


EDGAR CHAKHOYAN*

*Applicant, Yerevan State University,
Chair of International Relations and Diplomacy*

chakhoyan1990@gmail.com

0000-0002-5637-981X 

DOI: 10.54503/1829-4073-2025.3.68-87

Re-evaluating US-Georgia Relations in the Context of the Russo-Georgian War (2008–2009)

Abstract

This article examines the development and re-evaluation of US-Georgia relations in the context of the 2008–2009 five-day Russo-Georgian War, revealing the real boundaries of Washington's policy and its influence on the geopolitical environment of the South Caucasus. The article analyzes the internal political developments during the first years of Mikheil Saakashvili's second presidential term, Georgia's aspirations for NATO membership, and the nature of US diplomatic, political, and financial support before and after the war. The article demonstrates that despite clear US statements on supporting Georgia's territorial integrity and Euro-Atlantic integration, this support did not translate into military guarantees, which became evident during the five-day Russo-Georgian War.

Special attention is paid to the re-evaluation of Georgia's prospects for NATO membership, the political consequences of the Bucharest Summit, and Washington's response during the August 2008 military operations. After the war, relations took on a more institutionalized form with the signing of the Strategic Cooperation Charter in 2009, but the reduced US interest in the region under the Obama administration posed new challenges. The article also offers important conclusions from the perspective of the national security of the Republic of Armenia and regional stability.

* The article has been delivered on 05.12.2025, reviewed on 22.12.2025, accepted for publication on 19.12.2025.

© 2025 The Author(s). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Keywords: *US-Georgia relations, Russo-Georgian War, NATO, South Caucasus, regional security, strategic partnership, Armenia's national interests.*

Introduction

The events of 2008–2009 shaped a new geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, gradually re-evaluating the place and role of the region's states in the system of international relations. The five-day Russo-Georgian War and the subsequent international reactions, especially the political positioning of the US, became pivotal factors not only in the bilateral relations but also in the process of reconstructing the wider regional security architecture.

This work aims to systematically and comprehensively examine the development of US-Georgia relations during 2008–2009, studying both the diplomatic steps relating to the prelude and the course of the war, as well as the impact of global transformations on the cooperation between the two countries. The work is based on diverse diplomatic documents, official statements, reports from international research centers, and authoritative expert assessments, which make it possible to consider the issues thoroughly and comprehensively.

The research covers the change in Washington's foreign policy priorities, the evolution of the US role from the Bush administration to the Obama administration, Georgia's internal and foreign policy dynamics in the periods preceding and following 2008, the re-evaluation of Georgia's prospects for NATO membership, the revelation of the boundaries, opportunities, and limitations of the strategic partnership in the context of the global financial crisis, the Russian factor, and energy interests, as well as the new security environment formed as a result of the war.

The material presented allows for a deep understanding of how Georgia's geopolitical role changed, why US support was limited in nature, and what long-term impact these processes had on Georgia's statehood, foreign policy orientation, and, particularly, the stability of the Republic of Armenia in the South Caucasus.

Re-evaluating US-Georgia Relations in the Context of the Russo-Georgian War (2008–2009)

The resolution of the internal political crisis in Georgia in 2007 led to early presidential elections. On January 5, 2008, M. Saakashvili won again, receiving 53.45% or 1.059 million votes, which was significantly less than in the previous

elections.¹ In fact, since 2004, he had lost the trust of hundreds of thousands of voters and no longer had the legitimacy he enjoyed after the Rose Revolution; therefore, he had to try to restore his former trust as much as possible. Simultaneously with the presidential elections on the same day in Georgia, a plebiscite on NATO membership was held, where 77% of voters (1.355 million votes) voted "Yes."²

It follows from the statements of the White House and the State Department that the US government recognized the elections as legal and reflective of the will of the Georgian people. In the opinion of Ambassador Kenneth Yalowith,³ these elections were favorable for Georgia's international status, including its relations with the US.⁴

Despite the violations of democratic values during the November 2007 events, the US did not severely criticize the Saakashvili administration and, after the elections, continued promises of support at the level of various officials, including the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.⁵ This gave Saakashvili a great opportunity to use permissible and not-so-acceptable methods to deepen relations with the US, strive for NATO and EU membership, as well as for the restoration of territorial integrity.

High-ranking representatives from various countries attended Saakashvili's inauguration on January 20, 2008. However, by President Bush's decision, the US delegation was headed not by the Secretary of State, but by the Secretary of

¹ See CEC, "Summary Protocol of the January 5, 2008 Presidential Elections," November 5, 2009, https://cesko.ge/geo/list/show/5189-2008-wlis-5-ianvris-saprezidento-archevne-bis-shemadjamebeli-oqmi-3338?cf_chl_jschl_tk=pmd_6e3ef1515777eab19de45124b4284cd04a0a88d3-1628972896-0-gqNtZGzNAnijcnBszQ10 and <https://cesko.ge/res/old/other/6/6773.pdf>, viewed on 03.08.2023.

² See CEC, "CEC Approved the Summary Protocol of the Plebiscite," January 18, 2008, https://cesko.ge/geo/list/show/1114-ceskom-plebiscitis-shemadjamebeli-oqmi-daamtkica-2763?cf_chl_jschl_tk=pmd_9854bd70135e15f54d87a5a64032ff03d74b265d-1629064130-0-gqNtZGzNAmKjcnBszQji, viewed on 05.08.2023.

³ Kenneth Yalowith was the US Ambassador to Georgia from June 29, 1998, to June 21, 2001.

⁴ See "American government satisfied with how the presidential elections in Georgia were held", "Voice of America", January 18, 2008, <https://www.golosameriki.com/a/a-33-2008-01-18-voa3/636364.html>, viewed on 06.08.2023.

⁵ See Alexander Cooley & Lincoln A. Mitchell, No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.–Georgian Relations, *The Washington Quarterly*, Published online: 09 Jan 2009, pp. 30-31, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600802540895>, viewed on 02.09.2023.

