

GEORGIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS DURING THE PERIOD OF "GEORGIAN DREAM" POWER

KAREN GHAZARYAN

Yerevan State University, Yerevan, RA

E-mail: kar.ghazaryan@gmail.com

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ABSTRACT

The current stage of Georgia-Russia relations began in 2012, when the "Georgian Dream" party came to power and introduced changes in the foreign policy course. In order to understand the current course of bilateral relations, it is important to analyze the processes that have taken place between the parties since 2012. The purpose of the scientific work is to analyze the bilateral relations after the "Georgian Dream" came to power, to present the existing problems and challenges, to investigate the nature of these relations, as well as the influence of geopolitical developments on the relations.

While writing the scientific work, we used the systematic methods of historical-comparative, event and content analysis.

Achievements. Since 2012, relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation have registered a dynamic growth in several areas, changing the character and course of relations, the Russian Federation has become one of the leading economic states of Georgia, but politically, the existing problems the ongoing conflicts with Abkhazia and Ossetia in bilateral relations remain unresolved.

Key words. Georgia, Russian Federation, bilateral relations, South Caucasus, foreign policy, multilateral diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

In the post-Soviet period, relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation underwent various changes due to several circumstances. After the "Five-day War" of 2008, problems in Georgia gradually increased, leading to greater dissatisfaction among the population. Although the former President of Georgia, Saakashvili, tried to leverage international pressure to achieve certain results with Russia, the situation regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not change. Moreover, in 2008, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, after which Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia.

The coming to power of the "Georgian Dream" in the 2012 elections marked a shift in Georgia's foreign policy.

In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party competed with the United National Movement party in the 2012 parliamentary elections. According to the results, the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia party won the elections, securing more than 50% of the seats in the Georgian Parliament (Hovhannisyan, 2012). The regional and extra-regional policies adopted by the new authorities were quite interesting. Particularly, relations with Russia deserve attention. Georgia had suspended diplomatic relations with Russia in August 2008, in response to the Kremlin's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, the new government of Georgia, led by the Georgian Dream alliance, which came to power in October 2012, announced that regulating relations with Moscow would be one of the most important areas of the country's foreign policy. In parallel with the first regional visits (to Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara), at the end of October 2012, the position of Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for Relations with Russia was established. By decision of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili on November 1, 2012, former Georgian Ambassador to Russia (2000-2004) Zurab Abashidze was appointed to this position (Abashidze, n.d.). At that time, dialogue with Moscow began in the "Abashidze-Karasin" format, complementing the Geneva Discussions on Security in the Caucasus, which had been in effect since 2008 (when diplomatic relations were broken), and are held with the mediation of the EU, the United Nations, and the OSCE. These talks also involve delegations from Georgia, Russia, the USA, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. As a result of the negotiations, the Russian market was opened to Georgian agricultural products, mineral waters, and wine-vodka industry products. Zurab Abashidze noted, "Tbilisi is ready to continue the Geneva international dialogue, as well as the meetings in Prague on practical issues." Grigori Karasin welcomed Tbilisi's position, stating, "If my respected colleague Zurab Abashidze really made such a statement, we can only welcome it. You know that it was not Russia that suspended diplomatic relations in September 2008, and there are no obstacles to their restoration on our side. The timing of positive changes in this matter depends exclusively on Tbilisi." The constructive discussion of current issues within this dialogue has already led to tangible results. Bilateral trade has been restored, and the only land crossing point of the Georgia-Russia border, "Upper Lars-Kazbegi," now operates around the clock. At the end of 2013, regular road traffic was restored between Georgia and Russia, and air traffic resumed in October 2014. After three years of lifting restrictions on the import of wine, mineral water, and agricultural products from Georgia, bilateral trade picked up, and Russia returned to the top three of Georgia's main foreign trade partners. However, in the context of the global economic crisis, bilateral trade decreased to \$697 million in 2015 (89% of the figures from the same period in 2014). Russian exports remained at the same level (\$534 million). After the economic crisis, private transfers from Russia to Georgia decreased by about 25% (previously around \$1 billion per year (Dëgtsev,

