

ADANA AND BEYOND: REVOLUTION AND MASSACRE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE SEEN THROUGH DANISH EYES, 1908/9

MATTHIAS BJØRNLUND
matthiasb@webspeed.dk

INTRODUCTION

5 February 1909, American missionary Dr. H. N. Barnum, of the *American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (ABCFM) *Euphrates College* in Harput (Kharpert), wrote a letter to Baroness Sigrid Kurck, member of the *Armenia Committee* of the Danish organization *Women Missionary Workers* (*Kvindelige Missions Arbejdere*; KMA).¹ The subject of the letter was partly to praise Danish KMA nurse Maria Jacobsen in her capacity as a member of the ABCFM staff, and partly to express hope for the situation in the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk (*Committee of Union and Progress*; CUP) revolution of 1908: "Of course, we all rejoice in the new regime. There are many difficulties in the way to the full realization of the new liberties which have been granted, but I hope that these will be overcome gradually. The prejudices of centuries, along with the want of preparation among the people for self-government, will require much time and patient effort, but the beginning is most hopeful."²

Many of Barnum's contemporaries, including many of his colleagues, made similar expressions of hope and rejoicing. During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, Protestant missionaries in particular had been viewed as subversive elements, but now they could suddenly experience being called 'pioneers of progress' by Young Turks, as well as being invited as speakers at meetings in Young Turk clubs in places like Harput,³ a town where people, Armenians and Turks, Christians and Muslims, were singing in the streets when the Sultan was overthrown in 1908, as recalled by Armenian genocide survivor Sarkis Khachatrian.⁴

But one series of event in particular would shake the faith in the Young Turk project of many among groups ranging from missionaries and relief workers to Ottoman Armenians. That was the 1909 Adana massacres or pogroms, also known as the 'Cilician Vespers' (an allusion to the 'Sicilian Vespers,' the massacre of thousands of French in 1282),⁵ the 'Adana holocaust,'⁶ or simply, as some who witnessed or survived the blunt and numbing trauma of murder and plunder would call it: 'When the

buffalo went mad.⁷ It was a shocking series of events marked by the utmost brutality that ensured they were widely noticed, commented on, and analyzed around the world, including in Denmark.⁸

Although, for instance, cooperation between the Armenian *Dashnak* (*Tashnag*) Party (*Armenian Revolutionary Federation*; ARF) and the CUP continued,⁹ the two waves of massacres in and around Adana, Cilicia, in April 1909 came to signify a notable and ominous development after the 1908 Young Turk revolution that had restored the liberal 1876 Constitution and promised justice, fraternity, and equality, and had seemed to many to herald a new age of brotherhood and peaceful coexistence. Some 20-30,000 Armenians,¹⁰ mainly adult males, together with two US missionaries, were slaughtered or burned to death by mobs of Turks and Kurds with the participation of the local authorities and the army, massacres that were initiated but not completed during the brief spell between the 'reactionary' counter-coup of 13 April to 24 April when the Young Turks took back power.¹¹

It still does not seem clear if, or to what extent, (parts of) the CUP leadership were (co-) responsible for the massacres.¹² Local Muslim-Christian tensions and antagonism, economic motives (i.e., the looting of Armenian property), as well as an 'Armenian rebellion,' have at times been blamed.¹³ But many, if not most contemporary observers and present-day scholars tend to underline that the main culprits were Sultan Abdülhamid and/or elements among the 'counter-revolutionaries.'¹⁴ They organized the 1909 massacres as a means to, among other things, provoke outside intervention and discredit or humiliate the CUP in the eyes of the general population and the Western world by killing Armenians who were widely seen as representing the ideas behind and benefitting from the 1908 revolution.¹⁵ Also, the aim was to "diminish the number of,"¹⁶ "teach a lesson to,"¹⁷ or simply crush the Christian Armenians who were viewed by many Islamists and conservatives ('Old Turks') as well as by Turkish nationalists as a particularly assertive, prosperous, or subversive group.¹⁸ A British February 1909 report actually describes how such an Islamist reaction to liberalism and religious equality had been taking shape since the autumn of the previous year, resulting in disturbances and widespread rumors of impending massacres.¹⁹

But despite the fact that many saw Armenians as a group as supporters or even symbols of the liberal constitution that was re-introduced by the Young Turks in 1908, there is also strong evidence that at least partly implicates local, perhaps also national, CUP members, cadres, and police and regular armed forces loyal to the CUP.²⁰ This seems especially to have been the case during the second round of massacres. In the words of British historian Christopher Walker.

During the period of the killings of 13-16 April the Young Turks had been ousted from power in Constantinople, and the reactionary regime had been reinstated. But on 24 April, as a result of the march on the capital by the 'Action Army' headed by Mahmud Shevket, the parties loyal to the constitution again seized power, and compelled sultan Abdul Hamid (whom they suspected of complicity in the counter-revolution) to go into exile in Salonika. One of the first actions of Mahmud Shevket was to order two regiments of Rumeliot troops – crack Young Turk soldiers – from Beirut and Damascus to Adana. But shortly after their arrival, at dusk on 25 April, further bloodshed and fire began in the city, perpetrated in a more thorough and brutal manner than before. A Turkish version held that the initial firing of the second outbreak came from the Armenian quarter on the troops' encampment. But on inspection this was found to be physically impossible. An alternative explanation for the outbreak was that some Turks dressed up as Armenian revolutionaries, and, declaring that a revolution had begun, opened fire. What followed was that the Rumeliot troops opened fire on the Armenian quarter, and, in the words of H. Charles Woods (who visited Adana soon after these events), 'for a time at any rate took part in the looting of houses and the killing of innocents'.²¹

Interestingly, newly published German diplomatic reports, containing a wealth of important, detailed information on central aspects of the countercoup and the Adana massacres, strongly support the assertion that troops deployed by the CUP were crucial perpetrators, even instigators, of the wave of massacres that took place 24-27 April.²²

NEWSPAPER COVERAGE IN DENMARK

In Denmark, newspapers and periodicals covered the 1908/9 events quite closely. Humorous papers would print caricatures of the sultan, an ever popular object of ridicule and contempt, especially since the 1890s massacres of 100,000 Armenians or more. One of the caricatures, from 1909, depicts the now deposed despot as a tired, beaten man, thrown out of his palace, with skulls at his feet, surrounded by his harem and leaning against a portrait of the German *Kaiser* Wilhelm II, his old ally.²³ Generally, most welcomed the 1908 revolution and the defeat of the counter-revolution, with the exception of, for instance, the more cynical among conservative observer who saw in the CUP but another example of the triumph of idealistic, but incompetent and dangerous, liberal nationalist theoreticians.²⁴

Often, the revolution, counter-revolution, ensuing massacres, and their aftermath made it to the front page of the daily newspapers, with a predominance of sometimes conflicting or confusing news agency

telegrams during or immediately after the April massacres, supplemented with more in depth analyses, reports, and eyewitness accounts over the following months.²⁵ While there would eventually be little if any doubt expressed in the Danish press about the scope and severity of the Adana massacres, and little doubt that Armenians were the sole or main victims²⁶ and Turks/Kurds/Muslims the perpetrators, interpretations of other fundamental aspects of the events could vary widely, quite often in accordance with the paper's fundamental values or political affiliations. The following brief analysis of the coverage by two very diverse, but (to various degrees) ideologically committed dailies will serve to illustrate that point.

As was the case during the 1890s Hamidian massacres as well as the Armenian genocide, *Kristeligt Dagblad* (*Christian Daily*) tended to emphasize religious aspects of the persecution and destruction of Armenians – a tendency that was of course to some extent related to the paper's explicit and predominant Christian values.²⁷ But this did not exclude nuanced analyses, or, for instance, the publication of eyewitness accounts by neutral observers who might emphasize other aspects. 11 June 1909, a lengthy article based on an account by German *Berliner Tageblatt*'s special correspondent described in grueling detail the slaughter of Armenians in Adana, with an emphasis on mob rule, desperate resistance, and troops deployed by the CUP as co-perpetrators,²⁸ while this 27 August 1909 article with new information on the scope and background of the massacres made it to the front page, describing a well-planned political assassination on a big scale:

The number of dead seems to be much larger than what was originally believed. According to the exact calculation 1.000 Mohammedans and 21.000 Armenians have been killed, including 5.000 in Adana and the rest in the surrounding region where many villages and farms have been destroyed. Although the bloodbath has not been as encompassing as in 1895, it is, however, horrible enough to create outrage in every compassionate heart. This is because one must not be deceived by the allegations that are raised against the Armenians after each such bloodbath, namely that they have brought their misery upon themselves. This time they were accused of having rejoiced too noisily over the introduction of constitutionalism, something that should have awoken the anger of the Turks. But were not people rejoicing over the Constitution everywhere in the Turkish Empire? One should simply recall how the Jews in Jerusalem celebrated the introduction of the new form of government. [...] To this it can be added that what happened in

Adana was not a sudden outburst of passion among the people. The massacres were meticulously prepared; several weeks in advance the Kurds, posing as 'harvesters,' had travelled to the Armenian towns, and with the help of coded telegrams from Yildiz [Yildiz Kiosk, the Sultan's palace in Constantinople, MB] the day of the bloodbath had been decided, that which had not only been planned for the Armenians but also for the Young Turks leaders, and which they only avoided by happy coincidence. It was political assassination on a big scale, this the final great bloody accomplishment of the old regime, in every sense a parallel to the 1895 bloodbath.²⁹

The socialist daily *Social-Demokraten* (*The Social Democrat*) had been generally positive toward the 1908 CUP revolution like most other Danish papers at the time, including *Kristeligt Dagblad*.³⁰ In the case of *Social-Demokraten*, the paper's support for the Young Turks was sometimes merely lukewarm, not just because of, for instance, what was explicitly seen as the excessive brutality the CUP used to suppress opposition in the wake of the counter-coup – like when a 4 May 1909 article described public mass executions that were part of the "horribly barbaric methods with which the Young Turks continue their cleansing operation among the reactionaries." The article concluded with the cautionary note that "[t]his spectacle reeks of the darkest Middle Ages in the middle of the Young Turk regime's preparations for the march of Western European culture into Turkey."³¹

Social-Demokraten was far from being alone in detecting such early signs of a reversal to the brutal era of Abdülhamid or worse.³² But what was indeed more pronounced in the paper's coverage of the 1908/9 events was a basic criticism of the CUP that was based on particular socialist analyses. Such analyses led the paper to view the Young Turks as (relatively) 'progressive,' but, after all, not 'true' but only 'bourgeois' revolutionaries who roughly belonged to the same category as the instigators of the 1789 French Revolution.³³

The socialist worldview of *Social-Demokraten* also thoroughly influenced the paper's explicit and fundamental anti-clericalism in the tradition of much of the contemporary left-wing press. This was clearly expressed 16 April 1909, in a front page attack on the counter-revolutionaries who had declared full implementation of Muslim *Sharia* (*Şeriat*) law one of their main goals³⁴: "In good harmony with the actions of the clergy all over the world and of all religions, the Mohammedan priesthood has enthusiastically given assistance of the lowest kind to the forces of reaction." According to the paper,

besides from the Muslim clergy the 'forces of reaction' consisted mainly of "the darkest elements of the Sultanate and of capitalism," crucially aided by what seems to be regarded here as sort of an Ottoman equivalent to the Marxist human category *lumpenproletariat* ('raggedy' or 'rabble' proletariat), the allegedly ignorant, marginalized, often criminal bottom of society that has no class consciousness and can thus be easily manipulated and used as a power base by those very 'forces of reaction.'³⁵

Even the variant of Armenophobia expressed on the front page of *Social-Demokraten*, 30 April 1909, seems to have been an early example of a racist negative stereotype-made-'scientific' that was at least partly influenced by a certain branch of Marxist thinking – the widespread variant of the *comprador* or 'middleman' thesis which tends to brand groups like Jews, Greeks, and Armenians as unscrupulous, provocative, parasitic, bourgeois categories of people who allegedly act as agents of international capitalism and imperialism, thus preventing (a certain 'progressive') economic development from taking place in, for instance, the Ottoman Empire.³⁶ In a background article on *Turkey, the Motley Empire*, Armenians and other Ottoman Christian 'races' were once again designated as cold, calculating, dishonest business-minded people, this time with the twist that they belonged to an economic class who exploited what was described as the "honest" and "easygoing" Turks. But Armenophobia did not keep *Social-Demokraten* from publishing reports and cables describing in no uncertain terms the fate of Armenians, like the following on *Horrible Massacres in Asia Minor*, from the same 30 April 1909 edition:

Mersina, 29 April. On Saturday, 2 Turkish regiments were disembarked. The soldiers immediately marched to Adana. During the night between Sunday and Monday they have instigated a horrible bloodbath of the local Armenians and set their houses on fire – 1,000 Armenians have been burned alive, and the fleeing Armenians were shot down by the soldiers. In the Adana province it has been estimated that 30,000 people have been killed. The material losses are enormous.