Commerce, Carlos Gutierrez.⁶ At the same time, in the conditions of tense Georgian-Russian relations, the Russian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.⁷ After the inauguration, M. Saakashvili met with Lavrov, and the parties emphasized the importance of improving bilateral relations, and Lavrov met with representatives of both the government and the opposition in Tbilisi.⁸

During his inauguration, Saakashvili spoke about "giving Russia another chance,"⁹ re-confirming the country's Western course and the priority of joining NATO and the EU, but did not particularly emphasize relations with the US.¹⁰

The visit continued after the meeting with Lavrov on February 21 with Saakashvili's participation in the CIS summit in Moscow, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin.¹¹ The meeting discussed the normalization of bilateral relations, the restoration of air communication and the issue of Georgian airlines' debt, as well as the return of Georgian goods to the Russian market.¹² On March 18, 2008, Saakashvili, already the re-elected president, made his first working visit to New York, meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.¹³ He complained about the unilateral cancellation of sanctions on Abkhazia by the Russian Federation, the inefficiency of the CIS peacekeepers,

⁶ See The White House, Personnel Announcement, January 18, 2008, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080118-2.html>, viewed on 07.09.2023.

⁷ See "Sergey Lavrov will go to Mikheil Saakashvili's inauguration", "Коммерсантъ", 16.01.2008, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/842676>, viewed on 13.08.2023.

⁸ See "There is no alternative to correcting relations with Russia, - Saakashvili declares", Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, Georgia, 20/01/2008, <https://civil.ge/ru/archives/171376>, viewed on 13.08.2023.

⁹ See "Mikheil Saakashvili's Inauguration - January 20, 2008", YouTube.com, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5I21QeLNyl>, viewed on 15.08.2023.

¹⁰ See Inaugural speech of President Mikheil Saakashvili, January 20, Tbilisi, Civil Georgia, 21/01/2008, <https://civil.ge/archives/114132>, viewed on 15.08.2023.

¹¹ See "Saakashvili met with Putin", Civil Georgia, 21/02/2008, <https://civil.ge/ru/archives/171576>, viewed on 09.01.2024.

¹² Air communication between Georgia and the Russian Federation had ceased since 2006, and direct flights were to be reopened only on February 21, 2008, on the condition that Georgia paid the debt of 142 thousand US dollars. See "Russia and Georgia agreed on the restoration of air communication", Civil Georgia, 21/02/2008, <https://civil.ge/ru/archives/171594>, viewed on 12.12.2023.

¹³ See The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, "A working visit of the President of Georgia in the United States has begun today," 3/18/2008, <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3252&i=1>, viewed on 18.08.2023.

and the delay in the return of refugees, and presented the Georgian peace initiatives to solve these problems.¹⁴

On March 19, Saakashvili traveled from New York to Washington to meet with President Bush.¹⁵ The parties discussed the continuation of strengthening Georgian democracy, economic development, the peaceful restoration of territorial integrity, and the issue of NATO membership, for which Georgia received US support. The next day, he met with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who confirmed the US's readiness to present and support Georgia as a potential candidate for membership at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest,¹⁶ as well as discussing the preservation of Georgia's territorial integrity and new approaches to settling the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.¹⁷

At a meeting with the diaspora in Washington on March 21, Saakashvili assessed the visit as his most successful and emphasized that the Georgian leadership meets with the US President every year, testifying to the high level of relations and Georgia's growing significance for the US.¹⁸

Nevertheless, the diplomatic efforts made before the Bucharest Summit (April 2–4, 2008) yielded no results. Georgia did not even receive the status of a Membership Action Plan (MAP).¹⁹ It is notable that Russian diplomacy actively

¹⁴ See Ibid.

¹⁵ See The White House, "President Bush Meets with President Saakashvili of Georgia," Oval Office, March 19, 2008, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080319-4.html>, viewed on 20.08.2023.

¹⁶ Already on February 27, 2007, during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at NATO Headquarters, Saakashvili had expressed readiness to join the Membership Action Plan, but his proposal was rejected due to existing problems with territorial integrity. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Georgian President visits NATO HQ", 27 Feb. 2007, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_7516.htm?selectedLocale=en, viewed on 20.08.2023.

¹⁷ See The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, "Mikheil Saakashvili met Condoleezza Rice," 3/20/2008, <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases/?p=3248&i=1>, viewed on 21.08.2023.

¹⁸ See The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, "Mikheil Saakashvili met the representatives of Georgian Diaspora," 3/21/2008, <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3247&i=1>, viewed on 23.08.2023.

¹⁹ See North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO), Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, 03 April 2008, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm, viewed on 25.04.2024.

opposed it, while German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy opposed the participation of Georgia and Ukraine in MAP, citing tensions with Russia and corruption in those countries.²⁰ Later, former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen assessed the Bucharest decision as a mistake, linking it specifically to the failure to prevent the five-day Russo-Georgian War.²¹

Following the partial failure of its aspirations towards NATO, the Saakashvili-Medvedev meeting took place at the Konstantin Palace in Saint Petersburg on June 6, 2008, before the CIS summit.²² The parties declared their readiness to resolve bilateral issues through mutual understanding, without intermediaries.

The meeting between the presidents of the two countries temporarily reduced the danger of war, creating the impression that the existing obstacles would be resolved exclusively through diplomacy. However, just a month later, on July 9–10, 2008, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Tbilisi for a two-day working visit. In a press briefing with Saakashvili, she re-confirmed Washington's support for Georgia's territorial integrity, NATO membership, and democratic development.²³ Saakashvili, in turn, emphasized that Georgian-American relations are based not only on investments but also on shared values.²⁴ Rice notes in her memoirs that during meetings with Putin and Lavrov, she warned that any action against Georgia would harm US-Russian relations, but she received a tough response.²⁵

²⁰ See **Bush** 2010, 259.

²¹ See "Anders Fogh Rasmussen - It was a mistake that Georgia and Ukraine were not given a MAP at the 2008 Bucharest Summit," InterPressNews, 05.04.2019, <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/540580-anders-pog-rasmuseni-shecdoma-iqo-rom-2008-clis-bukarestis-samitze-sakartvelosa-da-ukrainas-map-i-ar-misce>, viewed on 26.04.2024.

²² See The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, "The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili is in St Petersburg," 6/6/2008, <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3168&i=1>, viewed on 02.09.2024.