Margoev, & Tokarev, n.d.)). Cultural, sports, scientific, religious, and business ties were activated. Over 60,000 Russian visas were issued to Georgians between 2013 and 2015. Georgian athletes also participated in the 2014 Sochi Olympics. In December 2015, the visa regime for Georgian citizens traveling to Russia was significantly liberalized. Despite the lack of diplomatic relations and ongoing political issues with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in 2015, Russia was still the leader in the number of remittances to Georgia, accounting for 40% (down from 49% in 2014). According to the National Bank of Georgia, in 2015, \$432.68 million (39% less than in 2014) was sent from Russia to Georgia out of a total of \$1.08 billion (\$1.44 billion in 2014). For comparison, Greece, an EU member, ranked second with \$117.68 million in transfers (42.5% less than in 2014 (USAFacts, 2024)). After the Russian market was reopened to Georgian products, Russia entered the top five trade partner countries of Georgia. According to the Statistical Service of Georgia, in 2015, Russia was the second-largest trading partner of Georgia (second to Turkey), and fifth in terms of imports of Georgian products. The trade turnover between Georgia and Russia in 2015 amounted to \$788.5 million, including an 8.7% increase in imports to \$625.6 million, while exports decreased by 40.7% to \$162.8 million (Pavlyushina, Kulaeva, & Muzychenko, 2019). In 2022, Russia remained the second-largest trading partner of Georgia, following Turkey. In terms of interstate visits, the year 2015 ended with the positive decision of the Russian Foreign Ministry on liberalizing the visa regime for Georgian citizens, simplifying the process for obtaining business, work, and study visas of any duration. However, in early 2016, these relations were criticized by both the opposition and parts of the Georgian public, primarily due to Tbilisi's gas negotiations with its neighbors, including Russia. In 2016, Karasin and Abashidze reaffirmed their intention to continue the normalization of relations. Earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that he does not rule out the restoration of a visa-free regime for Georgian citizens, and according to the President, there are sufficient grounds for this. According to a survey conducted in Georgia, when asked about Georgia's foreign policy, 14% of respondents answered "pro-Western," 52% said "pro-Western, but we must maintain good relations with Russia," 16% answered "pro-Russian, but it is necessary to maintain good relations with the EU and NATO," and 5% chose "pro-Russian." At the same time, 77% of respondents approved of the Georgian government's goal of becoming a member of the EU by 2015 (National Democratic Institute, 2024).

Georgia-EU Relations during the "Georgian Dream" era.

It should be noted that the problem of developing relations with the West had existed since 2008. The only change was the election of the new American president, Donald Trump, and the policy of the new regime in the South Caucasus (with statements of non-confrontation with Russia), which motivated Tbilisi to approach Moscow. In October 2013, as a result of the presidential elections, the candidate of the ruling coalition "Georgian Dream", Giorgi Margvelashvili, won. At that time, as he had promised, Bidzina Ivanishvili "retired from politics," and the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia,

