

EVERYDAY TEMPORALITY AS A FOUNDATION OF THE SEMANTIC UNITY OF CULTURE

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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to substantiate the thesis that everyday temporality, as a particular form of perceiving and experiencing time, is the source and foundation of the semantic unity of culture. Examining the ontological characteristics of the everyday, this study aims to address the pressing issue of defining the foundations and criteria of cultural unity as a guarantor of cultural identity. This stated goal is realized by identifying the methodological and heuristic potential of the chronotope concept. A brief reconstruction of its semantic content enables us to introduce the idea of the chronotope of culture and define it as a form of semantic integration of spatial and temporal coordinates, ensuring the subject's entry into the space of cultural meanings, where time, as heterochrony, plays a leading role. Identifying the role of time in the formation of cultural identity shifts the focus of the research to everyday temporality as a specific form of experiencing time that links personal existential time with cultural time within the chronotope of culture. Thus, the article proposes everyday temporality as a key organizing principle of the cultural chronotope, thereby offering a new perspective on the foundations of cultural semantic unity.

Keywords: the everyday, everyday life, culture, cultural meanings, time, existential time, heterochrony, space, chronotope of culture.

The subject of this study is everyday temporality, that is, a particular way of experiencing and manifesting time, which characterizes the reality of everyday life. The topic of the everyday and everyday life has relatively recently moved from the realm of philosophical marginalization to one of the mainstreams of philosophical thought. Everyday language, everyday rationality, everyday bodily practices, and so forth, have become the

focus of intense attention by philosophers of various directions, as they embody a mode of individual and social existence that encompasses the ambivalence of the human self as a combination of the universal and the unique, the anonymous and the individually specific, the eternal and the momentary. Consequently, the topic of everyday in its various aspects is part of the problematic field of social ontology, philosophy of language,

existential phenomenology, philosophy of culture, and so on (Highmore et al., 2012; Highmore, 2020; Moran, 2017). Everyday temporality, or the temporal dimension of the everyday, is, in our view, one of the key subjects of the research, since it is no coincidence that the very name of this area refers to time, capturing the particular way it is represented in a person's daily life.

The object of the research indicated in the title is the result of the interdisciplinary interaction between the philosophy of culture and social ontology, as it implicitly covers the problem of identifying any cultural entity – a problem of great importance for both fields. The relevance of this topic in the current situation of fluid cultural boundaries, conditioned by global migration and information flows, seems self-evident (Vostal, 2018). The very real threat of the loss of cultural identity and the problematic nature of cultural self-identification dramatically aggravate the need to address the foundations of formation and the conditions for defining a certain 'physiognomic' unity of culture, especially in a context where previous methods of identification no longer work.

However, it is important to remember that the problem of cultural unity is not a recent discovery. Not only the current multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state of culture in many countries, but also the inherent complexity of culture, which arises from the dynamic interaction of various social, economic, and religious factors, makes the topic of cultural unity and the foundations of cultural identity a significant theoretical and practical issue. Culture as a form of human and social existence is inherently plural: and one of the major works of the French thinker Michel de Certeau, "Culture in the Plural" (2001), emphasizes this irreducible multiplicity in its very title. Although the impetus for writing it was provided by the social and ethnic conflicts that engulfed France and several European countries in the late 1960s, and the work itself was a development of ideas outlined in a report presented at a forum of the ministers of culture, this book became one of the fundamental theoretical works devoted to the problem of the relationship between cultural plurality and the integrity of culture as multi-layered and complex unity. Strictly speaking, any theoretical approach to understanding culture faces the need to relate unity to

multiplicity. The key challenge in this case is finding a criterion that defines culture as a stable and recognizable unity. In our opinion, the most effective approach is to define culture as a semantic unity, that is, to identify the universal cultural meanings of a given culture as its unifying source. The concept of cultural meaning itself can be interpreted in various ways, but the fact remains that the human being is a specific kind of being aimed at understanding and creating meaning in search of answers to the fundamental questions that they pose to the world. According to Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of dialogue, these answers are predetermined by the rootedness of humans (as well as culture as the producer of meaning) in their 'place in Being', that is, the historically specific 'place' of their existence (Zhuk, 2025). This Bakhtinian concept implicitly presupposes that we always pose our questions to the world from the perspective of 'here and now'. 'Place in Being' is not so much a spatial concept, indicating the topos of our existence, as a term reflecting the fusion of time and space. Here, an analogy with Aristotle's understanding of place suggests itself, with him defining place as the outermost boundary of an enclosing body (a kind of vessel) that not only contains something but also serves as the condition and possibility of displacement, that is, movement. Thus, we must remember that Aristotle started the tradition of the parallelism of time and movement, in contrast to Parmenides' identification of temporality and eternity. Twentieth-century philosophy offers the concept of chronotope as a specialized term to denote the aforementioned fusion of time and space.