²³ See "Rice: There are attempts to resume the Abkhaz peace process", Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, 10 July, 2008, <https://old.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=18761>, viewed on 25.02.2024.

²⁴ See The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, "The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held a briefing," 7/10/2008, <http://www.saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News?p=2277&i=1>, viewed on 26.02.2024.

²⁵ See Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor, "A Memoir of My Years in Washington,"* Crown Publishers, New York, 2011, p. 341.

Rice's visit to Georgia, which took place one month before the war, was interpreted in the US as support for a diplomatic settlement, while in Georgia, it was perceived as a boost for NATO membership and military cooperation.²⁶ Regarding her visit to Georgia in July 2008, Rice testified that, in addition to signing the anti-missile defense treaty, she tried to convince Saakashvili to sign a non-use of force agreement while they had international support; otherwise, avoiding disaster would be impossible. However, he refused, demanding additional concessions from the Russian Federation.²⁷ This indicates that the US had warned Georgia about the impending dangers and hinted at the absence of support in the event of military escalation.

Despite the strong ties between Washington and Tbilisi, US diplomatic rhetoric could not restrain the Georgian authorities from the intention of a military solution. Essentially, the US was limited to calls for a peaceful settlement without offering a realistic alternative, which created new security risks in the region. Regardless of diplomatic efforts, after months of mutual accusations and local clashes, the Russo-Georgian five-day war began late at night on August 7, 2008. Russia, supporting South Ossetia, quickly established control over Tskhinvali and advanced its troops deep into Georgia, stopping about 48 km from Tbilisi.²⁸ On August 12, Russia ceased its advance, and the war ended.

On August 9, 2008, US President George W. Bush, while attending the Olympic Games in Beijing, called for an immediate cessation of violence and respect for Georgia's territorial integrity, as a result of which Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was scheduled to travel to France (August 13) and then to Georgia.²⁹

Although the US Congress was on summer recess, in parallel with Bush's call, Rice convened a national security council meeting in the US to discuss the Georgia issue. However, it became clear during the session that Washington was

²⁶ See Vicken Cheterian, "The August 2008 war in Georgia: from ethnic conflict to border wars," CIMERA, Geneva, Switzerland, *Central Asian Survey*, Routledge, Vol. 28, № 2, June 2009, p. 164.

²⁷ See Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, "A Memoir of My Years in Washington," Crown Publishers, New York, 2011, p. 428.

²⁸ See Rondeli Foundation, 103, 2018. (David Batashvili, "August 7, How Russia Prepared and Started the 2008 War Against Georgia," Expert Opinion, Rondeli Foundation, 103, 2018), pp. 12–20.

²⁹ See **Nichol** 2008, 1.

not ready for a military confrontation with the Russian Federation due to the risk of nuclear escalation.³⁰ As a result, the US limited itself to only political and diplomatic support.

At the same time, Georgia's transit role—as a route bypassing Russia to reach Central Asia and Afghanistan—was important for the US. The route started at the Poti port and passed through Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.³¹ The development of these transit capabilities also had strategic significance for Georgia.

There was no clear evidence that the US was prepared to defend Georgia militarily. Washington did not have a significant military presence in Georgia and had previously warned, through Rice, about the absence of military support. Instead, the US supported the mediation of the EU and France, and then promised post-war financial aid.³²

In fact, during the five-day war, Georgia was left alone against Russian forces, and US support was limited to a humanitarian mission and a roughly \$1.1 billion aid package in September.³³

Nevertheless, French President Nicolas Sarkozy played a crucial role in stopping the war; the six-point cease-fire agreement he proposed was accepted by Georgia. On August 28, the Georgian Parliament approved these six points and also instructed the executive power to officially break diplomatic relations with Russia.³⁴

According to the EU's 2009 fact-finding report, about 850 people were killed during the 2008 five-day war, and about 35,000 Georgians became homeless. The report concludes that while Georgia initiated the war, Russia had provoked the situation for a long time and reacted to the initial artillery attack.³⁵

³⁰ See **Condoleezza** 2011, 430.

³¹ See **Marmon B.**, "New Supply "Front" for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the "Stans," "The European Institute, <https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/93-european-affairs/february%E2%80%9494march-2010/959-new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans>, viewed on 10.06.2024.

³² See **Neil MacFarlane** 2013, 91.

³³ See **Bonner** 2008, 84.

³⁴ See Legislative Herald of Georgia, Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on the Occupation of the Territories of Georgia by the Russian Federation, №243, August 28, 2008, Registration Code: 0000.00.00.000000.

³⁵ See Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia 2009, 5–43.

After the war, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited France (August 13) and Georgia (August 15) to coordinate international support.³⁶ In France, she met with President Nicolas Sarkozy, and in Tbilisi, she met with President Saakashvili and other officials, reaffirming US support for Georgia's territorial integrity and regional stability.³⁷ The visit was seen as an important sign of US political commitment and was widely welcomed by both the Georgian government and many of its supporting countries.

On August 17, US Senator Joe Biden also visited Georgia. He promised the Georgian leadership and US Ambassador John Tefft to support the Georgian people and democratic reforms. Upon his return to Washington (August 19), he initiated the provision of about \$1 billion in aid and called on Russia to withdraw its troops to pre-war positions.³⁸

On August 24, 2008, Saakashvili declared in Parliament that Russian troops did not enter Tbilisi thanks to Bush's diplomatic steps, and he emphasized Georgia's unity against Russia. In his address to the EU, he noted that "the fate of Europe is being decided in Georgia."³⁹

Saakashvili was also inciting the Armenians living in Georgia against the Russians, as the Russian 62nd military base was stationed in Akhalkalaki for many years, and the residents did not wish to worsen relations with the Russians, who were also a guarantor of security in case of the danger of Turkish invasions.

To better understand the threats faced by the Armenians living in Georgia from Turkey, we can consider an incident that occurred:

³⁶ See U.S. Department of State, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the Situation in Georgia, Le Fort de Bregancon, France, August 14, 2008, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108254.htm>, viewed on 11.11.2024.