Irakli Gharibashvili, became the head of the new government. The "For Georgia" government program was introduced. An analysis of the activities of the new government of Georgia shows that the change of prime minister did not affect Georgia's foreign political priorities in any significant way. Even after the presidential change, and in the context of the ongoing complex dialogue between Georgia and the Russian Federation, the United National Movement (UNM) opposition organized various protests in recent years against the so-called "pro-Russian policy" of the "Georgian Dream" coalition, accusing it of retreating from European integration and making concessions to Russian occupation. Despite these accusations, under the new government, on November 29, 2013, at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Maya Panjikidze, and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, officially signed Georgia's Association Agreement with the EU (European Union, 2014). At the same time, Georgia's Minister of Economy, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, and European Commissioner for Trade, Karel de Gucht, signed the part of the association document dealing with the establishment of a comprehensive free trade zone (EEAS, 2016). The Parliament of Georgia approved this document on July 18, 2014. As a result of this policy, on June 27, 2014, the Association Agreement with the EU was signed, which included the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA), replacing the 1996 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Georgia and the EU. This association agreement laid the new legal foundation for future cooperation between Georgia and the EU. The agreement has since been ratified by EU member states and the European Parliament and is now fully operational. The dynamics of support for and opposition to Georgia's integration into the European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are also interesting. When given a choice between the EU and the EAEU, 61% of respondents favored the EU, while 20% chose the EAEU (NDI, 2019). The Association Agreement entered into force in 2016, contributing to the development of trade between the EU and Georgia (Batalov, 2016). In March 2017, the EU granted Georgians visa-free entry. Despite the fact that Georgian Dream made certain adjustments in foreign policy relations with Russia, no serious changes took place in bilateral political relations. The changes were mostly in the economic sphere, initially in the form of recovery and later in dynamic development. The Georgian authorities continued to prioritize the Western vector of foreign policy, keeping NATO and EU membership among their primary goals. In turn, the West has provided significant support to Georgia's Western integration and welcomed Georgia's democratic progress and close cooperation with the West. However, it is important to note that despite these advancements, Georgia has been unable to make progress on issues related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Bilateral political processes remained relatively passive because Georgia maintains a clear position regarding the restoration of territorial integrity. Georgia also recognizes that disregarding Russia's stance could lead to serious consequences for the country. Russia, on the other hand, has shown a willingness to restore dialogue and

relations if Georgia abandons its pronounced anti-Russian position. It should also be noted that many in Georgia realize that restoring territorial integrity with the help of the West is quite difficult. Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze also commented on this, stating that it is impossible to expect the return of these regions in the context of tense relations with Russia. In Georgia's internal politics, there are also processes that emphasize Georgia's orientation toward the West and anti-Russian sentiment, making it difficult to imagine a government that would abandon the Western vector in favor of a constructive dialogue with Russia. The positions of both Russia and Georgia remain in stark contradiction on the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In December 2023, Georgia was granted candidate status for EU membership, which was of great importance for the country (Council of the European Union, n.d.). However, following the adoption of the "Foreign Agents" law, Georgia faced serious criticism from Western countries, particularly from the EU. In response, the EU ambassador stated that Georgia was moving away from European values (Ostiller & The Kyiv Independent, 2024). The parliamentary elections held in Georgia on October 27, 2024, were marred by numerous violations, which were also criticized by observers and Western countries. All of this could negatively impact the development of relations between Georgia and the West. The course of Georgia's relations with the West will also depend on the new U.S. President Donald Trump, as he has a different approach to relations with Russia and South Caucasus policy, as evidenced during his first presidency. It should be noted that in the last parliamentary elections held in October 2024, "Georgian Dream" won 53.92% of the vote, but the opposition and various observation groups did not recognize the results, and thousands of people took to the streets demanding new elections.

NATO-Georgia relations

As for Georgia's relations with NATO, in September 2014, during the NATO summit in Wales, NATO member states and Georgia adopted a "Substantial Package of Measures" that was designed to help Georgia in its pursuit of membership in the alliance. As part of this agreement, on August 27, 2015, the joint training and assessment center of Georgia and NATO was established at the Krtsanisi National Training Center of the Ministry of Defense of Georgia (NATO, n.d.). Despite this, Tbilisi's official goal remains membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, not the intermediate stage that exists today. A clear answer from Brussels came on December 2, 2015, during a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, when they announced that, in order to join NATO, Georgia must pass the "Membership Action Plan" (MAP) stage, which has not been provided to the country since 2008. Then, on February 11, 2016, during a regular Georgia-NATO commission session (at the level of NATO member states and Georgia's defense ministers), NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mentioned that work was being done with Georgia in NATO towards all areas of the Essential Package agreed upon at the Wales summit in 2014 (NATO, 2014). On March 2, within the framework of his visit to Brussels, Georgian Foreign Minister Mikhail