The Concept of Chronotope: History of Formation and Semantic Content

It should be immediately noted that the popularity of this concept in modern humanities determines its ambiguity, often metaphorical use and even some 'blurriness'. Therefore, for a clear understanding of the object of this study, it is necessary to provide some background information that allows us to reconstruct the history of this concept and clarify its semantic content.

It is well known that the term 'chronotope' gained popularity in the humanities through the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin. However, due to an

overly narrow interpretation of the disciplinary affiliation of the Russian thinker's work, many researchers attributed this concept exclusively to the aesthetics of verbal creativity and literary criticism. This limitation of the applicability of the concept arose from Bakhtin's historically and ideologically conditioned need to apply his fundamental philosophical ideas in the field of literature; however, this was also caused by an overly literal reading of his works in the Russian-speaking world, as well as in Western Europe and America, where the first attempts to popularize his ideas were made by C. Emerson and J. Kristeva. This not only contradicts Bakhtin's own interpretation of this concept (who always emphasized that his speciality was philosophy, not philology or literary criticism), but also ignores the fact that Bakhtin borrows the term from the teachings of the Russian thinker Alexei Ukhtomsky, known primarily for his fundamental works on the physiology of perception. Ukhtomsky, in turn, based his studies not only on the data of the natural sciences, but also on the material of philosophy and theology, introducing into the context of his theory the ideas of Aristotle and Augustine, Descartes and Nietzsche, probably responding to ideas in the air of his epoch, in need of constructing a new non-classical ontology of time. And, as we can recall, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one of the most prominent representatives of phenomenology who made a significant contribution to the development of a new ontology of time, also began with problematizing human perception. This is likely the reason for the appeal of the Russian thinker to the concept of chronotope as a certain basic characteristic of perception. Ukhtomsky (2002) defines the chronotope in the most general terms as a lawful connection of spatio-temporal coordinates. However, it is crucial to emphasize here that, within this definition, Ukhtomsky assigned a primary role to time, which once again underscores the intersection of his ideas with leading tendencies in non-classical philosophy (represented by the philosophy of life and phenomenology) that made the ontology of time the semantic core of their theoretical research. In Ukhtomsky's concept, time is presented as a harmonizing multiplicity, known as 'heterochrony': "Ukhtomsky proceeded from the premise that heterochrony is the condition of possible harmony: coordination in time, in speeds, in

rhythms of action, and therefore in the timing of the execution of individual elements, forms a functionally defined center from spatially separated groups" (Large Dictionary of Psychology, 2004, p. 342). Here, too, the significance of temporal multiplicity is evident, as well as the importance of difference as a condition for movement and change, and the possibility of experiencing time as a multitude of times. It was precisely this interpretation of the chronotope that was incorporated by the Russian physiologist into his theory of human perception. This allowed Ukhtomsky (2002) to actualize another significant concept (which later also occupied a central place in the philosophy of M. Bakhtin), the concept of event, since, as he stated, from the point of view of the chronotope, there are no longer abstract points, but living events, indelible from Being. Thus, it is Ukhtomsky who has the scientific priority in the use of this concept and the merit of understanding chronotope as a fusion of time and space, predetermining the semantic unity determined by time as heterochrony, which should be the starting point in the study of the chronotope of culture.

As the Russian-speaking phenomenologist Lyudmila Gogotishvili (2000) rightly notes, it is precisely this semantic message given by Ukhtomsky that is perceived and retained in Bakhtin's doctrine of chronotope. And this allows her (Gogotishvili, 2000) to give the following general definition of chronotope as typological or personal forms of the semantic integration of spatial and temporal coordinates, which, as a kind of 'intentional framework of consciousness', are a prerequisite for the subject's entry into the sphere of cultural meaning in general. Moreover, in Bakhtin's version, the determining factor in this fusion of time and space is specifically time, understood in the Aristotelian way, as a synonym for movement and change. Gogotishvili states (2000) that Bakhtin defines chronotope as the drawing of space into the process of movement, as a result of which space envelops the axis of time, and time itself thickens and condenses.