³⁷ See Live: Rice and Saakashvili hold a press conference in Tbilisi, France 24, 15/08/2008, <https://www.france24.com/en/20080815-live-bush-gives-press-conference-situation-georgia-russia-georgia>, viewed on 27.01.2025.

³⁸ See The New York Times, "Senator Biden's Statement on Georgia," Aug. 18, 2008, <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/us/politics/18text-biden.html>, viewed on 19.02.2025.

³⁹ See The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili, "The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili met the members of the Parliament bureau," 8/24/2008, <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3135&i=1>, viewed on 31.08.2023.

For example, after the withdrawal of the Russian military base, Turks stole cattle from the village of Sulda in the Akhalkalaki region.⁴⁰ This means that the borders of Georgia are not sufficiently secure, and the genocidal Turk can illegally invade Armenian-populated villages at any moment, causing at least material damage, and at most, depriving them of life.

Although the US did not provide military support, it continued political pressure on Russia and supported the restoration of Georgia's economy and democracy. On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and deployed about 10–12 thousand servicemen there. However, this recognition did not receive widespread international support; only four states—Nauru, Venezuela, Vanuatu, and Nicaragua—recognized their independence⁴¹.

At the same time, the US actively countered this process, and with the economic aid provided to Georgia, it contributed to the country's recovery in the face of both the war and the global economic crisis.⁴²

On September 4, 2008, US Vice President Dick Cheney visited Tbilisi to reaffirm Washington's support for Georgia.⁴³ During the meeting with Saakashvili, they discussed aid for economic recovery and cooperation in the field of security. Subsequently, Cheney told reporters that the US supports Georgia's democratic government and territorial integrity, and conflicts should be resolved diplomatically, placing all responsibility on Russia.⁴⁴

Cheney's statements were also aimed at underscoring political support for Saakashvili, considering information that during the war, Lavrov had called

⁴⁰ See First Channel, "63 cows were stolen in the village of Sulda, Akhalkalaki", 1TV.ge, 28.05.2018, <https://1tv.ge/news/akhalqalaqis-sofel-suldashi-63-dzrokha-moipares/>, and "Cows stolen from shepherds in Akhalkalaki were found in Turkey," imedi, May 29, 2018, <https://imedinews.ge/ge/samartali/63719/akhalqalaqshi-mtskemsebistvis-moparuli-dzrokhebi-turqetshi-ipoves>, viewed on 07.09.2024.

⁴¹ See International Crisis Group, "Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence," *Europe Report N°202 – 26 February 2010*, and "South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition," *Europe Report N°205 – 7 June 2010*.

⁴² See Tsereteli M., "US-Georgia Relations: Expanding the Capacity of a Small State," In *Georgia's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Challenges for a Small State*, Ed. Tracey German, Stephen F. Jones, Kornely Kakachia, I. B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022, p. 226.

⁴³ See **Cheney, Cheney** 2011, 512–515.

⁴⁴ See "Cheney confirms US strong support for Georgia", Civil Georgia, 04/09/2008, <https://civil.ge/ka/archives/144662>, viewed on 19.12.2024.

Condoleezza Rice and placed three demands to stop the war. Washington agreed to the first two demands – Georgia should sign a non-use of force commitment agreement and return its troops to military bases – but opposed the third, which required Saakashvili to step down as president.⁴⁵

On September 26, 2008, at the first foreign policy debate held in Oxford within the framework of the US presidential elections, John McCain and Barack Obama condemned Russia's actions in Georgia and supported the acceleration of Georgia's NATO membership.⁴⁶ Already in October, Obama's victory predetermined the review of US foreign policy, including towards the South Caucasus.⁴⁷

In summary, 2008 became a transitional phase for Georgian-American relations, conditioned not only by military defeats but also by the global financial crisis, the strengthening of Russia's positions in the Caucasus, and Washington's strategic re-evaluations.

Nevertheless, Georgian-American relations acquired a systemic nature and were legally solidified.⁴⁸

On January 9, 2009, in Washington, C. Rice and G. Vashadze signed the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, which defined the main directions of cooperation: defense and security, implementation of joint economic, trade, and energy programs, development of democracy, as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges.⁴⁹ The Charter became one of the last important foreign policy steps of the Bush administration and established a new basis for bilateral relations.

In subsequent years, bilateral relations were deepened through a Joint Commission, which began its activities on June 22, 2009, following the

⁴⁵ See **Condoleezza** 2011, 429.

⁴⁶ See the video at 1 hour 14 minutes: "McCain vs. Obama: The first 2008 presidential debate," <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b7NfEZWBzw>, accessed on 11.12.2022.

⁴⁷ See American Rhetoric, Barack Obama, President-Elect Victory Speech, Grant Park, Chicago, Illinois, 4 November 2008, <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2008/barackobamavictoryspeech.htm>, viewed on 10.05.2025.

⁴⁸ See *Foreign Policy Strategy 2006-2009*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.ge, https://gfsis.org.ge/media/download/GSAC/resources/115_1973_997704_Strategy_MFA2006-2009En.pdf, viewed on 01.06.2025.

⁴⁹ See US Department of State, *United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership*, <https://www.state.gov/united-states-georgia-charter-on-strategic-partnership/>, viewed on 14.05.2025.

formation of the Obama administration.⁵⁰ US support and dedication to Georgia are also reflected in a number of resolutions and bills adopted by Congress.⁵¹ Moreover, a series of agreements concluded between Georgia and the US concerning culture, security, military, economic, political, and other fields further strengthen the diplomatic, military-political relations, and economic cooperation between the parties.⁵²

The deepening of Georgia-US relations was also facilitated by the participation of the Georgian armed forces in American programs in Iraq and Afghanistan in various formats,⁵³ as well as energy cooperation, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku–Supsa pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor, which aimed to reduce the region’s energy dependence on Russia and Iran.