Janelidze met with NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow, who confirmed the alliance's support for Georgia regarding its "ambitious reform agenda (Dzhanelidze, 2023)". The Deputy Secretary General of NATO also noted that the Georgia-NATO essential package was being implemented "successfully" and emphasized that the allies were ready to "find ways to strengthen NATO cooperation with Georgia." According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, during the session, the parties also discussed the progress of Georgia's integration into NATO and the deepening of political and practical cooperation in preparation for the alliance's Warsaw summit, which was set to take place in August of that year. It should also be noted that the Russian side does not hide the fact that Georgia's potential membership in NATO would be seen as a direct threat to Russia. The Russian side has repeatedly stated that the addition of another NATO member state in its immediate neighborhood would create serious security threats, and that Russia would respond to such developments with harsh rhetoric. Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO are also seen as dangerous by the Russian side. Russia has made it clear on numerous occasions that any NATO enlargement near its borders is unacceptable and will be met with strong opposition.

The Next Stage of Tension in Georgia-Russia Relations

After the 2012 elections in Georgia and the rise to power of the "Georgian Dream" coalition, Tbilisi, and Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili himself, softened the rhetoric against Russia and its authorities. Ivanishvili personally avoided publicly criticizing Putin, even on obvious issues. Russia opened its market to Georgia, which led to an increase in exports and a rise in the number of Russian tourists visiting Georgia (with Russia being the number one source of both), bringing the country back to a state of economic dependency on Russia. However, politically, the two sides did not come closer. As before, Russia continued to insist that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were independent states, and that Georgia "must recognize the new realities." On the other hand, Tbilisi insisted that diplomatic relations would not be restored as long as Russia's recognition of Georgian regions as independent entities remained in force. This political impasse did not prevent Russian state media and pro-Russian organizations from flourishing in Georgia during Ivanishvili's reign. Organizations such as the "Heracles II Society," the "Eurasian Choice," and the Russian-Georgian Public Center (named after Yevgeny Primakov and funded by the Russian government) became more active (Ekho Kavkaza, 2014). The main aim of these organizations was to promote a shift away from Georgia's Western course towards NATO and the EU, and to encourage the restoration of diplomatic relations with Moscow. Starting in 2015, more and more events involving Russian delegations took place in Georgia, one of the most notable being the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Orthodoxy session on June 20, 2019, which led to a crisis. The session was disrupted when the Russian deputy, Sergey Gavrilov, took the chair of the Georgian legislature and attempted to continue the meeting in Russian (Musayelyan, 2019). This incident sparked a wave of protests both inside the

parliament and throughout the country. Official Tbilisi reacted strongly, with Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze stating that it was "difficult to see the deputy of the occupying country in the main chair of the Georgian legislature (Agenda.ge, 2019)." After the incident, the Russian deputy claimed that negotiations between Georgia and Russia on humanitarian and economic issues were on the verge of failure. President Salome Zurbashvili also addressed the incident, saying, "What kind of Orthodox union can there be with a country that is not only the occupier of our lands but also fights against religion and Christian values (Kommersant, 2019)". The protests that followed were spontaneous, with opposition parties accusing the government of rapprochement with Russia and an ineffective dialogue. This marked a turning point, leading to a political crisis that undermined the very foundations of Ivanishvili's power. The June 20 demonstration, which initially began as a protest against the presence of the Russian deputy in the Georgian parliament, turned into violent clashes in the heart of Tbilisi, resulting in over 200 injuries. The next wave of tension came in June 2019, amid the anti-Russian protests in Georgia. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded by canceling direct flights between Russia and Georgia, a move that further exacerbated relations. The Russian State Duma even proposed imposing economic sanctions on Georgia in response to the protests, but Putin ultimately spoke out against it. The protests in Georgia were more than just about the presence of a Russian official; they reflected deep discontent with the government's ambiguous stance on foreign policy — trying to balance its NATO and EU ambitions with efforts to appease Moscow. The Georgian government's handling of the protests, particularly the brutal dispersal of demonstrators on the night of June 20-21, led to serious international criticism. The government initially believed that the protests were orchestrated by the United National Movement (UNM), but the turnout and the broad-based nature of the protests proved otherwise. Russia's press secretary Dmitry Peskov referred to the protests as "Russophobic provocations," and President Putin banned flights to Georgia, citing the safety of Russian citizens. However, no Russian citizens were harmed during the protests. For many Georgians, the protests were a direct response to the government's pro-Russian policy and its failure to adequately address Georgia's aspirations for integration with NATO and the EU while simultaneously engaging with Russia. To this day, Georgia's position regarding relations with Russia remains unclear, with no meaningful political dialogue between the two countries. This lack of dialogue has stalled any progress on issues such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and has further entrenched the divide. Georgia continues to rely on its Western orientation for strengthening its position, aiming for NATO and EU membership in hopes that international pressure will force Russia to back down on its stance regarding the occupied territories. Despite statements of willingness from the Russian side to restore relations, the fundamental issues between the two countries remain mutually exclusive, making any substantial progress unlikely in the near future. As a result, the situation remains frozen, with the political crisis within Georgia continuing to hinder the country's ability to resolve its foreign policy issues.