Thus, it is important to note that the concept of chronotope contains three fundamental semantic premises:

- chronotope is a form and method of *semantic* integration and the basis for the unity of space and time, ensuring the entry of an individual or

social subject into the sphere of cultural meaning;

- dominant feature of this unity is time, existing as *heterochrony* or harmonizing temporal multiplicity;

- chronotope predetermines the *eventful* nature of human individual and cultural existence, i.e., the experience of time as meaningful, individualizing multiplicity.

All of the above can be applied to culture as a collective, meaning-creating subject, and the concept of cultural chronotope can be proposed as an organizing model of culture's semantic unity. Therefore, one of the most methodologically productive ways to resolve the problem of the semantic unity of culture is, in our view, an appeal to the concept of chronotope, which allows us to capture its unique integrity. Cultural chronotope may be defined as a typical form of integration of spatio-temporal coordinates for a given culture, determined by the dominant role of time as an organizing and harmonizing principle. Introducing the concept of cultural chronotope into scientific usage can not only contribute to the solution of the problem of cultural unity as the foundation of cultural identity, but can also open up fruitful paths for intercultural dialogue.

Time and Space in Culture

Every person and every culture has its own time and space, into which it is impossible to artificially move, but one can live the experience of presence if some intersection of chronotopes occurs. This statement, first and foremost, points to the ontological shift occurring in the understanding of subject and subjectivity with the birth of the non-classical type of philosophizing. While within the framework of classical rationalism, the subject was primarily a subject of knowledge, and space and time were typically interpreted as a priori forms of cognitive activity, almost all schools of non-classical philosophy no longer address the cognitive subject, but rather the existing, embodied one. Even where consciousness remains the primary focus of research, it is no longer understood as an abstract, universal, unpreconditional instance, but as consciousness situated in the world through the embodied nature of the existing subject. Accordingly, time and space also become 'woven' into the living

fabric of human existence, which significantly modifies the semantic content of the concepts themselves. The most significant aspect is that they are transformed from abstract cognitive forms into specific forms of human existence in the world; they become existential time and space that are experienced and inhabited.

Perhaps, at first glance, the metamorphoses occurring to the concept of space seem more noticeable. This is primarily due to the emergence of the theme of corporeality in philosophical discourse. While space was previously understood as a form of grasping and organizing the world of external objects confronting the subject, it is now associated with the phenomenon of the human bodily situatedness in the world and the 'intertwining, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's terms, of the human body with the objects – that means, the blurring of familiar spatial boundaries occurs.

The second important consequence of the transformations that occurred in the model of subjectivity is the loss of space's fundamental and even legitimizing significance both in mental schemas and in the existence of European culture as a whole. Classical philosophy, as a self-consciousness of culture, as well as culture itself, rooted in the Ancient Greek polis, was initially spatial, or topological. The social topology constructed by the polis culture, as an orderliness of social space, was transferred to the universe and conceptualized as the order of the cosmos (as is well known, the word 'cosmos' originally meant order), which is reflected in all spheres of culture. This fully affected language, predetermining for millennia the eidetic and spatial nature of Western thought. Ultimately, this model of worldview reduces the subject to primarily spatial characteristics, correlating subjectivity with shape and boundary (Nalivaika, 2018). However, such a spatial reading of the subject, which means identifying the subject with shape and boundary, does not fit into the concept of an existing subject, since existence is, first of all, the movement of transcendence, becoming, and development, going beyond established limits.

It was precisely this fact that predetermined the reorientation in the interpretation of the subject from spatiality to temporality. This 'temporal turn' is most evident in the works of the representatives of philosophy of life and phenomenology. Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology (even in his early works that were epis-

temologically oriented), proposed the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness, which prescribes the unchanging relevance of a 'now-point' for our consciousness linking past and future through retention and protention. Thus, he not only clarified the nature of consciousness but also touched upon highly significant ontological projections that subsequently allowed philosophers of the existential-phenomenological wave to comprehend the specificity of the existential experience of time. Existential time is always given to us as 'now', implicitly containing a 'before' and 'after' (Nalivaika & Tin, 2014). Husserl's approach to understanding time was further developed in the works of Merleau-Ponty, primarily in his "Phenomenology of Perception". Synthesizing late Husserl's concept of the 'living body' and his doctrine of the internal time-consciousness, Merleau-Ponty overcomes the dualism of pure consciousness and passive body and proposes a concept of embodied existence and perceiving consciousness, which realizes a special perceptual synthesis. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes (1999) that perceptual synthesis is for us a kind of temporal synthesis, as subjectivity at the level of perception is nothing other than temporality. It is precisely this temporal embodiment of human presence in the world that endows us with a special kind of knowledge, skills, and habits that are formed as a bodily assimilation of meanings, fundamentally different from the cognitive acts of consciousness. Skill is the result of repeated perceptual moments that lead to a kind of 'sedimentation' in the human body. The movement of sedimentation, according to Merleau-Ponty (1999), is primarily temporal in nature: there would be no present, that is, the sensory with its density and inexhaustible diversity, if perception did not preserve the past in the depths of its present and did not compress this past within itself. Thus, Merleau-Ponty develops and complements the Husserlian concept of time, linking it directly to the embodiment of human existence.

Thus, understanding the theme of the subject as an embodied existence leads to the phenomenological thesis that the subjectivity at the level of perception is nothing other than temporality, proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1999). Moreover, time is understood here as existential, as that which arises at the moment of its emergence and manifestation, which is experienced as

a specific and always qualitatively different duration: thus, for example, the time of a holiday and the time of anticipation of a holiday last differently.

The qualitative heterogeneity applies both to an individual's perception of time and to its perception by a specific culture. Each culture develops its own 'cultural time', which sometimes leads to everyday conflicts arising from the clash of these cultural times.

It is important to note here that the specificity of the existential experience of time is that it is always being given to us as the present, as a constantly elusive 'now', yet implicitly containing a 'before' and 'after'. On the level of individual existence our existential time is nothing other than the daily lived and fleeting 'now', the living connection between past and future, experienced in the present moment. Moreover, as Michel de Certeau (2013) very accurately notes, this is approximately what the Ancient Greeks understood as 'memory': Greek word 'metis' is a form of reason that is always immersed in practice, it is a specific rationality of everyday life. This temporal practice counts on an opportune moment, 'kairos', and it is inextricably linked with special knowledge, or even art, which precisely is memory, which in Antiquity denoted the plurality of times not being limited to the past alone, but linking together specific events that have already happened and those that may yet happen (Certeau, 2013). That is why Certeau (2013) calls memory an 'anti-museum', being not the collection of ready-made places, but the imprints of the events. Memory mediates complex processes of identification of an individual and a culture, based, among other things, on everyday practices. It is precisely this quality of existential time that brings the phenomenon of the everyday, as a kind of living embodiment of this thesis, to the forefront of contemporary philosophical thought. The very name of this sphere and mode of life refers to time as a fluid and transient present, yet somehow stable and defining, since breaking free from the everyday as a system of repetitive daily rhythms and rituals, repetitive bodily practices, is practically impossible.

While this paper explores three concepts, defining different modes of time experience for the sake of terminological precision, it is important to distinguish between existential time, everyday temporality, and cultural time, which, although

closely interconnected, refer to different levels of temporal experience. Existential time designates the lived, embodied experience of temporality as constitutive of subjectivity itself, arising at the level of individual existence and perception. Cultural time, by contrast, refers to the historically and symbolically mediated temporal frameworks through which a culture organizes collective meanings, values, and narratives. Everyday temporality occupies an intermediate position between these two dimensions: it represents the concrete, repetitive, and yet irreversible temporal mode of everyday life in which existential experience is stabilized through habitual practices and through which cultural temporal structures are continuously reproduced and actualized. In this sense, everyday temporality functions as a mediating and organizing principle linking existential time with cultural time within the chronotope of culture.

Everyday Temporality as an Organizing Principle of the Chronotope of Culture

Phenomenological attempt to consider subjectivity in terms of temporality not only led to the problematization of the everyday as a kind of embodiment of the inherent human way of experiencing time ('every day', 'all the days'), but also forced us to think about the ontological status of the everyday itself.

As was stated above, time in the everyday is experienced as an 'eternal present' encompassing the past and the future. But what does the present of the everyday mean? It presupposes at least two ineliminable characteristics of the everyday. Firstly, its mobility and fluidity, which is very accurately captured in Maurice Blanchot's maxim that 'everyday life disappears', stating that it is the only true definition of the everyday (Nalivaika & Tin, 2014), and secondly, the irreversibility of everyday actions. The everyday is very often contrasted with the eventfulness of existence as the lack of individual moments, as the imperceptible 'leakage' of time. But a person's everyday presence in the world is associated with a special kind of activity, that is, labor activity, which produces irreversible changes in the world. According to many theorists of everyday life (Martin Heidegger, Alfred Schütz, Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau), a person in the

everyday is represented as a worker. And work, as Schütz so aptly notes, leads to changes that cannot be undone. Thus, the English verb 'undo' cannot be applied to the sphere of the everyday, which very clearly highlights the real irreversibility of time.

This suggests that everyday time is an irreversible flow that draws us into specific interactions with the world and other people with whom we share this unique intersubjective present. Its specificity also assumes a specific type of communication, i.e., face-to-face communication that presupposes the unity and fullness of the spatio-temporal presence of the subjects of communication, which ensures its effectiveness. Such model of time in the everyday is represented in Schütz's socio-phenomenological theory. However, there is another image of everyday time – the everyday as the repetition. The repetition of daily habitual actions, the alternation of daily cycles, of day and night. And also, the repetition of our productive acts. How can these two models be reconciled? Is it possible to connect the flow directed from the past to the future and the image of recurring cycles? There can be different answers to this question. Henri Lefebvre's neo-Marxist theory of the everyday contrasts two types of cyclicity present in the everyday life of modern people: there are, firstly, natural cycles (the alternation of day and night) and secondly, the linearity of production cycles. The former corresponds to the primordial nature of everyday life, which is connected to the person as a whole and which is free from the withering effects of alienation. As stated by Lefebvre (1987), the latter are imposed by bourgeois production and the processes of alienation that have transformed the richness of everyday life into a sterile and monotonous routine. Lefebvre believes that a revolutionary reorganization of everyday life is necessary in the name of liberating and celebrating natural cycles.

Thus, the movement of everyday time is a complex and ambivalent phenomenon, encompassing two intersecting characteristics of the everyday: its mobility and fluidity and the irreversibility of everyday actions. And everyday time also can be viewed as a repetition. Paradoxically, the everyday combines both of the above-mentioned models of time, drawing a very specific 'graphics' of the time flow.

When analyzing the specifics of experiencing temporal flows in the everyday, special attention

should be paid to the social context. Being-with-others is one of the fundamental characteristics of the everyday. Therefore, concepts focusing on socio-ontological aspects of everyday temporality make a significant contribution to understanding its nature and ontological status. One of the most interesting approaches in this context is represented by the social philosophy of the aforementioned Michel de Certeau. Drawing on the genealogical ideas of Nietzsche and Foucault, as well as Lefebvre's critique of everyday life, Certeau develops an original conception of everyday practices. Reflecting on the thesis about the decisive impact of power strategies (produced by various social institutions as subjects of power) on the existence of society and their role in determining social order, Certeau finds a unique counteragent in the tactical practices of everyday life. He insists that any strategy encounters hidden, yet quite tangible, resistance, which constitutes a kind of 'power of the weak' (Certeau, 2013). And it unfolds precisely within the framework of everyday life as a set of practices aimed at the processing and individual appropriation of strategic prescriptions. For instance, this is how everyday language functions: while freely utilizing the rules of literary language, it nevertheless achieves the most rapid and complete understanding. This is also how information is being perceived: flowing along the established streams of mass media, it diversifies these streams and redistributes depending on the choices of each consumer. If strategies construct a kind of official 'cartography' of social space, the everyday practices, in turn, exploit the possibilities of temporality, which unfolds here as a network of 'opportune moments' and 'fortunate occurrences' that allow one to avoid the unifying impact of strategies. Tactics are fused with time and utilize a special kind of rationality (the above-mentioned 'metis'), which allows one to avoid direct and passive subordination and construct social order as a resulting balance of power. As we mentioned before, the form of time's existence in the everyday, according to de Certeau, is memory that links together the past, present, and future in the lived moment. And he states that the 'art' of memory develops the capacity to always be in the place of the other without possessing it, and to profit from this change without disappearing into it. This capacity is not power; rather, it can be called authority:

what is 'extracted' from collective and individual memory 'sanctifies with authority' an inversion, a change of order or place, a transition to something else, a 'metaphor' of practice or discourse (Certeau, 2013). Everyday temporality thus ensures the plasticity and mobility of social order, the maintenance of tradition and society's capacity for change.

However, it is possible to construct another, more complex and more productive 'timeline' for understanding the nature of the everyday and human individual and cultural existence, connecting the intentionality and cyclicity of time in the everyday. Methodologically productive basis for resolving this temporal paradox may lie in the combination of Nietzschean idea of the eternal return of the same and Bakhtin's theory of the chronotope.

Classical philosophy was wary of dealing with the constantly repeating phenomena of everyday life: reading, sleeping, eating, and so on. But it is precisely these actions that represent the everyday in its essence: everything constantly disappearing and constantly returning – eternally returning.

One of the interpretations of the eternal return of the same asserts that it reconciles eternity and time, Being and existence. Repetition makes it possible to interrupt continuity, to affirm the being of existence, the being of everything finite, including human existence. According to Nietzsche, this is a way to free people of the spirit of revenge against time. The repetition of everyday practices that create the ordinary person can be seen as the embodiment of this reconciliation.

Bakhtin's philosophy of dialogue, in particular his understanding of chronotope, provided an understanding of time that is similar in spirit, but actualized with a different vocabulary. Bakhtin's theory of chronotope links time to one of the fundamental concepts of his philosophy of dialogue: *place in Being*. Based on this concept, one can define the everyday as a world where we create, cognize, contemplate, live, and die, that is, a world in which the act of our activity is objectified and accomplished, a world in which this act actually takes place (Bakhtin, 1986). The concept of 'place in Being' itself clearly refers to spatial projections of the everyday, but this spatiality is inextricably intertwined with the movement of time, its irreversibility, which predetermines the eventfulness of individual and cultural

existence. Irreversible acts of our activity not only presuppose place as a point of origin, but they are also aimed at inhabiting space, constituting a place that becomes one's own, that is inextricably linked to human existence. In reality, we are dealing with the inseparable unity of the spatio-temporal situatedness of a person in the world, with the chronotope of human existence, where the irreversible fluidity of time is fused with the distinctness of the 'here and now' moment, ensured by the inhabitation of one's topos. The leading and organizing role in this process undoubtedly belongs to everyday temporality as the mediator and connecting link between existential time and cultural time.

Conclusion

Summarizing the main points of this article leads us to the following conclusions.

The unity of culture can be defined primarily by semantic unity, i.e., by basic cultural meanings common to all representatives of that culture.

The condition and guarantee of the entry of the subject (which can be understood as an individual or as a culture) into the sphere of cultural meanings is chronotope as a form of semantic unity of spatial and temporal coordinates, with the harmonizing role of time represented as heterochrony (which is regarded as a harmonizing temporal multiplicity).

Since culture can be viewed as a collective subject producing and transmitting meanings, the chronotope of culture appears to be one of the basic concepts that helps reveal its unity and define its identity.

Drawing on the phenomenological thesis of the temporal nature of subjectivity, we distinguished and compared existential time (as the living flow of an individual's embodied existence and individual consciousness), cultural time (which refers to the historically and symbolically mediated temporal frameworks through which a culture organizes collective meanings, values, and narratives), and everyday temporality (as a mediator between existential time and cultural time). As we have demonstrated, everyday temporality plays a fundamental role in shaping the semantic unity of culture.

Our initial hypothesis that everyday temporal-

ity is a key organizing principle of the cultural chronotope was substantiated through the following argumentation.

The everyday is a complex fusion of time and space, where time is fused with the process of habitation of a place. Furthermore, time in the everyday represents a dual process of the irreversibility of temporal flow and the cyclical repetition of everyday actions. This is precisely the everyday understood as such that provides the most accurate illustration of Mikhail Bakhtin's remark that time is not a line, but a complex figure of a rotating body. Therefore, it can be argued that it is the everyday, or rather, the so-called everyday temporality as a specific form of experiencing and comprehending time, that acts as the organizing principle of the chronotope of culture, defining its semantic unity.

Thus, turning to the phenomenon of the everyday in the context of searching the foundations of the semantic unity of culture is entirely justified, since this phenomenon forms the real chronotope of human existence, both in individual human existence and in the existence of culture.

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