session at which the “final conclusive draft of the document” was to
be presented did not take place 40.

In 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Armenia’s Independence a
part of the Soviet-Turkish border also de-jure turned into Armenian-Turkish
border, and the legal, political and technical issues continued anew. Those issues
clashing with Armenian-Turkish inter-state problems acquired new characteristics.
It should be particularly noted that after the collapse of the USSR certain issues
(precision and partial re-delimitations) related to the newly emerged border
between Armenia and Turkey remained unsolved and ambiguous. First the
question on the assignee of the Soviet-Turkish committee rises. On July 17, 1992
the Permanent Representative of Armenia in Moscow F. Mamikonian sent a note
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RA Raffi Hovhannissian to which the copy 41
of the Soviet delegation’s written account of the committee sessions on state
borderline was attached. In the note it was stated that the above-mentioned
committee’s activities were in fact terminated, and Mamikonian suggested turning
to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Kozyrev, petitioning to continue the
activities of the committee.

In the committee’s account it was noted that a major part of the former
Soviet-Turkish border passes through mountainous rivers, and the riverbeds
annually undergo changes, leading to the volatility of the borderline. That account
has 2 noteworthy points: firstly the co-chairman of the supervising committee Yu.
Sholmov noted that in February, 1992 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia
appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, asking to
assist to finalize the activities of demarcating the borderline between Turkey and
Armenia. Moreover, Armenia suggested henceforth renaming the Soviet
delegation as Armenian-Russian delegation which would include a representative
from Armenia 42. The Russian Federation agreed to proceed with the activities of
the delegation and in March, 1992 addressed Turkey with regard to that issue,

40 ՀԼԱ, գ. 9, գ. 119, էջ 4:
41 ՀԼԱ, գ. 9, գ. 119, էջ 1:
42 ՀԼԱ, գ. 9, գ. 119, էջ 4:
nevertheless receiving no answer from them. In Sholmov’s opinion Turks’ silence, “was conditioned by the abrupt escalation of the situation in Transcaucasia in general”\textsuperscript{43}, i.e. due to the waging of the Artsakh war.

Certain noteworthy facts and documents, regarding the further phases of this issue have been preserved in the national archives of Armenia. Hence, on July 7, 1992 the co-chairman of the supervising committee Sholmov sent a note to the Deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs of Armenia Arman Navasardian with the schedule of the committee’s work for the second term of 1992. Accordingly, an objective was set to check the state borderline between Armenia along the River Araks. Noteworthy is the fact that the delegation was already referred to as “Armenian-Russian”\textsuperscript{44} and Sholmov asked the Armenian side to present their observations, additions and proposals. On July 22, 1992 with regard to that document the Deputy Minister Navasardian instructed “to respond that we agree”\textsuperscript{45}. According to the work schedule, meetings were planned between the sides, the monthly timeline of the meetings was outlined, and even the meeting locations were established. Moreover, in November, 1992 there was to be “the signing of a conclusive document”\textsuperscript{46}. However, this process didn’t continue.

Having read the documents, I talked to late Arman Navasardian who recalled that there was such correspondence with Russians; however, he noted that the process was halted presumably due to the absence of the Turks’ response.

\textbf{The Manifestations of “Kars Complex” in Turkey Nowadays}

Dwelling on today’s actualities and the current state of affairs, it should be noted that no change can be observed in the attitude of Turks towards the “Kars complex”; not only does it remain in the mindset of the wide political and public circles in Turkey, but it has even been exacerbated. Within the past 30 years of the Armenian-Turkish relations, one of the well-known preconditions of Turkey has been and still is the recognition of the Kars Treaty, very often formulated as “the recognition of Turkey’s territorial integrity”, “assurance of not making any territorial claims to Turkey”, etc. Up until now Armenia has never acknowledged the Treaty of Kars on the state level, although having declared that it doesn’t make

\textsuperscript{43} <ULU, ř. 326, g. 9, q. 119, p. 4:
\textsuperscript{44} <ULU, ř. 326, g. 9, q. 119, p. 5:
\textsuperscript{45} <ULU, ř. 326, g. 9, q. 119, p. 5:
\textsuperscript{46} <ULU, ř. 326, g. 9, q. 119, p. 6:
any territorial claims to Turkey. Nevertheless, the issue under discussion is deeper and more multi-faceted. It is essential that Armenia officially, in black and white recognize the Kars Treaty in order for the Turks to be able to cope with the “Kars complex”.