In December 2018, President Salome Zurbashvili was elected and, shortly thereafter, announced her refusal to cooperate with Russia, which she described as an enemy of Georgia (Antidze & Osborn, 2019). The reference made on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation regarding relations with Georgia is quite significant. Specifically, it highlights the events of August 2008, when Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This recognition followed the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia over these regions. As a result, Georgia severed diplomatic relations with Russia in September 2008. Since March 2009, Swiss embassies have represented the interests of both countries in Tbilisi and Moscow, acting as intermediaries. Following the war and the subsequent recognition of the two separatist regions, Georgia took several legal actions against Russia, including initiating cases in the European Court of Human Rights and the International Criminal Court (The Hague). Moreover, Georgia maintains a consistently unfriendly stance towards Russia in international organizations, where it accuses Russia of violating Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the national security strategy of Georgia Russia has consistently identified as primary security threat, framing it as the "main enemy". Despite some economic progress and the softening of attitudes towards Russia under the "Georgian Dream" government, tensions remained high. The central issue of territorial integrity remains unresolved, with Russia continuing to strengthen its influence over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, providing increasing economic and military support. Despite Western pressure, Russia has repeatedly made it clear that there will be no change to the situation in these regions. For Georgia, the future of its relations with Russia remains uncertain, especially in light of ongoing internal political struggles and the country's deepening ties with the West. The official stance of the Russian Federation remains steadfast, emphasizing that relations with Georgia cannot be restored while Georgia continues its path towards NATO and EU membership. Furthermore, Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the ongoing diplomatic tension, ensure that meaningful dialogue remains elusive.

ACHIEVEMENTS

The character of Georgia-Russia relations began to change after the "Georgian Dream" coalition came to power in 2012, with the most noticeable shifts occurring in the economic sphere. Russia gradually increased its influence in Georgia, and this was reflected in various developments, including greater economic engagement. However, alongside this, there have been challenges in EU-Georgia and USA-Georgia relations. Geopolitical developments have had some effect on the dynamics between Georgia and Russia, but the overall nature of their relations has remained largely unchanged since 2012. The influence of third countries, particularly the EU and the U.S., did not lead to significant changes in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. For instance, the portrayal of Russia as a security

threat in Georgia's strategic documents has become less relevant in practice, especially since Russia has become one of Georgia's leading economic partners in recent years.

With the election of Donald Trump as the U.S. President, some analysts suggested that there could be positive changes in Georgia-Russia relations, given Trump's softer stance towards Russia during his first presidency. However, despite these potential shifts, political relations between Georgia and Russia remain tense, primarily due to their deep-seated contradictions on the issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia would be a challenging process. For Tbilisi, the restoration of territorial integrity is a non-negotiable condition for any diplomatic rapprochement. Meanwhile, Moscow is constrained by its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. This significant difference in position means that any potential diplomatic resolution would require bilateral compromises, and a temporary status could be a possibility until a final settlement is reached.