MASSACRES AVERTED

Besides from the massacres that did take place in the Adana region, a number of Danish and other eyewitnesses asserted that these massacres were to be part of a far more widespread scheme concocted by 'counter-revolutionaries.' Apparently, atrocities were carried out, prepared, averted through self-defense, prevented, anticipated, or feared from Konia and Cesarea (Kayseri) to Kessab, Urfa, Alexandretta (Alexandrette; Iskenderun), and beyond.³⁷ A main leader of the troops loyal to the CUP,

General Mahmud Shevket Pasha (Mahmut Shevket/Cevket Pasa), even asserted that Christians in Constantinople (Istanbul) were about to be attacked by the 'reactionaries' as – or, according to some sources, if – his CUP troops were marching into the capital.³⁸ Some of the rumors of massacres were probably just that: rumors. But others seem clearly to be much more substantial. According to Danish KMA missionary Jenny Jensen, a massacre of Armenians and missionaries of Mezreh (Elazig) and Harput was planned to take place 26 April 1909. Jensen believed this to have been part, not of Young Turk central or local policy, but of Abdülhamid's short-lived counter-revolution. Jensen and other Western eyewitnesses contended that the otherwise conservative *vali* of the *vilayet* of Mamouret-ul-Aziz hesitated in carrying out the orders from Constantinople until later that same day, when the orders were retracted after news of the final deposition of the Sultan reached the *vali* by telegram.³⁹ Perhaps the reason for the *vali*'s hesitation was, to paraphrase Sir Edwin Pears, that he was one of the 'reactionaries' who chose not to carry out his orders before he had seen which side in Constantinople would win.⁴⁰

Jenny Jensen's version of the events in Harput and Mezreh is largely supported by the British archeologist (and Armenophobe) Gertrude Bell, who was staying in those towns at the time, and in US missionary Grace Knapp's collection of accounts, *The Tragedy of Bitlis*.⁴¹ Furthermore, in a 6 May 1909 handwritten letter, Wilhelmine Grünhagen, leader of *Emaus*, the Danish orphanage for Armenian children in Mezreh, described in detail to Elise Blædel of Danish KMA's *Armenia Committee* how she experienced the events:

It has been troubled here for a long while and it has seemed as if it was becoming more and more serious for each day. The second to last Monday, then, Baron [Mr.] Ruben came up to me, pale as a corpse, and said, "Mama, I have to tell you something that will make you very sad. Today is as bad as it has ever been. The shops are closed, and there is a [one illegible word] at the town square, and this afternoon the massacres might start. It is necessary that you send a message to the consul asking him to send us protection." I was of course aware of the seriousness of the situation, but at the same time I was surprisingly calm. I promised B. Ruben to send a message to Mr. [one illegible word, six letters, starts with an S], who had taken over management [of the local German mission] while Brother [Johannes] Ehmann had left with Mr. [Friedrich] Schuchardt. Brother [?] acted in a very wrong way, though. But I tell this only to the Committee, and I do not want them to tell it to

others. He laughed at it all and said that there was no [four illegible words] than normal. The Armenians, they were always scared, and now we too were going at it, we could be absolutely calm because he had been seeing the consul and he had promised to send a message immediately if something should happen.

Sister Anna [Jensen, Danish-German DH missionary] told me this when she came home from Mr. [?], I had indeed asked her to go to Mr. [?], I insisted that there had to be a danger, and I was very cross at Brother [?] that he could take it so lightly. The little ones we kept home from school, and they cried, of course, and were scared although they did not understand much of it all. The big children went to school in a serious mood; I think they were slightly comforted knowing (because they think that the Turks do not dare break into the orphanages) that they were more secure than others. B. Ruben could not understand the answer sent by Brother [?], but said, "Do you have a big German flag we can raise?" I did not, I did not feel like making one either, I would much rather make a big Danish one that signified that we were protected by the Cross. But, you know, we cannot always get what we want, and I quickly made a big German flag, luckily we had both red and white and black clothes in the house; shortly after it was finished I got a message that I should definitely not raise it.

The afternoon was spent with quietly expecting something to happen today. Then between 4 and 5 a telegram arrived, "the Sultan has been toppled." How great a God we have; in the nick of time, when it really looked like the bloodbath was about to begin, God, our Father, removed the man who, before the hour of God had arrived, would start a war that would be as awful as anything. Imagine, his single last wish was to send a telegram to all his Valis ordering them to start massacring all Christians, all missionaries, they were supposed to go first, no one was to be spared, houses and everything were to be destroyed, it did not matter what nation the missionaries belonged to. Here, a lot of Kurds were gathered, they had been distributed to all the small towns so that they were immediately ready when the Vali gave the order. I think you can understand that we are full of thanks and praise. Would you believe it, our Vali had the order, but he held it back, we do not think it is purely out of concern for our well-being, but rather out of intelligence. Because what would have happened when it was learned that missionaries from

England, America, and Germany had been killed without mercy. [...]

It was quite strange that the very day we had expected a massacre we ended up seeing flags raised to honor the new King [sic], men rode around the towns and shouted it out, "the Sultan has been deposed, we have a new one." The next day there was to be a party everywhere; the houses were decorated and illuminated in the evening. We had 6 Turkish flags made and bought colored lamps, and in the evening we strolled around with more than 30 children to look at all the decorations. How all things can suddenly change. Only few Turkish houses were decorated, many Turks want the old Sultan back; it is far from calm here though the immediate danger has passed. Imagine it was not until early Friday we learned how great a danger we had been in. When Brother [?] had been with the consul on Monday, the consul had said that he expected news of the outbreak of massacres any minute, and he knew that the missionaries would be the first to go, he invited Brother [?] with his family to stay with him, but he could not accept this as leader of the station. In order not to scare us he laughed at us and pretended nothing was wrong. I think he has treated us like little children, but I will not say more about this. God protected us all so lovingly, if only we could learn what our dear Father wants to teach all His children, to trust Him completely [...].⁴²

In Malatia, about 100 km southwest of Mezreh, it appears that a massacre of the city's 20.000 Armenians had also been planned. According to German missionaries from Ernst Jakob Christoffel's *Christlichen Blindenmission im Orient* (*Christian Blind Mission*), Armenians and missionaries were warned previous to the planned attacks of the government-controlled Kurdish militias that they were put on death lists by the authorities, a plot that was seemingly only averted by the actions of a local CUP officer.⁴³ Danish KMA missionary Jensine Ørtz (Jensine Oerts Peters), who worked alongside Christoffel in Malatia, adds that when the Kurdish militias entered the city they gathered, as was customary, at the market place to await orders. But since whom Ørtz calls the "resident governor," probably the local *kaimakam*, had died the night before, no orders came, and the CUP officer took command and ordered that no Christians were to be harmed. However, according to Ørtz, the officer was not rewarded for his deeds by the CUP when they regained control; rather, he was imprisoned until local Armenians and Germans managed to have him released and sent away for safety.⁴⁴ Seen in connection with the fact

that most of the many known killers of Armenians in Adana remained unpunished, this treatment of a protector of Armenians was regarded as a sign of how little value even the new, purportedly democratic and tolerant CUP government ascribed to an apparently still despised minority.

In Syria, Danish *Eastern Mission* (*Østerlandsmissionen*; ØM) doctor Rudolf Christian Fox Maule, descendent of a Scandinavian branch of an old French-Scottish noble family, experienced an equally tense atmosphere during those same April days.⁴⁵ According to the Danish doctor, massacres of Christians in Damascus and elsewhere had been planned by 'Old Turks' as part of a nationwide scheme of which the Adana massacres were only a part, and had the Young Turks been held up for 3-4 more days before re-taking power in Constantinople, "we would have witnessed one of the most horrifying spectacles in the history of the world":

In Damascus, the signal for the massacre was the same as in 1860, i.e. that all convicts should break out of the prisons and start murdering Christians. A number of officers and soldiers who sided with the Young Turks had learned about the plans and were posted with loaded rifles near the prisons in order to shoot down any and all prisoner who would try to break out. [...] Even here in our otherwise peaceful country district, far away from the big cities, people were ready to slaughter 'the infidels.' The Mohammedans of the mountain villages were one night ready to attack one of our stations, Jabned [Jabrud; Yabrud], a town of 7-8,000 inhabitants, Mohammedans and Christians, and another night had been set for massacres here in Deratije [Dayr' Atiyah; Dair Atiah]. Afterward, we have learned everything through the Mohammedans who are friendly toward Christians, and the Kaimakan himself, i.e. the mayor, of the town Nebk [An-Nabk; Kalamun], which lies about one hour's horseback ride from here, has admitted to us that there would have been great danger all over the country for serious disturbances to take place had not the Young Turks been victorious.⁴⁶

These events in one of the Arab regions of the Empire are arguably an under-researched topic. It has been asserted in a recent publication that, besides from the Adana massacres, simultaneous "[o]utbreaks of violence against Christians also broke out in Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, and Beirut as Bedouins, Arabs, and Kurds took up arms against their religious foes."⁴⁷ Also, contemporary German diplomatic reports describe how Christians would close shops in anticipation of massacre in the Aleppo region,⁴⁸ and, more substantially: German vice-consul at Jaffa, Rössler, reported 26 April 1909 to *Reichskanzler* (Imperial Chancellor, i.e.

head of government) Bernhard von Bülow in Berlin that he had learned from a reliable source that three emissaries from what he dubs the reactionary government in Constantinople had arrived in Beirut in order to incite the Muslim population there as well as in Damascus, Hauran, and Kerak (along the Mecca railroad in the south) against the CUP and the Christian ideas they allegedly represented.⁴⁹ Regarding Damascus, the local US consular agent, Meshaka, reported that shortly after the counter-coup in the capital some thousands of armed members of the *Mohammedan Union* gathered at a square in Damascus with the intention of, among other things, killing members of the CUP: "A threat of military action by the commandant induced them to disperse, but there was nonetheless a panic among the Christians 'for the Moslems in their war songs mentioned that the Moslem religion was one of the sword and that being once again victorious, the Christian religion must give way.'"⁵⁰

This still leaves doubt whether the outbreaks of violence and general unrest that did in fact take place in the Arab regions were, in essence, largely spontaneous, uncoordinated acts motivated by religious chauvinism, devotion to the sultan, hatred of the CUP, and spurred on by the counter-coup. Furthermore, these acts could have been motivated by local grievances; by news or rumors about rebellions or already ongoing massacres of Christians elsewhere; and/or by what was widely viewed by many Ottoman Muslims all over the Empire as an increasing and provocative assertiveness displayed by non-Muslim groups in the wake of the 1908 CUP takeover. As British vice-consul H. E. Wilkie Young reported January 1909 from Mosul in Mesopotamia, a city and a region not quite under the control of the CUP-dominated central authorities in Constantinople, local Christians and Jews were only tolerated "as long as they kept their place": "Any sign of pretension to equality is promptly repressed."⁵¹