In this respect noteworthy data of the 1990s were preserved in the official, declassified American documents. Namely, on January 18, 1990 a meeting was held between the US President George Bush Sr. and the Turkish President Turgut Ozal, in which the US State Secretary James Baker and other American officials took part while the Turkish ambassador in the US Nuzhet Kandemir represented Turkey. At the meeting Ozal raised the question of the bill on the Armenian Genocide that Senator Dole had put forward, naturally opposing it. During the same talks, Turkish ambassador Kandemir declared: “They (Armenians) will use the bill for terrorism and justification of territorial claims. They will use the Armenian bill that the 1921 border is not legitimate (italics R.M.)”47. While on February 12, 1992 in a report sent by the US Embassy in Turkey to the State Secretary Baker, a conversation with Candan Azer, (“the deputy of the chief” of Caucasian issues at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was recounted with regard to the Armenian-Turkish interactions and steps to normalize the relations. According to Azer, at the Armenian-Turkish meetings the territorial claims and the Armenian Genocide were discussed. In the American report it was mentioned: “The Turks discussed the reference to Western Armenia in the Proclamation of Armenia’s Independence, stating that they would demand an unambiguous claim-declaration on territorial issues, probably based on the 1921 Treaties of Moscow and Kars”48 (italics R.M).

It should be affirmed that “the Kars Treaty” formulation was not included in the Armenian-Turkish Protocols of Zurich, 2009, because of which the ruling party, Justice and Development, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu in particular were severely criticized by not only the opposition but also by the scientific-analytical circles. Nowadays we can still encounter explicit, large-scale or implicit manifestations of “the Kars complex” in the Turkish political circles. Let us introduce the “freshest” example: after Russia's initiation of special military action in Ukraine, in February, 2022 the issue of territorial claims by

47 Մելկոնյան 2022, 110:
48 Մելկոնյան 2022, 198:
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Russia (implicitly by Armenia) and such a perception became a hot topic again in Turkey. The head of the opposing parliamentary nationalistic party Lav, the MP Meral Aksener stated: “Who can be sure that Kars, Erzurum, Ardahan are not seen as constituents of Putin’s envisaged Russia”⁴⁹. The chairman of another nationalistic party, Great Union, Mustafa Destici, again preoccupied with actions carried out in Ukraine, noted that if Russia wasn’t stopped now then the Turkic republics were likely to become its targets in future, adding: “As if it weren’t enough Putin cites Lenin. And if they (Russians) reach our borders of Kars and Ardahan, nobody should get surprised”⁵⁰.

Summing up, we should affirm that the “Kars complex” and one of its most vivid manifestations consist in forcing Armenia to recognize the Kars Treaty as one of Turkey’s preconditions and still being its priority. Moreover, if Turkey fails to reach its goal during the ongoing Armenian-Turkish negotiations, in case of establishing relations between Armenia and Turkey in all likelihood the necessity of border re-demarcation will rise, then referring to the previous phases, i.e. the first Soviet-Turkish border delimitation in the 1920s (based on the Kars Treaty), Armenia will be presented with the recognition of the covert version of the Kars Treaty, the implications of which will be the same. The given issue has the potential of turning from hypothetical into factual. Hence, the Republic of Armenia should be prepared in technical, political and legal respects.

Conclusions

Thus, having studied the process of inter-state border re-delimitation between the USSR and Turkey we have drawn the following conclusions

1. The 1921 Treaties of Moscow and Kars and their further implications led to a sense of insecurity in the wide political, public circles of Turkey. This can be conventionally identified as “The Kars complex”.