Despite the Georgian government's continued emphasis on the importance of settling relations with Russia as part of its broader foreign policy, bilateral relations have remained somewhat frozen and passive, particularly outside of the economic sphere. However, this should not be seen as a signal that Georgia is moving away from the West. While the relationship with Russia has evolved in economic terms, Georgia's aspirations for integration with the EU and NATO remain central to its foreign policy direction. The country continues to balance its economic ties with Russia with its strategic ambitions towards the West.

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ԱՄՓՈՓՈՒՄ

ՎՐԱՍՏԱՆ-ՌԴ ՓՈԽՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ «ՎՐԱՑԱԿԱՆ ԵՐԱԶԱՆԷԻ»

ԻՇԽԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՇՐՋԱՆՈՒՄ

ԿԱՐԵՆ ՂԱԶԱՐՅԱՆ

Վրաստան-ՌԴ հարաբերությունների ներկայիս փուլը սկսվել է 2012 թվականից երբ իշխանության եկավ «Վրացական երազանք» կուսակցությունը և փոփոխություններ մտցրեց արտաքին քաղաքական կուրսում: Հասկանալու համար երկկողմ հարաբերությունների ներկայիս ընթացքը կարևոր է վերլուծել այն գործընթացները, որոնք տեղի են ունեցել կողմերի միջև սկսած 2012 թվականից: Գիտական աշխատանքի նպատակն է վերլուծել երկկողմ հարաբերությունները «Վրացական երազանքի» իշխանության գալուց հետո, ներկայացնել առկա խնդիրներն ու մարտահրավերները, հետազոտել այդ հարաբերությունների բնույթը, ինչպես նաև աշխարհաքաղաքական զարգացումների ազդեցությունը հարաբերությունների վրա: Գիտական աշխատանքը շարադրելիս օգտագործել ենք պատմահամեմատական, իրադարձային եւ բովանդակային վերլուծությունների համակարգային մեթոդները:

Ձեռքբերումներ: Վրաստան-ՌԴ հարաբերությունները 2012 թվականից դինամիկ աճ են գրանցել մի քանի ոլորտերում՝ փոխելով հարաբերությունների բնույթը և ընթացքը, ՌԴ-ն դարձել

Է Վրաստանի տնտեսական առաջատար պետություններից մեկը, սակայն քաղաքական առումով երկկողմ հարաբերություններում առկա խնդիրները Աբխազիայի և Հարավային Օսիայի հետ կապված շարունակում են մնալ չուծված:

Բանալի բաներ: Վրաստան, Ռուսաստանի Դաշնություն, երկկողմ հարաբերություններ, Հարավային Կովկաս, արտաքին քաղաքականություն, բազմակողմ դիվանագիտություն:

РЕЗЮМЕ

ГРУЗИНО-РОССИЙСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ В ПЕРИОД ГРУЗИНСКОЙ МЕЧТЫ К ВЛАСТИ

КАРЕН КАЗАРЯН

Современный этап грузино-российских отношений начался в 2012 году, когда к власти пришла партия «Грузинская мечта» и внесла изменения во внешнеполитический курс. Чтобы понять текущий ход двусторонних отношений, важно проанализировать процессы, происходящие между сторонами с 2012 года. Цель научной работы – проанализировать двусторонние отношения после прихода к власти «Грузинской мечты», представить существующие проблемы и вызовы, исследовать природу этих отношений, а также влияние геополитических событий на отношения. При написании научной работы мы использовали системные методы историко-сравнительного, событийного и контент-анализа.

Достижения. С 2012 года в отношениях между Грузией и Российской Федерацией наблюдается динамичный рост по ряду направлений, меняя характер и ход отношений, Российская Федерация стала одним из ведущих экономических государств Грузии, но в политическом плане возникли проблемы в двусторонних отношениях с Абхазия и Южная Осетия остаются нерешенными.

Ключевые слова. Грузия, Российская Федерация, двусторонние отношения, Южный Кавказ, внешняя политика, многосторонняя дипломатия.

Հորիշծր ււղւղւել՝ 02.09. 2024

Հորիշծն ուղարկւել է գրիխոււմին՝ 07.09. 2024

Հորիշծր երւշխււղորւել է տւղադրուղին՝ 24.11.2024