But if the abovementioned unrest and the averted massacres of Christians in Syria were indeed, as it is claimed in Fox Maule's report and elsewhere, planned, ordered by, or coordinated with central and/or local authorities loyal to the Sultan during the short reign of the counter-revolutionaries, similar to what had been planned and/or executed in Cilicia and Anatolia, this would add yet another dimension to the prospective scope of massacres of Armenians and other Christians in April 1909 besides from what observers like Wilhelmine Grünhagen reported from regions such as Mamouret-ul-Aziz. Rössler's report, as well as the assertion by German ambassador Von Bieberstien that massacres of Armenians had been "prepared and ordered" from Mersin over Alexandretta to Beirut,⁵² seems to support that such an interpretation is

worthy of consideration and further research. In any case, there was arguably widespread support in the Arab regions among both officials and general populations for the counter-revolution and its stated goal of Muslim supremacy,⁵³ support which (considering the nature of the counter-coup and the legacy of local, inter-communal violence as well as of nation-wide state-sponsored massacres many places in the Empire, including in Beirut and beyond) could easily lead to either a large-scale coordinated action against non-Muslim groups; 'spill over' into more or less simultaneous yet spontaneous outbreaks of violence spurred on by local grievances and ethno-religious chauvinism at a time of upheaval; or a combination of both.⁵⁴

HOPE AND DISILLUSION: THE AFTERMATH OF MASSACRE

The effects of the Adana massacres – more refugees, orphans, poverty – were felt by *Danish Friends of Armenians* (*Danske Armeniervenner*, DA) and *Deutsche Orient Mission* (*German Mission to the Orient*) relief worker Karen Jeppe in Urfa, and by the Danish KMA missionaries in Harput and Mezreh where *Emaus* received orphans such as five-year old Lucia Arakelian from this most recent round of killings.⁵⁵ And for many, this whole ordeal spelled immediate disillusion.⁵⁶ But like some other contemporary observers,⁵⁷ Karen Jeppe's expectations regarding the CUP were more hopeful, at least as they were presented shortly after the massacres in a long, detailed 31 May 1909 letter to Anders Geert-Jørgensen – priest, progressive social activist, and later MP. The letter was published under the emphatic headline *Armenia!* in the conservative Danish daily *Jyllandsposten*, 26 June 1909, in order to raise further awareness and funds for relief work in the face of the new emergency. As an eye-witness to the Armenian genocide in Urfa, Jeppe would, however, very explicitly and radically come to change her position regarding the CUP, but in the summer of 1909 she still believed in the Young Turks to a degree that she would publicly defend them:

Once again, news about massacres and horrors in Turkey reach the ears of the European peoples. Once again, thousands have been killed and yet more thousands have been made homeless. This time they have not restricted themselves to killing people. They have burned down towns and villages. The survivors are now wandering around in the mountains, and it is their need and misery that has moved me to reach for the pen. I dare not try to estimate at all how many thousands are now starving. Various numbers are given, but there are so many that it is beyond imagination. The area that has been affected looks small on the map, but it is actually bigger than Denmark, and it was one of

Turkey's most densely populated areas. I travelled through the area a couple of years ago, and I remember so well the pretty villages in the Amanus Mountains. The only thing that is left of them is heaps of gravel. In those areas many of the houses are made of wood, so they have been burned to the ground. Some of the people have been killed, others burned to death. Those who managed to stay alive have nothing to eat and no clothes to wear. [...]

And the big factory towns, Adana and Tarsus, what has happened to them? The factories have been burned, the workers killed. Those who remained there are worse off than the villagers. They have absolutely nothing. All of this has taken place so close to us here in Urfa that it seems to us we have seen it with our own eyes. We have known many of those who were killed; we have been able to follow the details. [...]

Those massacres were the last accomplishment of Sultan Abdul Hamid. Hopefully, he will not be able to do damage ever again. The present government has a different view on everything. Here in the interior, where they have succeeded in suppressing all attempted rebellions, we have the very best impression of them. I have read in Danish papers that their actions in Constantinople against the vanquished are being disapproved of. It may be that they are not beyond reproach. But we are happy about their severity and firm hand. It was that hand that protected Mesopotamia and Armenia proper against new destruction. One must not forget either, that Denmark and Turkey are not one and the same, and that desperate diseases have desperate remedies. In any case we hope for the best. [...] The reactionaries wanted to break the power of the Young Turks; that is why they killed the Armenians who are the foremost allies of the CUP. This miserable people seems to be chosen to be the martyrs from whose blood the freedom tree of Turkey shall be nourished. It is a tough destiny....⁵⁸

'The martyred people.' That was what numerous Danish observers, from missionaries over *Kristeligt Dagblad* – but not *Social-Demokraten* – to a relief worker like Karen Jeppe, would sooner or later dub the Ottoman Armenians. Prior to World War I, some hoped or believed that 'martyrdom' (or, for those less inclined to use religiously charged terms: continued oppression or destruction) could be averted through reforms. Like so many Westerners, Danish linguist, humanist, globetrotter, and leading member of DA, Åge Meyer Benedictsen, had been optimistic

regarding the CUP takeover which he saw as the culmination of a generally progressive reaction from large and varied parts of the Ottoman population to the oppressive rule of Abdülhamid and a circle of conservative Islamists.⁵⁹ He himself had travelled extensively in and around the Ottoman Empire, and in the wake of the 1908 revolution he had received letters from friends and contacts in Constantinople, Van, Erzerum, Urfa, all reporting that although acts of violence and murder still took place, it was not as often or with the same degree of impunity as before, "all telling about the peace that has settled upon the mind of the farmer; he knows that the harvest he receives from the field will be his to own. The frightened and persecuted Christians of the towns and cities no longer need to fear prison and torture."⁶⁰

But while Benedictsén asserted in 1909 that the CUP government was not responsible for the Adana massacres, the official reaction to the atrocities betrayed a turn once more to the worse: "In an exercise of justice coming straight from some sort of a comic opera, the Military Tribunal at Adana has 'perceived' the massacres perpetrated by the Sultan and his officials as bloody street fighting between equally guilty gangs. A number of the so-called leaders from each side have been selected – and condemned to death. Some young Armenians who valiantly defended the lives of their families on the one side; some pitiful butchers of human beings among hundreds of equally guilty on the other side."⁶¹ Or, as Russian diplomat Anatole Nekludoff expressed it, the Young Turk leaders expressed a "rather too obvious mildness" in the repression and punishment of the perpetrators of the Adana massacres.⁶² In fact, as papers in Denmark would also report, post-massacre repression and punishment seems in many cases to have been directed against Armenians and their institutions *en bloc*, with arrests of clergy, dismissal of officials, closing of newspapers that challenged the official position regarding the massacres, etc.⁶³ "One despotism had just crumbled, but a new one had been founded in its place," as a liberal Turkish observer would recall the transition from Abdülhamid's regime to CUP rule.⁶⁴

What can be safely said in lieu of a conclusion is that regardless of the extent of CUP involvement in the Adana massacres, the events of 1909 in the Ottoman Empire did not bode well for the future. This is not least the case because extreme violence with a large number of actual or, in the case of the averted massacres, potential perpetrators directed against a vulnerable minority, a scapegoat as it were, had once again turned out to be a readily available remedy that was used to 'fix' or 'cure' perceived societal ills of the political, ethno-religious, and economic kind. This does obviously not mean that from 1909 on, all political developments in the

Empire were, say, anti-democratic, authoritarian, repressive, or that everything pointed toward disaster for Armenians and other non-Turkish groups.

At least before the takeover of the most radical wing of the CUP in 1913, there were, for instance, signs of positive developments for many of the Armenian refugees who had fled during or after the Hamidian massacres. According to a comprehensive annual report written in early 1915 by Danish diplomatic minister at Constantinople, Carl Ellis Wandel, these refugees believed the assurances given by the CUP in 1909 that the Adana massacres were not the work of the Young Turks, they were "merely caused by a brief period of transient anarchy"; thus, the refugees returned to their villages where they were promised justice and security. But as the Danish diplomat also reports, it quickly became clear that this promise would not be kept, and that chauvinism and xenophobia were on the rise.⁶⁵ It is not just in hindsight that it can be said that, generally speaking, it was not justice or security that followed 1909, but renewed impunity for mass murder, mutual distrust, and dehumanization of real or imagined oppositional groups until such tendencies and policies reached a climax with World War I and the Armenian genocide.⁶⁶

ENDNOTES

¹ On KMA and on Denmark/Danes in general vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian genocide, and related issues: Matthias Bjørnlund, "Before the Armenian Genocide: Danish Missionary and Rescue Operations in the Ottoman Empire, 1900-1914," *Haigazian Armenological Review*, Vol. 26, 2006, pp. 141-156; idem, "'A Fate Worse Than Dying': Sexual Violence during the Armenian Genocide," in Dagmar Herzog, ed., *Brutality and Desire: War and Sexuality in Europe's Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan 2009, pp. 16-58; idem, "The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification," *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 41-58 (reprinted in Dominik J. Schaller & Jürgen Zimmerer, eds., *Late Ottoman Genocides: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Young Turkish Population and Extermination Policies*, London & New York: Routledge 2009, pp. 34-50); idem, "Karen Jeppe, Aage Meyer Benedicte, and the Ottoman Armenians: National Survival in Imperial and Colonial Settings," *Haigazian Armenological Review*, Vol. 28, 2008, pp. 9-43; idem, "Scandinavia and the Armenian Genocide," *The Armenian Weekly*, Armenian Genocide Commemoration Special, Vol. 74, No. 16, 26 April 2008, pp. 19-22 (French translation on <http://armeniantrends.blogspot.com/2009/05/la-scandinavie-et-le-genocide-armenien.html>); idem, "'When the Cannons Talk, the Diplomats Must Be Silent': A Danish Diplomat during the Armenian Genocide," *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, Vol. 1, No. 2, September 2006, pp. 197-224; idem, "Denmark, the 'Armenian Question,' and Violent Turkification in the Late Ottoman Empire," paper presented at the INOGS conference *Genocide: The Future of Prevention*, University of Sheffield, 9-12 January 2009. See also www.ermenisoykirimini.net/dansk.htm (Turkish, Danish, English). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the author's.

- ² Rigsarkivet (Danish National Archives), KMA, 10.360, Pk. 13, "Armeniermissionen. Korrespondence til og fra, Frk. Marie Jacobsen, 1907-1911", "1909". See also James L. Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey*, Boston: The Pilgrim Press 1908, n. p. ("Foreword"): "To the one who traces the entrance and development in the Ottoman empire during the last century, of reformatory ideas in the religious, intellectual, and social life of the people, the present almost bloodless revolution presents no mysteries. It is but the fruit of the seeds of intelligence, of righteousness, and of holy ambition, sown in good soil and now bearing fruit after their kind." On Barnum as an eyewitness to the 1890s massacres in Harput: Edwin Munsell Bliss, *Turkey and the Armenian Atrocities*, Edgewood Publishing Company 1896, pp. 428ff. On Maria Jacobsen, see also Maria Jacobsen, *Diary 1907-1919, Harput, Turkey, Antelias, Lebanon: Armenian Catholicosate* 1979; idem, *Diaries of a Danish Missionary - Harput, 1907-1919*, Princeton & London: Gomidas Institute Books 2001, ed. Ara Sarafian, transl. Kristen [sic: Kirsten] Vind.
- ³ Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Some Remarks on Alevi Responses to the Missionaries in Eastern Anatolia (19th-20th cc.)," 2000, on <http://www.hist.net/kieser/pu/responses.html>.
- ⁴ Verjiné Svazlian, *The Armenian Genocide and Historical Memory*, Yerevan: Gitutian 2004, p. 25. See also Leon Arpee, *A History of Armenian Christianity: From the Beginning to Our Own Time*, New York: The Armenian Missionary Association of America, Inc. 1946, p. 291. Incidentally, this sudden embracement by the CUP could very well have seemed paradoxical to some missionaries, because even though they often had a 'modern belief in progress,' missionaries usually viewed the concept of progress with more caution than the modernist Young Turks. In the eyes of the evangelical Christians at least, only personal salvation really mattered in the final analysis, and they believed from viewing their own societies that progress could become not only a positive force, like when it led to freedom from need and from religious, political, and cultural oppression, and not least when it led to literacy, a fundamental factor in spreading the message of the Gospel. Progress could also lead to materialism and skepticism which served to undermine 'authentic' Christianity: Torben Christensen, *Kirkehistoriske Afhandlinger*, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad 1981, p. 151.
- ⁵ Merrill D. Peterson, *Starving Armenians: America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930 and After*, University of Virginia Press 2004, p. 29. On the massacre of French in Sicily, 1282: Steven Runciman, *The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press 1958.
- ⁶ Z. Duckett Ferriman, *The Young Turks and the Truth about the Holocaust at Adana in Asia Minor during April 1909*, London 1913; Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Circumstances Surrounding the 1909 Adana Holocaust," *Armenian Review*, Vol. 41, No. 4, 1988; Rouben Paul Adalian, "Adana Massacre," in Israel W. Charny, ed., *Encyclopedia of Genocide*, Vol. 1, ABC-CLIO 1999, p. 47.
- ⁷ Svazlian, p. 29.
- ⁸ For an example of a Western observer who almost demonstratively kept his faith in 'the Turkish people'/'the Muslims' of the Empire in general well after the 1909 massacres: Frederick Jones Bliss, *The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine*, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark 1912, pp. 33-34.
- ⁹ Dikran M. Kaligian, "A Prelude to Genocide: CUP Population Policies and Provincial Insecurity, 1908-14," in Schaller & Zimmerer, eds., pp. 68-69.
- ¹⁰ As it can be seen from studying the relevant literature and sources, Armenian casualty figures vary, but there is largely a consensus on numbers ranging from 20,000 to 30,000. For estimates of 15-20,000 casualties: e.g. Taner Akcam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*, New York: Metropolitan Books