After the “Rose Revolution,” Mikheil Saakashvili’s main pillar of support was the US Bush administration. However, after Barack Obama’s election in November 2008, Georgian-American relations became noticeably passive. In the first year of Obama’s presidency, there were no high-level bilateral meetings between the parties.⁵⁴

After taking office on January 20, 2009, Obama adopted a policy of “reset” with Russia, reducing the priority of Georgia, and the South Caucasus in general, in US foreign policy. At the first official meeting between US Secretary

⁵⁰ See არჩილ გეგეშიძე, საქართველო და ამერიკა: თანამედროვე ორმხრივი ურთიერთობების ევოლუციის ძირითადი შტრიხები, ექსპერტის აზრი, 74, საქართველოს სტრატეგიისა და საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობათა კვლევის ფონდი, 2017 წ. (Archil Gegeshidze, Georgia and America: Key Features of the Evolution of Modern Bilateral Relations, Expert Opinion, 74, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 2017) p. 13, <https://gfsis.org.ge/files/library/opinion-papers/74-expert-opinion-geo.pdf>, viewed on 04.08.2025.

⁵¹ See The Embassy of Georgia to The United State of America, *U.S. Congress Resolutions on Georgia*, <http://georgiaembassyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/US-Congress-Resolutions-on-Georgia1.pdf>, viewed on 14.09.2025.

⁵² See United States Department of State 2017, 156–157.

⁵³ See Ministry of Defence of Georgia, International Missions, <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/mission>, viewed on 10.02.2025.

⁵⁴ Thomas de Waal, “More Than Georgia on Obama’s Mind,” *The National Interest*, February 23, 2012, <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/georgia-obamas-mind-6557?page=1>, accessed on 25.10.2025.

of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Geneva on March 6, 2009, the US offered Russia to restore relations.⁵⁵

Washington's foreign policy focus also shifted to other regions, such as Asia and the Middle East, as a result of which the content of Georgian-American relations did not meet Tbilisi's expectations.⁵⁶

Euro-Atlantic integration did not justify the hopes of the Georgian authorities, the break in relations with Russia deepened the foreign trade deficit⁵⁷, and high military expenditures slowed down economic and institutional development, limiting investment opportunities⁵⁸.

At the same time, it became clear that no country was ready to militarily support Georgia in the event of a conflict with Russia.

Thus, NATO membership remained a foreign policy priority for Georgia, on which significant military and political resources were expended. However, US interest in this issue had significantly decreased due to the change in foreign policy priorities.

Consequences for the Republic of Armenia

The developments of 2008–2009 also had important consequences for the Republic of Armenia. The 2008 Russo-Georgian five-day war showed that external support in the region is mainly political and diplomatic in nature. The strengthening of Russia's positions deepened Armenia's security dependence on Moscow, and the limited involvement of the West, especially the US, reduced the possibilities for Armenia to form alternative security pillars in the region.

The security situation of the Armenian community in Georgia, especially in Javakhk, deserves special attention, as security has weakened after the withdrawal of the Russian 62nd military base, and the risk of possible incursions by Turkey has increased, indirectly creating a threat to Armenia as well.

In addition, the change in Georgia's transit role and the military vulnerability of regional transport routes have influenced the deepening of

⁵⁵ See Ghia Nodia, Saakashvili's American Dream, January 17, 2011, <https://netgazeti.ge/life/8741/>, accessed on 07.07.2023.

⁵⁶ See **Khelashvili G.**, "Obama and Georgia: A Year-long awkward silence", *Caucasus Analytical Digest* 13/10, p. 9.

⁵⁷ See Gvalia G., Siroky D., Lebanidze B., Iashvili Z. *Thinking outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States*, *Security Studies*, № 22, 2013, pp. 121–123.

⁵⁸ See MacFarlane S.N. *Georgia: National Security Concept versus National Security*. London: Chatham House, 2012, pp. 8–9.

Armenia's economic and transport isolation. Overall, the developments of 2008–2009 forced Armenia to pursue a more cautious, balanced, and multi-vector foreign policy, based on its own security and national interests.

Conclusion

In summary, the study concludes that the 2008–2009 Russo-Georgian War and the subsequent processes became a crucial phase not only for US-Georgia relations but also for the entire geopolitical structure of the South Caucasus. US policy during this period showed its limitations. Although Washington continuously supported Georgia's territorial integrity, democratic development, and the idea of Euro-Atlantic integration, this support was primarily political, diplomatic, and financial in nature, failing to translate into military guarantees.

The expectations of the Georgian leadership regarding NATO membership and unconditional US support did not correspond to the international reality. The results of the Bucharest Summit and then the five-day war showed that the major powers avoid direct confrontation with Russia. As a result, Georgia found itself in a difficult military-political situation, suffering severe territorial, demographic, and economic consequences.

At the same time, after the war, US-Georgia relations took on a more institutionalized form with the signing of the Charter on Strategic Partnership in January 2009. However, under the Obama administration, it became evident that, in the context of the global financial crisis, Washington's foreign policy priorities were changing, and its interest in the region and Georgia's role were decreasing.

For the Republic of Armenia, these developments contained important lessons. They emphasized that external support in case of regional conflicts can be limited and conditional, and that a country's own calculated and balanced policy is paramount in ensuring security. Overall, the events of 2008–2009 revealed the real logic of power relations in the South Caucasus and the vital necessity of strategic realism for small states.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ცესკო, "2008 წლის 5 იანვრის საპრეზიდენტო არჩევნების შემაჯამებელი ოქმი", 5 ნოემბერი, 2009. (Tsesko, "2008 ts'lis 5 ianvris sap'rezident'o archevnebis shemadgamebeli ok'mi", 5 noemberi, 2009). *Central Election Commission, "Summary Protocol of the January 5, 2008 Presidential Elections", November 5, 2009*, <https://cesko.ge/geo/list/show/5189-2008-wlis-5-ianvris-saprezidento-archevnebis-shemadjamebeli-oqmi-3338> and <https://cesko.ge/res/old/other/6/6773.pdf>. Accessed: 03.08.2023. (in Georgian).

ცესკო, "ცესკომ პლებისციტის შემაჯამებელი ოქმი დაამტკიცა", 18 იანვარი, 2008. (Tsesko, "Tsesk'om plebiscitis shemadgamebeli ok'mi daamtk'ic'a", 18 ianvari, 2008). *Central Election Commission, "CEC Approved the Summary Protocol of the Plebiscite", January 18, 2008.* <https://cesko.ge/geo/list/show/1114-ceskom-plebiscitis-shemadjamebeli-oqmi-daamtkica-2763>. Accessed: 05.08.2023. (in Georgian).