2. Ensuring national affirmation of the inviolability of Turkey’s borders and the validity of the Kars Treaty on any occasion has been seen as a priority for the Turkish political machine namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. Nowadays the forenamed complex and the issue of priority, less intensely but are still an underlying idea in the Turkish state mindset, or at least their vitality is symbolically kept.

⁴⁹ Aksener 2022.
⁵⁰ Destici 2022.
4. Different officials of Soviet era, taking into account the historical experience and having been well-aware of the Turkish political modus operandi, attempted to avert the steps that could overshadow the historical facts and actualities and would create problems in the future.


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«КАРССКИЙ КОМПЛЕКС» В ТУРЦИИ И РЕДЕМАРКАЦИЯ
СОВЕТСКО-ТУРЕЦКОЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ГРАНИЦЫ В
1973 ГОДУ

МЕЛКОНЯН Р.

Резюме

Ключевые слова: СССР, Турция, Карский договор, Московский договор, делимитация, демаркация, армяно-турецкие отношения.

В международной практике делимитация и демаркация границ между двумя соседними государствами является нормальным и, по существу, обязательным процессом. Зафиксированные и взаимно признанные границы, являющиеся результатом политических договоренностей (переговоры, договоры) и военных действий (исход войн), в дальнейшем приобретают также технический характер, при котором иногда сохраняется и историко-политическая составляющая. Отмеченное полностью характерно для бывшей советско-турецкой границы, некоторая часть которой сегодня является границей между Арменией и Турцией. Как известно, граница между СССР и Турцией была определена уязвимыми, с правовой точки зрения, Московским и Карским договорами (1921), которые до сих пор в некотором смысле не приемлемы для широкого круга армянских научных, политических и общественных деятелей.

Карский договор был одной из самых животрепещущих тем для политических и общественных кругов Турции и остается таковым по сей день. Более того, проблема советско-турецких границ, установленных на основе Карского договора, и возможность их изменения в любой момент создали в Турции ситуацию, которая, на наш взгляд, может быть названа «карским комплексом», тесно связанным с процессами демаркации и в дальнейшем редемаркации армяно-турецкой границы.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE IN DIARBEKIR (TIGRANAKERT) PROVINCE

Key words: Western Armenia, Diarbekir, Tigranakert, the Armenian Genocide, Islamization, deportation, Mardin.

Introduction

Diarbekir (Tigranakert) province (vilayet) was one of the six provinces of Western Armenia. After final demarcation of provinces in the 1870–1880s Diarbekir province itself was divided into three sanjaks: Diarbekir, Arghana-Maden and Mardin. In his accounts T. Mkrtchian, the English vice-consul in Diarbekir mentioned that the Armenian population of Tigranakert was counted about 150.000. However, according to the data of Constantinople patriarchate, as of 1912 in the territory of Diarbekir province, except for the southern part, the Armenian population counted 105.000. According to the 1913–1914 lists there were 106.867 Armenians living in the area. It can be assumed that on the eve of the Armenian Genocide approximately 130.000 Armenians lived in Diarbekir province. Moreover, there were other Christians living especially in Mardin sanjak as well.

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1 Armenia National Ethnographic Museum, 03.06.22, Armenia National Ethnographic Museum 03.06.22, Armenia National Ethnographic Museum 01.12.22.
2 Մեծ Հայքի 1919, 87.
3 Տիգրանակերտ 1914, 808–809.
5 On more details see Պաբրույան 1920, 91–119. See also Bablumyan 2021, 43–62.
6 According to the 1912 statistics of the Armenian patriarchate, apart from Armenians, 60.000 Nestorians, Jacobites, Chalcedonians, also 4000 Yazidis, 82.000 settled or nomadic Kurds and Qizilbash and 45.000 Turks lived in the territory of the province. However, according to the statistics of the Ottoman government as of 1914 the number of Muslim population was estimated 492.101. See Karpat 1985, 188.