2006, pp. 69-70; Bertha S. Papazian, *The Tragedy of Armenia: A Brief Study and Interpretation*, Boston & Chicago: The Pilgrim Press 1918, pp. 94-95; Kévork Aslan, *L'Arménie et les Arméniens*, Constantinople: Librairie Weiss 1914, p. 118. For estimates of 30,000 or more: George Horton, *The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna*, London: Sterndale Classics 2003 (1926), p. 9; Yonan Hërmëz Sahbaz, *Islams Vrede - En Redogörelse Om Turkarnes Massaker På Kristna I Persien 1915-18*, Södertälje: Nsibin Förlag 2003 (Swedish transl. of *The Rage of Islam - an Account of the Massacre of Christians by the Turks in Persia*, Philadelphia: Roger Williams Press 1918), pp. 15ff; Hayk Ghazarian, *The Genocide of the Armenian People in the Ottoman Empire*, Yerevan 2005, p. 78; Diana Agabeg Apcar, *Betrayed Armenia*, Yokohama: The "Japan Gazette" Press 1910, p. 51. German diplomat at the Constantinople embassy, Hans von Miquel, stated after a visit to the Adana region that in reality the number of Armenian victims were about 40,000, while Armenians had killed 600 Turks in self-defense: Wolfgang Gust, "Die Armenier-Massaker in Adana und Umgebung 1909. Darstellung Anhang Von Deutschen und Britischen Dokumenten. Einführung," April 2009, introduction to Emily Chorley, Wolfgang Gust, George Shirinian, publishers, *Adana 1909 - Dokumente des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amts*, German and British diplomatic documents on the Adana massacres recently published on www.armenocide.net (hereafter: *Adana 1909*). See also *ibid.*, 1909-05-29-DE-001, "Der Konsul in Beirut (Schroeder) an den Reichskanzler (Bülow)," including attachment (report by Hammann of the German Beirut consulate) 29 May 1909, where German consul general at Beirut, Schroeder, and Hammann state that 40,000 Armenians had been killed, and that Young Turk soldiers, including officers, had participated in the killings, plundering, and destruction alongside the mob. I thank Wolfgang Gust for sharing the documents with me before they were published. On German sources to and interpretations of the massacres, see also Norbert Saupp, *Das Deutsche Reich und die Armenische Frage 1878-1914*, Köln 1990, pp. 173ff; Ernst Jäckh, *Der Aufsteigende Halbmond: Auf dem Weg Zum Deutsch-Türkischen Bündnis*, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt pp. 133ff; Uwe Feigel, *Das Evangelische Deutschland und Armenien: Die Armenierhilfe Deutscher Evangelischer Christen Seit Dem Ende Des 19. Jahrhunderts im Kontext Der Deutsch-Türkischen Beziehungen*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1989, pp. 142ff.

¹¹ Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, Oxford University Press 2005, pp. 60-62; Robert Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1986, pp. 69-70; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1971, p. 50. For eyewitness accounts of the massacres: Donald E. Miller & Lorna Touryan Miller, *Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1993, pp. 63-66.

¹² According to Vahakn N. Dadrian, in *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*, Providence: Berghahn Books 1997, 2nd rev. ed., p. 386, full responsibility for the massacre lies with the CUP (although his discussion of the massacres in *ibid.*, chapter 10, pp. 179-84, is more nuanced); Richard G. Hovannisian, "Confronting the Armenian Genocide," in *idem*, ed., *Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 2003, p. 29, asserts that responsibility lies primarily with "an anti-Ittihadist insurgency by liberals and Islamists," although CUP forces were involved in

the massacres; while Melson, in Hovannisian, ed., 1986, p. 69, asserts that it is questionable if the CUP are to blame. According to Hans-Lukas Kieser & Dominik J. Schaller, "Einleitung: Völkermord im Historischen Raum 1895-1945," in Kieser & Schaller, eds., *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah/The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah*, Zürich: Kronos Verlag 2002, p. 17, Young Turks in the Adana region cooperated with the perpetrators, but CUP officers elsewhere helped prevent a repetition of the nation-wide massacres of 1894-96.

¹³ See e.g. discussion in Vahakn N. Dadrian, *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2003, pp. 71-72; Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923*, London & Sydney: Croom Helm, New York: St. Martin's Press 1984, pp. 21-22. For an assessment by a Norwegian observer of the role of religion and economy in the massacre of Armenians, including in Adana 1909: Anton Mohr, *Kampen om Tyrkisk Asien. Bagdad-Banen*, Kristiania: Alb. Cammermeyers Forlag 1917, p. 81.

¹⁴ The extent of the Sultan's control over or responsibility for the coup and perhaps, by implication, for the subsequent massacres as going beyond the role of a mere figurehead is disputed: e.g. S. Tanvir Wasti, "The Last Chroniclers of the Mabeyn," in Sylvia Kedourie, ed., *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass 1998, n. 36, pp. 27-28; E. J. Zürcher, "The Ides of April. A Fundamentalist Uprising in Istanbul in 1909?" in C. van Dijk & A. H. de Groot, eds., *State and Islam*, Leiden 1996, pp. 64-76. In the literature it is often (vaguely) asserted that it was "supporters of the Sultan" who were behind the coup: e.g. Joseph R. Masih & Robert O. Krikorian, *Armenia: At the Crossroads*, Harwood Academic Publishers 1999, p. xxiv; or "certain elements from the military, the palace, and the religious establishment": Palmira Johnson Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911*, SUNY Press 2000, p. 2; or "traditionalists around Sultan Abdul-Hamid": Fatma Müge Göcek, "Reconstructing the Turkish Historiography on the Armenian Massacres and Deaths of 1915," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *Looking Backward*, p. 225. In "Venturing into the Minefield: Turkish Liberal Historiography and the Armenian Genocide," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2007, note 76, pp. 387-88, Bedros Der Matossian states that "[a]ccording to the Armenian, Turkish, and Arabic newspapers of the time the Adana massacres were perpetrated by the reactionary forces in the Ottoman Empire. Later CUP organs blamed Abdul Hamid as the sole instigator of the counterrevolution, which also resulted in the massacres of Adana." See also William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913*, Cambridge University Press 1913, pp. 480-81; Feroz Ahmad, *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*, Oxford: Oneworld 2003, p. 53; H. Jenssen-Tusch, H. Ewald, Johs. Lindbæk, H. Styrmer, eds., *Verdenskrigen i Samtidige Skildringer*, Vol. II, Copenhagen & Kristiania: Gyldendal 1916-17, pp. 240-41.

¹⁵ See e.g. William Mitchell Ramsay, *The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey*, London 1909, p. 136; popular Danish weekly journal *Illustreret Tidende*, Vol. 50, No. 32, 9 May 1909, p. 386.

¹⁶ Maurice Baring, *Letters from the Near East 1909 and 1912*, London: Smith, Elder, & Co. 1913, pp. 78-79.

¹⁷ Raymond H. Kévorkian, "The Cilician Massacres, April 1909," in Richard G. Hovannisian & Simon Payaslian, eds., *Armenian Cilicia*, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers 2008, p. 342.

¹⁸ See e.g. Stephan H. Astourian, "Genocidal Process: Reflections on the Armeno-Turkish Polarization," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, Palgrave Macmillan 1992, pp. 65-66.

¹⁹ "Extract from Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908. (Enclosure in dispatch from Sir G. Lowther, No. 105 of February 1909, R. February 22, 1909)," in G. P. Gooch & Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914; Vol. V, The Near East, The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia, 1903-1909*, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office 1928, pp. 258-59: "It was at the end of October that the first tendency towards reaction made itself sufficiently felt to require notice in despatches. The Arabs wondered how far the Constitution was in accordance with the principles of Holy Law. [...] The Armenians at Van showed signs of arrogance and provocation, whereas the Turks were sullen, subdued, and suspicious. Rumours were heard as the elections approached of contemplated massacres, none of which were however realized. Some of the emissaries of the Committee, who were sent to Bagdad and elsewhere, went rather far in their preaching of equality, with the result that strife was stirred up between the different religions, and the Delegates did not seem to appreciate that what might be good for Constantinople and the more civilized parts of Turkey could not be applied to the remote towns and villages. The complications in the Balkans produced their effect in encouraging critics of the Government. The first overt manifestation of reaction was the posting in the Mosque of St. Sophia of placards vilifying the Sheik-ul-Islam, and calling upon true believers to murder him. The ringleaders of this and other similar anti-constitutional movements were arrested, and they were to be tried and probably hanged, but nothing more has been heard of them. There were certain factors at work directed against the tendencies of reform. The stubborn and unyielding principle of the Moslem religion, which though perhaps less hasty, is more fixed and unrelenting in Turkey than in any other Mahomedan country. The idea of equality with Christians was abhorrent to them, and there were strong evidences in the provinces that these Moslem tendencies were coming to the fore. The crowd of dismissed officials seemed inclined to join their ranks. The numerous strikes had unsettled the working classes, who were prepared to present fresh demands. [...] The police might be said to be non-existent, and it was doubtful as to how far the military could be depended upon, especially those troops which had, under the old régime, been living under the shadow of Yildiz in a condition of comparative ease and luxury, thanks to the generosity of the Sultan. Moreover the attitude of the Sultan appeared to be ambiguous, and the feast of Ramazan appeared to offer every prospect of trouble between the strict Moslems and the adherents of the new régime and of liberal ideas. Fears of massacres in Anatolia were almost universal, but nothing occurred."

²⁰ Kévorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., pp. 339-69; Arman J. Kirakossian, *British Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, from the 1830s to 1914*, Princeton & London: Gomidas Institute 2003, pp. 303-4. See also Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912-1914," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, April 1948, p. 482; Stanley E. Kerr, *The Lions of Marash: Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief 1919-1922*, SUNY Press 1973, pp. 7-8; David Brewer Eddy, *What Next in Turkey: Glimpses of the American Board's Work in the Near East*, Boston, Mass.: The American Board 1913, pp. 31-32.