"მიხეილ სააკაშვილის ინაუგურაცია - 2008 წლის 20 იანვარი", საქართველოს პრეზიდენტები YouTube.com. ("Mikheil Saak'ashvili's inaguraci'a - 2008 ts'lis 20 ianvari", Sakartvelos Prezident'ebi YouTube.com). "Mikheil Saakashvili's Inauguration - January 20, 2008", President of Georgia YouTube.com, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F5I21QeLNyl> Accessed: 15.08.2023. (in Georgian).

"ანდერს ფოგ რასმუსენი - შეცდომა იყო, რომ 2008 წლის ბუქარესტის სამიტზე საქართველოსა და უკრაინას MAP-ი არ მისცეს", ინტერპრესნიუსი, 05.04.2019. ("Anders Pog Rasmuseni - shecdoma iq'o, rom 2008 ts'lis Bukarest'is samitze Sakartvelosa da Ukrainas MAP-i ar misces", Interp'resnusi, 05.04.2019). *"Anders Fogh Rasmussen - It Was a Mistake Not to Give Georgia and Ukraine MAP at the 2008 Bucharest Summit", Interpressnews, April 5, 2019*. <https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/540580-anders-pog-rasmuseni-shecdoma-iqo-rom-2008-clis-bukarestis-samitze-sakartvelosa-da-ukrainas-map-i-ar-misces>. Accessed: 26.04.2024 (in Georgian).

"რაისი: სახეზეა მცდელობები აფხაზეთის სამშვიდობო პროცესის განახლებისთვის", სივილ ჯორჯია, თბილისი, 10 ივლ. 2008. ("Raisi: sakhezea mcdelobebi Apkhazetis samshvidobo p'rocesis ganakhlebstvis", Sivil Jorjia, Tbilisi, 10 ivli. 2008). "*Rice: There are Attempts to Renew the Abkhaz Peace Process*", *Civil Georgia, Tbilisi, July 10, 2008.* <https://old.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=18761>. Accessed: 25.02.2024 (in Georgian).

დავით ბატაშვილი, "7 აგვისტო: როგორ მოამზადა და დაიწყო რუსეთმა 2008 წლის ომი საქართველოს წინააღმდეგ," ექსპერტის აზრი, Rondeli Foundation, 103, 2018 წ., გვ. 12–20. (David Bat'ashvili, "7 agvist'o: rogor moamzada da daidzq'a Ruset'ma 2008 ts'lis omi Sakartvelos tsinaaghmdag," Eksp'ertis azri, Rondeli Foundation, 103, 2018 ts., gv. 12–20). *Batashvili, David. "August 7: How Russia Prepared and Started the 2008 War Against Georgia," Expert Opinion, Rondeli Foundation, No. 103, 2018, pp. 12–20* (in Georgian).

საქართველოს საკანონმდებლო მაცნე, საქართველოს პარლამენტის დადგენილება, რუსეთის ფედერაციის მიერ საქართველოს ტერიტორიების ოკუპაციის შესახებ, №243-რს, 2008 წლის 28 აგვისტო, სარეგისტრაციო კოდი: 0000.00.00.000000. (Sakartvelos Sak'anonmadedeli Mats'ne, Sakartvelos P'arlament'is Dadgenileba, Rusetis Pederaciis mier Sakartvelos Teritoriebis Ok'up'aciis shesakheb, №243-rs, 2008 ts'lis 28 agvist'o). *Legislative Herald of Georgia, Decree of the Parliament of Georgia on the Occupation of Territories of Georgia by the Russian Federation, No. 243, August 28, 2008* (in Georgian).

პირველი არხი, "ახალქალაქის სოფელ სულდაში 63 პროხა მოიპარეს", 1TV.ge, 28.05.2018, და "ახალქალაქში მწყემსებისთვის მოპარული პროხები თურქეთში იპოვეს", imedi, 29 მაისი 2018. (P'irveli Arkhi, "Akhalq'alaqis sopel Suldashi 63 dzrokha moip'ares", 1TV.ge, 28.05.2018, da "Akhalq'alaqshi mts'q'emsebstvis mop'aruli dzrokhebi Turketshi ipoves", imedi, 29 maii 2018). *First Channel, "63 Cows Stolen in the Village of*

Sulda, Akhalkalaki", 1TV.ge, May 28, 2018, and "Cows Stolen for Shepherds Found in Turkey", Imedi, May 29, 2018. <https://1tv.ge/news/akhalqalaqis-sofel-suldashi-63-dzrokhamoipares/> and <https://imedinews.ge/ge/samartali/63719/akhalqalaqshi-mtskemsebstvis-moparuli-dzrokhebi-turqetshi-ipoves>. Accessed: 07.09.2024 (in Georgian).

"ჩემი ადასტურებს აშშ-ის ძლიერ მხარდაჭერას საქართველოს მიმართ", Civil Georgia, 04/09/2008. ("Ch'eini adasturebs ASHSh-is dzlier mkhardach'eras Sakartvelos mimart", Civil Georgia, 04/09/2008). "Cheney Confirms Strong U.S. Support for Georgia", Civil Georgia, September 4, 2008. <https://civil.ge/ka/archives/144662>. Accessed: 19.12.2024 (in Georgian).

არჩილ გეგეშიძე, საქართველო და ამერიკა: თანამედროვე ორმხრივი ურთიერთობების ევოლუციის ძირითადი შტრიხები, ექსპერტის აზრი, 74, საქართველოს სტრატეგიისა და საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობათა კვლევის ფონდი, 2017 წ., გვ. 13. (Archil Gegeshidze, Sakartvelo da Amerika: tanamedrove ormkhriwi urtiertobebis evoluciis dziritadi sht'rikhebi, Eksp'ertis azri, 74, Sakartvelos St'rat'egiesa da Saertashoriso Urtiertobata K'vlevis P'ondi, 2017 ts., gv. 13). Gegeshidze, Archil. "Georgia and America: Main Features of the Evolution of Modern Bilateral Relations," *Expert Opinion*, No. 74, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 2017, p. 13. <https://gfsis.org.ge/files/library/opinion-papers/74-expert-opinion-geo.pdf>. Accessed: 04.08.2025. (in Georgian).