²¹ Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*, rev. 2nd ed., London: Routledge 1990, p. 185. According to Bloxham, p. 61, "many of the soldiers loyal to

the CUP who were sent to Cilicia after 24 April also took part in the massacres, though there is no proof that this was on senior orders." See also Kirakossian, p. 304; Helen Davenport Gibbons, *The Red Rugs of Tarsus: A Woman's Record of the Armenian Massacre of 1909*, New York: The Century Co. 1917, p. 163. More on Gibbons during the massacres: *New York Times*, 25 July 1909.

²² Adana 1909, e.g. reports by Richard Stöckel and Franz J. Günther of *Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwoll-Gesellschaft m.b.H.* (German-Levantine Cotton Co.), in 1909-05-12-DE-002, "Die Deutsche Bank (Gwinner) an das Auswärtige Amt." For a detailed description by German Dr. Müllerleile of a massacre of 'infidels' in the Christian village Charne (Kharne), Adana Vilayet, that was preceded by luring the local Christians into abandoning weapons in their possession: *ibid.*, 1909-07-14-DE-001, "Der Geschäftsführer in Konstantinopel (Miquel) an den Reichskanzler (Bülow)."

²³ *Blæksprutten*, 1909, p. 38.

²⁴ See e.g. Johannes Østrup, *Erindringer*, Copenhagen: H. Hirschsprungs Forlag 1937, p. 107. As it happened, Østrup had an intimate, first-hand knowledge of the Ottoman Empire, cultivated through journeys and research from the 1890s to the 1930s. On Østrup, a 1910 conversation with Talât Pasha, and the Armenian genocide: Bjørnlund, 2006, p. 201.

²⁵ See e.g. *Frem's Aarbog over Ny Viden og Ny Virken*, Vol. 1, 1908-9, p. 307. On newspaper coverage of the massacres in the contemporary Jewish press, see the chapter "The Attitude Toward the Massacre of Armenians in the Jewish and Eretz Yisrael Press, 1894-1909," in Yair Auron, *The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian Genocide*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2003, pp. 122ff.

²⁶ On non-Armenian Christian victims of the massacres: David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia During World War I*, Gorgias Press 2006, pp. 44-45; David Wilmschurst, *The Ecclesiastical Organisation of the Church of the East, 1318-1913*, Peeters Publishers 2000, p. 364.

²⁷ See e.g. *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 22 April 1909.

²⁸ See also Danish conservative daily *Jyllandsposten*, 13 May 1909, "The Massacres in Asia Minor", article based on detailed eyewitness account by US missionary teacher Herbert Adams Gibbons who emphasizes, for instance, slogans cried out by perpetrators in Adana ("Turkey for the Turks" as well as "Down with the Infidels") and the role of regular and irregular Turkish troops in the killings of Armenians.

²⁹ The number of casualties, 21,000, is most likely based on the report by Hakop Papikian (Hagob Babikian), Armenian member of an Ottoman parliamentary commission established to investigate the Adana massacres. In the 1909 report it is stated that of the 21,000 massacred Christians, 19,479 were Armenian, 850 Syrian, 422 Chaldean, and 250 Greek (probably mainly Melkite, i.e. Greek Catholic): Richard G. Hovannisian, "The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire 1876 to 1914," in *idem*, ed., *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan 2004, p. 231.

³⁰ See also e.g. *Illustreret Tidende*, Vol. 50, No. 1, 4 October 1908, pp. 11-12; No. 30, 25 April 1909, p. 362. That would often change, though, as disillusion spread after the Adana massacres: see below, as well as, e.g., *Illustreret Tidende*, Vol. 50, No. 36, 6 June 1909, p. 456.

³¹ See also Kévorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., p. 340.

³² See e.g. Kirakossian, pp. 303-4; F. M. Leventhal, *The Last Dissenter: H. N. Brailsford and His World*, Oxford University Press 1985, p. 100.

³³ *Social-Demokraten*, 22 April 1909. For a contemporary Ottoman socialist critique of the CUP, presented in Denmark in 1910 at the *Second International Socialist Congress* in

Copenhagen that was hosted by the Danish Social Democratic Party, see "Annual Report from the Socialist Workers Federation in Thessaloniki (July 1909-July 1910) to the Meeting of the 2. International in Copenhagen," published in full in Danish as Appendix II to Lars Nørgaard, "Den Græske Arbejderbevægelse før 1918 og Føderationen i Saloniki," in Lars Bærentzen, Lars Nørgaard, Ole Langwitz Smith, *Mens Vi Venter: Studier i det Modern Grækenlands Historie*, Museum Tusculanum Press 1980, e.g. pp. 38-39: "[The CUP] works to consolidate its position and it especially favors the Turkish population. The application of an autocratic nationalistic policy makes the new constitution lose its Ottoman character. The counter-revolution in April forced [the CUP] to apply restrictive methods, which made them lose the sympathy of the liberal progressives. With the parliament under their control the Young Turks introduced a series of restrictive police laws which violate the Human Rights Declaration of 23 July 1908." The *Saloniki Federation*, as it was also called, was founded mainly by Jewish and Slav socialists, but seems also to have had members or allies from other groups, including Armenians, Turks/Muslims, and Greeks. On such 'restrictive police laws' (not least Martial Law) and similar restrictive or oppressive legislation and practices introduced after April 1909: George W. Gawrych, "The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish Society, 1903-1914," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, July 1986, pp. 322-23; Nesim Seker, "Demographic Engineering in the late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3, May 2007, p. 464; Ahmed Emin, *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*, Columbia University 1914, pp. 98ff; W. E. D. Allen, *The Turks in Europe: A Sketch-Study*, London: John Murray 1919, pp. 208-10.

³⁴ David Farhi, "The Şeriat as a Political Slogan: Or the Incident of the 31st Mart," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 3, October 1971, p. 276.

³⁵ On *lumpenproletariat*, see e.g. Michael Evans & Geraint Perry, *Karl Marx*, Routledge 2004, passim. For a largely similar negative view of the role of Muslim clergy in the counter-coup, expressed in the Viennese-based Austrian socialist daily *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 14 April 1909, see Artem Ohandjanian, 1915. *Irrefutable Evidence: The Austrian Documents on the Armenian Genocide*, Yerevan 2004, p. 42. On *Arbeiter-Zeitung's* coverage of the Adana massacres, and on related issues: *ibid.*, pp. 37-46. It should be noted that there were in fact important sections of the Ottoman Muslim clergy, most notably the high-ranking *ulema* of the *Society of Islamic Scholars*, who opposed the counter-revolution: Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd 1997, p. 101.

³⁶ On this subject, see e.g. Hilmar Kaiser, *Imperialism, Racism, and Development Theories: The Construction of a Dominant Paradigm on Ottoman Armenians*, Ann Arbor, MI: Gomidas Institute 1997; Margaret Lavinia Anderson, "'Down in Turkey, Far Away': Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 79, March 2007, pp. 80-111; Mark Levene, "Port Jewry of Salonika: Between Neo-colonialism and Nation-state," in David Cesarani, ed., *Port Jews: Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950*, London & Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2002, pp. 135-36.

³⁷ See e.g. Hilmar Kaiser, "The Ottoman Government and the End of the Ottoman Social Formation, 1915-1917," 2001, <http://www.hist.net/kieser/agher/Essays/EssayKaiser.html>; *The Times*, 21 April 1909, in Tachat Ramavarma Ravindranthan, *The Young Turk Revolution - July 1908 to April 1909: Its Immediate Effects*, MA Thesis, Utah State University 1965, p. 284, where the author of the thesis states in addition that "[t]he Adana massacres had been in preparation for some time, but the revolt in

Constantinople ignited the spark". Available on
<http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/bitstream/1892/4710/1/b11672420.pdf>.

³⁸ Consider e.g. the following quotes and references:

For detailed descriptions of massacres all over Cilicia: Kévorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., 2008, *passim*.

Walker, 1990, p. 186: "It appears, too, that attacks were planned throughout Asia Minor as well as Cilicia. At Kharput there were disturbances, but the firmness of the local governor prevented any trouble; at Kayseri a similar outbreak threatened, but again a local official took firm action; and at Van a late snowstorm put a blanket over the plans for killings."

Clarence D. Ussher, *An American Physician in Turkey: A Narrative of Adventures in War and Peace*, Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1917, pp. 161-63: "But Abdul Hamid was still the same wily old Sultan. With incessant intrigues he brought about a reaction among the older Turks, then planned massacres in the leading cities of the empire to discredit the new regime. The one planned for Constantinople was prevented by the adherents of the Young Turk Party; Aintab was saved by the determination of an officer who defied the Sultan; the Vali of Adana was one of Abdul Hamid's supporters and for three days there was slaughter in that city the 14th, 15th, and 16th of April, 1909. Rogers and Maurer, two American missionaries, were killed in this massacre. The massacre in Van was planned for the 26th. Bands of Turks armed with daggers were to be ready at the head of each street in the bazaar or market; at the appointed moment they were to close the gates of the market and, passing quietly without outcry or pistol shot from shop to shop, they were to kill all the Armenians, allowing none to escape and warn others. Having thus disposed of nearly all the able-bodied men, they were to raise the cry that the Armenians in the Gardens were attacking the Turkish women there in the absence of their protectors, and, enlisting the help of the unsuspecting soldiers, they were to rush out into the Armenian quarters and begin a slaughter which, they bound themselves by an oath, should last three days; after that they would divide the spoil. When day dawned on the 26th of April so violent a blizzard was raging that the Armenians did not attempt the three-mile walk from their homes to the bazaar in the walled city, and thus were frustrated the plans for a massacre on that day." On fear of massacre in Aintab, the Adana massacres, etc., see also Alice Shepard Riggs, *Shepard of Aintab*, New York: Interchurch Press, n. d. [c.1920], pp. 117ff.

Hilmar Kaiser (with Luther & Nancy Eskijian), *At the Crossroads of Der Zor: Death, Survival, and Humanitarian Resistance in Aleppo, 1915-1917*, Princeton & London: Gomidas Institute 2002, p. 38: "During [an] earlier stint as pastor to the Armenian village of Ekizoluk [in the Kessab region, present-day Syria, MB], he had coped with the effects of the 1909 massacres. During the Adana massacres many Armenian villages in the area where Ekizoluk was situated had been burned down by Muslim mobs. While the loss of life remained limited in comparison to the slaughters on the Cilician plains, the already-poor villagers had serious problems regaining their economic self-sufficiency."

Miller & Miller, 1993, p. 63: "In 1909 a series of massacres occurred in the region of Cilicia, claiming the lives of about twenty thousand Armenians. The massacres were centered on Adana, but we also interviewed survivors from Tarsus, Kessab, Baghche, and Dort Yol. In fact, we heard accounts of incidents that had occurred as far away as Marash, Hadjin, and Gurin." On Hadjin (Hajen), see also *New York*

Times, 23 April 1909; Rose Lambert, *Hadjin and the Armenian Massacres*, New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1911.

Adana 1909, 1909-06-09, "Der Konsul von Aleppo (Tischendorf) an den Reichskanzler (Bülow)," on killings of Armenians in Dörtöl (Deurt-Yol; Dort Yol) and Marash (Kahramanmaraş): "Euerer Durchlaucht beehrte ich mich in der Anlage 2 Berichte des Kaiserlichen Vizekonsuls in Alexandrette über die Lage dort und Dörtöl gehorsamst einzureichen, wonach in der Nacht vom 30. zum 31. v.Mts. angeblich in Folge eines Mißverständnisses mehrere Einwohner von Dortöl und zwar Frauen und Kinder Seitens der vor dem Dorfe lagernden türkischen Truppen getötet worden sind. Die Schuld an diesem Vorfall wird von vielen Seiten dem Kommandanten von Dortöl Major Nedim Bey zugemessen, der ein großer Feind der Armenier sein soll. Der Kaiserliche Vizekonsul klagt ferner über die Haltung des stellvertretenden Kaimakams von Alexandrette und offenbar zur Untersuchung dieser Klagen ist am 5. d.Mts. der hiesige Direktor des Affaires Politique nach Alexandrette gesandt worden. Schritte in Konstantinopel behufs Entfernung dieses Beamten von Alexandrette, wie sie der Kaiserliche Vizekonsul anregt, scheinen mir nach Lage der Dinge bisher noch nicht angezeigt, zumal Herr Belfante bestimmte Tatsachen, welche sie rechtfertigen könnten, nicht anführt. [...] In Marasch scheint es in letzter Zeit ruhig geblieben zu sein trotz mancher anderslautender Meldungen. Vorgestern sind von dort 24 Gefangene gefesselt hier eingetroffen, von denen 21 nach Budrum gebracht werden sollen. Die Freilassung anderer verhaftet gewesener Muhammedaner in Marasch hat Anlaß zu neuen Befürchtungen Seitens der dortigen Armenier gegeben. Nach den letzten von dort unterm 9. Juni aus den Anstalten des Deutschen Hilfsbundes für christliches Liebeswerk, in welche nach den letzten Unruhen mehr als 200 ganztägig aus den umliegenden Dörfern stammende armenische Waisenkinder gesammelt und untergebracht worden sind, mir zugegangenen Nachrichten sollen bei den Unruhen in der Stadt Marasch selbst nur einige Zwanzig Armenier getötet und doppelt so viele verwundet, aber gegen 400 Männer aus Marasch, die auswärts Arbeit gefunden hatten, dort untergebracht worden seien, woraus sich die große Zahl der Waisen in Marasch erklärt."

Ramsay, 1909, pp. 201-3: "It appears that after the Mutiny of the 13th April, when the Reactionary party was in power at Constantinople, three hodjas arrived at Konia, and preached in the mosques, urging the people to make a holy war and to kill the Christians. Panic prevailed during several days. The Governor shut himself up in his house for six days, pleading illness as an excuse for not coming to business, and allowed things to drift. Hundreds of Armenian refugees gathered in the house and grounds of the British Consulate. The Consul resides at Mersina in the winter and spring, and comes to Konia only for the summer; but the Dragoman, a young Armenian, was instructed by telegraph to receive every refugee. A number of people tell the same story, people of all classes and religions. They differ only as to the reason why the agitation failed. Some (especially Armenians and Greeks) declare that the population of Konia would not rise, and actually arrested one of the hodjas, when he was preaching massacre at the door of a mosque; and they maintain that no one could have saved them, if the people had been willing to listen to the exhortations of the emissaries. Others say that one of the officers, an Albanian named Murad Bey, a poet and soldier, who had been an exile of Abd-ul-Hamid's time, calmed the excitement and averted a catastrophe, and that he was actively aided by the Tchelebi Effendi, the head of the Turning Dervishes, one of the most highly

respected personages in Turkey, whose family has always been noted for liberality of mind and broad views. The old custom was that every Ottoman Sultan was invested with authority by the Tchelebi Effendi, who girt on them the sword of Osman. [...]. Probably the truth is that all these causes combined to produce the result. It is quite true that friendly feeling has reigned always in Konia between Turks and Christians. But it is also true that Murad and the Tchelebi were active in using their eloquence and influence. We hear similar accounts from other places. In Kaisari the attempt to start riot and massacre was frustrated by the decided and energetic action of the Mutessarif [...]. In various other towns on this side of the Taurus mountains order was maintained with more or less difficulty. But that an organised scheme of massacre had been planned at some centre and systematically preached by agents, who either had or pretended to have a religious character as hodjas and dressed accordingly, is beyond dispute or question. My few friends in Constantinople who disbelieved the reports that arrived there about this organised attempt at a general massacre would be convinced that those reports were true, if they came up here and heard the evidence. Every one we meet, Turk, Greek or Armenian, knows and tells how critical the situation was. The simultaneousness of the preaching, and the similarity of the circumstances, demonstrate that a single plan was carried out in many places; and it cannot either be doubted or proved that the centre whence the plan originated was the Palace of Yildiz. Where else could it be planned, and who would be so foolish as to leave evidence of the plan? Whether it was with or without the cognisance of the old Sultan no proof can be discovered."

Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Ottoman Urfa and Its Missionary Witnesses," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *Armenian Tigranakert/Diargbekir and Edessa/Urfa*, Costa Mesa, Ca.: Mazda Publishers 2006, pp. 416-17: "[In Urfa, shortly] before the Adana massacre in April 1909, news arrived of the murder of twenty-two Protestant teachers and pastors, among them Djurdji Shammas and the Armenian Protestant pastor from Urfa. These local Protestant leaders had been on the way to their annual regional church assembly, which was to take place in Adana. Their murderers belonged to a circle of people who, shortly afterward, carried out the Cilician massacres in Adana, Tarsus, Antioch, and elsewhere. [...] It was at this point in time that inter-religious mistrust reached a climax. Everyone armed; the Armenian quarter prepared for an attack; trade came to a halt; the bazaar remained closed for many days; communication with Aleppo was severed; police patrolled the city day and night. Young Turk officers spoke in the cathedral in an attempt to calm the Armenians. They accused Abdul-Hamid of being the instigator of the troubles. On the night of April 27, a telegram arrived announcing the deposition of the sultan and the accession of Mehmed V. Already on the following morning a public ceremony took place with gunfire salutes, a speech by the governor, and prayers."

On massacres of Armenian men in Antioch (Antakya) in 1909: Wolfgang Gust, ed., *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16. Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes*, zu Klampen 2005, p. 279.

For the claim by General Mahmud Shevket Pasha that massacres of Christians in or around Constantinople had been planned in Yildiz Palace: *Adana 1909*, confidential report by Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, German Ambassador at Constantinople, regarding a long conversation he had with Shevket Pasha, 1909-05-07, "Der Botschafter in Konstantinopel (Marschall von Bieberstein) an das Auswärtige Amt": "[...] Auch die Massakres in Adana und Umgebung seien auf

das Palais zurückzuführen. Der Vali von Adana, eine bekannte Palastkreatur, von dessen Konak die Bewegung ausgegangen sei, werde kriegsgerichtlich abgeurteilt werden. Da Mahmud Chekhet Pascha bei Ankunft in San Stefano Nachricht erhalten, dass auch hier ein grösseres Christen-Massakre geplant war, hat er den Einmarsch beschleunigt und dem Sultan telegraphiert: Die Armee sei nicht gekommen, um ihn zu entronen, sondern um alle Schuldigen zu bestrafen. Dem Sultan persönlich werde kein Leid geschehen, falls aber hier vor oder während des Einmarsches der Armee Gewalttätigkeiten gegen Christen und Fremde verübt würden, lehne er jede Verantwortlichkeit für das Leben Seiner Majestät ab. [...]. For an interesting American view on Von Bieberstein and the CUP, see *New York Times*, 25 July 1909.

Shevket's claim is supported by US correspondent William Eleroy Curtis in his posthumously published travel letters, *Around the Black Sea: Asia Minor, Armenia, Caucasus, Circassia, Daghestan, the Crimea, Roumania*, Hodder & Stoughton 1911, p. 172: "There is no longer any doubt that Abdul Hamid, the late sultan, planned and ordered a general massacre of Christians in Constantinople and other parts of the empire for Friday, the 14th [sic] of April, in order to force the Europeans to seize and occupy the city. In that way he hoped to save his throne. This has been repeatedly admitted by those who were in his confidence at the time. It was the last struggle of despair, but Shevket Pasha, the commander of the troops that were loyal to the young Turks, received notice and pushed on so that he was able to attack Constantinople on the day previous, and thus prevent the sacrifice of Christian lives and property at the Turkish capital, similar to that which took place at Adana, Marash, Tarsus, Aintab, and other places in central Turkey."

See also German news agency telegram, published in Danish daily *Jyllandsposten*, 2 May 1909: "Berlin, 1 May. Wolff's Bureau has received the following cable from Constantinople: 'The rumor that Abdul Hamid intended last Saturday to have Kurds and rebellious soldiers instigate a massacre of Armenians and Greeks to provoke an occupation by the Great Powers has been confirmed by a well-informed source; the Sultan saw the intervention of the Powers as the only way to keep his position. This is supposedly the reason that the entry of the besieging army took place already on Saturday.'"

Furthermore, Kévorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., pp. 339-40, states that "[o]nce Grand Vizier Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was in control of the situation and the armed forces returned to the barracks in Constantinople, the Ottoman Parliament decided on April 17, 1909, to send a delegation (several Turks such as Yusuf Kemal and the Armenian deputies Krikor Zohrab and Vartkes Serengulian) to Mahmud Shevket Pasha, commander of the troops of Rumelia, to inform him that it was not necessary to march on the capital and that such a move would provoke bloodshed. Having initially accepted the advice, Mahmud Shevket nonetheless decided to occupy Constantinople." For an opposing view – that there was no real threat of massacre in the capital, see Francis McCullagh, *The Fall of Abd-ul-Hamid*, London: Methuen & Co. 1910, p. 50. An Albanian liberal MP in opposition to the CUP during 1909 vaguely asserts that massacres and looting might have followed when Shevket's Saloniki army entered Constantinople: Ismail Kemal Bey, *The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey*, London: Constable & Co. 1920, pp. 343-44. On Ismail Kemal and the Parliament delegation, see also Zürcher, 1996, pp. 69-70.

³⁹ Elise Bockelund, *Høsten er Stor: K.M.A. Gennem 50 Aar*, Copenhagen: KMA 1950, pp. 32-33. See also idem, *En Tjenergerning Blandt Martyrfoleket: Kvindelige Missions Arbejdere 1900-1930*, KMA 1932, pp. 24-25. The Sultan was technically not deposed

until April 27, but in reality he was finally toppled on April 24: Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, Cambridge University Press 1977, pp. 281-82.

⁴⁰ Edwin Pears, *Turkey and its People*, n. d. [1912], London: Methuen & Co., pp. 292-93.

⁴¹ Gertrude Bell, "Letter to her parents," 10 June 1909, *Gertrude Bell Archive*, in the Robinson Library, University of Newcastle, <http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/letters/1896.htm>
"Dearest Mother. I posted a letter to you at Kharput [Harput] on Monday, since when letter writing has been interrupted by long marches and official visits which have taken up all my time. On Monday evening I had a visit from the Vali, a cheerful rubicund little man who told me he had come to see me a. because it was his duty to look after all travellers and b. because in particular I was English and the English were the firm supporters of the new government. He then passed on to some expressions of rejoicing at the fall of Abdul Hamid. Next came the American consul who acts for us while Mr Rawlins is at Diarbekr [Diyarbakir (Amida)] (the latter is accredited to both vilayets.) He was a man, was the American consul; he sat with me for near[ly] 2 hours and gave me exactly the information I wanted. Here, as at Diarbekr, they were on the very edge of a terrible massacre. On April 17 the Kurds began to come in from the mountains and threaten the villages - there are lots of Armenian villages round about and all were decimated in 1895. Fortunately 2 or 3 American missionaries from the Kharput College happened to be in a village 6 hours from Mezreh. They sent in word to the consul who despatched some soldiers to their aid at once and followed them up with another consignment of 20. When these last arrived (they dawdled 24 hours on the way, observe) the Kurds greeted them thus: 'Why did the Govt. send you? in a few hours we should have finished the whole business.' Meantime there was a horrible panic in Kharput and Mezreh. Mr Masterson calmed the Armenians as best he could - they are dogs, as we say here; they all flocked to the Consulate leaving their wives and children to take care of themselves - and promised to protect them if need were. On Ap[ri]l 25 the Vali came to him looking like a man who was on the verge of nervous collapse. He said that on the 17th a telegram had come from C'ple [Istanbul (Constantinople)] ordering massacres. He swore that no one but himself and the telegraphji knew of its existence, but he added that for 4 days he had been holding the Kurds at bay. For 4 days they had been clamouring at his gate, demanding that he should give them the word to fall upon the Xians [Christians, MB]. This quite tallies with other things that I have put together bit by bit. There must have been a preliminary propaganda among the people; they all knew that massacres were to take place; they even knew the date almost to a day. The Vali's resistance does him all the more credit because he is a man of the old order and thoroughly reactionary - hence the expressions of a contrary opinion to me. I was a little surprised at their fervour. The fact was that the order from C'ple was too sweeping; even reactionary officials feared the consequences if they carried it out. The news of the Sultan's abdication came on the 26th but the danger was over on the 24th when the General of the Dersin district telegraphed to the acting Vali at Diarbekr that if what is generally spoken of as a masaleh - an incident - were to occur, he would hold him personally responsible. From the moment that the Sultan fell, the anti Xian agitation went out like a candle, that also is a fact worth noting. But there is no end to surprises in this country. A week ago the chief Mufti of Kharput assembled the people, Moslem, Xian and Jew in a village an hour or two away and then preached them a most moving sermon. All alike,