საქართველოს თავდაცვის სამინისტრო, საერთაშორისო მისიები. (Sakartvelos Tavdac'ebis Saminist'ro, Saertashoriso Misiebi). *Ministry of Defense of Georgia, International Missions*. <https://mod.gov.ge/ge/mission>. Accessed: 10.02.2025 (in Georgian).

გია ნოდია, სააკაშვილის ამერიკული ოცნება, netgazeti.ge, 17 იანვარი, 2011. (Gia Nodia, Saak'ashvilis amerikuli otsneba, netgazeti.ge, 17 ianvari, 2011). Nodia, Gia. "Saakashvili's American Dream", netgazeti.ge, January 17, 2011. <https://netgazeti.ge/life/8741/>. Accessed: 07.07.2023 (in Georgian).

Cooley, Alexander & Mitchell, Lincoln A. "No Way to Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations." *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2009, pp. 27-41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636600802540895>. Accessed: 02.09.2023.

The White House. *Personnel Announcement*. January 18, 2008. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080118-2.html>. Accessed: 07.09.2023.

Civil Georgia. *Inaugural speech of President Mikheil Saakashvili, January 20, Tbilisi*. January 21, 2008. <https://civil.ge/archives/114132>. Accessed: 15.08.2023.

The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Archive. *A working visit of the President of Georgia in the United States has begun today*. March 18, 2008. <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3252&i=1>. Accessed: 18.08.2023.

The White House. *President Bush Meets with President Saakashvili of Georgia*. Oval Office, March 19, 2008. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/03/20080319-4.html>. Accessed: 20.08.2023.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). *Georgian President visits NATO HQ*. February 27, 2007. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_7516.htm?selectedLocale=en. Accessed: 20.08.2023.

Chakhoyan E.

The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Archive. *Mikheil Saakashvili met Condoleezza Rice*. March 20, <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases/?p=3248&i=1>. Accessed: 21.08.2023.

The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Archive. *Mikheil Saakashvili met the representatives of Georgian Diaspora*. March 21, 2008. <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3247&i=1>. Accessed: 23.08.2023.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). *Bucharest Summit Declaration*. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008. April 3, 2008. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. Accessed: 25.04.2024.

Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. Crown Publishers, New York, 2010.

The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Archive. *The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili is in St. Petersburg*. June 6, 2008. <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3168&i=1>. Accessed: 02.09.2024.

The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Archive. *The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice held a briefing*. July 10, 2008. <http://www.saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News?p=2277&i=1>. Accessed: 26.02.2024.

Rice, Condoleezza. *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*. Crown Publishers, New York, 2011.

Cheterian, Vicken. "The August 2008 war in Georgia: from ethnic conflict to border wars." *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Routledge, June 2009, pp. 155–170.

Nichol, Jim. *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*. CRS Report for Congress, RL33453. Updated August 13, 2008.

Marmon, Brooks. "New Supply 'Front' for Afghan War Runs Across Russia, Georgia and the 'Stans'." *The European Institute*. <https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/93-european-affairs/february%E2%80%94march-2010/959-new-supply-front-for-afghan-war-runs-across-russia-georgia-and-the-stans>. Accessed: 10.06.2024.

MacFarlane, S. Neil. "The Reluctant Patron: Georgia-U.S. Relations." In *Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security*, edited by Kornely Kakachia and Michael Cecire. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Tbilisi, 2013, pp. 83–98.

Bonner, Arthur. "Georgian Losses and Russia's Gain." *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 2008, pp. 81–92.

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. Report, Volume I. September 2009.

U.S. Department of State. *Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the Situation in Georgia*. Le Fort de Bregancon, France, August 14, 2008. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/08/108254.htm>. Accessed: 11.11.2024.

France 24. *Live: Rice and Saakashvili hold a press conference in Tbilisi*. August 15, 2008. <https://www.france24.com/en/20080815-live-bush-gives-press-conference-situation-georgia-russia-georgia>. Accessed: 27.01.2025.

The New York Times. *Senator Biden's Statement on Georgia*. August 18, 2008. <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/us/politics/18text-biden.html>. Accessed: 19.02.2025.

Re-evaluating US-Georgia Relations in the Context ...

The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili Archive. *The President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili met the members of the Parliament bureau*. August 24, 2008. <http://saakashviliarchive.info/en/PressOffice/News/Releases?p=3135&i=1>. Accessed: 31.08.2023.

International Crisis Group. *Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence*. Europe Report N°202, February 26, 2010.

International Crisis Group. *South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition*. Europe Report N°205, June 7, 2010.

Tsereteli, Mamuka. "US-Georgia Relations: Expanding the Capacity of a Small State." In *Georgia's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: Challenges for a Small State*, edited by Tracey German, Stephen F. Jones, Kornely Kakachia. I.B. Tauris, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2022, pp. 221–242.

Cheney, Dick & Cheney, Liz. *In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir*. Threshold Editions, New York, 2011.

YouTube.com. *McCain vs. Obama: The first 2008 presidential debate*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4b7NfEZWBzw>. Accessed: 11.12.2022.

American Rhetoric. *Barack Obama, President-Elect Victory Speech*. Grant Park, Chicago, Illinois, November 4, 2008. <https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/convention2008/barackobamavictoryspeech.htm>. Accessed: 10.05.2025.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. *Foreign Policy Strategy 2006-2009*. https://gfsis.org.ge/media/download/GSAC/resources/115_1973_997704_Strategy_MFA2006-2009En.pdf. Accessed: 01.06.2025.

U.S. Department of State. *United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership*. January 9, 2009. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-georgia-charter-on-strategic-partnership/>. Accessed: 14.05.2025.

The Embassy of Georgia to The United States of America. *U.S. Congress Resolutions on Georgia*. <http://georgiaembassyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/US-Congress-Resolutions-on-Georgia1.pdf>. Accessed: 14.09.2025.

United States Department of State. *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 2017*. U.S. Government Publishing Office, Washington, 2017.

de Waal, Thomas. "More Than Georgia on Obama's Mind." *The National Interest*, February 23, 2012. <https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/georgia-obamas-mind-6557?page=1>. Accessed: 25.10.2025.

Khelashvili, Giorgi. "Obama and Georgia: A Year-long awkward silence". *Caucasus Analytical Digest*, No. 13/10, 2010, pp. 8–10.

Gvalia, Giorgi; Siroky, David; Lebanidze, Bidzina; Iashvili, Zurab. "Thinking outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States." *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2013, pp. 98–131.

MacFarlane, S. Neil. *Georgia: National Security Concept versus National Security*. Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper, Chatham House, London, 2012.

"Amerikanskoe pravitel'stvo udovletvoreno tem, kak proshli prezidentskie vybory v Gruzii", *Golos Ameriki*, 18 Yanvar', 2008. («Американское правительство удовлетворено

тем, как прошли президентские выборы в Грузии», *Голос Америки*, 18 Январь, 2008). *“U.S. Government Satisfied with How Presidential Elections in Georgia Were Held”, Voice of America, January 18, 2008.* <https://www.golosameriki.com/a/a-33-2008-01-18-voa3/636364.html>. Accessed: 06.08.2023 (in Russian).


“Na inauguratsiyu Mikhaila Saakashvili poedet Sergey Lavrov”, *Kommersant*, 16.01.2008. («На инаугурацию Михаила Саакашвили поедет Сергей Лавров», *Коммерсантъ*, 16.01.2008). *“Sergey Lavrov to Attend Mikhail Saakashvili’s Inauguration”, Kommersant, January 16, 2008.* <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/842676>. Accessed: 13.08.2023 (in Russian).

Civil Georgia. “U ispravleniya otnosheniy s Rossiey alternativy net, - zayavlyayet Saakashvili”, 20/01/2008. («У исправления отношений с Россией альтернативы нет, - заявляет Саакашвили», 20/01/2008). *“Saakashvili States There is No Alternative to Improving Relations with Russia”, January 20, 2008.* <https://civil.ge/ru/archives/171376>. Accessed: 13.08.2023 (in Russian).

Civil Georgia. “Saakashvili vstretilsya s Putinyem”, 21/02/2008. («Саакашвили встретился с Путиным», 21/02/2008). *“Saakashvili Met with Putin”, February 21, 2008,* <https://civil.ge/ru/archives/171576>. Accessed: 09.01.2024 (in Russian).

Civil Georgia. “Rossiya i Gruziya dogovorilis’ o vosstanovlenii vozdušnogo soobshcheniya”, 21/02/2008. («Россия и Грузия договорились о восстановлении воздушного сообщения», 21/02/2008). *“Russia and Georgia Agreed to Restore Air Service”, February 21, 2008.* <https://civil.ge/ru/archives/171594>. Accessed: 12.12.2023 (in Russian).

ԷԴԳԱՐ ԶԱԽՈՅԱՆ

Երևանի պետական համալսարանի հայցորդ
Միջազգային հարաբերությունների և դիվանագիտության ամբիոն
chakhoyan1990@gmail.com
0000-0002-5637-981X 

ԱՄՆ-ՎՐԱՍՏԱՆ ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՎԵՐԱԴԻՄԱՏԱՎՈՐՈՒՄԸ ՌՈՒՍ-ՎՐԱՑԱԿԱՆ ՊԱՏԵՐԱԶՄԻ ՀԱՄԱՏԵՔՍՏՈՒՄ (2008–2009 ԹԹ.)

Ամփոփում

Սույն հոդվածը ուսումնասիրում է ԱՄՆ-Վրաստան հարաբերությունների զարգացումն ու վերաիմաստավորումը 2008–2009 թթ. ռուս-վրացական հնգօրյա պատերազմի համատեքստում՝ բացահայտելով Վաշինգտոնի քաղաքականության իրական սահմանները և դրա ազդեցությունը Հարավային Կովկասի աշխարհաքաղաքական միջավայրի վրա: Վերլուծվում են Միխեիլ

Սաակաշվիլիի նախագահության երկրորդ շրջանի առաջին տարիների ներքաղաքական զարգացումները, ՆԱՏՕ-ին Վրաստանի անդամակցության ձգտումները, ինչպես նաև ԱՄՆ-ի դիվանագիտական, քաղաքական և ֆինանսական աջակցության բնույթը պատերազմից առաջ և հետո: Հոդվածում ցույց է տրվում, որ չնայած ԱՄՆ-ի հստակ հայտարարություններին Վրաստանի տարածքային ամբողջականության և եվրատլանտյան ինտեգրման աջակցության մասին, այդ աջակցությունը չի վերածվել ռազմական երաշխիքների, ինչն ակնհայտ դարձավ ռուս-վրացական հնգօրյա պատերազմի ընթացքում:

Հատուկ ուշադրություն է դարձվում ՆԱՏՕ-ին Վրաստանի անդամակցության հեռանկարների վերաիմաստավորմանը, Բուխարեստի գազաթնաժողովի քաղաքական հետևանքներին և Վաշինգտոնի արձագանքին 2008 թ. օգոստոսյան ռազմական գործողությունների ընթացքում: Պատերազմից հետո հարաբերությունները ստացան առավել ինստիտուցիոնալացված ձև՝ 2009 թ. ռազմավարական համագործակցության խարտիայի ստորագրմամբ, սակայն Բարաք Օբամայի վարչակազմի օրոք տարածաշրջանի նկատմամբ ԱՄՆ հետաքրքրության նվազումը նոր մարտահրավերներ առաջ բերեց: Հոդվածը կարևոր հետևություններ է առաջարկում նաև Հայաստանի Հանրապետության ազգային անվտանգության և տարածաշրջանային կայունության տեսանկյունից:

Բանալի բառեր՝ *ԱՄՆ-Վրաստանի հարաբերություններ, ռուս-վրացական պատերազմ, ՆԱՏՕ, Հարավային Կովկաս, տարածաշրջանային անվտանգություն, ռազմավարական գործընկերություն, Հայաստանի ազգային շահեր:*