said he, were children of one God, all were perishing from the lack of rain, and it behoved them all to pray together and entreat God to send them beneficent storms. Whereupon the assembled hearers, who 5 weeks before had been ready to fly at one another's throats, prayed devoutly side by side for 3 days. The rain came, by the way! it was that rain which caught us in the mountains, though I did not then know the origin of it. Subsequently Mr M. has tried to get from the Vali a copy of the C'ple telegram. But the Vali has now recovered from the strain; he prevaricates, declares that the Consul misunderstood him, that something came from Smyrna [Izmir], he isn't quite sure what. At the same time he was delighted with Mr M.'s proposal that the latter had got the leading Armenians to sign a testimonial to the Vali saying that he stood by them at a time of grave peril. Mr M. set about this at once and behold! the Armenians won't have a word to say to it. No, they don't know, they aren't sure that the Vali prevented anything, or that they couldn't have done as well for themselves - men who, as Mr M. said, for ten days could scarcely drag themselves to his house on account of the trembling of their knees. They are an unspeakable race. At the same time you can't let them be massacred by thousands if there are any means of averting it. Now what do you think of that tale? The thing that puzzles me is why I was entirely out of the panic zone during the critical days - Ap 13-Ap 26. The only reason I can give was that I was then passing through two vilayets, Baghdad and Mosul [Mawsil, Al], where the Valis were men of the new order. Abdul Hamid knew possibly that no injunctions of the kind he sent to Diarbekr and Kharput would be obeyed. I also knew that during those days the Vali of Mosul received telegrams from Salonica [Thessaloniki (Saloniki)] telling him not to obey any orders from C'ple. That looks as if the Salonica Committee knew that something was in the air. But I fancy that there was a close shave at Aleppo [Halab] and at Damascus [Dimashq (Esh Sham, Damas)], though the Valis there had nothing to gain from a reversal of the constitutional regime. There were several days' panic in both towns, I gather, and as you know massacres occurred at various places in the Aleppo vilayet. Here is another tale from life that bears on those episodes. The day we left Kharput we had a very long march through the mountains, 12 hours by the clock down to the Euphrates. In the afternoon Fattuh and I were riding on together with a zaptieh. Fattuh, I must tell you, is always taken for a Moslem; he looks like one, and for good reasons he never removes the impression. He passes for a Moslem all down to Baghdad and up to Diarbekr, for he is known on every road. Well, as we rode we met an immense train of camels. Fattuh hailed [sic] one of the camel drivers and asked him whence he came. From the port of Beilan, he said, ie Alexandretta [Iskenderun (Alexandria ad Issum)]. The camel string went slowly past and Fattuh said to the next man 'How is Kirk Khan [Kirikhan]?' Kirk Khan is a village on the Aleppo road, six hours from Alexandretta. 'The infidels (giour) are all dead' said he. 'And the houses of the infidels?' shouted Fattuh. The next man answered: 'They are all burnt.' 'Praise be to God!' said Fattuh. When the camels had gone past I said: 'Why did you say alhamda 'lillah?' 'Excellency' said Fattuh 'those men were all happy, they were all rejoicing, otherwise they would not have said giour.' 'But you said it too' said I. 'Not till they had said it' he answered. But for an hour he told me as we rode how all the men of that village had been his friends, all came out to greet him when he drove along the Alexandretta road, and when they came to Aleppo, he entertained them at his house. The masaleh sounds grim enough when you hear of it from the lips of the people. [...]"

In Grace H. Knapp, *The Tragedy of Bitlis*, London: Sterndale Classics 2002 [1919], p. 81, the following version of the events is related: "In 1908 [sic] a massacre occurred at Adana and Minot Rogers was killed. At that time, by grape-vine telegraphy, news of an impending massacre came to Harpoot. [...] Convinced of the danger, George Knapp went to the Vali of Harpoot and found the most prominent Armenians in the city there on a like errand. The Governor pooh-pooed the idea of any danger; besides, he had sent four soldiers out there [the nearby village of Ichme]. Finding the missionary determined to go that night to the village where his daughters were, the Vali gave him an escort of twenty soldiers and one officer. As day broke they reached Ichme to find the children and village safe. 'Why didn't you do it before? You can't, now the "Hat-wearer" is come,' said one of the soldiers to the Moslems, not realizing how well the missionary understood Turkish. The Kurds were massed in a ravine back of the town. Another company were in the mosque. They had planned just as deadly and brutal work as actually happened at Adana, but were forestalled."

⁴² KMA, 10.360, pk. 16, "Armeniermissionen, Korrespondence 1907-1909," letter from Grünhagen to Blædel 6/5 1909.

⁴³ Tessa Hofmann & Meline Pehlivanian, "'Der Schlimmsten Orte Einer...': Malatia 1915 bis 1918," 2005, <http://www.aga-online.org/de/texte/malatia/malatia.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Jensine Ørtz, *Fra Armenien – Optegnelser fra Malatia*, KMA No. 95, n. d. [1912], p. 12; Jensine O. Peters [Jensine Ørtz], *Tests and Triumphs of Armenians in Turkey and Macedonia*, Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House 1940, pp. 35-37.

⁴⁵ On Fox Maule, see e.g. Christian Siegmundfeldt, *Østerlandsmissionen*, Vol I-II, Copenhagen 1923 & 1927, passim.

⁴⁶ *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 9 June 1909. See also Siegmundfeldt, 1927, p. 70; Harald F. Jørgensen, *Ørkenen Skal Blomstre – Glimt af Østerlandsmissionens Historie Gennem 50 Aar*, Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag 1947, p. 70. The local *kaimakam* was no friend of Fox Maule and his organization – in fact, the Danish doctor describes him as "our enemy, fanatic as he is" in a letter to the Swedish diplomatic minister at Constantinople, Anckarswärd, 26 November 1909, who was in charge of Danish affairs in the Ottoman Empire until a Danish diplomatic minister, Carl Ellis Wandel, was appointed in 1914. Fox Maule had earlier expressed some vague hope in the CUP, but in that same letter he describes how a new Young Turk *vali*, Ismail Pasha, had been appointed in the region, which led to a regime of an "absolutely xenophobic character": *Rigsarkivet (Danish National Archives), Udenrigsministeriets Arkiver (Foreign Ministry Archives; UM)*, 2-0355, pk. 36, "Konstantinople/Istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation. 1822-1920. Korrespondencesager. Korrespondence om sunheds [sic] og humanitære sager 1897-1920. Dansk hospitalsvirksomhed i Tyrkiet, 1909-1914." On the 1860-61 massacres of thousands of Maronites and other Christians in Lebanon and Damascus, see e.g. Michael Kuderna, *Christliche Gruppen im Libanon*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag 1983, pp. 21-22; A. J. Abraham, *Lebanon at Mid-Century. Maronite-Druze Relations in Lebanon 1840-1860: A Prelude to Arab Nationalism*, University Press of America 1981, pp. 101ff; Engin Deniz Akarli, *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 1993, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁷ Jonathan S. McMurray, *Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of the Baghdad Railway*, Greenwood Publishing Group 2001, p. 79. On disturbances or (expected) massacres in the Arab regions of the Empire, see also *New York Times*, 25 April 1909.

⁴⁸ *Adana 1909*, 1909-04-24-DE-002, "Der Generalkonsul in Aleppo (Tischendorf) an den Reichskanzler (Bülow)".

- ⁴⁹ *Adana 1909*, 1909-04-26-DE-004, "Der Vizekonsul in Jaffa (Röbler) an den Reichskanzler (Bülow)".
- ⁵⁰ Meshaka to Ravndal, 22 April 1909, quoted in Elie Kedourie, "The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution in the Arabic-Speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire," *idem, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*, London: Frank Cass 1974, p. 148. On *Mohammedan/Muslim Union* and other contemporary Muslim/Islamist groups, see also Kemal H. Karpat, "Ifte and Kaza: The *Ilmiye* State and Modernism in Turkey, 1820-1960," in Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki, Rhoads Murphy, eds., *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies. Vol. I: State, Province, and the West*, I. B. Tauris 2005, pp. 37-38.
- ⁵¹ H. E. Wilkie Young, "Mosul 1909," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, May 1971, p. 232. See also Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *Amurath to Amurath*, Gorgias Press 2002 (1911), p. 248.
- ⁵² *Adana 1909*, 1909-04-27-DE-001, "Der Botschafter in Konstantinopel (Marschall von Bieberstein) an das Auswärtige Amt." The German consul general at Beirut, Schroeder, asserted 15 May that the persecutions of Christians in Cilicia and northern Syria had not spread to central Syria as the local population had feared, with the exception of a reported incident where the murder of a Muslim by a Christian led to the gathering of thousands of armed Muslims in Beirut threatening to massacre Christians, but he seems to refer mainly to the cities Aleppo, Beirut, and Damascus, not the countryside: *ibid.*, 1909-05-15-DE-003, "Der Konsul in Beirut (Schroeder) an den Reichskanzler (Bülow)."
- ⁵³ Support for the counter-coup and for the sultan in general among for instance the *Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society* could also primarily or partly be motivated by the fact that the CUP was widely considered to be 'anti-Arab,' although Arab nationalist (as opposed to, e.g., religiously motivated) resistance to the CUP seems to have only become significant after the reinstatement of the CUP-controlled administration in 1909 that marked the beginning of more pronounced policies of Turkification and centralization. See for various views on when and how Arab resistance to the CUP developed: Aykut Kansu, *The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey*, Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill 1997, pp. 183-84; Weldon C. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine*, I. B. Tauris 2006, pp. 13-14; Randall Baker, *King Husain and the Kingdom of Hejaz*, The Oleander Press 1979, pp. 35-37; Reeva Spector, "The View from Baghdad," in Reeva Spector & Eleanor H. Tejirian, eds., *The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921*, pp. 39-40; Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*, Cambridge University Press 2004, pp. 56ff; Sarah D. Shields, *Mosul Before Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells*, SUNY Press 2000, pp. 61-62; Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920*, Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 59-60.
- ⁵⁴ On active anti-CUP, pro-ancient régime trends in the Arab regions: Ravindranathan, 1965, pp. 283-84. On Kurdish and Arab resistance to the CUP in 1909, see David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, London & New York: I. B. Tauris 2000, rev. 2nd ed., pp. 95-98.
- ⁵⁵ KMA, 10.360, pk. 112, "Protokol over Plejebørn i Børnehjemmet 'Emaus' i Mezreh, 1909-1917," e. g. "No. 3. Lucia Arakeljan. Accepted fall 1909. 5 years old. Father killed in Adana." "No. 45. Makruhi Gustanjan. Accepted 1909, 7 years old. Father and a brother killed in the Adana massacre. Transferred from No. 42. Did not return after summer holiday 1911; mother wanted to keep her." On relief work in general after the massacres: e.g. Victoria Rowe, "Cilicia: The View from the Constantinople Women's Organizations," in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., 2008, pp. 371-90.

- ⁵⁶ See, besides from the already mentioned sources, e.g. Rubina Perroomian, "Tears and Laughter of Cilician Armenia: Literary Representations of Destruction and Revival, 1909-1918," in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., pp. 392ff.
- ⁵⁷ See e.g. Charles M. Pepper & Irving Bacheller, *Life Work of Louis Klopsch: Romance of a Modern Knight of Mercy*, Kessinger Publishing 2005 (1910), pp. 50-52.
- ⁵⁸ For an interesting, less optimistic analysis of the CUP project by a missionary observer who had witnessed the 1909 Adana massacres (e.g. *New York Times*, 28 April 1909), see S. V. R. Trowbridge, "The Old and the New Regime in Turkey," in E. M. Wherry et al, eds., *Islam and Missions: Being Papers Read at the Second Missionary Conference on Behalf of the Mohammedan World at Lucknow, January 23-28, 1911*, New York, Chicago, Toronto, London, Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1911, p. 170: "The attitude of the government upon any vital question is largely determined by the dictates of a committee outside of the government and backed by the best part of the army. What then of the attitude of this committee? At present the leaders are so absorbed in political affairs and in the military strategy by which their difficult position is held that they are giving little attention to religious matters. Some have even denounced religion as being the cause of divisions in the nation. But they are not directly opposed to Christian missions so long as public feeling and fanaticism are not aroused. Their instincts are so intensely political that they resent any movement which weakens Islam. This is not in most cases from religious faith, but from the instinct that Islam is the strongest available bond for national unification and for defense against foreign aggression. If Christian missions could be demonstrated to them to be an advantage to the nation and a means of unification and progress, these 'Young Turks' would waive traditional Mohammedan objections. But they are far from the field of faith and theology. They are bent upon political and economic reorganization. A considerable proportion of these 'Young Turks' are at heart agnostics, somewhat influenced by French writers, but more influenced by the corrupt condition of Islam. It is impossible to forecast the future. Meanwhile the history of the early Church furnishes inspiring and suggestive studies. It does not seem likely that the present Ottoman government will vouchsafe real religious liberty."
- ⁵⁹ On Benedictsén and DA, see Bjørnlund, *Haigazian Armenological Review*, idem, "En Excentrisk Komet," *Goldberg: Magasin Om Jødisk Kunst, Kultur, Religion, Samfund*, October 2007, pp. 12-14.
- ⁶⁰ *De Danske Armeniervenner, Beretning 1909*, Copenhagen 1910, pp. 2-3.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 4. See also Åge Meyer Benedictsén, "Aarsagen til de Armeniske Rædsler," *Frem* 1925, p. 620; William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927*, Routledge 1966 (1927), pp. 480-81; *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 3 August 1909, "The Military Tribunal is Aggressive Toward the Armenians"; George Frederick Abbott, *Turkey in Transition*, E. Arnold 1909, pp. 304-5; Ephraim K. Jernazian, *Judgment Unto Truth: Witnessing the Armenian Genocide*, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 1990, pp. 23-24; G. S. Graber, *Caravans to Oblivion: The Armenian Genocide, 1915*, New York, Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996, pp. 47-48; Karl Meyer, *Armenien und die Schweiz – Geschichte der Schweizerischen Armenierhilfe*, Bern: Blaukreuz-Verlag 1974, pp. 80-81. For an interesting contemporary analysis of the massacres and the subsequent court-martial, which was "inspired by a conception of equity that failed to earn the gratitude of the Armenians or the approval of anyone else": Abott, 1909, pp. 302ff.
- ⁶² A. Nekludoff, *Diplomatic Reminiscences Before and During the World War, 1911-1917*, (transl. from the French by Alexandra Paget), London: John Murray 1920, p. 22.

- ⁶³ See e.g. *Kristeligt Dagblad*, 11 June 1909, 3 August 1909;
- ⁶⁴ Quoted in Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Dr. Mehmed Reshid (1873-1919): A Political Doctor," in Kieser & Schaller, eds., 2002, p. 255.
- ⁶⁵ *UM*, 139. D. 1., "Politiske Begivenheder i Tyrkiet i 1914," 26/1 1915, pp. 1-5.
- ⁶⁶ See e.g. Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*, HarperCollins 2003, p. 157: "As the concept of Armenian massacre was hammered deeper and deeper into the social psychology of Turkish society, the Armenian Question was inculcated as an issue that could only be solved by unmitigated state-sponsored and state-sanctioned violence"; James L. Barton, comp., *"Turkish Atrocities: Statements of American Missionaries on the Destruction of Christian Communities in Ottoman Turkey, 1915-1917"*, Ann Arbor, MI: Gomidas Institute 1998, p. 121. For a comparison of Mehmet Talât (Talaat) Pasha's attitude toward the Adana massacres with his leading role in the Armenian genocide, see Lewis Einstein, *Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist's Diary During the Dardanelles Expedition*, London: John Murray 1917, pp. 175-76: "[Talât] was different six years ago, when I used to see him daily after the Adana massacre; he had a seemingly engaging frankness, which contrasted favourably with the shiftiness of Hamidian officials. He then told me that he wished to see the Governor of Adana hanged for allowing the murder of 20,000 people, and praised the English Consul, Doughty Wylie, who was wounded in trying to check it. Now he himself fosters the same thing. All his loyalty is to his organization, and his policy is ruthless Turkification, which will later be turned against the Germans, but has now fastened on the Armenian as a victim. He declares openly that the persecution is revenge for the defeat at Sarakymish [Sarikamis], the Turkish expulsion from Azerbaidjan, and the occupation of Van, all of which he lays at the Armenian door. The Committee of Union and Progress fear the Armenian organization. Added to this is the conviction that they cannot assimilate, and must therefore crush them, and that the present is the most seasonable moment, which will never again recur, and one has a series of conditions which entail the usual reactions of brutality and cruelty. The Germans, to their eternal disgrace, will not lift a finger to save the Armenians. Their callousness is disgusting, but one's indignation rises in vain." On Major Charles Hotham Montagu Doughty-Wylie during the Adana massacres, see also *New York Times*, 3 May 1909; *Adana 1909*, passim; Ara Sarafian, comp., *United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide 1915-1917*, Princeton & London: Gomidas Institute 2004, pp. 357-58; Nassibian, 1984, p. 22.

**ԱՏԱՆԱՆ ԵՒ ԱՆԿԷ ԱՆԴԻՆԸ. 1908-09՝ ՕՍՄԱՆԵԱՆ ԿԱՑՄԱՐՈՒԹԵԱՆ ՄԷՋ-
ՑԵՂԱՓՈԽՈՒԹԻՒՆ ԵՒ ԶԱՐԴԱՐԱՐՈՒԹԻՒՆ
ԴԱՆԻԱՑԻՆԵՐՈՒ ԱԶՔԵՐՈՎ ԴԻՏՈՒԱԾ
(Ամփոփում)**

ՄԱԹԻԱՍ ԳԻՈՐԵԼՈՒՆՏ
matthiasb@webspeed.dk

1908ի երիտթուրք լեղափոխութիւնը յոյսեր ներշնչեց որ Օսմանեան Կայսրութեան ներքին իրավիճակը կը բարելաւուի, հայերու հանդէպ զուլումի քաղաքականութիւնը վերջ կը գտնէ, ազատութիւն, արդարութիւն, հաւասարութիւն լուծուցը կ'իրականանայ:

Նման յոյսեր փայփայեցին նաեւ բողոքական միախոնարները, որոնք եթէ Համիտի շրջանին կը նկատուէին քայքայիչ տարրեր, ապա յեղափոխութենէն ետք ողջունուեցան իբրեւ յառաջդիմութեան ախոյեաններ:

Սակայն Ատանայի կոտորածը եկաւ ցնցելու այս լաւատեսութիւնն ու յոյսերը: Յստակ չէ երիտթուրքերու մասնակցութեան ծաւալը այս ջարդերուն, թէեւ փաստուած է նման մասնակցութիւնը, մանաւանդ որ կարգ ու կանոն հաստատելու համար զրկուած բանակային միաւորներ նոյնպէս մասնակցեցան ջարդերուն՝ ըստ նոր հրապարակուած գերմանական դիւանագիտական տեղեկագրերու:

Դանիական թերթերը մեծապէս արձագանգեցին այս ջարդերուն: Մամուլը ներկայացուց ականատեսի վկայութիւններ: Դէպքերու օրերուն հրապարակուեցան նաեւ հակառակն եւ շփոթեցնող լուրեր, թէեւ աւելի ետք դէպքերու մասին յստակ պատկերացում տուող յօդուածներ հրատարակուեցան: Դանիոյ մամուլին համար յստակ էր որ գլխաւոր գոհերը հայերն էին: Յստակ էր նաեւ ջարդերուն տարողութիւնը, եւ թէ՛ թուրք/քիւրտերն էին ջարդարարները: Սակայն այլ հարցերու շուրջ զանազան կարծիքներ կային՝ ըստ տուեալ թերթի գաղափարական հակումներուն:

Քրիսթեյնիթ Տակայաթ թերթը, օրինակ, ինչպէս Համիտեան ջարդերու շրջանին, այս դէպքերուն պարագային ալ շեշտեց կրօնական գործօնը, բայց ներկայացուց նաեւ այլ գործօններու առկայութիւնը, ինչպէս՝ ամբոխներու դերը, եւն- եւ Հնահատակուած ժողովուրդը՝ կոչեց հայերը: Անդին սոցիալիստ Մոսիայ Տեմոքրատթէն թերթը հակառակ որ ողջունած էր երիտթուրք յեղափոխութիւնը, սկիզբէն եւեթ մատնանշեց երիտթուրքերուն բիրտ ուժի անզուսպ գործածութիւնը եւ հիմնովին քննադատեց 1909ի ջարդերը եւ երիտթուրքերը նկատեց յարաբերաբար յառաջդիմական եւ ոչ-իրական սոցիալիստներ, այլ՝ բուրժուա յեղափոխականներ: Միւս կողմէն, իր հակակրօնական հակումով թերթը ծանրօրէն քննադատեց հակայեղափոխականները եւ շարիաթի հաստատման անոնց նպատակը: Թերթը, իր գաղափարախօսութեան տուրք տալով քննադատեց նաեւ հայերը զանոնք ներկայացնելով իբրեւ միջազգային դրամատիրութեան միջնորդներ:

Ըստ դանիացի միախոնարներու տեղեկագրերուն ջարդերուն աշխարհագրական ընդգրկումը շատ աւելի ծաւալուն էր՝ Գոնիա-Կեսարիայէն մինչեւ Քեսապ, Ուրֆա, Ալեքսանտրէթ եւ նոյնիսկ Հալէպ-Դամասկոս ու Պէյրութ: Տուեալներ կան որ նոյնիսկ Պոլսոյ քրիստոնեաները յարձակումի պիտի ենթարկուէին: Սակայն, ոչ-բոլոր վայրերուն մէջ գործադրուեցան ջարդեր: Օրինակ ծրագրուած էր Խարբերդի ջարդը իրականացնել Ապրիլ 26ին: Նոյնը ծրագրուած էր Մալաթիոյ 20,000 հայութեան, քիւրտ զինեալ ամբոխը կը խուժէ քաղաք եւ կը հաւաքուի շուկան՝ օպասելով հրամանին, որ կ'ուշանայ, քանի որ նախորդ գիշեր տեղի քայմաքամը մահացեր էր ...:

Ատանայի կոտորածէն ետք տակաւին եղան միախոնարներ, ինչպէս Քարէն Եփփէն որ պաշտպանեցին երիտթուրքերը: Յետագային սակայն, Եփփէ եւս համոզուեցաւ եւ փոխեց իր կեցուածքը ու բացայայտօրէն քննադատեց երիտթուրքերը: Դանիական թերթեր հեզնեցին Ատանայի Զինուորական Ատեանի եզրակացութիւնը, թէ եղածը փողոցային արիւնոտ կռիւներ էին եւ թէ հաւասարապէս յանցաւոր էին երկու կողմերու աւազակախումբերը: Դանիական թերթեր տեղեկագրեցին թէ ջարդերէն ետք ճնշումներն ու պատիժները ուղղուած էին հայերուն դէմ եւ եզրակացուցին թէ մէկ բռնակալութիւնը փլուզուած էր, բայց նոր մը հիմնուած էր անոր փոխարէն: