

VANIK HRANT VIRABYAN

**ARMENIA IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN
MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN TRANSCAUCASUS
(1917-1920)**



YEREVAN 2024

VANIK HRANT VIRABYAN

**ARMENIA IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN
MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN TRANSCAUCASUS
(1917-1920)**

YEREVAN 2024

UDC 94(479.25)

The Monography is published through the sponsorship of the grant provided by the State Committee of the Ministry of Science, Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Armenia (21T-6A102. – «Armenia in the context of relations with European military-political representations in Transcaucasus (1917-1920)»).

The Monography was guaranteed for publication by The Chair of Armenian History, Council of the Faculty of History and Social Sciences and the Scientific Council of the Armenian State Pedagogical University after Kh.Abovyan (ASPU)

Responsible editor and reviewer: Candidate of historical sciences (PhD), professor **E. G. Gevorgyan**

Reviewers: Head of Chair of the Armenian History YSU,
Doctor of History, Professor **E. G. Minasyan**
Head of the Department of History,
Doctor of History, Professor of Vanadzor State University
F. V. Movsisyan
Candidate of historical sciences (PhD),
professor **A. H. Harutyunyan**

Virabyan V. H.

European military-political representations and the Republic of Armenia in 1917-1920:
Monography / V. H. Virabyan.- Yerevan: «Vahe Mkrtchyan» PE, 2024.- 200 pp. + 2 inserts.

In the monograph were highlighted and valued the activities of the military-political representations of the European countries in Armenia and Transcaucasia in the context of the state-building, economic-military construction processes of the Republic of Armenia, and the interethnic conflicts and confrontations over the territorial-border demarcation disputes.

The monography is intended for historians, military chroniclers, international scholars and the general reading public.

ISBN 978-9939-9191-2-6

© Virabyan Vanik, 2024

CONTENTS

Introduction	4
Chapter 1.	
THE POSITION OF MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ALLIED COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSPIRACY ACTIVITY OF AZERBAIJANI DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE KHAN TEKINSKY IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA	14
Chapter 2.	
THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SOUTH RUSSIAN VOLUNTEER ARMY, BRITISH AND AZERBAIJANI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN TRANSCAUCASIA AND OVER THE ARMENIA IN 1918-1920	42
Chapter 3.	
ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI TERRITORIAL CONFLICT AND THE KARABAKH- ARTSAKH ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND TRANSCAUCASIA IN 1918-1920.....	64
Chapter 4.	
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 1919 ANTI-ARMENIAN UNREST OF THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE SOTQ-ZOD-BASARGECHAR REGION AND THE RESTORATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACTIVITY OF COLONEL CLIVE TEMPERLEY, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE OF GREAT BRITAIN	97
Chapter 5.	
RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 10, 1920 AND THE POSITION OF MILITARY- POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN TRANSCAUCASIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA	130
Chapter 6.	
THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA FROM THE GREAT BRITAIN IN 1918-1920	140
Chapter 7.	
THE QUESTION OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN 1918-1920	164
BIBLIOGRAPHY	186

*History is the treasury of our deeds, the witness of the past, an
example and a lesson for us...
Fake historians should be put to death,
like scammers.*

Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra

INFRODUCTION

The 20th century is full of inter-ethnic clashes. They primarily increased in 1917 in the period of Russian revolutions in February and particularly in October, when Russia found itself in the whirlwind of chaos, as a result of which the Transcaucasian people appeared in entirely different and opposing poles in ferocious anti-war conditions. The October Revolution of 1917, implemented in Russia through the scheme drawn forward by Parvus (I.L. Gelfand) after the approval of German government, was the project of overthrowing Russian powers by organizing a revolution through Lenin, L. Trotsky, thus laying a foundation for the new era of the collapse of states and civilizations, with the aim of seizing victory laurels from Russia which was honoured military victory in World War I and gained advanced geopolitical positions in Europe, and through this to return or minimize the losses of Germany, the culprits of which, perhaps, were Great Britain and France, the consequences of which were "enjoyed" by mankind until the beginning of the 21st century. As a result, Transcaucasia also appeared under the revolutionary debris of 1917, which had its irreversible consequences on the historical fate of the Armenian nation.

Transcaucasia and Armenia did not accept the Bolshevik coup; instead, they swallowed up separatist sentiments in the region, which also contributed to the irreconcilable, confused, often incomprehensible political approaches of the Armenian political forces that were most beneficial to the progressive Turks in the Transcaucasia.

The situation of Armenia and the Armenian people was aggravated by the new invasion of the Turkish invaders on the Caucasian front. In April, Batumi and Kars were occupied, then they moved to the central regions of the Transcaucasus. Mass massacres of Armenian civilians accompanied the advance of Turkish troops.

The "salvation" of Transcaucasia and Armenia at that time was perhaps in the establishment of Soviet rule, which had gradually become an essential part of the geopolitical agenda. However, the unpredictable change of the events went in a different direction. It was unclear when it would become an important strategy for the Bolsheviks in Moscow and when it would be implemented. At

the same time, the Transcaucasus was abandoned by both the German-Turkish military and its allies.

Historical evidence shows how confused the Armenian political circles were, in which Dashnaktsutyun was unable to orientate and conduct conscription, allowing major missteps and failures to make political-military judgments, and as a result, day-to-day deterioration of the Armenian front. This was further exacerbated by the nationalism of the "ally" Georgian Mensheviks and nationalists. Using their dominant positions, they wiped out all ammunition, bullets, and other types of weapons from Kars and other military bases. The weapons were stored in the warehouses in Tbilisi, and nothing was left for Armenians. During the Georgian-Armenian military confrontation in December, the transfer of Armenian military and other property to Armenia was simply sealed and blocked. Even negative was the commander of the Armenian Front, General I. Z. Odishelidze's behavior, who was known for his deep and lively connections with the Turkish authorities, and with the anti-Semitic commander of the Turkish army, Mehmed Wahib Pasha. There was nothing left for Armenian representatives of the Seim to avoid a clash with Turkey, and to declare acceptance of the demands under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty headed by Hovh. Qajaznuni, and to conduct a reconciliation with Turkey. The Dashnak figures were practically isolated. Dashnaktsutyun's famous figure A. Jamalyan noticed this fact. "Turkey's proposal [separation of the Transcaucasus from Russia- V.V.] raised serious political concern for the Armenians, who felt the danger of entering into separate relations with the enemy. However, the Transcaucasian Commissariat decided to conclude a ceasefire [November 21, 1917], and we have [easily] come to terms with the idea that it is necessary to get along with the neighboring nations¹."

In that situation, General I. Odishelidze handed Kars to Turks ignoring the opinions of Armenian partners. To address the issue, Leo said, "At the price of Kars a ceasefire was signed, the hostilities ceased, and new peaceful negotiations between the parties began in Batumi. That is why a new political comedy was played: the Seim declared the Transcaucasus as an independent republic², which led to the inevitable collapse of the Transcaucasian House or Confederation. In 1918, April 9, at the request of Turkey, the Transcaucasus declared itself an independent republic, which was a turning point in the political life of the Transcaucasian peoples. This federation of Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis was not viable. Although I. Tsereteli, the leader of the Georgian Mensheviks, has repeatedly stated that none of the three major nations can save and secure his existence unless he devotes all his efforts to the salvation of others. The three Transcaucasian peoples could not be united in one statehood because they had contradictory political standpoints. The Decree on Turkey was virtually ineffective, and with the contribution of

¹ Jamalian A. 1928: 124.

² Leo 2009: 363-364.

the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by Bolshevik Russia, Kars, Ardahan and Batumi provinces were donated to Turkey.

By revealing the contradictions, confusion, and the whole panorama of expectations and frustrations, confidence and indecision, short-sighted steps of each of the political-party forces, Hovhannes Qajaznuni affirmed that "Russia (not Bolshevik, not anti-Bolshevik) could not help, even if it wanted to. Not only alone but also much endangered, because it was clear that along with the Turks, the Azeris would also strike us (who knows, maybe the Georgians - to completely conquer Akhalkalak, Lori, and Pambak)³."

Turkey not only took advantage of the opportunities provided by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty but also went further in 1917-1918 with the Bolsheviks in practical and profitable cooperation, which gave it a certain degree of restraint in its military-political undertakings and aggressive steps under certain restraint from Bolshevik Russia and the Tatar-Azerbaijani anti-Armenian actions. Armenians just appeared to be in a state of military-political isolation stations, which also indirectly confirmed by Turkish authors⁴.

The independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan forced Armenia to move towards the declaration of independence, which was a consequence of the geopolitical process imposed by the irreversible course of historical and political revolts imposed by the October Revolution of 1917. In which the Armenian national political and party circles were inept, due to varying geopolitical orientations. The separation of the Transcaucasus from Russia created a chaotic geopolitical situation in the region, which gave unpredictable prospects for the vital national-political interests of the peoples of the area and the possible opportunities of historical-political priorities.

The reason, according to Qajaznuni, was that "... the Georgians saw that we were an extra burden for them, that without us they would be able to handle their affairs more easily. Now, the only concern for the Azerbaijanis was to join the Turks, and enter Baku, "relying on the Turkish army." After the Turkish Army's victory, the Azeris no longer needed the Transcaucasian Federation. Georgians were redundant, Armenians were enemies⁵."

Of course, it is essential to record the historical-political reality of 1917. The October uprising in Russia, its separation from the South Caucasus, and the collapse of the Transcaucasian Federation brought new social realities to the Armenian public. Even the Dashnaktsutyun pursued a differentiated approach to Russia's policy, be it Bolshevik Russia or Denikin-Kolchak Russia, accepting them to the extent that would not impede Armenia's independence and territorial integrity, while preserving friendly relations with the Russian people and Russia. In contrast to the

³ Qajaznuni Hovh. 1923: 27-28.

⁴ CEMoGUZ C. 1998.

⁵ Qajaznuni Hovh. 1923: 29.

precise anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian positions of the Transcaucasian political forces, the Georgian Mensheviks and Musavatists, the Dashnaksutyun was practically against the separation of Transcaucasia from Russia until the last moment. It thereby saw danger for the Armenian people in Eastern Armenia, which in May 1918, was baffled by the fact of forced and compulsory independence⁶. Leo clearly expressed it in connection with the choice of historical-political orientation imposed by fate; "Why did we split up, why did we subdue others' party accounts and 'become a toy in the hands of the Turkish pasha⁷."

In their political calculations, the Georgians preferred either to take a neutral stand or to sacrifice "friendly Armenians" for the sake of the political interests and security of authoritarian Georgia.

Finally, on May 26, 1918, under the Turkish ultimatum, the Transcaucasian Seim was dispersed, yielding to the Turkish side Ardahan, Kars, Batumi, the province Surmalu of Yerevan, almost the entire region of Nakhichevan, most of the areas of Sharur-Daralagyaz, Yerevan, Echmiadzin and Alexandropol, as well as Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikhe from Tiflis province⁸. On the same day, the Georgian National Council declares Georgia's independence, with Chkhenkeli appealing to the Ottoman state and Enver Pasha and receiving congratulations on independence⁹. On May 27, the independent republic of Azerbaijan was formed under the leadership of the Musavatists. During the last ten days of May 1918, the Armenian armed forces have been able to suppress the enemy's advance into the depths of Armenia through a lot of efforts. It is possible to record with some confidence the historical-political reality that ultimate the proclamation of independence and the re-establishment of Armenian statehood on the territory of Eastern Armenia depended not on the strategy employed by party-political, public-intellectual forces, but on the new alignment of geopolitical forces and historical-political developments. Al. Khatisyan also has a unique observation of it. "You and we are at war together; we are at war, how can you leave us when we still shed blood? Is it honest? It is an honorable thing for the benefit of the people. We cannot drown with you, and you have to find a language of agreement with the Turks. You have no other way out." "We would have no other choice but to declare Armenia's independence too." Answered N¹⁰. N. Jordanian in a cold manner.

For Armenians, of course, it was a major historical-political event that made significant adjustments to the history of the Armenian people. That made Mehmed Wahib Pasha reconcile with that undeniable reality, which was the May 1918 Sardarapat heroic battle against the Turks. During

⁶ "Yaraj" ("Forward") 1919: October 2.

⁷ Leo 1925: 367.

⁸ The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history) 2000: 171.

⁹ Makhmuryan G. 2014: 223.

¹⁰ Khatisean Al 1968: 8.

the last ten days of May 1918, the Armenian Armed Forces managed to stop the enemy's movement to the depths of Armenia with great efforts. The battles of Sardarapat, Bash-Aparan, and Gharakilisa were significant. The nationwide character of the heroic fighting is remarkable. Those heroic battles have an essential meaning.

The popular character of the heroic war is remarkable. The mystery of those battles is important. It was expressed in the fact that the Armenian people not only defended their physical existence but also forced them to reckon with them and to recognize their right to live independently. The Sardarapat heroic battle can be considered the Armenian Patriotic War against the centuries-old adversary, which can be compared to the liberation of Artsakh and the liberation of Shushi. This was followed by the Declaration of Independence, written by N. Aghbalyan and M. Tumanyan on May 30, announcing the rights of the Armenian National Council to the Armenian provinces¹¹.

The Armenian National Council declares itself the supreme and sole authority of the Armenian provinces concerning the new situation created by the dissolution of the Transcaucasian political integrity and the declaration of independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan. For some crucial reasons, the formation of the National Government of Armenia postpones, and the National Council temporarily assumes all the functions of government to run the political and administrative leadership of the Armenian provinces¹². In this regard, S. Vrcyan characterizes the mystery of that historical moment. "Declaration of Independence, however, came on May 30, under more external pressure than the will of the National Council, adding that it was" not a genuine declaration of independence, but was made by events ", adding that" Armenia's Independence Day should have been considered May 30 but not May 28¹³", which is the day when the National Council decided¹⁴ to send a reconciliation delegation to Batumi.¹⁵ This gives the impression of being the decisive factor of Turkish compulsion, which contradicts the historical and political results and lessons of Sardarapat victory. Feeling this, Dashnak historians start to reassess, by giving priority to the military-political results of the victory of the unity of Armenians in Sardarapat on the occasion of the Independence Day. Accordingly, deciding "to declare May 28 as the exact date of Armenia's declaration of independence¹⁶." It can be said that after the six-year interval the independent Armenian statehood was restored, which, in effect, began a new era in the centuries-old history of

¹¹ The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920 2000: 18.

¹² NAA, fund 222, list 1, file 141, sheet 7.

¹³ Vrcyan S. 1993: 160-161.

¹⁴ Historian R. Hovhannisyan speaking about the incidents of these days, describes the 28th of May as a day for which 1919 was essential as a day of celebrations, and the corresponding call for independence is dated as the 30th of May.

Hovhannisyan R. G. 1967: 191, 305.

¹⁵ Vrcyan S. 1958: 131-132.

¹⁶ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 118, part III, sheet 10.

the Armenian people. Appreciating the history of the establishment of the Republic of Armenia, Leo says: "That Armenia was above ten thousand square meters. Mostly mountain and desert on Lake Sevan, not a place of residence for the Armenian people, but a cemetery. The state border passed beneath Yerevan, and the Armenians had only a six-foot-long railway. Enver Pasha had found that only of such a size¹⁷." It should be noted that in the Declaration of Independence, the Armenian National Council avoided mentioning clear boundaries, while referring to its further claim, underlining its jurisdiction over the Armenian provinces, noting the "proclaimed Republic of Armenia" in the June 4, 1918, Batumi peace treaty¹⁸. Thus, the Republic of Armenia was proclaimed with the relentless imposition of historical-political circumstances. "Anyway, May 28 was the day of origin of the Republic of Armenia. That day became a tribute to the Armenian people and was included in the national calendar ¹⁹."

However, in those conditions, some of the members of the Armenian National Council did not want to leave Tbilisi and move to an unattractive provincial Yerevan surrounded by refugees. The Armenian government representing the Armenian National Council in Tbilisi did not want to make a voluntary decision to move to Yerevan. The Georgian authorities have not kindly approved it. Considering inadmissible the existence of any other body with legislative or administrative functions, considering it the sovereignty of the Georgians violations of rights²⁰" which has been repeatedly criticized by intellectuals, historians, and some public figures of that time. After all, in 1918, Hovhannes Qajaznuni sharply announces his decision to resign as Prime Minister after ineffective discussions on July 12, after which, on July 13, members of the Armenian National Council decided that the Armenian National Council will immediately move to Yerevan²¹.

Finally, after senseless bickering, under the unhappy gaze of the Georgians, on July 17, members of the Armenian National Council; Av. Sahakyan, S. Tigranyan, R. Ter-Minasyan, A. Babalyan, St. Malkhasyan, H. Azatyan, Hovh. Qajaznuni, Arsh. Mkhitaryan, Kh. Karchikyan, Hovh. Hakhverdyan, accompanied by German and Turkish officers, move from Tbilisi to Yerevan, and on July 19, they were in Yerevan. On July 24, 1918, the composition of the first government of the Republic of Armenia was officially announced. The Prime Minister was Hovh. Qajaznuni, and the Foreign Minister was Al. Khatisyan, Affairs Minister; A. Manukyan, Finance Minister; Kh. Karchikyan and the Military Minister was General H. Hakhverdyan. Characteristics of that historical moment can be seen from memorandum of Hovhannes Qajaznuni's "Republic of Armenia," which was presented to the US Government in October 1919 and discussed by the

¹⁷ Leo 1925: 368-369.

¹⁸ The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920 2000: 36.

¹⁹ Vracyan S. 1993: 161-162.

²⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 17, sheet 237-238.

²¹ The proclamation of the Independence of Armenia and the formation of the central bodies of the government 2009: 10-11, 149-152.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the Subcommittee on Armenian Affairs: "Armenia was left alone, surrounded by enemies or unfriendly forces, without any external support and assistance. There was no communication with the outside world because the only railway line was occupied by Turkish troops; the import of goods was stopped because links with Russia, Persia, and Europe were cut off. The neighboring countries Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey did not have the goods to export. The state mechanism inherited from Russian domination was destroyed; all administrative organs were disturbed. There was chaos and anarchy. Everything had to be restarted from the beginning, to build new state buildings on the ruins"²².

On the other hand, the situation was influenced by Englishmen, Frenchmen, and the USA. Those who got rich in World War I worked out large-scale plans of world domination, which, as today, were of paramount importance to Transcaucasia, and in particular, to Armenia itself, under the guise of receiving a mandate from Armenia and under the guise of a "friend." The New York Times, which was very influential in this regard, reported, "We have to be interested in Armenia, the Balkans on the borders of the Great Powers ... Armenia is a great way to connect Europe with Asia and take command over the Black and Mediterranean Seas. If we accept the mandate for Armenia, Armenia will become the American outpost in the East ... There are 100 million people within the 500-mile radius of Armenia who need to conform to American ideology and policy. And if we renounce our mandate, Armenia will come out of the influence of Anglo-Saxon civilization. So we will lose the opportunity to propagate Anglo-Saxon civilization in the Middle East"²³."

In such desperate conditions, at the expense of the great efforts of the people, the bodies of state power; the Government of Armenia, the Parliament, the banking system of the Republic of Armenia and the courts, local self-government bodies, state-economic structures, the Armenian army, diplomatic relations, symbols of statehood were formed. As well as the collections of the security system that are entirely missing from the attention of professionals to the point of establishing a statehood today; the Reconnaissance and Counter Reconnaissance department of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia: Reconnaissance Service of the Republic of Armenia, force structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. The Republic of Armenia was an organized state not only in terms of power structures but also from international law. More than 30 nations recognized Armenia around the world.

On June 15, 1918, the formation of the RA Ministry of Defense began. There was a full focus on this component of the Army's system of public security, going through ambiguous development processes. According to the first Military Minister of the Republic of Armenia General Hovhannes Hakhverdyan, about 18,000 soldiers and officers were serving in the Armenian Armed Forces at the

²² Qajaznuni Hovh. 1993: 24-25.

²³ Adamia V.I. 1961: 13-14.

beginning of autumn 1918²⁴. According to one military report, the number of people in the military service in the spring of 1919 was 16,000²⁵. According to Hovh. Qajaznuni's Memorandum, which was brought to the attention of the European powers, the total number of troops at the end of July 1920 was 18,000²⁶. As to January 16, 1919, following to the information of the General Staff of the RA Ministry of Defense, there were 295 senior officers, 1168 junior officers, 1201 lieutenants and 13214 soldiers in the Armenian Army, with a total of 15878 people²⁷. In this case, to uncover the reality, it is necessary to combine a number of data to find out the true picture, the legend and the truth of the actual situation. According to K. Sassouni, on the eve of the 1920 Armenian-Turkish war the number of the Armenian Army reached 35,000²⁸, including the maximum number of officers at the Kars front according to Head of officers staff was 16,500²⁹. According to Al. Khatisyan, the RA Army in all four directions, at the fronts of Kars-Alexandrapol, Surmalu, Nakhichevan, and Dilijan-Ghazakh at the beginning of November 1920 there were 16,700 swords, overall there were about 25,000 in the Army. Adding to that the 30 percent of military servants in the back, loaders, headquarters staff, health care providers and servicemen, the total number of those involved in the Army reached 34,000, according to Al. Khatisyan. In addition to that, the number of militants in the irregular units, which reached 6,000, eventually led to a 40,000-strong army³⁰. In April 1919, the Reconnaissance and Counter Reconnaissance Unit was established at the General Staff of the Armenian Army, although the groundwork for this extremely important state security task was laid on August 13, 1918. S. Vracyan thought that during the Turkish-Armenian war the total number of the Armenian Army was about 40 thousand, of which 25-26 thousand were regular army units and about 10-12 thousand were volunteer troops³¹. That was the period when Bolshevism, as a military-political force, was undergoing a process of consolidation in Russia. But at first incomprehensible, as a result of which the Armenian party-political and diplomatic-military-political circles relied on P. Vrangeli, A. Kolchak, A. Denikin, and others, losing precious time and all hopes of using strategic opportunities, relying on the abstract assurances of the great European powers. Not trying to guess what the near-catastrophic geopolitical developments of the nearest events will create for the Republic of Armenia first of all. Many did not want to understand that temporary interests, temporary accounts were historically forced to help each other's two enemy states - V Lenin's Russia and Kemal Turkey's "brotherly" Turkey - to form a single front against a common enemy - "monetary" Europe. Al. Khatissyan spoke about it all retrospectively. "On the

²⁴ NAA, fund 45, list 1, file 132, sheet 77.

²⁵ Ibid, fund 275, list 5, file 79, sheet 47.

²⁶ Ibid, fund 200, list 1, file 498, sheet 33.

²⁷ Ibid, fund 199, list 1, file 35, sheet 17.

²⁸ Sasuni K. 1926: 112.

²⁹ Arcruni V. 2002 20.

³⁰ Khatisean Al. 1968: 289-290.

³¹ Vracyan S. 1958: 477.

other hand, the Paris Assembly was too late to deal with Turkey's problems and gave the Kemalists time to get stronger. Then, when Russia ended its internal civil strife, the Allies feared the complexities and left, leaving the newly formed republics in their fortunes³²" that he "came to the firm conviction that the Allies left Armenia, that the Turks took advantage of it on a daily basis, but that the Turks' main allies were the Bolsheviks, who gave power and opportunity to attack the Turks in Armenia. That is a telling fact. It is also a fact that as a result of helping each other they divided Armenia between each other. The Bolsheviks did this, not as a separate enmity towards Armenia, but as a result of their "concerted" policy, for which they would have to win the friendship of the Turks by sacrificing Armenia. And the Bolsheviks gave the Turks what they wanted - Kars, Surmalu, Ardahan, the rest, no Turks needed, that is, the regions inhabited by Armenians, the Russians took³³." Europe's anti-Turkish paper decisions moved Turkey towards rapprochement with the Bolsheviks, though the Turkish politicians of the Milliyet movement, of course, would have preferred to have strong links and serious friendships with the British Empire, as there was an agreement between Turks and Russians. Whether it is Bolshevik or not, they have always considered a non-permanent political move incompatible with their strategic aspirations. However, both the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists assessed the situation very realistically. They made the necessary political conclusions based on a deep understanding of their interests, which was almost completely ignored by the Armenian side. There was never any substantial assistance from the Allies, only empty statements and encouragement. It was not possible to get along with neighbors, for various reasons.

Rapid changes in the geopolitical situation and a substantial revision of the attitude of the Allies towards Armenia led to fatal isolation of the Republic of Armenia. The logical end of which was the disastrous results of the Turkish-Armenian war that began on September 23, 1920, and the shameful, burdensome treaty of Alexandropol for the Republic of Armenia. As a result, the Bolsheviks, in the new situation created by the Yerevan Agreement, received a massive inheritance of about 10,000 square km area of about 1 million people, a large proportion of whom were starving refugees.

The defeat of the Armenian army caused a political crisis in the country. Under the deadly Turkish threat, the Republic of Armenia lost its independence and became Soviet. December 2, 1920, is a fateful day in the history of the Armenian people, as it is considered to be the day of the loss of independence of the First Republic. Also, on that same day, the Treaty of Alexandropol was signed. According to which a significant part of the territories of the Republic of Armenia was annexed to Turkey. However, the conclusion is clear: In the current situation, the Sovietization of

³² Khatisean Al. 1968: 193.

³³ Khatisean Al. 1968: 293.

the Republic of Armenia had no alternative. Moreover, R. Hovhannisyan finds that Dashnakcutyun and the Armenian government remained separate and abandoned by the West, the country was exhausted and left without support. The additional delay not only necessitated the cooperation of Bolshevik Russia and Turkey but also allowed the Turks to exterminate Armenia and impose oppressive conditions³⁴. However, it is also evident that it was at that time that the transition from Republic to Republic took place, and reasonableness demands to see this fact, to view it as a historical reality, even from a socialist perspective. Bolshevism was one of the most influential political currents of the 1920s, and its neglect was tantamount to self-destruction, which was objectively underestimated by influential Armenian social and political forces. There was no alternative, and the Armenian people were drawn into the new and unusual course of world politics, faced with the inevitable fact of Sovietization. This fact, with all its negative layers, nevertheless played a definite role in the preservation of the nation, saved it from physical assimilation. It closed the way for one set of perspectives and kept the system of possibilities and perspectives of another quality in disguise, which became evident in the late 1980s-1990s³⁵.

These precipitous declines in the situation have been very carefully observed by English scholars in the Caucasus; David Marshall Lang and Christopher James Walker. "The situation in the world has undergone such dramatic changes in 1920 that the promises of the allied powers to Armenia have lost the meaning ...After heated arguments ... the dashnakcakan government decided to peacefully hand over power to the Bolsheviks and, as the proverb says, they preferred "to be red rather than dead."³⁶

Thus, the so-called "Sovietization" of Armenia had no alternative and it was the obvious reality and logical outcome of the geopolitical situation.

³⁴ Yovhannesean R. 1993: 32-33.

³⁵ Political History of Armenia 1995: 143.

³⁶ Lang D. M., Walker Cr. J. 1992: 32.

*Mildly exfoliating
From the footsteps of God
You woke up suddenly
And you looked back.*

Chapter 1.

THE POZITION OF MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTIVES OF ANTANTE IN IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSPIRACY ACTIVITY OF AZERBAIAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE KHAN TEKINSKY IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

In dokuments are revealed the efforts of Armenian counterintelligence in its struggle against the Azerbaijani secret services which were aimed at destabilizing the state structures and economy of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920. The Armenian counterintelligence was able to secure the internal peace of the country, neutralize the Muslim uprisings in the territory of RA and solve the most important security issues in general.

Spies have always been a state's invisible and smartly disguised eyes directed at its not-underestimated enemy. Spies are a state's invisible, most loyal and trained soldiers among the enemy. Ancient Chinese martial arts expert Xian Li (VI-V centuries BC) knowingly noted in his book: "... an army without reconnaissance is like a man without eyes and ears"³⁷.

The geopolitical consequences of World War I brought about radical changes in the content of the political map of the Transcaucasian region and in its manifestations. The upheavals and political tides caused by the 1917 October Revolution in Russia were of a "long-lasting" nature and affected almost the whole world, including Armenia. All the possible solutions to the Armenian Question collapsed one after another, the previous treaties and agreements lost their former validity and the peoples (Armenians, Macedonians, Arabs, Slovenes, etc.) standing on a difficult path of seeking independent national statehoods faced fatal dilemmas and geopolitical insecurities. In such an unfavorable geopolitical and grave military situation, when the Turkish hordes, carrying out the massacre of Western Armenians, were knocking on the doors of Eastern Armenia, the First Republic of Armenia was proclaimed on May 28, 1918. The Armenian National Council of Tbilisi that had undertaken the mandate of the first government, not only declared itself the supreme power of the Armenian provinces and creator of state power, but also considered one of its priorities the

³⁷ Sun Tszi 2006: 67.

establishment of a vital body for every state – intelligence and counterintelligence – as the most important basis of the state security system. The processes in that direction were complex, contradictory and ambiguous, due to the alignment of geopolitical forces in the region and the intensity of the struggle between them.

The study of various archival documents leads to the conclusion that in 1918-1920 the Government of RA sought to have not only important structures such as the army, bank, parliament, etc. in terms of understanding and establishing the idea of statehood, but also, of course, the necessary structures guaranteeing the national security of each state, such as the special services – intelligence and counterintelligence, as well as fullyfledged security forces of internal affairs bodies, militia, i.e. a more or less complete security system which would serve the solution of various foreign and domestic policy issues in the region, the detection and prevention of hostile conspiracies and provocations against the Republic. Due to such considerations, in spite of the grave geopolitical situation that arose in the second half of 1918, the government of the Republic of Armenia undertook the task of forming state and national bodies of the security system and directing their activities. The first more or less practical steps in terms of solving organizational-and-financial and human resources issues were taken immediately after the proclamation of the Republic. On August 13, 1918 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia heard the request of the Ministry of Defense to release funds to cover the expenditures on aviation, intelligence and radiotelegraphy. After discussing the issue, the Council of Ministers decided to approve the steps taken, such as to release 6 million roubles financed from government loan: a) to allocate 20 thousand roubles for unforeseen expenses, b) 20 thousand roubles for intelligence, and c) another 20 thousand roubles for counterintelligence, for solving the organizationaland-political problems of the intelligence service³⁸.

Considering these obvious historical facts, it can be argued that immediately after the arrival of the RA government from Tbilisi, when the RA Council or Parliament was formed and the government was appointed, one of its priority tasks was the establishment of the RA state security system and the organization of the relevant bodies, including intelligence and counterintelligence divisions, i.e. the Armenian Intelligence Service or special services, crucial from the point of view of the establishment of the Armenian statehood and its security, protection of state borders. Therefore, it can be unequivocally stated that the beginning of the establishment of the RA intelligence and counterintelligence services or special services should be considered August 13, 1918.

³⁸ NAA, fund 201, list 1, file 484, sheet 9; fund 202, list 1, file 13, sheet 12; fund 204, list 1, file 216, sheet 1.

In this regard, it is important to clearly understand that statehood in general, its independence and more or less complete domestic policy and after all, national and state security cannot be imagined without the thorough organization of intelligence and counterintelligence, the constituent component of that system. In this regard, Tigran Devoyants³⁹ very accurately noticed: “The intelligence is the eyes and ears of the state. The intelligence division prepares for war during a peaceful time, and constantly studies the alignment of enemy forces, the movement of troops, the types and quality of the troops, the fortifications, means of communication, food and ammunition stocks, crops, the economic and health condition of the people, their mood, the relation between the nations and their attitude towards the state, reserve military units, the character of the commanders, the depth of the rivers during the four seasons of the year, the places to cross them, the newly-built roads, the airports, etc., etc. The job of the intelligence division is also to try to disrupt the means of communication of the enemy, to blow up ammunition depots, to burn supplies, to spread illness through microbes, to stir up rebellion and unrest within the enemy country, to connect with their telephone and telegraph communications, to decipher coded telegrams. In short, a skilled spy has no boundaries in his work and activities, he must move in accordance with the requirements and conditions”⁴⁰.

It should be noted that Armenian spies had a good understanding of the essence of intelligence and its problems. Tigran Devoyants correctly noticed that circumstance: “The intelligence, during peace or war, is the eyes and ears of every state. Intelligence studies the arrangement of troops of the enemy or neighbouring state, the alignment of forces, the weapons system, the layout of cannons, machine guns, rifles, tanks, armoured trains, air force, navy, fortifications, their type, quality, power, etc., means of communication, supply, military and supply depots, the economic and sanitary condition of the people, their mood, the relations of the powerful and their attitude towards the state, reserve forces, the description and character of commanders; in a word, everything connected with war – the construction of railway lines, highways, bridges, navy, type of air force, their speed, weaponry etc...

The intelligence division prepares for war during the peaceful time of every state, thoroughly examines all the things irritating the given state in order to facilitate the implementation of its own state’s strategic plans in the event of future war. Thus, the knowledge of the main connections of the railway lines, the depots, the location of important factories, the exact location of bridges will make it easier to bomb those centers, to blow up the bridges and temporarily disrupt

³⁹ Devoyants Tigran Tadevos (20.08.1887, Yerevan - 02. 09. 1965, Belgium) – studied at the Faculty of Mining Engineering of Tomsk University, teacher. He is known by the nicknames Devo, Tigr, etc. The date of birth has been corrected as opposed to the year 1980 circulated by us previously.

Hovakimyan R. 2005: 596; Horizon, 1914, № 230, 233; Armyanskij vestnik, 1916, № 33, p. 24; Kavkazskoe slovo, 1914, № 28-30, 3436; 1918, № 117. Virabyan V. 2018: 16.

⁴⁰ Devoyants T. 1938b: 59.

communications behind enemy lines. Thus, in peacetime every state prepares for war with the help of its intelligence division”⁴¹.

This situation is very well depicted by the well-known Armenian spy Tigran Devoyants, who wrote the following in his memoir “Episodes from my Life”: “And the budget was so small, with worthless Armenian roubles, that was of no significant value outside Armenia. Meanwhile, large sums of money should be allocated to those branches for the self-preservation of the country, because those two branches were to be the eyes and ears of the small country of Armenia, the basis of its diplomacy”⁴².

From the very first days of establishment the head of the intelligence division at the General Headquarters was highly-skilled Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Constantine Shneur, who had a small number of employees at his disposal. In the following years, the division was headed by a number of officers, whose names will forever remain in the pages of biography of that division. From September, 1919 to April, 1920 the head of the intelligence division was Vahagn Galust Muradyan, a rather famous, non-partisan captain. From April, 1920 to the end of June, the intelligence division was run by Tigran Tadevos Devoyants, who had political convictions and was a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation party (by his own testimony, he had been Dro’s classmate⁴³). From July 10, 1920 to the Sovietization of Armenia (December 2) the intelligence division was headed by Mikayel Nikita Dodokhyan. On the path to the establishment of the Service, of great importance was the decree of the RA Military Minister dated April 14, 1919, which mainly completed the organizational work carried out towards the formation of the intelligence service; and an intelligence and counterintelligence division of the General Headquarters was established. As T. Devoyants noticed, becoming “the eyes and ears of every state” “it prepares for war in peacetime, thoroughly examines all the things irritating the given state in order to facilitate the implementation of its own state’s strategic plans in the event of future war”⁴⁴. “It became a more or less complete institution, the immediate tasks of which were to gather facts about the enemy and terrain, to process those data and provide timely information about them, to lead the intelligence work of the brigade headquarters, to count the money provided for intelligence, to organize the fight against espionage”⁴⁵.

And at the time of the escalation of espionage passions against Azerbaijan, when the official diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Yerevan was Khan Tekinsky, who took advantage of his position and conducted conspiracy and reconnaissance activities against the Republic of Armenia,

⁴¹ Devoyants T. 1943a: 91.

⁴² Devoyants T. 1945b: 84-85.

⁴³ Devoyants T. 1938a: 49.

⁴⁴ Devoyants T. 1943b: 91.

⁴⁵ NAA, fund 204, list 1, fie 132, sheet 54-55.

the resident representative of Armenia in Baku was Arshak Sargisyan⁴⁶ (according to a number of facts, in 1922 Tekinsky was already in Tabriz). In response to Tekinsky's expulsion from Baku, Arshak Sargisyan (Arshak Sargisov), resident representative of RA in Baku – a member of the diplomatic mission, was deported from Baku for alleged disruptive activity when Khan Tekinsky was the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. On February 20, 1920 this was reported to Foreign Minister Mustafa Vekilov⁴⁷.

There is almost no fundamental work on the issues related to the Armenian army and intelligence especially in terms of the military and political relationship of the army and the RA intelligence service. In this respect, of certain interest is M. Karapetyan's work⁴⁸, where the author addresses several issues of the formation and development of the Armenian army. It is important to mention several books⁴⁹ published in the Diaspora, where, however, the issue under discussion has caught our attention with some of its undisclosed pages. In general, they are undoubtedly of some interest, but the issues we are interested in are discussed from the standpoint of the activities of the ruling party, the ARF. They mainly focus on the analysis of the strategy of the Bolsheviks and largely blame the Bolsheviks for the slips and mistakes of the Armenian army, dimming the deeper causal findings, without delving into the errors and deviations of the internal political strategy implemented by the Government of the Republic of Armenia. The study of the main issue under discussion is particularly important from the point of view of the RA State Security System formation concept. In that respect of great interest are the issues related to the crisis and conflict situations for the Republic in 1918-1920 and the successful or failed attempts to overcome them, first of all having in mind, for example, the two-week Georgian-Armenian war in December, 1918 that ended in victory for Armenians⁵⁰, as well as the 1920 Turkish-Armenian war which was disastrous for the Republic of Armenia, particularly the inglorious fall of Kars on October 30, around which there are conflicting views today – with sound approaches, as well as views dictated by opportune selfish motives.

This gives the impression as if Kars were one of the main points of confrontation between the world military and political forces, and the solution of many problems depended on the resolute will of the Armenians, the strength of spirit, etc., viewing them in isolation from complex regional realities. The need to shed light on the issues under discussion stems from the fact that today some authors discussing the problems of the Armenian army try to find the failures and slips of the

⁴⁶ According to the investigation carried out in July, 1927 by General Political Department of the Crimean SSR (at that time he worked as an accountant) and according to the data of Grigory Khachatryan's interrogation in connection with the case, the work of intelligence in Baku went rather well. A large number of copies of very valuable correspondence of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Army and the Military Ministry were received.

⁴⁷ Nazim M. 2018a. See Nazim M. 2018b: 80, 99, 110, 158 etc.

⁴⁸ Karapetyan M. 1996.

⁴⁹ Sahakyan H. 1937.

⁵⁰ Virabyan V. 2003; Virabyan V. 2016; Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 99-135; Gevorgyan H. 2007: 269-316 etc.

Armenian armed forces in other areas, particularly putting the lion's share of the blame on the Armenian intelligence, without thoroughly examining the matter and showing a complex approach to the problem, without any real grounds. This is done unilaterally and mainly relying on literature in the format of memoirs, without showing an investigative or critical approach to them, almost without relying on archival data, as if they do not exist or are not very useful or suitable for use, contradicting narrow personal goals. It can be said that regarding that issue, with some reservations, Colonel T. Baghdasaryan duly noted: "Writing about the reasons for the defeat of the Armenian army is absolutely beyond my power. It is raw material and only strategists and skilled military men can write about it. My writings are my personal memories, very limited, a modest amount of material"⁵¹.

Thus, we once again refer to the publications of authors, who relied heavily on literature in the format of memoirs which requires a somewhat critical attitude. The authors of those publications were members of the junior command personnel of the Armenian army, and were not high-ranking officials (centurion Hay Gnduni (Hambardzum Toptchean)⁵², commander of the 1st battalion of the 8th regiment led by Sepuh, commander of the Armenian Army; Artashes Babalyan⁵³. Minister of Social Affairs and had no direct contact with civilian and military departments (it goes without saying that they had to be less informed about the current events, especially that there were civilian albeit high-ranking officials in that role). Their references should be treated with reservation. They contain completely unverified, one-sided, often inaccurate and defective facts, the target of which, among other goals, is the activity of the RA Intelligence Service in 1918-1920 and therefore, Armenian spies, from the private soldiers to officers. It should be emphasized that the assertions openly denying the existence of the RA special services and certain activities carried out by them, are totally unacceptable and not convincing, inaccurate and one-sided, despite the aforementioned mistakes and slips of the RA intelligence division which must have been typical of the whole Armenian state in the process of its establishment and there is no intention to disguise or moreover, openly deny them. Thus, summarizing what has been said, we reject the "assertions" of the non-existence, indisputable dullness and absolute inaction of the Armenian intelligence service, as well as the viewpoint that "the latter were completely unaware of the plans and schemes of the enemy Turkey", the number of soldiers of the Turkish armed forces and their plans, and that the Republic of Armenia had no agents in Turkey etc. Under the irrefutable pressure of numerous undeniable facts all the above-mentioned is denied in the monographs published by us. Although there is some rationality in the points of view expressed, they are

⁵¹ Sahakyan H. 1937: 130-131.

⁵² Martkoc, October 29, 1932, N0 16, 1, 3, 5, 8, November 10, 1932, N0 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.

⁵³ Babalyan A. 1923: 53.56.

sometimes so contradictory and with vague purpose that they can confuse inexperienced readers and create a misconception about the history of the First Republic's state security system, particularly the intelligence service, leading to the erroneous conclusion of the nonexistence of the Armenian statehood. It is unacceptable ignoring the existing facts on the activities of young Armenian intelligence against the republics of Azerbaijan and Georgia and other forces, and especially looking for the causes of the failures and slips in the field of army-building and defeats of the Armenian army only in the activity of the RA intelligence service, and doing so based solely on memoirs and other completely unverified sources.

Thus, by coming to random conclusions about the specific issues of the army and the activity of the intelligence, how could one ignore the circumstance and evident historical fact that, no matter how disorganized and weak Armenian intelligence were (as some "supporters" of the non-existence of the Armenian intelligence services or merely "political deniers" claim), it was to some degree practically possible to prevent the aggression of the Republic of Azerbaijan against the Republic of Armenia in the fierce and long battles⁵⁴ from September-October 1919 to April 1920 due to the efforts of the Armenian intelligence service that was living through complicated and uncertain processes of establishment, born in grave conditions of starvation and destruction and persistently aspiring to be fully established (the mentioned problem is one of the completely unresearched issues in Armenian historiography). It was due to this that the Armenian armed forces under the leadership of Garegin Nzhdeh achieved an important decisive victory and thus, secured the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia in the territories very important for Armenia from the strategic point of view. There is an episode in famous Armenian spy T. Devoyants's memoir, which we do not take as granted, but neither can we ignore, as it clearly testifies to a very important fact of the useful activity of the Armenian intelligence, a historical episode which, in fact, directly and practically to some extent enabled the audacious Armenian armed forces under the command of G. Nzhdeh (Garegin Yeghishe Ter-Harutyunyan, January 1, 1886 – December 21, 1955) to defeat and force out of Zangezur the aggressor army of Azerbaijan, as the invincible patriotic army had once done under

⁵⁴ At the end of 1919 two Azerbaijani regiments intruded into Zangezur headed by Generals Ali Agha Ismayil Agha oghli Shikhlinskij (April 23, 1865 - August 18, 1943) and Samed Bek Sadikh Bek oghli Mehmandarov (October 16, 1855 – February, 1931). [*Shikhlinskij A. 1984: 209; Ibragimov D. 1975*]. G. Nzhdeh organized a counterattack under Goris, and the enemy fled in panic to Avdalar [present Lachin]. After this defeat, the Azerbaijanis did not dare to attack Zangezur until April, 1920. Azerbaijan also used Turkish forces, which in April, 1920 tried to attack Kapan under the leadership of Nuri Pasha, but they suffered a crushing defeat in the Vorotan gorge. At the end of April, Nzhdeh not only repulsed all the attacks of the enemy, but also went to Artsakh with Dro, and helped the heroic Armenians of Artsakh. In connection with these events and regarding the acts of heroism demonstrated by Arsen Shahmazyan, Garegin Nzhdeh, and other national devotees and well-known military figures during the long and fierce battles in Zangezur from September-October, 1919 to April, 1920 one of the totally undiscovered and unknown pages of Armenian historiography is addressed above. It is connected with the role of the intelligence and counterintelligence division of the General Staff of the RA Military Ministry in these very important events for the Republic of Armenia, which does not cast a shadow on the military and political activity of the famous general Garegin Nzhdeh.

Melkonyan A. 1998: 217; Danielyan E., Melkonyan A. 2008: 297-299.

the command of David Bek. In this connection, T. Devoyants very clearly claims: “Armenia’s intelligence division bribed the chief of officers of the Azerbaijani army that stood against Nzhdeh by giving him 200,000 roubles. He arranged his troops, cannons and machine guns in the way we wanted, and when the fighting broke out, Nzhdeh’s forces defeated the much stronger Azerbaijani army, captured or destroyed the enemy’s strong artillery and machine guns.

The chief of officers of the Azerbaijani troops of that region was Georgian.

It was after this that Garegin Nzhdeh became Sparapet⁵⁵

In order not to give the impression that on the one hand we demand a critical attitude towards literature in the format of memoirs, and on the other hand we refer only to such sources let’s turn to the help of archival facts to verify the above-mentioned evidence. A number of important archival documents help shed light on obviously insufficiently studied or, more exactly, completely unexplored issues, thus overcoming a number of hardened stereotypes, stereotyped conclusions and judgments. The first documents related to Major General Hovsep Artem Kishmishyan, the military attaché attached to the Armenian diplomatic mission in Tbilisi, i.e. the coordinator and head of intelligence-related issues, are of certain interest from the point of view of the abovementioned questions despite some contradictory information contained. It should be taken into account that despite the fact that the Armenian intelligence was still quite young, inexperienced, and was taking the first steps to become a serious service, in the moral and political sense this did not hinder it from getting useful information. The document below is one of the best and indisputable proofs of that and confirms T. Devoyants’s above-mentioned assertion about a really interesting historical event that testifies to the fruitful work of Armenian spies. It proves that the division’s work was not so bad at all, as some eyewitnesses and contemporary authors “try to testify”. Thus, H. Kishmishyan, the head of the Armenian special service in Tbilisi, in his report (No 33) of January 17, 1920, addressed to the RA Military Minister, informed that a fully trusted person, Bogdan Davidovich Avan-Yuzbashi Khan Sagnakhsy (who was considered a loyal man among the Armenian military mission in Tbilisi), according to the assignment of the department he ran, had reached an agreement with Lieutenant Colonel prince Eristov⁵⁶, chief of staff of the Azerbaijani detachment which had been given the “right” to act in Zangezur. For 200-300 thousand roubles Eristov had promised to provide them with the code (password) of the Azerbaijani Army, all the secret correspondence, deployment of Azerbaijani troops and the plan of alleged attack on Zangezur. Eristov was also obliged to make the combat order in a desirable way for them and to develop the whole plan of the

⁵⁵ Devoyants T. 1944: 75.

⁵⁶ Eristov, Eristavi Ksansky, Alexander Nikolay (5.07.1873-10.02.1955) – prince, lieutenant general from August 23, 1917. He served in the army of Menshevik Georgia. As a member of the delegation of the Menshevik government he was sent to Turkey, where he remained until 1921, after which he was deported to France.

Zalesskiy A. 2003: 712-713.

operation according to the instructions of the Armenian side, at the same time keeping in touch and informing of all the military operations of Azerbaijan.

As we can see, this is very interesting information, which, of course, cannot be taken as granted. However, one should not ignore similar intentions of the Azerbaijani intelligence and the preparations being made, although in the information he gave General Kishmishyan confidently added that Khan Sagnakhsy had assured them of the reliability of the information, adding that it would be delivered through Lieutenant Colonel Eristov, and the money would be paid only after checking the above-mentioned documents. Apparently, expressing almost complete conviction that these Azeri officers could already be considered fully bribed or lured to their side, in this very interesting report General Kishmishyan expressed an opinion that it was necessary to immediately send Captain V. G. Muradyan to Tbilisi together with the money, so that the latter could directly contact the above-mentioned Lieutenant Colonel Eristov for a detailed clarification of all the circumstances. Kishmishyan informed that on the eve of Captain Muradyan's business trip it was necessary to ask the Chief of Staff about the questions that Lieutenant Colonel Eristov should be aware of 1) the number of troops, 2) their groupings, 3) directions of military actions, 4) auxiliary operations. At the end of this interesting report, General Kishmishyan stated that Captain Muradyan should be informed by a detailed, exhaustive instruction necessary for his work, which would include the verification of all the information. Besides, Kishmishyan informed that one of the best employees of the Tbilisi intelligence network, Lieutenant Yeghiazarov had been sent to Yerevan for an oral report. There is also a corresponding note on the document (No 34) addressed to the Military Minister that the code, as well as the whole secret correspondence about the deployment of the Azerbaijani troops could be obtained for 200-300 thousand roubles⁵⁷.

Ultimately, the important thing here is that although one might think that the Armenian intelligence was I enough to believe the Azerbaijani army officers in such important matters, it should be noted that in this case the Armenian intelligence officers acted I and obtained very important information that could serve the issues of ensuring Armenia's security and defense capacity [such examples can be found in the practice of other countries as well]. They even turned to bribery and other means and methods of obtaining important information which in practice served the decisive victory against Azerbaijan won by military units led by Nzhdeh. Referring to T. Devoyants it should be once again stated that when Azerbaijan was concentrating large numbers of troops against Zangezur, thanks to the Armenian intelligence service the Armenian government was able to obtain information of great strategic value, which helped to achieve significant results in the military and political conflict with the enemy. In regard to this T. Devoyants simply emphasizes the

⁵⁷ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 184, sheet 3-4.

following: “The Armenian government was able to bribe the Azerbaijani army’s chief of officers who was a Georgian colonel. The latter not only gave us information on the deployment of Azerbaijani troops, but also arranged the Tatar military units in such a way that our army managed to easily defeat them and seize their cannons, machine guns and ammunition”⁵⁸.

We think that additional comments are unnecessary and irrelevant here. Moreover, even Dr. Nazim Mustafa, the Azerbaijani researcher studying our monograph⁵⁹ on Armenian intelligence published in 2015 unwittingly and unconditionally acknowledged this fact and confessed that a significant role in the defeat of the Azerbaijani troops was played by the misinformation of Major General David Bey Yedigarov, who headed the 1st Azerbaijani division against Zangezur (he was disqualified directly by the order of Azerbaijani Military Minister Samed Bek Mehmandarov, and an official investigation was launched). At the same time Dr. Nazim Mustafa stated that before the famous operation, Armenian spy Tigran Devoyants had managed to bribe a Georgian officer of the Azerbaijani army with 200,000 roubles thanks to which G. Nzhdeh was able to strike with great accuracy and defeat the stronger Azerbaijani army⁶⁰.

Thus, the RA Intelligence Service did not stop showing interest in the events unfolding around Armenia and the people involved in them. In his secret service telegram dated May 18, 1920 (N 01322), addressed to the RA military attaché in Tbilisi, General Kishmishyan, H. Khan-Kotursky, acting Head of Intelligence Division at the time, asked to interrogate retired rotmister Khan Sagnakhsy to find out if his adjutant Timiryan, who served in the Tbilisi Cavalry Regiment, had served during his tenure and what was known about him⁶¹. And on May 21, 1920 (N 218) in a secret letter addressed to the RA Chief of the General Staff, General Kishmishyan informed that Timiryan’s interrogation had already taken place and it had revealed that Timiryan had served in the 1st Machine Gun command staff of the Cavalry Regiment. He was from Shushi and as far as was known, he was from a wealthy family and his mother lived in Tbilisi at that time. He was said to be a generally negative person who had persuaded his friends to rob his own mother two years before, and it had been done. Kishmishyan reported that, according to Sagnakhsy, more thorough details about Timiryan could be provided by Timiryan’s immediate staff-captain Melik-Adamov, who was in Armenia in Colonel BekPirumyan’s detachment⁶².

The detailed study of a number of other documents makes it evident that the special services of the First Republic of Armenia tried to work, to do their best in the conditions of the resources and manpower available. It is another thing that they were not able to achieve a more or less tangible

⁵⁸ Devoyants T. 1945b: 83.

⁵⁹ Virabyan V. 2015.

⁶⁰ Nazim M. 2019a.

⁶¹ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 154, sheet 119.

⁶² Ibid, 123.

advantage, e.g. in the fight against the Turkish special services (especially against counterintelligence) which felt more confident and secure, and in some situations were more proactive and bold. On the one hand, there was the centuries-old experience of a powerful world empire (albeit an Asian variant, savage and insidious), the availability of manpower and resources, and on the other hand, there was the newly-forming state of Armenia, with lack of manpower, and the available staff consisted of very young, untrained people not having much experience in operative work. The establishment of these services was also negatively affected by the isolation from Russia and from its educational and military support institutes, the geopolitical isolation, as well as the pro-Western sentiments, which then boomeranged, exposing their rear. Nevertheless, in this situation, the existing Armenian special services tried to interfere with the enemy agents, to strengthen the security of the Republic in extremely tense moments for the homeland (Böyük-Vedi and Zangibasar, Armenian-Georgian war for Lori and adjacent regions, etc.).

In order to have a more or less full disclosure of the history of the intelligence service of the First Republic of Armenia it is relevant to mention an important page of the activity of the Armenian intelligence service in regard to the plots of the Azerbaijani special services in Yerevan which had the diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Armenia as the headquarters of their activity, and a network of agents. In this connection Al. Khatisyan meaningfully noted: “The other side confirmed that the special messenger of the government of Azerbaijan had distributed 5 million rubles to the rebel villagers of the Sharur region. Thus, the riot fed from the outside, not only disturbed the minds of the population, but also created a belief that in the event of an uprising foreign aid would be provided to them.

At the beginning of 1920 the other side would send them officers and soldiers...

Through their intelligence bodies the government of the Republic of Armenia received information on the preparations made in this or that region on a daily basis”⁶³.

All this is denied by the facts illustrated by V. Artsruni and others. According to them, the Armenian intelligence which allegedly operated during the years of the First Republic of Armenia, “would also show its traditional weakness on the ArmenianAzerbaijani front”. In practice it was not so: on July 31, 1919 the RA Minister of Foreign Affairs Al. Khatisyan lodged a strong complaint with the Azerbaijani government over the Böyük-Vedi incidents, in connection with its disruptive espionage and intelligence activities, emphasizing his great awareness: “The Armenian government has evidence based on verified, undeniable documents not only about the armaments and financial aid provided to the population of Böyük-Vedi from outside, but also about the fact that all the subsequent insurgences are the work of an organization that pursues one goal – to artificially turn

⁶³ Khatisyan Al. 1968: 205.

the Muslim population against the government of Armenia and to forcibly wrap this provocation around the neck of the Muslim population through the many agents from abroad. Without them the Muslim population would still continue to live a peaceful, cultural life in the mentioned regions of Armenia, as is the case in other parts of Armenia. After these exhaustive explanations about this issue, the Armenian government deems it necessary, based on solid data, to declare with sorrow that with his actions Mr. Tekinsky⁶⁴ personally contributed to the movements directed against the Republic of Armenia and against peace in the country”⁶⁵.

This is very clearly stated by T. Devoyants in his famous memoir “Episodes from my Life”: “Azerbaijan had a very good spy network in Yerevan”⁶⁶. Then on another occasion he added the following: “The diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Yerevan not only reported with unusual speed about the deployment of Armenian troops and transportation of troops and ammunition to Tbilisi and Baku, but also had in its possession Armenia’s secret orders and instructions. Armenia had given seats to Muslims in its parliament and for the election of those Members of Parliament the Azerbaijani government had allocated 40,000 roubles. Every day many of their spies freely passed Tokhmakhian Gjol behind the Tatar district of Yerevan and went from there to Sharur-Nakhichevan, Böyük-Vedi and Zangibassar, transporting ammunition, instructions, news and food from Yerevan. They had all kinds of certificates issued by the police, this or that member of Parliament or minister”⁶⁷.

At the same time, in honor of the measures and countermeasures undertaken by the Armenian intelligence service, Tigran Devoyants emphasizes the following: “Fortunately, every day the Armenian government was kept informed of the enemy’s plans by these telegrams and accordingly, took measures. If the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan had not been robbed by “bandits” in the neutral zone, the number of the Tatar army in the Sharur-Nakhichevan region alone would have reached 10,000 with the money sent from Baku through Tbilissi. Similarly, the number of Tatars

⁶⁴ Tekinsky Mamed (Muhammed) khan (1880-1938) –was a lawyer, worked as the official representative of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in the Republic Armenia from January 29 to October 10, 1919. From October 11, 1919 till April 28, 1920 he was Deputy Foreign Minister. In 1938 he was executed by the decision of the Council of 3 of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), later in 1955 he was acquitted. See Nazim 2018a.

Undoubtedly, Nazim Mustafa’s book published in Baku in 2018 is worth paying attention to. It is written from the Azerbaijani point of view and a number of fundamental issues related to the activities of the Azerbaijani envoy in Yerevan Khan-Tekinsky, as well as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict became a subject of discussion. See *Nazim M. 2018a; 2018b: 20, 80, 84, 99-105, 107, 109-110, 113, 115, 158 and etc.* Safarov Rafiq (National Archive Department of the the Republic of Azerbaijan Chief Advisor, Documentation and Usage Department), Mammad Khan Birinski (1879-1938), one of the statesmen and prominent diplomats of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic. See <http://www.milliarxiv.gov.az/az/mammed-xan-tekinski-1>;

Nazim M. 2018a; Kelbizade E. 2014.

Tekinsky was one of the most experienced and promising diplomatic and intelligence employees of Azerbaijan, whose neutralization and prevention of conspiratorial steps was one of the most successful and skillful actions ever undertaken by the RA Intelligence Service, particularly Tigran Devoyants.

⁶⁵ Hayastani Ashkhatavor, August 19, 1919, N 123.

⁶⁶ Devoyants T. 1945a: 88.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 81.

fighting in Böyük-Vedi, Zangibassar and other regions would have increased, and all Armenians of Armenia would have been in danger of extinction”⁶⁸. This view is also supported by S. Vracyan: “From the very first day of Khan-Tekinsky’s arrival in Yerevan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia was familiar with his code. All the telegrams sent by or to Khan-Tekinsky became known to the Armenian government before they reached him. In May, 1920, after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, those telegrams were published in a separate booklet “Secret Documents” (a page of conspiratorial activities of Azerbaijan), 1920, Yerevan, publ. “Razmik”⁶⁹. In another place S. Vracyan added: “From the very first days of independence, Azerbaijan did not leave Armenia alone. With the support of the Turks, the Azerbaijanis tried to turn the Turkish-Tatar population of Armenia against the Armenian government. The Ambassador of Azerbaijan Khan Tekinsky was a key player in these affairs. He kept agents in various parts of the country, received large sums of money from Baku and provided classified information to his government. An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Yeakulian (P. Yakulyan – V. V.) soon deciphered the code by which Khan-Tekinsky exchanged telegrams with his government”⁷⁰. Abr. Gyulkhandanyan also wrote about it: “Although seemingly friendly relations were maintained and the two countries had representatives in the other country, the government of Azerbaijan made every effort to prevent the Muslim elements in Armenia from submitting to the Armenian government. And that is why Azerbaijan supported them with weapons, military leaders, especially money. The representative of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia, using his position, constantly reported to his government about the work he carried out through coded telegrams and received instructions...”

The Armenian government, which was aware of the content of all these telegrams from day one, was finally forced to actually expose the real image of that unique state ambassador and demand that the Azerbaijani government recall him. And although that representative was replaced by another, the latter also continued the work that his predecessor had begun”⁷¹.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Vracyan S. 1993: 310; Ruben 1982: 193; Vracyan S. 1966: 102.

It should be added that famous spy T. Devoyants had a significant role in this issue. He was the first to decode their key, to declassify them and prevent the destructive actions against Armenia and its authorities (See Devoyants 1945a: 87).

⁷⁰ Vracyan S. 1966: 102.

It should be noted that in this connection Tigran Devoyants reported that he had declassified all the known 75 secret coded telegrams, which the RA Ministry of Foreign Affairs illegally attributed to themselves (Devoyants 1945a: 87-90; 1945b: 82-83).

NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, sheet l. 9, number 150, fund 206, list 1, file 84, sheet 27, The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history) 2000: 110.

⁷¹ Gyulkhandanyan A. T. 1967: 76.

This is clearly confirmed by R. Hovhannisyan, who emphasizes the awareness of the Armenian intelligence: “The Armenian intelligence service soon learned to decipher the briefs and provided declassified texts to the government and officers”⁷².

Mamed Khan-Tekinsky, Azerbaijan’s representative in Yerevan, worked tirelessly in order not to let Sharur and Nakhichevan to connect to Armenia. Since his arrival, he kept his government informed of the military and political situation in southern and other regions through coded messages. And in order to achieve those goals, Khan-Tekinsky constantly demanded large sums of money from the Azerbaijani government, at the same time demanding to use force on the Armenian government to immediately resolve the issue in favor of Azerbaijan⁷³.

Therefore, it is quite natural that during those years the Armenian special services not only had a certain interest, but also control over the activities of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Yerevan, the capital of the Republic of Armenia (it was opened in March, 1919 and became an espionage and intelligence center for developing and directing anti-Armenian operations; the spy forces concentrated there, gathered information about the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia, deployment of forces, conducted political observations, collected data on the RA financial capabilities and gave instructions and advice to their own government on how to harm the national and state security of the Republic of Armenia). In this regard, the declassification of a number of coded telegrams sent to Baku by the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission provided an opportunity to disclose some important aspects of hostile activity. Moreover, the enemy’s goals included providing financial and military support to the hostile and insurgent elements inside the country, as well as causing the implementation of various issues of state and political construction to fail. In order to have a clear understanding of the destructive and harmful espionage and intelligence work Azerbaijan carried out against the Republic of Armenia through its diplomatic representatives in Yerevan, let us bring a number of factual data, quotes from secret correspondence. This is reflected in the first secret coded telegram that Tekinsky, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia, sent to Baku immediately after setting foot in Yerevan, on March 22, 1919. It said: “On March 14 Armenia received 14 million roubles from Tbilisi, but if you cause financial difficulties, Armenia will soon find itself in a difficult position. Because of lack of income, Armenia cannot lead an independent life”⁷⁴.

On April 10, 1919 a few days after arriving in Yerevan, Khan-Tekinsky briefed the Head of the Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, informing: “Armenia has 6 infantry regiments, each consisting of 3 battalions. Besides, 6 Karabakh battalions and 1 Yerevan

⁷² Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 213.

⁷³ Ibid, 263-264.

⁷⁴ Secret Documents 1920: 18.

battalion are being formed. Chieftain military units are being formed. The whole infantry does not exceed 10 thousand. Conscription has been announced to replenish the regiments. The cavalry consists of 3 divisions, each having 3 squadrons. Only one squadron is provided with horses. There are 2 field, 5 mountain and 1 cavalry batteries, 3 armored vehicles, captured from the Georgians”⁷⁵.

Paying special attention to the events and incidents in the Nakhichevan region, on April 18 Khan-Tekinsky informed his government about the resistance of Muslims in the Zod-Bassargechar region and the fighting with the Armenian military units⁷⁶. On April 29, Khan-Tekinsky wanted to find out what kind of help the government would provide to the Muslims of Nakhichevan in the event of resistance when Armenian troops entered there: “Will they send troops, at least under the pretense of volunteers?”⁷⁷. S. Vracyan testifies about Khan-Tekinsky’s anti-Armenian conspiracies and provocations: “On April 30, Azerbaijani agents Nakhichevansky and Makinsky arrived in Yerevan with large sums of money in order to get to Nakhichevan... A new period of conspiracies of Azerbaijani agents began”⁷⁸.

There is direct evidence of that in a telegram sent to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan by Tekinsky, the diplomatic representative of that country in Yerevan, on May 1, 1919. It said: “On April 30, Makinsky (Ganizade) and Nakhichevansky arrived. In Yerevan, William Montgomery Thomson prohibited Makinsky from crossing into Nakhichevan on the grounds that the area was under the control of the Armenian government. Makinsky has given the money to me. I am waiting for instructions on how to use the money allocated to Nakhichevan. Nakhichevansky is forced to return. The British took Makinsky’s car”⁷⁹. On May 4, 1919 asking for an urgent response to his April 29 telegram, Khan-Tekinsky added: “The people of Nakhichevan are asking me how to behave. Will Azerbaijan come to their help if the people of Nakhichevan show resistance to Armenians?”⁸⁰. In another telegram of the same day, Khan-Tekinsky informed the government of Azerbaijan: “The Armenian regiments moved to Nakhichevan. In order to put pressure on Armenia, I consider it necessary to immediately deploy our regiments to the borders of Armenia. The population of the Nakhichevan region is ready to show resistance. The 4th Armenian Regiment is stationed in Dilijan but not at full strength. The accumulation of Armenian troops continues in Davalu. The Muslims stand near the village of Sadarak, in the region of Gayli Durk”⁸¹. Khan-Tekinsky demanded that the Azerbaijani government provide a large amount of money to the diplomatic mission to organize armed forces and use them against Armenia. “Thanks to the

⁷⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, sheet 1.3, number 41.

⁷⁶ Ibid, l. 4, number 60.

⁷⁷ Ibid, number 72.

⁷⁸ Vracyan S. 1993: 311-312.

⁷⁹ Secret Documents 1920: 21.

⁸⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, sheet 5, number 83.

⁸¹ Ibid, number 82.

measures I have taken, Sharur, Nakhichevan and Ordubad have united in the Nakhichevan (Muslim) National Council, which always keeps in touch with me”⁸², - Khan-Tekinsky informed. Here is the answer of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov to the last telegram No. 130: “I approve of the measures aimed at establishing contacts with Sharur-Nakhichevan. I agree to release funds for military organizations. Inform of the ways of implementation and organization of the mentioned plan”⁸³. In a telegram dated July 24, 1919 Jafarov also informed Khan-Tekinsky of the decision of the Defense Committee of the Government of Azerbaijan about refusing to supply oil to Armenia: “I inform you about it, do not say anything to Armenians”⁸⁴.

Khan-Tekinsky, using the cover of diplomatic immunity, through evident espionage was in fact engaged in sending valuable information on many issues, including the structure and armament of the Armenian army. In his secret telegram No 94, dated May 10, 1919 sent to Baku, to the chief of ministers, Khan-Tekinsky wrote: “Make the Bolshevik threat to Baku a pretence and ask the British to transport the cannons in Kars to Baku”⁸⁵. This was later achieved by Azerbaijan. We learn about this from the letter dated April 14, 1920 sent to Colonel M. Zinkevich, the military representative of the General Command of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, by Al. Khatisyan, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of RA. We have covered this previously. Due to the efforts of the intelligence this and 75 other such secret and coded telegrams came into possession of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA, which published them⁸⁶.

A few more examples: thus, in response to telegram No 1599 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated June 5, 1919 Khan-Tekinsky reported that the Sharur-Nakhichevan region had a semi-regular army of up to 6,000 soldiers, cavalry, cannons, machine guns, “they are not inferior to Armenians in combat capabilities” and at wartime their number could increase to 10.000. “I think we should make expenditures for 6,000 soldiers, with the old command staff, we should deploy troops in the places where they were before the arrival of the Armenians, and concentrate one military unit in the mountains of Zangezur. It is difficult to fully guarantee the right spending of money. The importance of the case makes us even reconcile with small abuses”, - Khan-Tekinsky wrote⁸⁷. At the request of the Azerbaijani government to urgently report on the situation in Nakhichevan, Sharur, Vedibassar, Goghtn, Ordubad and Julfa, on June 26 Khan-Tekinsky reported: “The regions of Nakhichevan, Sharur, Vedibassar, Shahtakht are occupied by Armenian troops, an

⁸² Ibid, sheet 8-9, number 129, 130, 151.

⁸³ Ibid, l. 9, number 1599.

⁸⁴ Ibid, sheet 13, number 54.

⁸⁵ Harutyunyan Kl. 2002: 61-62.

⁸⁶ Virabyan V. 2007: 82-88.

⁸⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, sheet 9, number 150, fund 206, list 1, file 84, sheet 27; The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history) 2000: 110.

Armenian administration has been established. Julfa is under the control of Armenians, the Muslim troops are scattered. There are only 300 Chetniks”⁸⁸.

On June 22, 1919 the diplomatic envoy of Azerbaijan, who had arrived in Armenia to “establish good-neighborly relations”, but carried out active and provocative espionage and intelligence activities, wrote the following in a very hostile attitude: “I think Azerbaijan has no other enemy besides Armenia. Special attention should be paid to Armenia: we need Kurdish Smko to take our side”⁸⁹. On July 16, 1919, he sent a coded telegram to the Azerbaijani military attaché in Tbilissi, Colonel Mahmed Bek Aliyev, saying: “Armenia has 3 infantry brigades, each consisting of 2 regiments. A regiment has 3 infantry battalions, three cavalry regiments, each consisting of 6 squadrons, but the organization of all squadrons is not over yet; 12 batteries with 4 cannons each. In addition, there is one Karabakh detachment consisting of one infantry battalion, 3 squadrons and 4 cannons. There are approximately more than 500 cannons in Kars, from 8-inch to field cannons, and there are officers and soldiers on them. There are three armored trains. A strong mobilization is currently taking place. I think that only by mobilization the number of the mentioned regiments can be supplemented, because there is a lot of desertion. Please report all this to the Military Minister”⁹⁰.

Two days later, on July 19, in another telegram sent to the same addressee, the Azerbaijani diplomat engaged in espionage activities against the Republic of Armenia hurried to make the following addition: “Besides the six infantry regiments, there is the seventh one. There is also one border brigade and the military unit of the military headquarters. There are Armenian military units in Zangezur, but their number is unknown”. Then he added: “The fifth Regiment is stationed in Kars. The fourth is somewhere in the Dilijan and Surmalu province. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd military units of the 7th Regiment, as well as one unit of the border brigade, the military headquarters company, a mortar unit, two armored trains, the small military units of the cavalry and mountain cavalry battery are located in the regions of Vedibassar, Sharur and Nakhichevan. The military training contingent and the separate Yerevan battalion are stationed in Yerevan. The entire Karabakh detachment, under the command of Colonel Kafiev, have probably moved to Zangezur. The cavalry was stationed in Alexandrapol, but it is difficult to determine where it is now, as there are only three squadrons on horseback, the rest are without horses. Due to the fighting, the locations of the military units are being changed. Copies of General Shelkovnikov’s secret orders to the

⁸⁸ Ibid, fund 200, list 1, file 299, sheet 10, number 184, 1695; fund 206, list 1, file 84, sheet 28; The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history): 114.

⁸⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 10, number 202.

⁹⁰ Yaraj, June 6, 1920, No 117.

regimental commanders have been sent to the Muslims of Sharur-Nakhichevan, which the Armenian authorities probably are not aware of”⁹¹.

As it becomes clear from the materials of the correspondence on the conspiratorial activities of the Azerbaijani agents, in addition to organizing internal unrest in the Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan spared no effort and resources to dismantle Armenia economically, using oil, fuel oil and gasoline which were in their hands. As it becomes obvious from the well-known correspondence, Azerbaijan paid special attention to the railway as the main artery for the operation of the commercial and industrial system of the Armenian state, a means of rapid transportation of goods and troops. From this point of view, the military and political regions of Azerbaijan, the intelligence bodies and the agents operating in the territory of RA always gave instructions to their government to be very prudent and careful in the transit of oil and fuel oil to Armenia and avoid excessive “generosity”. Thus, in a telegram dated June 4, 1919, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tekinsky emphasized the following: “For whatever reason, postpone sending fuel oil to the Armenian railway because events are expected to take place in the Nakhichevan region”⁹². And in a telegram dated July 24, 1919 the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jafarov instructed Khan-Tekinsky on how to act in the current situation: “(On – V. V.) Bekzadyan’s mediation on sending 500,000 poods of oil... the Security Council has decided not to release oil until the Azerbaijani government changes two conditions of the contract”⁹³.

Azerbaijani diplomatic spies were deeply convinced that by causing financial difficulties for Armenia they would be able to bring about military and political complications and unsolvable difficulties as well. Moreover, in their intrigues against Armenia the Azerbaijani agents also allocated a certain place to external forces, trying to find the most effective ways and means to influence them, giving appropriate instructions and advice to their own government. Thus, in his telegram dated April 16, 1919 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Khan-Tekinsky emphasized the following: “It is necessary to protest before all the Muslims of India, Turkey, Afghanistan, the Malay Islands and the Caucasus, as well as before the Reconciliation Assembly against the desire of the British to subjugate several million Muslims to half a million Armenians”⁹⁴.

The Azerbaijani agents believed that their government should take some precautionary measures to ensure its interests in the means of communication. In this connection they asked the government to take actions so that the British would not harm them or hinder them from taking the appropriate measures. This view is defended in the telegram dated July 28, 1919 sent by Khan-

⁹¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, part I, sheet 6.

⁹² Secret documents 1920: 26.

⁹³ Ibid, 37.

⁹⁴ Ibid, 19.

Tekinsky to the Chief of Ministers: “I think our government should make a solid offer to the British to hand over to us the Julfa-Shahtakht railway on the Aleat-Julfa line to start trade with Persia. The line to be handed over must extend to the village of Davalu. While making that offer to the British, point out Armenia’s incompetence, the frequent interruption of train traffic. At the same time, promise to establish a new order in Sharur Nakhchivan. I think the British will agree”⁹⁵. Finally, when it comes to the operation of the Julfa-Yerevan railway, from the point of view of trade, without considering the sovereignty of any state, in his telegram dated February 10, 1920, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan, taking an openly anti-Armenian position, literally emphasized the following: “Before the normalization of our relations and the establishment of the borders, I consider opening the Yerevan-Julfa road inexpedient. From the economic viewpoint, it is beneficial only to Armenia. For us the opening of the road is not of economic interest yet, and we can pursue political interests in both Nakhichevan and Persian Azerbaijan without that road”⁹⁶.

Back on July 21, 1919 Khan-Tekinsky demanded that his government concentrate Azerbaijani troops on the borders of Armenia and raised the alarm that Armenian troops continued to move to Sharur, where major events were unfolding, battles were going on: “Armenia is concentrating all its efforts... The presence of our troops on the borders is causing panic among Armenians, is increasing desertion and lifting the spirits of Muslims. I have already informed Aliyev, the military attaché in Tbilissi about the number of Armenian troops, asking him to inform the Military Minister about it. If you want to take advantage of the moment, take urgent and decisive action”⁹⁷.

On August 1 and 3, Khan-Tekinsky wrote to the Head of Government of Azerbaijan: “We must immediately declare war on Armenia⁹⁸ and put an end to Zangezur within two weeks and move troops to Ghamarlu. Now is the best time. It will be too late after the arrival of Colonel William Nafew Haskel, American Commissar in Armenia. Organize the attack without declaring war. Please use the moment and do not waste time”⁹⁹.

On August 3, 1919, the “diplomatic representative-spy” reported to the Azerbaijani government that artillery and projectiles had been sent to Dilijan, Nor Bayazet and Bassargechar in 8 trucks and that the 4th regiment was in those regions. He concluded that “the Armenians are preparing it against the Muslims” and demanded that the government “take the necessary

⁹⁵ Ibid, 38- 39.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 51.

⁹⁷ Ibid, 36.

⁹⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, part I, sheet 14, number 601; The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history) 2000:116.

⁹⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, part I, sheet 14-15, number 601, 606.

measures”¹⁰⁰. The anti-Armenian provocative and destructive activities of the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative, the establishment of an espionage and intelligence network and groups of agents throughout the Republic of Armenia encouraged the Muslim masses, whose leaders provoked them to run various manipulations, and pushed them to insurgent actions against the legitimate Armenian authorities and the Armenian people. Encouraged by this, Muslim bandits that had started anti-government riots in Zangibassar, Zod-Bassargechar, Kars and elsewhere, showed strong resistance to Armenian troops and local authorities under the leadership of Turkish officers and special service agents and with the participation of military men and Turkish soldiers.

In this respect, the information obtained by Armenian special services regarding the Azerbaijani aspirations towards Zangibassar is of interest. The telegrams sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Baku testify to that. Thus, in his telegram dated December 20, 1919 sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan the acting diplomatic attorney of Azerbaijan in Yerevan, Mir Babayev simply wrote the following: “... if the people of Zangibassar surrender, we will lose a lot from the political, moral and material point of view. Please make every effort to repel the Armenian attack on the people of Zangibassar. They have taken all the possible measures”¹⁰¹.

From the point of view of revealing the conspiratorial and disruptive activities of the Azerbaijani special services against the Republic of Armenia, of interest is the telegram regarding Zangibassar and Nakhichevan, dated March 4, 1920 sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by Musayev, acting Head of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Yerevan: “Failure to receive money for Nakhichevan until today makes the work of the governor general useless and causes significant damage to the Republic. Without our financial support, Zangibassar is also in a terrible situation which is beneficial for Armenia. I am defending the two regions by saying that the money is already in Tbilissi and as soon as it arrives in Yerevan it will immediately be sent as planned. Every minute of delay has a strong impact on our interests. I’m asking for your order before it is too late”¹⁰².

Naturally, as we have already mentioned, the Armenian intelligence was well informed about all these preparations, because it was carefully monitoring it all. After the neutralization of the Azerbaijani network of agents in Armenia by the Armenian special services, it became obvious that the Azerbaijanis also had serious ambitions towards the Böyük-Vedi and Kars regions and supported the local separatists. We learn about this from a telegram dated May 6, 1919 sent to Khan-Tekinsky by Khan-Khoisky, the Chief of Ministers of Azerbaijan: “Contact the government of Kars immediately. Show them all kinds of support, find out what they need, write to us to take

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, sheet 15, number 616.

¹⁰¹ Secret documents 1920: 47.

¹⁰² Ibid, 55.

the necessary measures”¹⁰³. And in a telegram dated July 14, 1919 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Khan-Tekinsky referred to the issue of Böyük-Vedi: “The situation of Böyük-Vedi is serious, Armenia is concentrating all its forces. A mobilization has been announced... The Muslims can be saved by Azerbaijani armed intervention... The conflict continues. Send large sums of money to military organizations without wasting time”¹⁰⁴.

This position was supported by the government. In a telegram dated July 19, 1919 Jafarov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan informed Khan-Tekinsky about it: “Follow the events in Böyük-Vedi and in other villages. If possible, send an official representative, otherwise appoint an undercover agent. Report about the situation”¹⁰⁵.

Finally, the same mentality prevailed in the telegram dated July 22, 1919 sent by KhanTekinsky to the Minister of Foreign Affairs: “I have the impression that the Armenian troops will not leave Böyük-Vedi, but will stop the hostilities standing only on the positions. Take measures for the withdrawal of Armenian troops, otherwise the situation of the Muslims of Böyük-Vedi will become difficult, even dangerous”¹⁰⁶.

As a “result” of his conspiracy and espionage activity in Armenia Mamed KhanTekinsky was declared persona non grata. This was emphasized in Al. Khatisyan’s note addressed to the government of Azerbaijan: “Based on solid data, the Armenian government finds it necessary to state with sorrow that through his actions Mr. Tekinsky personally contributed to the movements against the Republic of Armenia and peace in the country”. Al. Khatisyan advised the Azerbaijani government to make the relevant conclusions about Khan-Tekinsky’s activities after receiving that information¹⁰⁷, but the latter was appointed Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan for his services and “successfully” continued his anti-Armenian activities and his place was taken by “national poet”, former representative of Azerbaijan in the Mountainous Republic Abdurakhman Bek Hakhverdov (Abdul Rahim-Bek Hakhverdov)¹⁰⁸. After March, 1920 the latter was replaced by Teimur khan Makinsky¹⁰⁹ (according to the decision of Prime Minister of

¹⁰³ Ibid, 23.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 31-32.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 33-34.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 36-37.

¹⁰⁷ Zohrabyan E. 2002: 179-181.

¹⁰⁸ In a telegram (No 1671) dated November 8, 1918 addressed to the RA Minister of Foreign Affairs, RA diplomatic envoy in Tbilissi, A. Jamalyan reported that he had received a letter from Jafarov, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Tbilissi, asking on behalf of his government to find out which of the persons represented by him would be considered desirable for the role of the representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia by the RA government - Tbilissi Mission Financial Officer Narimanbek Narimanbekov, Assistant to Sworn Envoy Amir Bek Narimanbekov or Sworn Envoy Mamedkhan Tekinsky. Jamalyan informed the Foreign Minister that in Tbilissi’s private circles they believed that the response of the Armenian side should be delayed just as Azerbaijan was trying to do in T. Bekzadyan’s case. Thus, based on the information in his possession, Jamalyan considered Tekinsky’s candidacy undesirable.

NAA, fund 200, list 2, file 18, sheet l. 5.

¹⁰⁹ Teimur Khan-Makinsky - graduated from Yerevan Gymnasium, and in 1916 from the Faculty of Law of the University of Warsaw. He was a member of the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He worked as the

Azerbaijan N. [Yusufbeyli] Bek-Usubbekov dated February 25, 1920)¹¹⁰. They continued Tekinsky's vicious practice which the Armenian intelligence and government were aware of. Due to the negligence of the Azerbaijani agents, the Armenian side easily obtained the code number, which the Azerbaijani side found out with some delay¹¹¹, but it did not give them significant results, which testifies to the good work of the special services in preventing and neutralizing the intelligence and destructive activities of the Azerbaijani agents which had hostile attitude towards the RA.

In order to make it clear that Azerbaijan really provided large financial aid to Sharur-Nakhichevan and Zangibassar, due to which the uprisings in those regions were organized, it is enough to point out that in 1919 a sum of about 5 million was sent to the governor of Nakhichevan in bonds and cheques. This money was stolen by the "robbers" who attacked the train while it was crossing the "Neutral" zone. They took all the money from Hakhverdov, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan¹¹² and T. Devoyants wrote about it. This is also stated by K. Sassuni, R. Ter-Minasyan, Al. Khatisyan¹¹³, who assured that the money was intended for intensifying the insurgent and separatist moods against the Armenian authorities in Zangibassar, Sharur and elsewhere, with the aim of cutting off the known territories from the Republic of Armenia and annexing them to Azerbaijan. "One day, a telegram was received: Hakhverdov, the new ambassador of Azerbaijan and S. Harutyunyan, the leader of the People's Party were leaving Tbilissi for Yerevan by the same train. Ruben and I immediately gave the relevant instructions, and at dawn of March 8, in the neutral zone of Lori, between the stations Sanahin and Kober a group of masked and armed young people stopped the train and seized the belongings from Hakhverdov and Harutyunyan. They took 3,400,000 roubles worth of Azerbaijani and 2 million roubles worth of Transcaucasian bonds from Hakhverdov, and 296,000 roubles worth of Transcaucasian bonds from Harutyunyan, which he was taking to their party's "Zhoghovurd" newspaper in Yerevan. This incident caused quite a stir. The Azerbaijani government expressed its complaints to Yerevan. The Georgians were laughing at their Azerbaijani friends. The Armenian government expressed condolences to S. Harutyunyan, returned the money and the golden watch taken from him, in spite of the fact that the money brought by Harutyunyan to "Zhoghovurd" newspaper would be spent to fight against the government¹¹⁴.

plenipotentiary representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia until December, 1918. By the decision of the Azerbaijani Government dated January 31, 1919, sworn envoy Mamed Khan-Tekinsky (1880-1938), a Turkmen national, a graduate of the Novorossiysk Imperial University was appointed the diplomatic representative in the Republic of Armenia. Tekinsky was succeeded by Abdul Rahim Bek Hakhverdov, and finally, the last diplomatic envoy of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia before the Sovietization of Azerbaijan was once again Teimur Khan-Makinsky appointed in that position on March 16, 1920.

¹¹⁰ Slovo, February 25, March 18, 1920.

¹¹¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 299, part II, sheet 105.

¹¹² Secret documents 1920: 9.

¹¹³ Sassuni 1968: 173; Ruben 1982: 246; Khatisean 1968: 205.

¹¹⁴ Vracyan 1966: 103.

An Armenian avenger at the root of “Nemesis”, Misak Torlakyan¹¹⁵ (he served in the intelligence unit of the Russian army from 1915 to 1918. Later he moved to Batumi, then Constantinople, where on July 18, 1921 he killed Behbut Khan Jivanshir, executioner of Armenians in Baku. On October 6, 1921, a British court found Misak Torlakyan insane and released him), gave an interesting reference and observation of it complementing and completing the above mentioned in regard to the conspiratorial and destructive activities of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia: “...The ARF Bureau in Armenia instructed the Central Committee of Georgia to rob Azerbaijani Ambassador Hakhverdov’s steam train in a neutral zone and obtain the necessary documents. In late March, 1920, when Hakhverdov was returning from another visit to Baku, a group of armed young men dressed in Georgian clothes attacked the steam train at night, in a neutral zone. Harutyun Harutyunyan, armed with a weapon, ordered the train driver to stop the steam train. The boys broke into Hakhverdov’s wagon, stole everything from the people there. And in order to make the robbery look just like a bandit attack, they did not spare even the Armenian public figure Samson Harutyunyan, who was in the wagon and was heading to Yerevan. The documents obtained left no

¹¹⁵ Misak Torlakyan was one of the active members of the ARF Dashnaktsutyun. In 1910, like many other Armenians of the Ottoman Empire, M. Torlakyan was drafted into the army. During World War I M. Torlakyan was in Erzurum as a member of the 4th regiment of the 12th army of the Ottoman Empire. Feeling that Armenian soldiers were likely to be annihilated in the army, M. Torlakyan secretly escaped and joined a group of hayduks operating in the Erzurum-Trabzon direction. In 1915 Torlakyan went to Tbilisi and from there to Yerevan. Afterwards, Misak Torlakyan first participated in a number of battles as a member of the 6th volunteer detachment, and then as a member of the newly formed Armenian Corps (commander General T. Nazarbekyan), including the battle of Bash-Aparan (May, 1918). There he joined the volunteer regiment of Ishkhan (Hovsep [Arghutyan-Long-armed] Arghutyan), took part in several important battles, after which, by the decision of the party, went over Sukhumi to Trabzon with his detachment. He soon became a member of the Trabzon region Self-Defense military body. In December, 1915 it became known that after losing the battle of Sarighamish, Enver Pasha, a fanatical Armenophob intended to go over Trabzon to Istanbul. At a secret meeting it was decided to terrorize him in Trabzon. However, at the last moment, Enver managed to avoid the punishment he deserved. During the 1915 massacres of Armenians in Trabzon M. Torlakyan and the other Hayduks organized the self-defense of the Armenians, thus saving many Armenians from death. In 1916, Russian troops liberated Trabzon. In his memoirs Torlakyan said that his first job in Trabzon was intelligence service in the Russian army in Trabzon, which gave him an opportunity to enter Turkish villages, conduct searches, look for and find Armenians hiding there, and get a good chance to avenge Turkish criminals and executioners. For his service in the Russian army M. Torlakyan was awarded the “Battle Cross” order. In January, 1918, the Turkish troops started their campaign to Transcaucasia. The Trabzon group of Hayduks joined the troops under the command of Drastamat Kanayan (Dro). Prior to that, the Trabzon detachment was located in Kars, where it controlled the retreat of Armenian troops and the peaceful Armenian population to the Araks River. At the end of May, the detachment took part in the battle of Bash-Aparan. Battle-seasoned Misak Torlakyan helped the great hero in that work. He was in the vanguard detachment that, at Dro’s command, started the attack on the positions of Turkish troops in the battle of Bash-Aparan. In 1921, M. Torlakyan came to Istanbul where together with Harutyun Harutyunyan and Yervand Fundikyan, as part of the ARF Constantinople group he became one of the participants of operation “Nemesis”. During World War II, together with Dro and Nzhdeh, Torlakyan participated in the formation of Armenian military units within the Wehrmacht. He headed the secret agents and subversive-and-intelligence subdivisions of the Armenian Legion. He personally led the operation to seize the secret documents of the Turkish leadership concerning the spread of Pan-Turkism and the conquest of the Caucasus. The documents obtained in Turkey, which were presented to Rosenberg, became a reason for the Reich not to trust Turkey as an ally. After that, the Reich leadership refused to use the Turkish army in the Caucasus. For the brilliantly performed operation Captain Misak Torlakyan, along with many other intelligence agents, was awarded and received highest ranks.

Who is who 2005: 435; Torlakyan M. 2001: 357-490.

doubt about the intentions of Azerbaijan and Turkey to blow up Armenia from within. Some of these documents were published in the seventh volume of Rouben's memoirs"¹¹⁶.

Such a bold undertaking, which brought honor to its executors, had undesirable developments, of which we learn from M. Torlakyan's memories. And M. Torlakyan simply stated the following: "A group of participants in the operation did not want to give the money to the Central Committee. That is why the Central Committee decided to terrorize their leaders.

Some of those who carried out this operation remained in the neutral zone, where one of their leaders, Gasim Ruben was intimidated by Harutyun Harutyunyan. After this intimidation, the others came to Tbilissi to take revenge on the Central Committee for their friend.

Considering this tense situation, the Central Committee of Georgia summoned me and my friends from Batumi to Tbilissi.

The friends and associates of the murdered man were outraged and would come to Tbilissi to terrorize both Harutyun and the members of the Central Committee that had been with him. Barely a week after our arrival in Tbilissi, Ruben Safaryan, the second leader was assassinated on Yerevan Square by Yervand Fundukyan. After this terror, the others ran away and the issue was closed"¹¹⁷.

It was not confirmed either on March 11, 1920 during the Yerevan Provincial Court hearing on Hakhverdov's case, in which Samson Harutyunyan, a member of the People's Party of Armenia, Member of Parliament and Hakhverdov himself were questioned, but with no evidence, so the court finished its job¹¹⁸.

It is known that back on March 16, 1920, in the March 8 complaint (N 920) addressed to the Armenian representative in Tbilissi, the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Georgia, Vekilov stated that between the stations Kolageran and Kober Abdul Rahim Bek Hakhverdov, the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Yerevan was robbed by vicious bandits who had taken money and documents from him. He asked to take measures to find the robbers, to hold them accountable and return the stolen items and state documents. By the way, it was mentioned that the crime had been committed in the territory of the Republic of Armenia¹¹⁹. And already on March 18, 1920 a complaint (N 1920) was filed by F. Khan-Khoisky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, who informed the British Chief Commissioner O. Wardrop¹²⁰ about the robbery that had taken place with Hakhverdov in the Neutral Zone of Lori, during which 5 million 300 thousand

¹¹⁶ Torlakyan M. 2001: 455-456.

¹¹⁷ Torlakyan M. 2001: 456-457.

¹¹⁸ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 207, sheet 48-50, 64-70.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, sheet 24, 29.

¹²⁰ Wardrop John Oliver - General, specialist in Georgian Studies, former Consul General in Moscow. On July 2, 1919, the British War Department approved Wardrop's appointment as British Chief Commissioner to Transcaucasia, which was approved by Lord George Curzon as well. On July 22, the British Foreign Office approved Wardrop's candidacy, who knew Georgia and Caucasus very well.

Hovhannisyan R. 2014: 130.

roubles taken from the state treasury and 40 thousand roubles of personal money had been stolen from him and the robbery was accompanied by shooting. Stressing that the crime had been committed in the Lori Neutral Zone belonging to the two republics, Khan-Khoisky noted that the incident affected the interests of the Transcaucasian republics, and therefore, asked not to refuse and take decisive measures to immediately find the culprits, return the seized items, money and documents¹²¹.

Further squabbles over this case continued, the RA Internal Affairs bodies became involved, and they were tasked with finding out what happened. In this connection, on March 19 (N 1066) and March 27 (N 2871) there was some exchange of correspondence. The RA Diplomatic Commissioner in Tbilissi was also informed about this, as well as about the testimony given by S. Harutyunyan, interrogated in connection with the case. It should be noted, however, that while investigating this very important case, the Internal Affairs bodies examined it from the point of view of RA interests. They completely denied the circumstance that the robbery had taken place in the part of the Lori Neutral Zone that was considered RA territory, claiming that there was no evidence to prove that. And as it turns out from the document submitted to the RA Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs bodies by the Militia Department on March 30, 1920 (N 101) and from the protocol approved by the prosecutor, the robbery had taken place between the stations Kolageran and Sanahin, not Kober, i.e. in the territory of the Republic of Georgia, therefore the Republic of Armenia could not be held accountable. They also noted that if the perpetrators had crossed the border and hidden in the territory of RA, the Internal Affairs bodies ordered the Gharakilisa provincial commissioner to take urgent measures to arrest the robbers¹²². The deep motives of such an approach are clear – to ignore the facts of the case for the sake of protection of the interests of RA.

The intelligence had revealed that in the telegrams dated September 18 (No 736) and September 21 (No 757), 1919 sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan by Mir Babayev, the secretary and substitute of the diplomatic mission of Azerbaijan in Armenia, there were interesting details about the financial support provided by Azerbaijan to the insurgent and anti-government movements in Armenia, as well as the disruptive espionage and intelligence activities. Thus, in the telegram dated September 18, 1919, the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Yerevan informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Armenian agent in Baku had informed the head of the Armenian counterintelligence that Captain Kasumbekov, an officer on special assignments attached to the mission (it is interesting to note that on November 5 about half a million roubles were stolen from Azerbaijani diplomatic mission attaché, special assignments

¹²¹ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 207, sheet 33-34.

¹²² NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 207, sheet 40-41; fund 200, list 1, file 520, sheet 141.

officer Kasumbekov's apartment by Armenian mauserists. Hakhverdov also informed about this in his telegram to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan dated November 21, 1919 (No 1455) adding that the Armenian government was powerless against what happened and could not take any measures (it is clear that such a large sum was not personal money and it can be said with some certainty that it was just for intelligence purposes), and Cornet Ali Khan Makinsky were registered in the Azerbaijani counterintelligence, and in his opinion the Armenians were trying to get rid of them under various pretexts. Mir Babayev reported that Armenian special services had discovered their activities in Yerevan and asked the Foreign Minister to give Kasumbekov and Makinsky military uniforms and to get them into the Azerbaijani army, and thus, free them from various incidents, placing them under the auspices of the mission and therefore, getting rid of the Armenian counterintelligence¹²³.

And from the declassification of Mir Babayev's telegram dated September 21, 1919 it becomes clear that the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan reported that mobilization of 19-to 30-year-olds was underway in Armenia, that Yerevan mayor A. Shahkhatuni had left for Dilijan to personally observe the positions. Mir Babayev also mentioned that weapons and ammunition were being brought urgently¹²⁴. Thus, Mir Babayev was engaged in espionage activities in Yerevan, and the young Armenian counterintelligence was not asleep. They were intently watching the enemy and neutralizing the latter's schemes and fraudulent deals. As a result of all this, the work of Armenian intelligence and counterintelligence services in Yerevan yielded the desired results in terms of exposing hostile agents and preventing their conspiracy against Armenia.

As a result of all this, in the middle of May (May 19-22), 1920 the Information Department of the RA Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram-message to the ARF Bureau, the RA Ministries of Justice, Interior and Military Ministries, Commander-in-Chief of the Army General Nazarbekyan, the Speaker of the Parliament, as well as the RA diplomatic envoy in Tbilissi, Consul General of Batumi, the Armenian delegation in Paris, the Ambassadors of the Republic of Armenia in Italy, London, Washington and elsewhere. It said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia had published the entire secret correspondence exchanged between the representatives of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Yerevan and their agents. It stated that it concerned the anti-government, anti-Armenian aggressive activities of the Azerbaijani government and its representative in Armenia, which were aimed at organizing anti-government movements in the regions of Armenia and at undermining the foundations of statehood in the Armenian republic, and ultimately in practice deepening the insurgent situation in Zangibassar, undermining the authority of the Armenian officials, overthrowing them and annexing to Azerbaijan the Zangibassar

¹²³ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 73 (71), sheet 155.

¹²⁴ Ibid, sheet 156.

region which was a legitimate and inseparable part of the territory of the Republic of Armenia¹²⁵. Besides, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs applied to the newspapers “Yaraj”¹²⁶, “Zhoghovurd”, “Razmik”, “Socialist-Revolutionary” (only due to the closure of the “Socialist-Revolutionary” newspaper by the government order, at the last moment that important material was not published though it was planned) and others and offered them to publish the well-known correspondence about the secret anti-government activities of the Azerbaijani agents, relying on the full version of the case, also publishing it in English.

Finally, on June 3, 1920 the RA Military Court held a hearing in the case of the former staff of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Yerevan (the so-called kavases, patrol staff Mashadi Mamedov, Mashadi Hussein oghli, Hussein Vali oghli, Musa Mashadi Mamed oghli, as well as Ivakhnenko, the driver of diplomatic mission who was included in that list). They were accused of various criminal and political crimes, in particular of supporting the Zangibassar insurgents and inciting riots there. This was carried out on the direct instructions of the Azerbaijani diplomatic envoy to Yerevan Temur Bek Makinsky, and by coordinating with him the actions taken, as well as promising to transfer more than 600,000 roubles in Azerbaijani and Caucasian bonds (more precisely, 449,750 roubles in Azerbaijani bonds and 117,050 roubles in Transcaucasian bonds) addressed to the insurgents in Zangibassar and to hand the money over to Molla Kasum, the head of the Zangibassar “government”. However, in the village of Jafarabad (now Argavand – V. V.) they were arrested by Hambardzum Hakobyan, Jafarabad frontier post senior mounted militiaman of the Etchmiadzin provincial militia. They offered him a bribe of 100,000 roubles which he strongly refused to take. He arrested them and to make the case legal, handed them over to the law enforcement bodies together with the confiscated money. For performing his official duties conscientiously and honestly senior militiaman Hambardzum Hakobyan received thank-you from the Minister of Internal Affairs A. Gyulkhandanyan¹²⁷.

The RA Military Court issued a verdict, according to which one of the defendants, Hussein Vali oğlu was sentenced to indefinite exile, the other two, Mashadi Mamed oğlu and Musa Mashadi

¹²⁵ Ibid, fund 200, list 1, file 427, part II, sheet 284, 288, 290, file 461, sheet 24-27, 28-31, 40.

¹²⁶ Yaraj, June 5, 1920, No 116, June 6, 1920, No 117, June 8, 1920, No 118, June 14, 1920, No 121.

In this connection, the robbery of Abdurahman Bek Hakhverdov was referred to by Nazim Mustafa, laureate of State Prize of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Doctor of Philosophy, during his speech at the international conference held on June 26-30, 2018. The relevant materials were posted on Azerbaijani websites in February 2012. He tried to evaluate the realities of those days, assessing them as an operation carried out by the Armenian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services against Azerbaijan, particularly the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Yerevan. Referring to Hakhverdov's notorious robbery, M. Nazim described it as a violation of his diplomatic immunity, citing Armenian intelligence officer Tigran Devoyants, who was allegedly in Tbilissi at that time and followed the events. He said it was a calculated operation by Armenia in response to which the Azerbaijani government arrested the staff of the diplomatic mission of the Republic of Armenia in Baku, including Arshak Sargsyan, in return for which the Azerbaijani diplomats arrested in Yerevan were allegedly released.

Nazim M. 2018c; Nazim M. 2018b; Nazim 2019b.

¹²⁷ The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history) 2000: 181.

Mamed oğlu [see the materials of the June 3, 1920 court case regarding the three kavases – guards of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission in Yerevan] to 10 years of hard labor each¹²⁸. The case was not over by this, as Azerbaijan took retaliatory measures by arresting several employees of the Armenian diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan. We learn about this from a telegram sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the RA diplomatic envoy. The Azeris finally agreed to release the employees of the RA diplomatic mission in Azerbaijan in return to the release of secret agents of the Azerbaijani diplomatic mission arrested and convicted in Yerevan by the Armenian government, although their complicity in anti-government and espionage and intelligence activities against RA was absolutely evident¹²⁹.

Based on intelligence data, it was noted that Khan-Tekinsky was actively organizing anti-Armenian operations, maintaining secret relations with the Tatars of the Sharur-Nakhichevan region, inciting them to riot, supplying money, etc. It was mentioned in the overview that in the face of anti-Armenian sentiments, the situation of a small number of Armenian patrol guards among a well-armed, rather organized Muslim population had become dangerous. The authors of the military overview also noted that in view of the resumption of Turkish-Kurdish-Tatar attacks on the region of Surmalu and province of Kars, as well as taking into account the intelligence data regarding the general offensive planned by the Muslims throughout the south and in the west of Armenia, it was decided to withdraw the Armenian troops from Vedibassar (Böyük-Vedi) as far north as possible to give them a chance to rest, also providing possible reserves¹³⁰.

One thing is quite obvious – relying on secret telegrams and letters sent to Baku by Azerbaijani diplomatic representatives in Yerevan Khan-Tekinsky, Hakhverdov, Makinsky, as well as other sources, the Armenian counterintelligence was able to declassify them. They did not believe the “news”¹³¹, i.e. tried to work fully and effectively and obtain valuable information from the point of view of ensuring the RA security, which was aimed at securing the internal peace of the country, neutralizing the Muslim uprisings in the territory of RA and solving the most important security issues in general, and finally, aimed at the processes of the establishment of the Republic of Armenia as a state.

¹²⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 249, part II, sheet 415, 427, file 461, sheet 31, 40, file 427, part II, sheet 322-327. Secret documents 1920: 56.

¹²⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 249, part II, sheet 431.

¹³⁰ See Ibid, l. 4.

¹³¹ Zohrabyan E. 2002. 233.

Chapter 2.

THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SOUTH RUSSIAN VOLUNTEER ARMY, BRITISH AND AZERI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN TRANSCAUCASIA AND OVER THE ARMENIA IN 1918-1920

The breakthrough processes that took place in Russia led to the collapse and split of the Russian Empire, and as a result of that, the unpredictable development of historical and political processes led to the emergence of independent national statehoods in Transcaucasia. In each of them, ambiguous and contradictory functions of state system formation occurred, including, first of all, the processes of creation of armed forces and intelligence services, for which there were neither sufficient human resources, nor experience and material-and-financial means. Similar processes took place throughout the whole territory of the former Russian Empire. The first Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) appeared on the crossroads of different intelligence services (the Russian Volunteer army, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey).

It was the epoch of the re-building, catastrophic revolutions and ethnic tragedies.

It was the epoch of falling and sunset ancient civilizations.

It was the epoch of grandiose transformations.

It was the epoch of catastrophes and civil wars.

It was the epoch of dilettantes.

There has been no reference to this topic in historiography at all. That is why we set the aim of revealing to some extent the military and political relations between the South Russian Volunteer Army led by General A. Denikin and the Republic of Armenia in the domain of intelligence and political conflict with Azerbaijan in 1918-1920, in particular to study the conflict of intelligence services around Transcaucasia and in Armenia, based on very important archival facts and other documents. As a result of the Battle of Sardarapat against the Turks in May 1918, the Armenian people re-established their statehood, but found themselves at the center of geopolitical events and border conflicts and territorial disputes between Azerbaijan, Georgia and particularly Turkey. The intelligence services of the South Russian Volunteer Army led by General A. Denikin were carrying out activities in this regard and the Republic of Armenia was not neglected, since Armenia was given a prominent place in the programs of the restoration of the Russian Empire. As a result, the Republic of Armenia, its young, newly emerging intelligence agencies appeared at the center of an unyielding conflict.

The breakthrough processes that took place in Russia led to the collapse and split of the Russian Empire, and as a result of that, the unpredictable development of historical and political processes led to the emergence of independent national statehoods in Transcaucasia. In each of them, ambiguous and contradictory functions of state system formation occurred, including, first of all, the processes of creation of armed forces and intelligence services, for which there were neither sufficient human resources, nor experience and material-and-financial means. Similar processes took place throughout the whole territory of the former Russian Empire.

Leaving the national regions, however, neither the Red Guards, nor especially the White South of Russia reconciled with the situation, and they took steps to restore the former positions, the integrity of a united Russia. In this respect the newly established Transcaucasian republics and the North Caucasus became the center of their attention. The attention of the special services formed by the command of the Russian White Guard's armed forces was focused on these very issues, and the various newly emerging Transcaucasian states had their own attitude towards these realities.

Taking advantage of the passive position of the British in the region, Azerbaijan and Georgia accepted White Russia from the position of almost open hostility or so-called hostile neutrality. They were alarmed by the imperial ambitions of Volunteer Russia; sometimes they even were ready to form an alliance with the Bolsheviks with certain reservations. However, their desires were moderated by the British who practically did not need a united and powerful Russia in any way. In this situation, the Republic of Armenia, proceeding from its geopolitical interests, showed readiness to cooperate not only with the south of Russia and other new state formations, but also did not neglect or remove from the agenda the issue of having relations with the Red Russia.

Taking all this into consideration, the South Russian Volunteer Army, which had become an influential military and political force thanks to Denikin, turned the attention of its newly forming special services to those republics, trying to be aware of the events taking place there and thus influence them as much as possible, using its officers in the national armies. They also wanted to take out the military property left over from the old army, which those republics needed as well, because they simply did not have their own. This is what prompted the activation of the intelligence services of the Volunteer Army in Transcaucasia and in the Caucasus in general.

In 1918-1920 the Republic of Armenia maintained relatively stable military and political relations with various Russian state formations. The intelligence services of those republics as a whole were in the embryonic stage, striving to become professional, involving the special services of both the White Guards and Britain and others.

Due to the victory in the First World War, from the end of 1918 till the middle of 1919 the British military representation and those of other countries played a decisive role in the military and political life of the Transcaucasian republics with their presence, significantly influencing solutions

of regional significance and in particular, delimitation issues. The English played a negative role in the events of the beginning of 1918 and later, keeping under their control the incomparably strategically more important Baku, where allied police was established, as well as the no less important Tbilisi and Yerevan, considered secondary, without reckoning with the Azerbaijani, Georgian or Armenian government, which was considered an ally. They made openly gainful decisions for British interests, some Azerbaijani-related details of which were reviewed by Volkhonsky and Mukhanov¹³². At the same time, after the forced departure from Transcaucasia, a part of the Russian military remained in those republics, where they were much needed and in fact, some of them served those countries honestly and professionally. Nonetheless, in the new conditions, in order to restore its lost positions, the Russian Empire, in this case Voluntary Russia placed much importance on the intelligence and political work in the Caucasus and in Transcaucasian republics.

In this respect, the position of White Russia contributed to the stabilization of the Republic of Armenia at certain moments. The disruption of the position of Volunteer Russia at that historic moment could destabilize the situation in the Caucasus even more and contribute to the strengthening of the position of Musavat Azerbaijan and Menshevik Georgia in conditions of alienation of Russia itself; especially since the British policy was not particularly pro-Armenian. The Republic of Armenia was intently watching the events in the North Caucasus, where the Azerbaijani authorities were looking for support in the fight against the supporters of Denikin. The latter in their turn regarded Azerbaijan as a somewhat non-friendly force. Naturally, the intelligence services of the armed forces of South Russia noticed Azerbaijan's dangerous activation in the North Caucasus and tried to neutralize it, preventing the spread of separatist and anti-Russian sentiments among the population. For Armenia it was important also because significant forces of Armenian officers were concentrated in the North Caucasus, particularly the Armenians of the Black Sea coast, some of whom, in the form of armed detachments, supported the Volunteer Army in the fight against the Georgians. The latter changed their position only after Denikin's defeat and ended their participation in the battles fought by the Volunteers. Anyway, South Russia was of strategic importance to the Republic of Armenia. From there, although with difficulty, weapons, ammunition and food were procured for the Armenian army. A. Denikin openly supported the supply, also contributing to the transportation of Armenian troops to the Republic of Armenia through transit routes of Georgia, with the government of Georgia making significant obstacles for this. In this respect, the Georgian-Azerbaijani military and political alliance of June 16 and September 1919 was alarming, since the Georgian-Azerbaijani rapprochement was directed against Denikin and his

¹³² Volkhonsky M. , Mukhanov V. 2007: 151–156.

ally, the Republic of Armenia¹³³. And Azerbaijan did not hesitate and even brought its troops closer to the borders of Dagestan. In Armenia this was received with alarm. Armenia did not even think about joining the Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance, in spite of the concerns to remain completely isolated in the region¹³⁴. It should be noted that the Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance was quite stable, it was completed in 1920. According to the Turkish-Azerbaijani secret agreement signed on April 15, which was obtained by the RA intelligence service and published in 1920. In summary No. 20 of July 6 (it was signed by the head of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department of the RA General Staff, Admiral Hovhannes Khan-Kotursky and his assistant Mikayel Dodokhyan), which was also addressed by historian VI. Kazakh.¹³⁵

The intelligence of the Volunteer Army, which had its representation in the Republic of Armenia in the person of Colonel M. Zinkevich, who was particularly friendly towards the Republic of Armenia, naturally noticed Azerbaijan's activation. The latter took advantage of the alliance with Turkey and the passive position of the British which needed neither a strong White Russia nor, clearly, Red Russia. Highly covert destructive espionage activities were carried out throughout Russia.

The steps aimed at alienation from Russia became targeted, in response to which Volunteer Russia took appropriate countermeasures. The intelligence services of the Volunteer Army showed some aspiration to prevent anti-Denikin steps and actions. For that purpose real intelligence and political actions were taken to operatively be informed about the moods of the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as well and even to have their network of agents in the armed forces, other law enforcement institutions and state establishments of those countries.

At that moment, the British military and political representation was also trying to secure its presence in the region and entered into an ambiguous game. On the one hand, as mentioned by the advisor of the RA diplomatic mission in Tbilisi, prince M. Tumanyan "Not only did the British not support the agents of the Volunteer Army, but also forbade others"¹³⁶ to support them. On the other hand, in order to fight against Soviet Russia, which generally fitted into the goals of the British Empire, they wanted to pit the Bolshevik Russia, created by German emperor's agent V. I. Lenin against the South and generally White Guard Russia, to impair both sides, and as a result to have a

¹³³ Petrosyan G. 2011: 323.

¹³⁴ It should be noted that the Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance was quite stable and it was completed by the Turkish-Azerbaijani secret agreement signed on April 15, 1920. The document was obtained by the RA Intelligence service and was published in N.20 summary of July 6, 1920 (signed by Hovhannes Khan-Kotursky, Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department of the General Staff of the Republic of Armenia, Lieutenant of the Admiralty, and his assistant Mikayel Dodokhyan). This was referred to by historian VI. Ghazakhetsyan as well. See Virabyan V. 2015: 568-575, See also Ghazakhecyan V., 1-3 p.

<http://www.academhistory.am/imagesdownloadfiles/KAZACHECYAN%20rus.pdf> ghazakhec.

¹³⁵ Virabyan V. 2015: 568-575. Ghazakhecyan V. 2018: 1-3.

¹³⁶ Denikin A. 2005: 209.

torn up, dismembered Russia with a lot of small state formations, which would no longer pose a threat to the British Empire and which would be deprived of a global role. Denikin's representatives were allowed to recruit personnel in Batumi to replenish the Army and create an agency¹³⁷, which, however, did not become a reality due to the ambiguous and multi-layered policy of the British. Azerbaijan, as well as Georgia and the Republic of Armenia, became the scene of conflicting special services, where the vital interests of many countries clashed. And the Republic of Armenia was in the most difficult situation of all.

The fact that the command of Denikin's Volunteer Army had such intentions is evidenced by the fact that on November 1918 the so-called "Special Consultation" sent Colonel G. Leslie with a mission to Yerevan. He and other high-ranking officers started to serve in the General Staff of the Armenian army and in the secret Russian intelligence group, aiming to establish strong ties between the RA and the Volunteer Army, making the Armenian republic their stronghold in the fight against Bolshevism. They also sought to make it their ally in the plans to occupy Georgia, etc.; the events and developments around the 1918 Georgian-Armenian war served as an occasion for that. However, the Armenian side did not take the bait, especially since the RA intelligence services and the Ministry of Internal Affairs had considerable insights into the secret aspects of the activities of Denikin's officers¹³⁸.

This was more evidently demonstrated in the events that took place in the Kars province. The fact that the Armenian government was relatively well informed about the events taking place in the Kars province (June-July 1919), including Colonel G. D. Leslie's¹³⁹ (representing Denikin's Volunteer Army) espionage and political activities in connection with strengthening Russian Volunteer Army's influence in the region, indeed clearly testifies to the satisfactory activity of the General Staff's intelligence and counterintelligence division and its relevant unit on the ground, even though Leslie acted in a disguised manner and as a military spy kept the rules of secrecy. It was clear to the Armenian side that on the recommendation of the so-called "Special Consultation" attached to the Volunteer Army, Leslie, the military and political representative of the "Special Consultation" in the Armenian government, was negotiating with Muslim representatives and the command of the Turkish 12th Army in Kars. The goal was that after the Turks left, the region should be handed over to the Russians. The Armenian side had facts that Leslie was interested in the relations between the Armenians, the British and the Russians¹⁴⁰. We believe this should not be taken too seriously, because it was obvious that Bolshevik Russia, like the Volunteer Army,

¹³⁷ Ibid, 70.

¹³⁸ Petrosyan G. 2005a: 87-88.

¹³⁹ Leslie George [Yuri] Dmitriyev [01.04.1887-02.02.1957] - 01.12.1917 - 1920 – Volunteer Army]. Ganin A. 2009: 266, 481, 537, 595, 730.

¹⁴⁰ Petrosyan G. 2005a: 156.

Wrangel and all together were not able to deal with such issues at that time. However, Colonel Leslie's meeting with "Shura" and the Turkish command in midJanuary, 1919, of which the RA military authorities, the government and the intelligence bodies were informed as well, aroused the dissatisfaction of Armenian social and political circles. In this connection, on January 21, in a letter to Colonel Leslie, S. Tigranyan demanded an explanation concerning the negotiations with C. Temperley, English Governor of Kars, whether there was an intention to "establish Muslim and not Armenian governance headed by the Russian governor"¹⁴¹. On January 22, Leslie responded by saying: "I did not have an official conversation about political issues in Kars, however, I advised Colonel C. Temperley, the English military governor that in order to get out of this difficult situation, it is necessary to appoint a Russian governor who would be in direct contact with the Armenian government. There has never been a demand on my side that Muslim governance be established in the province"¹⁴². All this, however, deepened the dissatisfaction with Leslie's activities, and in 1919, in its N10 issue the "Zhoghovurd" newspaper of Yerevan simply wrote: "Colonel Leslie, General Denikin's representative, has entered into negotiations with English Colonel C. Temperley on his own, he has conducted anti-Armenian propaganda in Yerevan and Echmiatsin and is trying to turn the British against us. His goal is to establish a Russian-Tatar administration in the Kars province"¹⁴³. Thus, the people's faction of the RA Parliament demanded the presidency of the RA Council ask the Foreign and Military ministers whether they knew that "Colonel Leslie, the representative of the Volunteer Army was totally agitating against the Armenian people and the Republic of Armenia and whether it was true that Col. Leslie received 1000 rubles a month from the Military Ministry, and if so, from what money"¹⁴⁴. Naturally, the February 11, 1919 session of the RA Parliament addressed the issue and expressed its attitude, bringing facts, trying to find out who Leslie was, who he represented, what position he held¹⁴⁵, but many issues were not made public. It was obvious that the RA government, the military department and the relevant structures, including the intelligence service, were trying to keep secret ties with other non-Soviet state and other formations in South Russia and this could give rise to various parliamentary and political speculations and misunderstandings. Based on this, the heads of the RA Foreign and Military Ministries assured that the Colonel of the Volunteer Army had not abused his position and had not carried out any anti-Armenian activity. Hence, the fact of cooperation between the special services of the two sides is obvious, but it is another matter to find out by what negligence this important information spread to the press and into the sphere of parliamentary

¹⁴¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 164, sheet 4,

¹⁴² NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 164, sheet 5, 11, 71.

¹⁴³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 164, sheet 6, 14.

¹⁴⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 164, sheet 17.

¹⁴⁵ NAA, fund 198, list 1, file 15, sheet 133.

gossip, inflaming passions and creating new complexes around Armenia which was undergoing a process of establishment.

However, there was a sense of uncertainty. Some representatives of the RA Intelligence Service, some high-ranking commanding officers and party-and-political circles were more cautious in giving preference to this or that country. There were even vague doubts as to who was really stronger - Bolshevik Russia, Kolchak or Denikin (which became obvious during the cold reception given to Colonel Leslie sent to Yerevan by the Volunteer Army in mid-1919)¹⁴⁶, the British, the Americans or other forces. In the secret report from Tbilisi on January 20, 1919 addressed to S. Tigranyan, General G. Ghorghanyan warned about it: "Our foreign policy must be extremely cautious. We cannot, should not pursue an exclusively pro-British or pro-Russian policy. We had linked our destiny with the Entente countries since the very beginning of the war and did not give it up until the last day. We must now make it clear to everyone that we are waiting for a solution to our problems not from England, France, Russia or the United States separately, but from the Entente countries. Our fate must be decided by the Allies' Conference in Paris. Until that decision is made, it would be wrong to link our welfare with this or that Entente country, as it is impossible to predict the position of that country in the future conference. We may have temporary success, but we may lose a lot"¹⁴⁷. However, those hopes later turned out to be baseless, leading to the inevitable isolation of the Republic of Armenia and its inevitable decline.

A. Manukyan's article and the comprehensive study of the documents of the October 20, 1927 session of the Transcaucasian Territorial Control Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party reveal that one of the co-authors of the idea of establishing the General Staff in the Armenian Army was Colonel Mikhail Zinkevich, a staff officer of the Russian army (by the way, in some documents he is referred to not as a colonel, but as a general)¹⁴⁸. He intended to create an autonomous structure of Denikin's Volunteer Army in order to carry out the instructions and direct orders of the top leadership of that army at any time (he was originally the unofficial representative of that army). It is also necessary to refer to G. Petrosyan's point of view about a not fully disclosed page of M. Zinkevich's activity. According to a scientifically substantiated point of view, to prove which G. Petrosyan refers to interesting, practically reliable archival and other facts, Colonel M. Zinkevich, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armenian Army, with the active support of the Russian National Council of Yerevan, set up a secret intelligence group in Yerevan with his agents. The group was in direct contact with the "Special Consultation"¹⁴⁹ attached to the Volunteer Army

¹⁴⁶ Petrosyan G. 2005a: 88.

¹⁴⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 193, part I, sheet 35- 36.

¹⁴⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 412, sheet 35, Hovhannisian R. G. 1982: 470, 474, 516 -517, 524.

¹⁴⁹ It played the role of a government. See Petrosyan G. 2005a: 15, 17, 22;

Petrosyan G. 2005b: 20, 80, 83-84, 132, 137,138- 139, 189; Petrosyan G. 2011: 90, 72-101, etc.

and with the Russian National Council for Transcaucasia in Tbilisi. This group provided regular information to the Volunteer Army and the “Special Consultation” attached to it about the Armenian Army, about various issues of the domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia, and the policy of Great Britain in Transcaucasia. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic had concrete facts about the existence and activity of the Russian intelligence group. However, the Armenian government showed restraint, firstly because on the one hand it did not pose a threat to the country’s independence and on the other hand in order not to disrupt the Armenian-Russian relations that were in the process of formation. The role of Denikin’s representation was to recruit Russian army staff officers living and operating in Armenia, deploy them to other various structures of the Armenian army and thus use them to solve far-reaching strategic problems, such as perhaps establishing the power of Denikin in the Republic of Armenia and jointly fighting the threat of Bolshevism. M. Zinkevich was one of the people given relevant tasks. It should also be noted that Zinkevich was one of the immediate witnesses of the involuntary birth of the First Republic of Armenia and one of the co-authors of the active creators and organizers of the power structures of the new state (with the above reservations).

According to the order of the Military Minister dated April 28, 1919, M. Zinkevich, the head of the headquarters of the Armenian division was appointed acting Chief of General Staff¹⁵⁰. Already on August 28, 1919 (3703/oc), on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief of the RA Military Ministry a telegram was received from Lieutenant General Lukomsky¹⁵¹ from Rostov. It said that Colonel M. Zinkevich was sent with a mission to Armenia as a military representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the South Russian Armed Forces under the Government of the Republic of Armenia. This is also referred to by the RA diplomatic representative in Tbilisi in his September 24, 1919 (N 3080) telegram addressed to the Military Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. And on October 3, 1919 (N 3219) he already recorded the fact that the operation was in process and that Zinkevich had arrived¹⁵². On September 27, 1919, hearing Prime Minister A.I. Khatisyan’s report on the appointment of Colonel Zinkevich as the RA Military Representative in the Volunteer Army, the session of the Council of Ministers gave its agreement¹⁵³. For his skilful activity Zinkevich was repeatedly awarded letters of gratitude by the government for his impeccable performance, especially during his tenure as Chief of General Staff, when he was in close cooperation with RA Military Minister Major General Hakhverdyan¹⁵⁴. After the multifaceted military and reconnaissance activity in Armenia, since the beginning of 1920 Zinkevich started beneficial

¹⁵⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 131, sheet 24.

¹⁵¹ Alexander Sergey Lukomsky [10.07.1868-25.02.1939]- from November 24, 1917 to 1920 he was in the Volunteer Army. He died in exile. See Ganin A. 2009: 269,406, 428, 535-536, 584.

¹⁵² NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 131, sheet 1-3.

¹⁵³ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100 (85), sheet 215.

¹⁵⁴ NAA, fund 204, list 1, file 91, sheet 65, etc.

activity in the structures of the South Russian Volunteer Army, often for the benefit of the Republic of Armenia. In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated June 27, 1920 (No 5205), the Head of the Office of the Council of Ministers informed that in the June 25, 1920 session the Council of Ministers decided to appoint Colonel M. Zinkevich as its representative in South Russia¹⁵⁵.

And in the letter dated June 29, 1920 (No 3922), Hakob Ter-Hakobyan, the Secretary General of the RA Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Zinkevich that the RA Government had recognized him as the representative of the South Russian Government attached to the Government of Armenia¹⁵⁶. And in his official letter to the government dated June 14, 1920 (No 3642) RA Minister of Foreign Affairs H. Ohanjanyan stated that Zinkevich's mission ceased to function with the victorious advancement of the Bolsheviks, considering that by negotiating with the Bolsheviks the Armenian government had not contradicted itself, that they had received and would receive the representatives of different divided parts of Russia, especially since both P. Wrangel and Denikin supported Armenia by giving ammunition and food and promising support in the future as well¹⁵⁷. In this new position Zinkevich was trying to be useful to the Republic of Armenia. In his letter back on April 11, 1920 (No 2313) addressed to Colonel Zinkevich Al. Khatisyan informed that according to the information obtained by them, as well judging from the conversation of M. Harutyunyan, the diplomatic representative of Armenia with General D. P. Dratsenko¹⁵⁸, it became clear that Major General D. P. Dratsenko, the representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army had voluntarily handed over to the Azerbaijani government in Baku more than 100 cannons, 200 machine guns, 40,000 three-barrel rifles, a huge number of land mines and bullets, 2 armored vehicles, a warship, etc., as well as other military engineering equipment. Khatisyan believed that the military property should either have been given a different purpose or should have been sunk in the sea. He considered any other solution as hostile act against Armenia and strongly protested against it, emphasizing that it was especially unacceptable because Armenia's attitude towards Russia had always been friendly¹⁵⁹. It was obvious that the Armenian side was expecting real support, an explanation for what had happened from Colonel Zinkevich, as an old friend. In his reply letter to the RA minister-president dated April 20, 1920 (No 2219) Colonel Zinkevich emphasized that the fact of handing over weapons and equipment to Azerbaijan was true, although he had no direct evidence for that. However, he did not deny that he could only have a pronounced negative attitude towards it and that those guilty would be punished. Zinkevich emphasized that his

¹⁵⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 412, sheet 33.

¹⁵⁶ NAA, sheet 33-34.

¹⁵⁷ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 111, part II, sheet 176.

¹⁵⁸ Dani[i]l Pavel Dratsenko [08.12.1876 - 1945] - General of the Russian Army, during 1915-1918 he was in Transcaucasia; from November 15, 1918 till 1920 he had close relations with the Volunteer Army, being a representative of its high-ranking officer staff.

Ganin A.2009: 213, 458, 587, 725.

¹⁵⁹ NAA fund 200, list 1, file 412, sheet 22.

attitude towards Azerbaijan was unchanged, adding that it was formed after the events of 1917. At the same time he explained his reasons for leaving the RA. At the end of his message Zinkevich emphasized that he was very happy to be able to continue his work for Armenia tested through hardships, and to strengthen the friendly ties between Armenian and Russian peoples. He added that at that time he was participating in the work of providing assistance to Armenian refugees organized by the Armenian government¹⁶⁰.

The RA intelligence apparatus studied the military and political situation in Armenia, and on the other hand, through its approved residents, representative-agents it provided information at the level of the Transcaucasian republics on the situation and military sentiments in Denikin's Volunteer Army and in particular in the Red Army. That intelligence unit also conducted intelligence operations against Turkey and Iran regarding the condition of the Turkish army, its location, number, plans, and other regional geopolitical issues. By the way, it should especially be noted that the initial stage of the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the Republic of Armenia is characterized by the dominance of the White Guard Volunteer Army. And it was so tangible and significant that later the Armenian government even took steps to isolate White Guard officers from their direct role in intelligence activities, which they deliberately carried out mainly in the interests of Denikin's Volunteer Army. In connection with this latest matter the government appointed Captain Vahagn Galust Muradyan head of the intelligence department and deputy chief of the General Staff, instructing him to possibly neutralize this tendency of the White Guards. Thus, Denikin's intelligence services covered not only the North Caucasus and its adjoining territories, but also each of the Transcaucasian republics.

We have already repeatedly and thoroughly referred to the functions of the formation and establishment of Armenian intelligence, whose role during the days of the First Republic was denied by the main actors of the military and political events of those days, who in order to justify and sanctify themselves, invent legends in their memoirs, in which they are somehow indiscriminately surviving heroes. , and the rest - cowards, defectors and general traitors, which can only claim to be a part of the possible truth. It completely ignores the fact that the information released by the existing intelligence service, about which we have written, with their omissions, could have been very useful to see preparations to strike back at the enemy, rather than relying on the paper decisions of Western countries and allies¹⁶¹. In this regard, the assertions of historian, professor Ararat Hakobyan, that "the state of military intelligence and counter-intelligence, especially, can be considered deplorable, are unfounded. Before the war (1920: Turkish-Armenian-V.V.) and during the war itself, the Armenian political and military circles had no real idea about

¹⁶⁰ NAA fund 200, list 1, file 412, sheet 23.

¹⁶¹ Hakobyan A. 2022, 373.

the enemy's military-political plans"¹⁶². The last claim is also false, because first of all, the fact that the military and political circles simply did not take into account, ignored the many facts presented by the RA Intelligence Service about the movements and preparations of the enemy along the entire Armenian border, which was recorded for example in 1919, played an important role here. during the brilliant Zod-Sotk operation in the fall, which ensured the re-establishment of the integrity of the Armenian territory in that important period, essentially denying A. Another groundless claim of Hakobyan is that "Armenian intelligence was of poor quality and ineffective on the Armenian-Azerbaijani front as well. The leadership of Armenia was mostly unaware of what was materializing against the country..." . Where the data presented by intelligence was ignored, there were also failures and defeats, and this is the fact and reality, which is obvious in the case of the Republic of Armenia, and we have repeatedly referred to this in our published works.

According to A. V. Ganin, who referred to the conflict between the White Guard intelligence and the Azerbaijani intelligence and the role of Armenians in it, as well as to the activities of the British special services in Azerbaijan in the first half of 1919, Armenia was one of the major stages of the conflict between the intelligence services of different countries, and the forces led by Denikin sought to revive the Russian Empire. This did not fit into the British plans, which carried out divisive intelligence and political work, guided by the principle "Divide and rule". They demonstrated their impartial position, but did everything possible to prevent Russia from being reborn, to make it remain in a collapsed state and be expelled from the Transcaucasian region. Currently similar processes take place as well and this harms the vital and security interests of the Republic of Armenia. Thus, according to A. Ganin, White Guard scout Captain A. S. Chernishev pursued exactly those goals¹⁶³. Around March 20, 1919, he penetrated into Azerbaijan and was able to infiltrate into the newly-opened Investigative and intelligence political department of Baku, which had a staff of 10 people¹⁶⁴. The department also recruited A. A. Okoyev or Akayev, Hakobyants, of Armenian origin, known to the Armenian intelligence¹⁶⁵. Since the department's

¹⁶² Hakobyan A. 2022, 375-376.

¹⁶³ According to A. Ganin, Captain Alexander Sergey Chernishev, born in 1886, had been a member of the General Staff since March 23, 1918 and then was sent to serve in the armed forces of South Russia. He was a brave combat officer who had taken part in the battles of the Caucasian front and the capture of Erzurum as a member of the 5th Caucasian Rifle Regiment and was severely wounded. As of May 1918 he was at the disposal of the headquarters of the Caucasian Front. By the order of the Transcaucasian government, from May 10, 1918 he was transferred to the General Staff. From 1919 he started serving in the armed forces of South Russia. His future fate is unknown. His political views are echoed in the draft text he wrote on the aims of the "Russian Order of Partisans", in which he set himself the task of uniting all the spiritual and physical forces for an active struggle for the revival of United Russia based on federative principles.

Ganin A. 2009: 375; Ganin A. 2016: 100, 108. See <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/razvedchiki-epohi-diletantov>: http://istmat.info/files/uploads/58797/azerb_1919.pdf 08.08.2021:

¹⁶⁴ Ganin A. 2016: 98-100.

¹⁶⁵ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 75, sheet 35, file 26, sheet 203, file 184, sheet 52, file 75, sheet 35, file 26, sheet 203, fund 204, list 1, file 131, sheet 24, file 275, sheet 1. 5: Ganin A. 2016: 98-100;

activities included the detection and declassification of Bolsheviks, counter-revolutionaries and particularly officers of the Volunteer Army, as well as the discovery of their counterintelligence, naturally, it was important for the White Guards to have an agent in such a structure in Azerbaijan. It should also be mentioned that according to Ganin, Captain Chernishev expected to influence the activities of the department and obtain valuable information for the Volunteer Army¹⁶⁶. According to Ganin, Chernishev was a bearer of imperial ideas and did not admit the existence of independent Transcaucasian states outside the united Russia, only allowing for the possibility of broad autonomy. Thus, he headed the White Guards intelligence network in Azerbaijan, but in April 1919 his activities ended with arrest¹⁶⁷.

However, during this time, in connection with the appointment of the representative of Kuban in Azerbaijan, Chernishev was trying to find out who would be the representative of Kuban in Azerbaijan, which was important in connection with the network of agents. It should be added that according to Ganin, the armed forces of the South did not have a diplomatic representative in Azerbaijan at that time. This complicated the work of the intelligence service, preventing them from using the diplomatic shelter and carrying out activities¹⁶⁸, provided for by the principles of organizing the intelligence service under the General Staff of the Caucasus Army. These principles should have been the base for the establishment of the intelligence service of the Volunteer army in the Caucasian region and for the organization of its further activities, a similar variant of which was realized in the Republic of Armenia¹⁶⁹. Ganin emphasized that General L. F. Bicherakhov's intelligence unit was referred to. Its principles became a basis for Chernishev in creating an agent network, which included the acquisition of information about the local population, gathering the necessary information about the enemies and opponents of the revival of united Russia - the Bolsheviks, separatists, nationalists, as well as collecting data about the neighboring nations and states. All this had to be realized through a network of agents and spies and by questioning the arriving people, by army intelligence, interrogation of prisoners, as well as through information obtained from refugees, using air intelligence as well. In general, the Command of the Volunteer Army planned to organize its reconnaissance as operatively as possible in Tersk province, Dagestan, Astrakhan region, Stavropol, in the Governorate of Elizavetpol, Tbilisi, Yerevan, on the border with Persia and in the Apsheron Peninsula where the main body of the intelligence service

During those days RA resident in Baku was Arshak Sargisyan. In response to Tekinsky's expulsion Arshak Sargisyan (Arshak Sargisov), a member of the diplomatic mission, was deported from Baku for allegedly destructive intelligence activities, when Khan-Tekinsky was the Deputy Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan; and this was reported to Foreign Minister Mustafa Vekilov on February 20, 1920.

Nazim M. 2018: 80, 99, 110, 158 and etc.

¹⁶⁶ Ganin A. 2016: 100-101, 107.

¹⁶⁷ Ganin A. 2016: 101.

¹⁶⁸ Ganin A. 2016: 107.

¹⁶⁹ Virabyan V. 2015.

was located. Naturally, the Armenians and the Armenian intelligence service did not stay away from this process, as a result of which certain relations were established between the two sides. Thus, according to A. Ganin, three reconnaissance groups were formed: Petrovsky, Tbilisi and Apsheron: this was thoroughly instructed and put on a real basis¹⁷⁰.

From the archival and other materials circulated by Ganin it becomes clear that through yesaul Samedbek Yusupov who was directly subject to the Chief of General Staff Sulkevich¹⁷¹ (appointed on January 15, 1919)¹⁷² Azerbaijani special services and internal affairs bodies managed to track down Captain Chernishev because of the chatty and careless agent Smislova and prevent his reconnaissance activities, arresting him on a former Armenian street. This became the subject of a detailed investigation by the Ganja (Gandzak) district judicial investigator in late April-early May 1919, and the governor of Ganja became involved in this as well.

Shamistun Nazirli, a researcher on the military history of Azerbaijan and a journalist, stated about a secret conversation between Samed Bey Mehmandarov, the Azerbaijani Military Minister and Khosrov Bey Sultanov, governor of Kharabakh, based on the information related to the troops operating on Askeran (Artsakh-Karabakh) and other fronts and on the facts provided by Major General, then Lieutenant General Habib Bey Salimov, the Commander of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic troops in Artsakh as of March 31, 1920, as well as the Chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The conversation provides important information on the above-mentioned Chernishev and presents Mehmandarov's opinion on the intelligence activities of arrested Smislova: "No more than a week ago, a subversive group led by Smislova was caught in Ganja. And who was among its members? Nelli Fyodorovna Chernisheva, the lover of our General Staff employee; Stanislav Zuber and others. Apparently, our counterintelligence and the security bodies are just asleep. Instead, in Armenia, judging by the facts, the Bolsheviks act differently. They declare with sympathy that the Armenians are under the hostile Muslim blockade by Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey, and that only the Bolsheviks give them guarantees of state independence, in addition to expanding their territory at the expense of Azerbaijan and Turkey"¹⁷³.

¹⁷⁰ Ganin A. 2016: 107-108.

¹⁷¹ Sulkevich Mammad Bey – Sulkevich Suleyman [Matvey, Massey, Muhabed Bey. 20.07.1865-15.07.1920] was a Lithuanian Tatar, a Muslim. His father had served in the Alexandrov Hussar Regiment, reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel. General Mammad Bey Sulkevich himself was born into a noble family in Kemeys, Vilen province. From June 25, 1918 till November 18, 1918 he was the head of the so-called Crimean regional government. He was named Matsey Bey upon birth, however, for his activities in the Crimea, the local Tatars named him Suleyman Pasha, and in Azerbaijan he voluntarily adopted the name Mammad Bey. From March 19, 1919 till April 1920 he served in the army of Musavat Azerbaijan. He was the Chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani army, then he was captured by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, arrested and detained in the Baitov Prison in Baku, and then executed by shooting.

Shamistun Nazirli 2015: 40-41, 47.

¹⁷² Aslanov, Akhundov, Abdullaeva, Alieva 2018: 51.

¹⁷³ Shamistun Nazirli 2015: 15, 200.

According to them, the disclosure of Chernishev's agent network was facilitated by the financial documents kept by him, which he did not manage to destroy, in particular, his one-month report from February 20 to March 20, and even more precisely - March 24¹⁷⁴. The documents testified that one of their main tasks was to expose the Bolshevik underground in Azerbaijan and beyond its borders, including the Caspian region, cooperating with the British in this matter, also trying to establish contact with Georgia. At the same time, they tried to establish secret contacts with the Georgian military attaché in Baku and the Azerbaijani state officials, attaching importance to parliamentary hearings in the Azerbaijani parliament, significant materials on military and political issues, etc. Without repugnance they resorted to bribery as well, which, according to the Volunteer intelligence, had become so widespread in Azerbaijan that ministers and even the most powerful officials could be bribed with a certain amount of money. They resorted to questioning Armenian refugees as well. The arrest of Chernishev by the Azerbaijani counterintelligence revealed the list of 9 agents he had recruited, indicating the sums paid to them. And so, in addition to Okoyev, the group of agents organized by Chernishev included Aghoyev, Barchikhinyants, Beyer, Igumnov, Orlov, Tsagolov, E. I. Smislova¹⁷⁵, V. A. Chestnokov¹⁷⁶. One of them - E. I. Smislova drew the attention of the 27-year-old yesaul Samedbek Yusupov (Yusubov), centurion of the 2nd Karabakh Cavalry Regiment. At a hotel she carelessly said that she had been sent to Ganja by General Denikin's army and by the English headquarters to gather information for the English about the Azerbaijani army, the number of Turkish officers in the Azerbaijani military units, as well as information for the Volunteer Army about the number, deployment and discipline of the Azerbaijani army, as well as the location of its arsenal¹⁷⁷. Yusupov immediately reported this to the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General S. A. Sulkevich, from whom he received instructions to watch Smislova. Ultimately, Yusupov's efforts were successful, as Smislova helped him to get to Chernishev, and a seemingly insignificant piece of paper was handed over by Yusupov to the head

¹⁷⁴ Ganin A. 2016: 105.

¹⁷⁵ Ganin A. 2016: 101.

In a letter to the Judicial Chamber of Azerbaijan, on April 25, 1919 the prosecutor of Ganja reported that Elizaveta Ivanovna Smislova, a 22-year-old resident of Penza, noblewoman, checked into hotel "Centralnaya" in Ganja around March 20: she was a fourth-year student at the Petrograd Faculty of History, specialized in Oriental languages at special courses, and already in 1918-1919 she lived in Baku, working at the Office of the Management of Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and after her dismissal in late January, 1919 she worked at a notary.

¹⁷⁶ Ganin A. 2016: 105-106, 108-109.

¹⁷⁷ Taking this into account, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the Azerbaijani special services, Aydin Bayram from Azerbaijan unconditionally claimed that in order to destroy the foundations of the young Azerbaijani republic and to undermine socio-political stability in the country, Armenian nationalists carried out intense anti-Azerbaijani, provocative and intelligence activities. A. Bayram concluded that the Armenian spies sent the information they obtained not only to the ARF centers, but also to the Denikinians, to the Bolsheviks, the British, that the majority of those arrested by the authorities of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic in connection with Denikin's army attack were Armenian saboteurs. See Aydin Bayram 2019: 8-9, 12.

www.elibrary.az/docs/jurnal/jrn2019_24.

of the counterintelligence department on March 29, as a result of which Smislova was searched and arrested.

This fact received exceptional attention from the military and political authorities of Azerbaijan and it is evident from the telegram sent by S. S. Mehmandarov from Ganja to Kh. Khasmamedov, member of the Azerbaijani Parliament, Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs on March 29, 1919. It requested that measures be taken immediately to arrest the members of the disclosed spy organization: "In connection with the irrefutable evidence that information was gathered about the Azerbaijani armed forces in Ganja, citizen Smislova was arrested. She is accused of spying for the Volunteer Army and the Armenian government. Several officers of the Ganja garrison were discovered to be her accomplices. Her other accomplices are in Baku, namely Nelli Feodorovna Chernysheva, who lives at 8 Armenian Street, Music College and is the wife of an officer of the General Staff who served in the Armenian army and currently lives in Baku; and Stanislav Rudolf Zuber who is in the Rilski Merkuriev office. I suppose all the threads of the spy organization are intertwined in Baku ...»¹⁷⁸.

As a result, he played an important role in the development of Azerbaijani counterintelligence. On March 31, 1919, the Chief of General Staff Sulkevich sent yesaul Yusupov on a business trip to Ganja on the instructions of the Military Minister, and the assistant to the Minister of Internal Affairs was instructed to support him. At the same time, they claimed that the center of the spy agency was in Baku, and it reached out to the troops and the government. Thus, according to the order of the Military Minister, Sulkevich considered it necessary to work in solidarity everywhere, to organize counterintelligence in the military department and in the criminal investigation department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, considering it a very responsible job, entrusting it only to very reliable Muslim officers, finding that the job should not be trusted to somewhat hostile Russians or Armenians and that he could not allow it for the sake of his homeland. Sulkevich believed that the job required a complete devotion to the interests of the republic, which could not be bought with money¹⁷⁹. In order to solve this problem, Sulkevich personally asked the governor to support Yusupov and to coordinate his actions with G. B. Fatalibekov, the head of the Baku reconnaissance police. Due to these important circumstances, the investigation of the case of Smislova and others, which started on March 29 in Ganja, was personally led by Lieutenant Aghalarov, the chief of the counterintelligence department of the General Staff, and the preliminary investigation was led by I. I. Viktorovich, investigating judge on especially important cases¹⁸⁰. And in his telegram of March 29, 1919 addressed to the Minister of

¹⁷⁸ Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan 1998: 88-89.

¹⁷⁹ Ganin A. 2016: 101-103.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

Internal Affairs, Azerbaijani Military Minister S. B. Mehmandarov stated that Ms. Smislova had been arrested in Ganja on charges of spying for the Volunteer Army and the Armenian government¹⁸¹. In this regard, General of the Azerbaijani Army Murad Gyaray Bey Tlekhas¹⁸² admitted that at that time he was ruthless towards Denikin's spies who had fallen into their hands in Azerbaijan.

A. Ganin stated that on the basis of the confiscated documents, the Azerbaijani intelligence declassified the activity of A. A. Okoyev¹⁸³, the 22-year-old triple intelligence agent of Armenian descent who collaborated with the White Guards and British intelligence, was well known in Armenian intelligence, which we mentioned above.

Thus, according to the facts provided by A. Ganin, Okoyev was tasked by the Volunteer Army intelligence to join the Baku Investigation Department in order to obtain the necessary information and, if possible, to guide the Department's activities. To uncover all the activities Okoyev had carried out against them, the Baku investigators conducted searches also at the house of General Shchetinin, prince, former head of the Tbilisi Railway Gendarmerie Department, head of the intelligence group of the Volunteer Army in Baku, and at the house of General Stanislav Rudolf Zuber. On April 4, on the basis of the facts obtained, charges were brought against Chernishev, his wife, Smislova and Lieutenant A. Okoyev, although they did not accept the charges, except for Smislova. They were imprisoned in the notorious and ominous Bailov prison in Baku. According to the facts brought by Ganin, during the investigation A. Okoyev claimed that he had never acted against Azerbaijan, but he was a secret agent under the Commissar of the Allied States in Baku, and from March 1 until his arrest he was a secret agent of the counterintelligence department of the British headquarters. And according to the testimony of Colonel F. P. Kokerel, Commissar of the Military Police of the Allied States in Baku, from late February 1919 till March 7, he served in the operative unit of General Bicherakhov's headquarters under Captain Chenishev whom he provided information about the local Bolsheviks, and on the instructions of the Police Headquarters of the Allied States he tried to find out whether the rumors were true that through the British headquarters Bicherakhov's army secretly distributed weapons to the workers of Baku. Okoyev kept this secret from Chernishev, although he had received a salary of 780 rubles for 20 days of work, which was

¹⁸¹ Ganin A. 2016: 103.

¹⁸² Murad Gyaray Bey Tlekhas (1874, Kuban region - May 29, 1920, Baku), Major General, Circassian. In 1918-1920 he fought for the independence of Azerbaijan. In the autumn of 1918, when the White Guards occupied Kuban and Adygea, Tlekhas went to Azerbaijan. On December 4, 1919, he was appointed Governor-General of the fortified region

¹⁸³ According to the evidence obtained by A. Ganin, Okoyev's father was Armenian and his mother was French. He was born in Paris, studied at a lyceum, and then, as a second-class non conscripted soldier he took an exam at a Realni School in Baku. He considered himself a Frenchman and converted from Catholicism to Orthodoxy during his marriage. Okoyev was the agent of the Allies, 22 years old. He lived in Baku since December, 1918.

Ganin A. 2016: 108.

not a small amount. The details of the case investigated by the Azerbaijani investigative bodies testified that in early April, 1919, without leaving his service at the British headquarters and his work with Chernishev, Okoyev was admitted to the Baku Intelligence Department, allegedly not on his own initiative but at the suggestion of the Governor of Baku, who had assessed his merits in connection with other matters. By the way, during the interrogation Baku Governor Rashid Bey Akhund Zadeh, for obvious reasons, did not confirm Okoyev's version. Together with Hasan Bey Fatalibekov, the head of the intelligence department, they denied Okoyev's allegations, stating that Okoyev had been accepted by the intelligence department as a secret agent due to his own persistent request, knowing in advance that he was serving in the British counterintelligence, which was not denied by Okoyev either. He had stated that he simultaneously worked in several places. He did not hide the fact that he had introduced himself as an Ossetian and had concealed his Armenian origin which would prevent him from entering the intelligence department¹⁸⁴.

In his new job Okoyev dealt with the disclosure of Bolsheviks and withdrawal of weapons from the village of Mashtagh, maintaining friendly relations with Chernishev and considering him useful in gathering information for the British¹⁸⁵. It is certainly interesting that Captain Chernishev himself vehemently denied the allegations against him, refusing to testify, and only after being accused of violating international law against Azerbaijan by Russian military intelligence, he tried to defend himself in a special way. Chernishev gave a very original answer to that, and during the interrogation on April 7 he found that the issue as such could be resolved only by the Peace Conference, and before the decision of the conference, the territory in which he had operated, was considered to be Russia, where the activity of Russian military intelligence was quite natural and legal¹⁸⁶. Such a statement simply showed that Chernishev did not recognize Azerbaijan as an independent state, clarifying: "The revolution, and then anarchy divided the peoples of Russia, proving that the former state system had exhausted its power and was unable to meet the demands of many peoples of Russia in regard to their cultural development and independent position. And in order to find new ways as soon as possible, in order to find common ground for unification on the basis of broad autonomy in which case all the peoples of Russia can express their national privileges, Russian military intelligence has set itself the goal of contributing to that unification. I strongly believe that only in these conditions the small peoples of Russia, which are culturally, historically, geographically, economically and politically connected with it, will not be exploited by any foreign third power, that only in the case of general unification will their voice be heard among the great powers deciding the fate of the world. I believe that only then will there be a common

¹⁸⁴ Ganin A. 2016: 107, 109.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

ground in the revolution and anarchy, only then will the principles of unification of all the peoples of Russia on the basis of broad autonomy be finally found, their security will be ensured, and state-building and cultural development will be achieved. The whole main purpose of intelligence, its idea, of sincerity of which there is documentary evidence, run like a red thread through my intelligence activities on the Apsheron Peninsula”¹⁸⁷. This is truly the sincere confession of a Russian noble spy, the unwavering, unique devotion of a Russian officer to the state, only in case of which the state could have real security guarantees.

Denying the testimony of his agent Smislova, as an excuse for his stay in Baku Chernishsev tried to divert the Azerbaijani special services, saying that he was not sent on a business trip by the White Guard command, but only accidentally stayed in Baku after the withdrawal of General M. A. Przhevalsky’s detachment, as he was tasked with liquidating the warehouses of the detachment. He said that he had not given any instructions to Smislova, that the acquaintance with her had been accidental, that they had met only 2-3 times. And his wife testified that she was in no way aware of her husband’s activities, that he was engaged only in “counterintelligence” for the Volunteer Army. During an additional interrogation Captain Chernishev himself denied his wife’s involvement in intelligence work, noting that the existence of a number of documents had nothing to do with intelligence¹⁸⁸. On April 2, investigator I. I. Viktorovich conducted a search of Chernishev’s house in Baku, during which two maps and several documents were confiscated, which he had not managed to destroy. Among them was in particular one of his important reports on a month-long work spanning the period from February 20 to March 24, which revealed almost the whole picture of White Guard intelligence in Azerbaijan¹⁸⁹.

However, not satisfied with the obtained facts, the Azerbaijani special services set out to find and arrest all the persons who had something to do with Captain Chernishev, first of all those who had visited his apartment. As a result, the list of those arrested included N. F. Chernisheva, Captain Chernishev’s wife (she lived on the Armenian street of Baku at that time and according to Ganin, she was the wife of a former officer of the Armenian army), Lieutenant A. A. Okoyev (Okoyants-Hakobyants), Captains N. D. Zhukov and Petrov, Staff-captain Y. Kalinin, Staff-rotmasters A. A. Kasimov and V. A. Chestnokov, Cornet V. P. Yordanov, Kaptenarmus A. P. Bulankin, Chernysheva’s servant, soldier I. S. Tsikhovsky, temporary military official S. Kleshchevsky, sworn trustee I. G. Lutskin, engineer S. M. Remennikov, as well as Remennikova’s servant N. Hakobyants. The adjutants were not kept for long, they were soon released. According to A. Ganin, on April 11, the detainees were transferred to Ganja, except for Petrov, who was being held in the

¹⁸⁷ Ganin A. 2016: 110.

¹⁸⁸ Ganin A. 2016: 109-110, 113.

¹⁸⁹ Ganin A. 2016: 104.

central prison in Baku. After all this Ganja's warden M. Sklyarov wrote to Ganja's District Prosecutor: "On April 11, the head of the intelligence department of the troops of the Republic of Azerbaijan, trusting me, without any documents, brought to the prison Semyon Remennikov, Yevgeny Kalinin, Sergey Kleshchevsky, Iosif Lutskin, Alexey Kasimov, Alexander Okoyev, Vladimir Yordanov, Alexander Chernishev, Nimim Chernishev, Vladimir Chestnokov, Nikolay Zhukov, Iosif Chekhovsky, Nikolay Hakobyants and Anton Bulankin, of whom adjutants Hakobyants and Chekhovsky were released based on a letter on April 13. According to the same letter the rest of them were ordered to remain in custody until the end of the investigation". Warden M. Sklyarov therefore asked him not to delay and send the decisions on the above-mentioned persons, except for Chestnokov, in regard to whom there was a decision, but who died of typhus in prison¹⁹⁰. According to Ganin, the Azerbaijani special services, in particular the counterintelligence bodies considered A. Okoyev's or A. Hakobyants's arrest more important, viewing it one of their successful cases, and the rest, according to them, were indirectly related to that case¹⁹¹.

In connection with Chernishev's case, as a result of an external observation of Colonel I. V. Tsvetkov, the head of the motorcade of the Caspian detachment of the Volunteer Army, G. B. Fatalibekov, Baku intelligence police chief found out about his ties with Chernishev and arrested him on April 22, confiscating his documents, notebook, notes, Chernishev's and Colonel Lazarev's notes on receiving a password. Colonels Lazarev and V. V. Makarov came under surveillance. During the search of the latter's apartment, among other items, the correspondence with General I. G. Erdeli, Commander of the Volunteer Army's military units in Terek-Dagestan region, the correspondence with Colonel Lazarev and two other coded telegrams were found. And as it turned out, Tsvetkov had at his disposal a large amount of explosives, ammunition, cars left over from Bicherakhov's detachment (102 cars). The cars were sold to private individuals and Armenian organizations, and the proceeds from the sale were transferred to the Volunteer Army, which was also the result of expulsion by the British from the region, which took place on March 1, 1919, when General William Montgomery Thomson, the commander of the Allies' troops that entered Baku, forced the Russian forces to leave Azerbaijan and the territory under the control of the South Russia's armed forces¹⁹². The counterintelligence of the Azerbaijani army had also found out that in March 1919 there was allegedly an intention to take the cars and other property out of Azerbaijan, but they could not obtain such direct evidence from Tsvetkov. On April 28, Tsvetkov, together with

¹⁹⁰ Ganin A. 2016: 110-111.

¹⁹¹ Ganin A. 2016: 110.

¹⁹² Ganin A. 2016: 110, 111-112; Bezugolny A. 2011: 234-236; Gasanli J. 2010: 323-324; Puchenkov A. 2012: 132-133.

Colonel V. P. Lik arrested with him, were released due to lack of *corpus delicti*, and the confiscated money and documents were returned to them¹⁹³.

This conflict between the intelligence services had formed in a situation when the Azerbaijani counterintelligence, as well as the intelligence bodies of the Volunteer Army in Azerbaijan were still in the embryonic stage of formation in the spring of 1919, and the intelligence personnel were somewhat amateurish, inexperienced. Moreover, there was no precise line between intelligence and counterintelligence bodies, which was specific to the Republic of Armenia as well, where they were subordinated to the General Staff¹⁹⁴. Nevertheless, as it turns out from M. Sulkevich's letter (N 1539) of March 31, 1919, addressed to Major General S. Aghabekov, Assistant to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the task was to organize counterintelligence in Baku. He informed that yesaul Yusupov was being sent for that purpose, adding that only especially trusted Muslim officers should be involved in the case, as it should not be entrusted to Russians or Armenians who were hostile to them. He emphasized that the job required a complete devotion to the interests of the republic, which could not be bought with any money¹⁹⁵. It was clear that the reason for such an approach was the events in Ganja connected with the alleged anti-Azerbaijani espionage activities by Smislova, Chernishev and others.

Chernishev's investigation lasted for 2 months, and on April 28 the latter's wife, Chernisheva was released on a 5000 rubles bail¹⁹⁶.

It is obvious that in Azerbaijan they were quite worried about the activities of the Volunteer Army spies¹⁹⁷. In his dispatch to Colonel M. B. Aliyev, the military attaché of Azerbaijan in Tbilisi,

¹⁹³ Ganin A. 2016: 113.

¹⁹⁴ It should be noted that according to A. Ganin, the Azerbaijani counterintelligence department, like its Armenian counterpart, had a limited number of personnel. As of March, 1919 it included Ali Kuliyeu, Mossum Ibrahimov, ShikhAli Oghli Aziz, Abbas Novruzoglu, Bakhtiyar Saniyev, David Kakhiyev, and the so-called temporary agents - yesaul S. Yusupov, I. Vakhramaibekov, having a very limited amount, about 11.5 thousand rubles for March, as was the case with the Armenian structure.

Ganin A. 2016: 114, Virabyan V. 2015.

¹⁹⁵ Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan 1998: 90-91.

¹⁹⁶ Ganin A. 2016: 114.

¹⁹⁷ On March 28, 1919, after the formation of the Azerbaijani army, by the decree of the Military Minister Samed Bey Mehmandarov and Chief of the General Staff Mammad Bey Sulkevich, the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Divisions were established under the General Staff. It was planned to employ 23 agents with a salary of 1000 rubles each, however, there were initially 10 agents who undertook the job of carrying out the operations of the special services of the state. The department was subordinated to the General-quartermaster of the General Staff. It was headed by Cornet, then Lieutenant Aghalarov. And since the Counterintelligence department of the General Staff could not handle its tasks with the Bolshevik propaganda in the army, in October, 1919, at the suggestion of the Military Ministry, a special criminal investigation unit was established under the Ministry of Internal Affairs to carry out political police operations in the army. And already in the autumn of 1919, an attempt was made to organize a military counterintelligence at the Ministry of Internal Affairs under the name "An organization for Struggle against CounterRevolution", which reminds of the Bolshevik experience. In 1919 the head of the counterintelligence of the Republic of Azerbaijan was Nagi Bey Sheikhzamanli. [Sheikhzamanov, born in 1883, a member of the "Musafat" party, died in Istanbul in 1967], who headed it in 1919. From August 20 to 1920 March 6. We should also add that one of the chiefs of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Army was also the former chief of staff of the Baku Fortified District, Colonel Irza Bey Mehdi Bey Oghli Hajibeilinsky [born in 1876], arrested several times during Stalinist repressions, shot in 1937.

General M. Sulkevich, the Chief of the General Staff, expressed his concern: “During the search at Chernishev’s, quite important documents were found, which reveal the entire network of his agency. By the way, one of his agents, an Armenian officer, simultaneously serves the British and in the Baku investigation department. There is reason to believe that the intelligence of the Volunteer Army in Georgia is headed by General V. P. Shatilov¹⁹⁸. Warn the Chief of the General Staff of Georgia to be careful until suspicious people leave the country, which we should do in Baku and in other cities”¹⁹⁹. On April 22, Sulkevich sent a special letter about Chernishev to the Prosecutor of the Ganja District Court, and in May he informed the Prime Minister of a radio report confiscated from Chernishev, regarding the activities of the network of agents of the Volunteer Army within Azerbaijan²⁰⁰. Its analysis shows that in those and other documents the Azerbaijani special services were also looking for an Armenian trace, which, according to them, was undoubtedly related to the intelligence of the Volunteer Army.

It could be assumed that Azerbaijan was really worried about the intelligence activities of the South Russian Armed Forces, which was also a matter of resources. In this regard, Ganin cited the self-confession of the Azerbaijani Interior Ministry, in which the head of the Ministry stated that they could not counter each of the actions of the agents of the Volunteer Army within Azerbaijan, the recruitment of the network of agents from among mountaineers and in the Caspian region, given the fact that Chernishev had access to the British, to the General Staff of the Republic of Azerbaijan and to the top leadership²⁰¹, and Azerbaijan simply could not counteract this. It was on the basis of this last circumstance that the examination of Azerbaijani officers and officials began in Azerbaijan. They were forced to testify and justify themselves, but as was the case with Chernishev’s additional interrogation, the whole further investigation came to a standstill, and extorting new information from the detainees proved ineffective. Finally, on May 27, the Ganja District Prosecutor proposed to replace the preventive measure for Chernishev, Okoyev and Smislova with a non-custodial measure. It was decided to release Chernishev on a 10 thousand rubles bail, and Smislova and Okoyev were put under local police surveillance. And so, Smislova and Okoyev were released on May 28 and Chernishev - on June 2²⁰². The latter left for Petrovsk, and the gun confiscated from

Ganin A. 2009: 131, 351; Aydin Bayram 2019: 8. See Ganin A. 2016: 113. Shamistan Nazirli 2015: 224; History of Azerbaijan 1963; Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan 1998: 87; Elşad Q.. 2018: 78-82, 84-86.

¹⁹⁸ Shatilov Vladimir Pavel [15.5.1855 - December, 1928] – a General, who was the representative of the General Command of the Volunteer Army in Georgia. He was arrested by the Georgian authorities, and in 1919 he headed the semi-official center of the Volunteer Army in Tbilisi. He was deported to Yugoslavia after the defeat of the White Army. Zalesskiy K. 2003: 666-667.

¹⁹⁹ Ganin A. 2016: 114.

²⁰⁰ Ganin A. 2016: 115-116.

²⁰¹ Steklov A. 1928: 26.

²⁰² Ganin A. 2016: 116.

Okoyev was handed over to the British headquarters. The British pressure on the Azeris is obvious here, otherwise Chernishev, Okoyev or Hakobyants would hardly escape from their clutches.

All this testifies to the conflict between the Voluntary Army, the Azerbaijani and British intelligence services in Azerbaijan and around it, in which the Armenians were not playing a secondary role at all. It should be noted that at that time both the Volunteer Army and the Azerbaijani and Armenian intelligence services were solving similar problems in an attempt to establish themselves and effectively counter the enemy's machinations. The role of the British in that conflict was multi-layered and ambiguous. They were one of the key figures in that secret war, and all the parties to the conflict sought to communicate and cooperate with them: they could not do without it since it was the most experienced special service in the region. According to the analysis, the case of Chernishev and Okoyev aggravated the relations between the Volunteer Army and Azerbaijan, created tensions for the local Russian and Armenian population. Many Russian officers were accused of espionage and were incarcerated in the prisons of Ganja and Baku²⁰³. It is noteworthy that during the interrogation both Captain Chernishev and A. Okoyev stated that they did not plead guilty because they had worked on their own land, i.e. on the territory of the former Russian Empire, at a time when the existence of independent Azerbaijan was not recognized by anyone. In this respect, according to Ganin, General A. Denikin's order dated November 9, 1919, was natural. According to it all the Russian officers had to leave the Azerbaijani troops due to the hostile attitude of the Azerbaijani authorities towards the Russian army and the treacherous advance of the Azerbaijani troops into the territory of Armenia²⁰⁴.

As a postscript it should be mentioned that one of the last references to Okoyev dates back to 1920. In a telegram (N 468) sent to Tbilisi on May 25, 1920, renowned Armenian spy Tigran Devoyants, one of the leaders of the intelligence and counterintelligence department of the General Staff of the Republic of Armenia, informed about the English translator Okoyev (A. Hakobyants), who had come to them to get a permit, and had had a lengthy conversation with his assistant, Khachaturyan, apparently seeking to get hired by the Armenians. Devoyants ordered to arrest Okoyev and send him to Yerevan²⁰⁵. In a telegram on July 5, Devoyants asked Kishmishyan to send him any letter addressed to Dodokhyan by the English translator Okoyev (or Akoyev)²⁰⁶.

In Armenia, they followed up on the information received through Tbilisi from the North Caucasus, particularly from the Volunteer Army, and often, if necessary, in order to verify this or that fact, to clarify issues connected with the personnel they sought the help of the relevant special services or turned to the relevant actions.

²⁰³ Baykov V. 1923: 177.

²⁰⁴ Ganin A. 2016: 117.

²⁰⁵ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 184, sheet 52; Ganin A. 2016: 115-116:

²⁰⁶ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 184, sheet 61.

History is in a manner a sacred thing, so far as it contains truth; for where truth is, the supreme Father of it may also be said to be, at least, inasmuch as concerns truth.

Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra

Chapter 3.

ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI TERRITORIAL CONFLICT AND THE KARABAKH-ARTSAKH ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND TRANSCAUCASIA IN 1918-1920

In 1918-1920s the steps of the military policy of Azerbaijan were directed toward the frustration of the Armenian State system. With this intention, Andranik's and Dro's forces were taken out with the help of British generals Thomson and Digby Inglis Shuttleworth. This allowed Azerbaijan to make the Armenian council in Karabakh temporarily obey the Azerbaijani Government on August 22, 1912, till the solution of this disputable issue by the French conference of allied nations, which was one of the steps of the Azerbaijani government planned beforehand. In reality, as a result of further important military changes in the Republic of Armenia and the mutually beneficial agreement between Russia and Kemal Atatürk, as well as taking into consideration the evident connivance of allied powers, during 1920- 1923 Azerbaijan managed to capture not only Nakhichevan, but Karabakh and other Armenian lands as well, the struggle for which restarted in 1988-1990.

The 1918-1920 Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict was uncompromising and bloody for Artsakh. In order to protect themselves from various Azerbaijani encroachments and simply from anti-Armenian militant actions, the RA government took several steps in 1918-1919²⁰⁷. Thus, on November 16, 1918, the report of the Military Minister on the organization of military forces for Karabakh and Zangezur was presented at the session of the Council of Ministers. The session approved the draft. Taking into account that Azerbaijan had taken action without waiting for the settlement of the disputed issues of the borders of Karabakh and Zangezur by mutual consent, and

²⁰⁷ Harutyunyan H. 1996: 11-235. 39.

seizing the mountainous parts of Artsakh-Karabakh and Zangezur, used violence against the population, armed forces should be organized to defend the above-mentioned Armenian regions and to protect the population from encroachment²⁰⁸.

At the session of January 21, 1919, Minister-President (Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia) Hovhannes Qajaznuni presented to the approval of the Government a plan to establish an interim administration in the Armenian parts of Artsakh and Zangezur. The following plan consisting of 16 articles made with the participation of Alexander Khatisyan, acting Minister of Internal Affairs of Armenia, was adopted at the session of the Government:

1. «The Armenian regions of Zangezur and Karabakh, being an integral part of the Republic of Armenia, are governed by bodies approved by the Government of the Republic, based on the laws in force in Armenia.

2. Due to communication difficulties, the General Administration of the country is temporarily transferred to the existing “Zangezur National Council”, which will be called “Regional Council of Zangezur and Karabakh” ...

3. The composition of the council should be replenished with representatives of the Armenian-populated parts of Karabakh, as well as with the representatives of the Turkish population living in the region according to their number...

4. Until a new order is established, all state institutions of the country and state officials are subject to the council, are established and approved by the council and are accountable to it.

5. Country revenues (state taxes and other state incomes) are spent for the needs of the country, the deficit is filled from the treasury of the Republic...

6. 400,000 roubles will be allocated from the treasury of the Republic to cover the state expenses for February. Regardless of this, the treasury covers the expenses of the soldiers of one detachment...

7. The “Regional Council of Zangezur and Karabakh” will present to the central government a report on the spending of the above-mentioned 400 thousand roubles...

8. The government of the Republic sends a state commissioner to Goris, as its representative, for the Armenian region of Zangezur-Karabakh.

9. The state commissioner is instructed to oversee the activities of the Council and, if necessary, give instructions to the Council on behalf of the government...

10. If the state commissioner is a military person, the command of the Goris detachment must be handed over to him, otherwise the special commander must be appointed by the Military Minister.

²⁰⁸ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 6, sheet 9.

11. Assign the election of the state commissioner to the Minister-President, with the consent of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Military Minister. It was decided to adopt the program and recommend the Minister-President to make the necessary orders to implement it”²⁰⁹.

Based on the resolution of the June 16, 1919 session of the RA Council of Ministers and the June 5, 1919 law, the government passed a new law on allocating 1,500 thousand roubles from the 8 million Karabakh fund to organize a military unit of Karabakh. According to the law, the Karabakh military unit was to consist of one infantry battalion, two mountain cannons and 54 scouts. Based on the above-mentioned law, in another document, which is a logical continuation of the above, on behalf of the Military Ministry, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel B. Baghdasarov asked G. Khojamiryan, the manager of affairs of the RA Council of Ministers, to speed up and put the mentioned sum at his disposal, at the same time noting that out of the sum of 8 million, 3,238,640 roubles remained²¹⁰. However, all this was either not effective enough, or the Armenian government fell victim to the vain promises and assurances of the military-and-political representations of the Allies in the Caucasus or their governments, who forgot that their small ally had shed blood in the Arabian sands.

Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan took advantage of the opportunities provided by the situation, in particular, the connivance and undisguised support of the British-European military-and-political representations in Transcaucasia and their governments. And this was in the circumstance when the Armenian government was taken aback by its Entente allies, who had made many promises before. The Republic of Armenia was an ally of the Entente, therefore of England. Given this fact, the ruling regions of Armenia naively and unconditionally believed that the allied powers would defend Armenia in the disputed issues with the neighboring Muslim power, and on that ground, especially in the beginning, they did not put a lot of effort into cajoling, showing a diplomatic approach to the heads of representation of the allied powers. Of course, there were some grounds for that. For the Armenians and their leading forces, who had enthusiastically welcomed the entry of allied powers, including the British, into the Caucasus, it was extremely difficult to soberly and unequivocally orient themselves in the context of the British policy and draw the necessary conclusions and be guided by viable and effective tactics. According to R. Hovhannisyan, the similar position of England was conditioned by the following circumstance: “At the end of 1918, they believed that Armenia would be given the Ottoman eastern vilayets. Therefore, it seemed natural to view Karabakh and Zangezur as compensation for Azerbaijan, whose claims to western lands would be rejected. Some critics single out economic exploitation as the primary factor in British politics. ...

²⁰⁹ The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920 (political history) 2000: 85-86.

²¹⁰ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 28, sheet 86-87.

Britain managed to buy thousands of tons of oil products worth millions of pounds. “Whether or not oil imperialism dictated British policy, in any case, economic factors could not be ignored”²¹¹.

In the current situation, W. M. Thomson²¹², who replaced G. Forrestier-Walker, the British Commander-in-Chief in Transcaucasia from March 9, and D. I. Shuttleworth²¹³, one of his staff officers, who was left in Baku as the head of the imperial armed forces, openly favored Azerbaijan, and were initially intolerant of Armenians and openly sympathetic to Azerbaijanis. In November 1918, with General W. Thomson’s intervention, General Andranik’s detachment was prevented from entering Shushi and Artsakh, the real story of which is openly falsified by Azerbaijani historians. T. de Waal writes the following about that: “General William Thomson, who headed the expeditionary corps, appointed Dr. Khosrov bey Sultanov (an Azerbaijani who was extremely infamous among Armenians)²¹⁴ governor of Karabakh and “persuaded” Andranik, the commander of the Armenian guerrilla detachments, to return to Armenia. Thomson said it was only a temporary agreement and all the other issues would be resolved at the forthcoming Paris Peace Conference”²¹⁵.

According to Azerbaijani historian Jamil Hasanli, Thomson also stated that the coalition government led by Khoyski was the only legal entity for all Azerbaijani territories, and that the Allied Command would provide full support to that government²¹⁶. In talks with Azerbaijani leaders, Thomson cynically tried to make it clear that he was not an “advocate of Armenians”²¹⁷.

Thomson’s image is largely negatively perceived by historians as a British man, because of whom Azerbaijan’s domination of Karabakh became de facto accepted. The opponents of this -

²¹¹ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 121.

²¹² Thomson William Montgomerie (December 2, 1878 - July 23, 1963) - Major General, from November 17, 1918 to March 10, 1919, he was the commander of the 39th Division, which occupied Baku, bringing about 2,000 troops from the British army deployed in India, after which he became Governor of Baku.

²¹³ Shuttleworth Digby Inglis (August 23, 1876 - May 15, 1948) - a British brigadier general known for his anti-Armenian activities in Karabakh. In 1905 he received the rank of captain. In 1912-1916 he served as a major in India, Mesopotamia and northwestern Iran; in 1917-1919 he was the commander of the 39th infantry brigade in the Caucasus; in April-August, 1919, he was involved in the withdrawal of British troops from Baku and the Caucasus in general and was in warm relations with the Azerbaijani leadership. D. Shuttleworth commanded all British troops in Azerbaijan, Petrovsk and Krasnovodsk. In 1920 D. Shuttleworth was a member of the Allied Control Council for Military Management of the Ottoman State in Constantinople and the commander of the 83rd infantry brigade during the Chanak and Dardanelles crisis of 1920-1923, during the unstable situation following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In 1936 he received the military rank of Major General.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digby_Shuttleworth. See https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Digby_Shuttleworth. See <https://bit.ly/3y2EYrS>: Isgenderli A., McCarthy J., Axundov Y. 2011: 184-185; «Azerbaijan» 1919: 24 august. № 179; *Azerbajdjanskaya Demokraticeskaya Respublika* 1998: 279.

²¹⁴ Sultanov Khosrov Bek Pasha Bey Oğlu (May 10, 1879 - January 7, 1943) – in 1903 he graduated from the Medical Faculty of the University of Novorossiysk; in 1917 he joined the “Musavat” party; in 1917 he became a member of the Transcaucasian Seim; in 1918 he moved to the “Ittihad” party; in May-June 1918 he was the Military Minister; in June-July 1918 and March 1919 he was the Minister of Agriculture. And from February 12, 1919 he was the governor-general of Karabakh; on April 28, 1920 he was deported to Turkey because of the sovietization of Azerbaijan. Vekilov R. 1998:

²¹⁵ Vaal de 4: See <https://bit.ly/3O6P0hj>: View date 22.10.2021. Vaal de 2005: 181.

²¹⁶ Hasanli J. 2016: 150.

²¹⁷ Hasanli J. 2016: 278.

European, especially Azerbaijani authors argue that Thomson simply sought stability, rather than hatred of Armenians, that Azerbaijan's control of Karabakh would allegedly contribute to stability and peace in the region. In this respect, F. Ahmedova writes as if in a telegram sent to London Thomson even wrote that the territories in Eastern Turkey should be handed over to Armenians²¹⁸, which does not correspond to the facts, is based on false claims, and is rejected by certain sections of society: "For the first time the international community forced Armenia to withdraw its Armenian armed forces from Artsakh or to deploy new forces. For example, it is widely known that on December 2, 1918, in the area of the present-day village of Berdadzor, William Thomson, British General, the commander of the federal troops in Western Transcaucasia, handed a letter to Commander-in-Chief Andranik. In the letter, Thomson urged Andranik not to move forward, not to enter Nagorno-Karabakh, as the issue of the borders of the newly formed states of the South Caucasus was to be discussed at the Paris Conference in the near future. The implication was clear that there was no need to create unnecessary complications. And even without that Artsakh could be Armenian, because it was inhabited exclusively by Armenians (very important fact – V.V.). Later, the people of Karabakh could defend their territory completely without Andranik"²¹⁹, and Azerbaijan, despite its ambitions and impudence, was not able to establish effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh, even with the support of Turkey, which was not the case in 2020, and Turkey acted with impunity and more effectively, and as in 1918- 1920, it felt the alienation and criminal isolation from the Republic of Armenia of the Entente countries, which were considered allies of the RA. And moreover, despite the fact that on February 19, Major-General G. T. Forrestier-Walker, the commander of the 27th military unit located in Tiflis, informed the Government of the RA that, in accordance with the principle proclaimed by the Allied peacekeepers, "conquest of a disputed territory by force of arms will seriously undermine the aggressor's ambitions and that everyone must wait for a decision of the Peace Conference", on February 24, the representative of Forrestier-Walker in Yerevan, Brigadier General Werni Asser, who was the British military representative in Yerevan from February 1 to the beginning of March, handed Foreign Minister S. Tigranyan an official message sent by Thomson from Tiflis. According to it, Dr. Sultanov was going to Shushi as the governor-general of the regions of Zangezur, Shushi and Karabakh, without making any demand on the future administration of Azerbaijan, only in order to maintain law and order in the mentioned territories²²⁰. Tigranyan immediately drew Forrestier-Walker's attention to the fact that the Armenian government could not consider General Thomson's telegram as an

²¹⁸ Akhmedova F. 2009: 174.

²¹⁹ The letter was handed on behalf of Thomson by G. F. Squire, English Captain, Commander of the detachment of the 7th battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment of the 39th brigade and Nicholas Gasfid, French Captain, Officer of the 6th Hussar Regiment, Attaché to the French Military Mission in the Caucasus.

Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 94; Historical cycle.

²²⁰ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 177.

expression of indirect recognition of Azerbaijani governance over Zangezur and Karabagh, even temporary rule over the disputed regions of the provinces that were to be subject to Sultanov's rule. Tigranyan considered the maintenance of the status quo to be the only acceptable thing until the Paris Peace Conference adopted a decision on the borders. Referring to the February 19 declaration of the Allies, Tigranyan asked a question whether the declaration on "the conquest of the disputed territory by force of arms" was sent to the Baku government as well"²²¹. Afgan Akhmedov, who defended his doctoral dissertation at Lancaster University, considers these actions of Thomson to be a fact of recognition of Azerbaijan's rights over Karabakh and Zangezur. Thus, he considered Khosrov Bey Sultanov's rule established by the British to be legitimate, sending telegrams to the so-called Karabagh and Zangezur National Councils on behalf of the British military authorities, which the Azeri author considers sufficient, ignoring the internationally recognized right of the Armenian people to self-determination²²². On March 11, 1919, S. Tigranyan directly appealed to General Thomson, finding that the Peace Assembly's instructions would be violated if Azerbaijan took unilateral action, reminding that Karabakh persistently defended its freedom during the war and now saw itself as part of the Republic of Armenia and that any violent attempt by Azerbaijan to impose its will would undoubtedly lead to the most serious consequences and thus considered Thomson's proposal of a "so-called governor-general" to be unacceptable²²³, although the Armenians of Karabakh were obviously shocked by the British patronage who had arrived as allies.

On March 21, 1919, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RA informed Colonel K. Temperley, the British Military Representative in Armenia, that "Armenia considers the Karabakh issue to be in its vital interests", finding that "1) Zangezur and Armenian Karabakh should remain independent of the Azerbaijani government and influence, as in the past. 2) If at the moment the British command finds it impossible to include these regions in the Republic of Armenia, it is necessary that Azerbaijan withdraw its troops from that region in any case, establishing an autonomous administration under the supreme authority and control of the British command, deeming it necessary that the governor-general be English"²²⁴.

On March 27, 1919, during a meeting with acting Prime Minister A. Khatisyan, in response to Khatisyan's request to withdraw the Azerbaijani troops from Karabakh and temporarily keep it under British administration, Thomson sharply objected saying that even if Sultanov was hated by everyone, he still was necessary for the British effort of helping the people²²⁵.

²²¹ Khatisean Al. 1968: 154.

²²² Akhmedova A. 2019: 106-017: See https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/132565/1/2019_afganphd.pdf. Date of download 13.02.2022.

²²³ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 177-178.

²²⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 121, sheet 1-4.

²²⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 188.

Of course, the weakness of the Republic of Armenia in terms of military, energy, food and other issues left its mark on the whole course of the country, in terms of the success or failure of the steps taken by the Government. Difficulties and possible successful progress in the territorial delimitation depended on the British military-and-political mission and the supreme command, which, as advisers, played a negative role in the RA foreign policy calculations and expectations, often contributing to decisions unfavorable for Armenia, which has not significantly changed during the last century. One of the main arguments of the Yerevan rulers in those years was not the flexible, far-reaching diplomatic activity, but the armed forces, which were few in number, poorly armed, including with British-Canadian firearms which were not usable enough, were often defective, which did not allow establishing themselves in Kars and Nakhichevan, Karabakh, Basargechar and elsewhere. The British and the other allies did not show any practical interest in this issue, because for them the priority was the oil of Baku, and the division of Russia, be it Tsarist or Bolshevik. All of this did not allow the Armenian government to at least occasionally oppose the British dictatorship which in many cases was not pro-Armenian, to overcome the slavish devotion to the Allies, as in 2020. Apparently, the Republic of Armenia could not support Karabakh and Zangezur, falling victim to the deceptive and on-the-paper decisions made by the Allies, which very skillfully and toughly passed the strategic initiative to Azerbaijan, to which they were much friendlier.

In her assessment of the British policy implemented in Transcaucasia, F. Akhmedova writes: “Despite the fact that the Armenian government sought to increase the pressure on the leadership of the British Armed Forces in the Caucasus (Walker, Thomson and others), all their attempts were unsuccessful. Colonel Shuttleworth went to Shushi and demanded that the Armenians obey the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan. However, the Armenians continued their separatist activities. At the /5th/ Congress held in late April, 1919, they refused to accept the power of the governor-general of Karabakh. The Armenian government and its representation in NagornoKarabakh played a very destructive role in making such a decision. For the first time, international mediators gained experience in participating in the settlement process, following the example of territorial disputes in the Caucasus.

The active role of Great Britain and the United States, examples of their participation in special projects are well known. On May 5, 1919, General Thomson announced that he had ordered the deportation of separatists. On June 5, the extremely reactionary Armenians were sent from Shushi to Tiflis accompanied by representatives of the English command. On June 6, at a rally in the part of Shushi where Armenians lived, Armenians declared their recognition of the Azerbaijani government. The Armenians, accepting the principles of the governor-general's actions, began to enter into negotiations. On August 15, 1919, the Armenians signed an agreement with the

government of Azerbaijan, recognizing that the territories inhabited by Armenians are an integral part of Azerbaijan. It was assumed that the Armenians of Karabakh would be given the right to “cultural autonomy”. It should be noted that at that stage, without the permission of the Azerbaijani government, foreigners arrived in Shushi as members of some organizations and did not present any mandate to the local authorities. Following the recognition of the government of Azerbaijan by the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan expressed its protest over the arrival of the Americans in Karabakh without submitting any document”²²⁶.

In April, 1919, General Thomson, the head of the British mission in the Caucasus, was replaced by General Shuttleworth. According to the assessment of Y. Ishkhanyan, chairman of the Artsakh National Council: “General Shuttleworth, who succeeded General Thomson, surpassed his predecessor, occupying us more and more with the issue of recognizing the rule of Sultanov, or rather, the rule of Azerbaijan. Through the mission he tried to persuade us to obey the governor’s orders”²²⁷. Shuttleworth turned out to be so unbridled that in late April, 1919, he personally left for Goris to demand the recognition of Khosrov Bey Sultanov as the governor-general of Zangezur, but he met with persistent resistance. He was forced to return with threats against Armenians, with the threat of air bombardment and the demand to remove A. Shahmazyan²²⁸ insisting that the Armenian government must have publicly renounced Shahmazyan, but secretly financed him²²⁹. Shuttleworth, who had sent a message to Thomson about the resumption of the Armenian opposition in Zangezur in the person of Shahmazyan and other agents associated with Yerevan, insisted on the termination of repatriation to Nakhichevan until the cooperation between Yerevan and Zangezur ceased, which also displeased Thomson, who was angry with General K. M. Davy, the British military representative in Yerevan who in the first place forced to stop repatriation, using the armed forces if necessary²³⁰.

After Shuttleworth’s departure, Rasulzade, the founder of Musavat, announced on August 28 that Azerbaijan would soon extend uninterruptedly from Dagestan to Julfa and the Araxes River in the south²³¹, thus claiming to achieve their long-cherished strategic goal of gaining control of the Araks Valley, just like today when Azerbaijan and Turkey persistently seek to open the road to Nakhichevan-Turkey through SyunikZangezur and to include the entire Araxes Valley in their ambitious plans, isolating Armenia from all active routes with the outside world.

And the steps taken by the Government of the RA and the strategic pursuits in foreign policy did not yield significant results. The security of Armenian Karabakh was soon significantly

²²⁶ Akhmedova A. 2019: 174-175.

²²⁷ Ishkhanyan Ye. 1999: 378.

²²⁸ Shahmazyan A.P. [1883 -1937]. Well known military figure of the RA.

²²⁹ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 210.

²³⁰ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 266.

²³¹ «Nor ashkhatavor», September 1, 1919.

endangered, and therefore the national-and-state security of the Republic of Armenia was undermined in this part of the country. In those circumstances, after isolating Andranik and Dro from involvement in the military-and-political events, Musavat Azerbaijan launched large-scale oppressive actions against the Armenian population of Karabakh, its legitimate national-and-state rights, violating the inalienable right of internationally recognized ethnic groups to self-determination, which had become a reality in some European territories. Azerbaijan had ambitions not only for Artsakh and Zangezur, but also for Sharur-Nakhichevan and even the eastern and northeastern regions of Lake Sevan basin. The command of the British troops in Transcaucasia and their military-and-political representation pursued pro-Azerbaijani policy on this issue. It was with the intervention of the British military-and-political mission in the Caucasus that the advance of Andranik's troops to Shushi was stopped, and for the sake of oil interests the way was paved for the establishment of Dr. Sultanov's repressive power in Karabakh-Artsakh.

In this regard, Azerbaijani historian B. Najafov welcomes Sultanov's actions in Karabakh, expressing satisfaction with the support of the British military-and-political authorities: "However, the confident actions of governor-general Khosrov Bey Sultanov, who was this time fully supported by the British, yielded results very quickly: calm and order were restored"²³². Assessing the recent June events in Karabakh, B. Najafov makes a judgement at his subjective discretion: "Dr. Sultanov was appointed governor-general and the British officer and the small British detachment were stationed in Shushi. According to the agreement, Sultanov had to issue his own orders and decrees only with the consent of the representative of England. Even such a governance was rejected by 66 Armenians and when the Azerbaijani messages and proclamations were posted all over the city, the Armenians, provoked by preachers, spoiled them or tore them"²³³. I

It was with the knowledge of Great Britain that from the beginning of 1919, Azerbaijan was trying to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. However, the Armenians of Artsakh have never really recognized the Azerbaijani rule, constantly rebelling against the yoke imposed on them by Azerbaijan, which has had variable success.

The Armenian progress and aspiration for stability were halted by British intervention. On April 3, 1919 Shuttleworth, the representative of the Entente Command, stated that the region would remain as part of Azerbaijan until the Karabakh issue was resolved by the Paris Conference²³⁴.

The position and decision of the English side on this issue was unequivocal. Ignoring the complaints of the Armenian government and in order to reaffirm their decision, on April 3 General

²³² Najafov V. 1994: 66.

²³³ Najafov V. 1994: 66-67.

²³⁴ Pilipchuk Ya. 2021: 132, 136.

Shuttleworth, the Commander of the British troops stationed in Baku, issued the following statement: “For the British the fate of Karabakh, as well as Zangezur, was decided. They had decided to annex those lands to Azerbaijan. On January 15, 1919, with Thomson’s approval Dr. Khosrov Bey Sultanov, who had a reputation among Armenians as an anti-Armenian and slaughterer, was appointed governor-general. The English Command declared the following to be implemented by the population of Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail and Jivanshir provinces: 1. by the decision of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan of January 15, 1919, Dr. Sultanov was appointed governor-general of the provinces of Shushi, Zangezur, Jebrail and Jivanshir, and he enjoys the support of the English command... 2. All the disputed issues will be finally resolved at the Peace Conference.

Simple and sharp: the Karabakh issue was not only a matter of annexing Karabakh to Azerbaijan, but also annexing Zangezur and Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan. ... And indeed, after “resolving” the Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan began to make feverish preparations to “put Zangezur in a harmless position” as well”²³⁵. In all of Thomson’s subsequent demands in relation to the interim governorate-general, we are dealing not with Karabakh alone but with Karabakh-Zangezur²³⁶.

According to A. Khatisyan, second Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, “it was not a purely Muslim policy, but a policy aimed at strengthening a young state with rich oil wells which had been part of Russia. The first steps of the active British policy in the Caucasus were, on the one hand, all kinds of efforts made to include the Armenian regions of Karabakh and Zangezur within the borders of Azerbaijan, to strengthen Dr. Khosrov Bey Sultanov’s authority appointed governor there and on the other hand, the withdrawal of Turkish troops under the command of commander Shukri from the Kars region»²³⁷.

In this connection, at the session of April 3, 1919, the RA government naturally responded that Karabakh could be discussed only with the consent of the representative bodies of the Armenian population of Karabakh²³⁸. However, contrary to the reasonable approach, with the active efforts of the British, in mid-1919 the regime of Khosrov bey Pasha bey oglu Sultanov, a notorious anti-Armenian who had a reputation among Armenians as an executioner, was imposed on the people of Artsakh and Zangezur by force. Naturally, the Azerbaijani politician Sultanov considered it a new “era” in the life of Karabakh. And as S. Vracian, the last Prime Minister of the First Republic of Armenia quite rightly wrote: “Unfortunately, a new era did not start, but Sultanov had the right to be proud, because, even if temporarily, Karabakh became part of Azerbaijan. Making

²³⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 193, part I, sheet 40-40 rev.; Vracian 1993: 330-331, 342-343; MK 1992: 83-84.

²³⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 244, sheet 2, fund 370, list 1, file 40, sheet 15-17; Khatisean Al. 1968: 179-180.

²³⁷ Khatisean Al. 1968: 179.

²³⁸ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 43, sheet 59.

the “temporary” “permanent” was a matter of the future, and the Azerbaijani politicians did not give up on that idea”²³⁹.

With the active support of General Shuttleworth, in order to establish his power in Artsakh and Zangezur Kh. Sultanov adopted a new strategy, particularly a tactic to flatter the Armenians and to mislead and persuade them with false promises. After the command of the British troops in Karabakh on behalf of Colonel D. Shuttleworth factually confirmed the recognition of governor-general Kh. Sultanov as the sole supreme authority on April 3, 1919, and the population was called upon to unconditionally obey all his orders the actions of the British became more purposeful and consistently pro-Azerbaijani. History was repeating itself: ignoring Colonel Shuttleworth’s threats and baseless demands, on April 23, 1919, the Armenians of Artsakh convened the 5th Congress of Artsakh in Shushi and resolutely rejected the decision to accept the Azerbaijani authority imposed by the British command in order to create a mood to recognize the Azerbaijani rule²⁴⁰. As Y. Ishkhanyan wrote: “Sultanov conducted separate work with the Armenians, through well-known Turkish merchants, so that the Armenians would visit the governor, take part in provincial matters, and take up positions... Dr. Sultanov thought that by having Armenian officials, he could create the mood among the villagers to recognize the government of Azerbaijan”²⁴¹. All the efforts of the British and Sultanov aimed at establishing themselves in Artsakh initially failed. Facing the resolute resistance of the Armenians of Artsakh, Colonel Shuttleworth left for Shushi on April 23 to personally make Artsakh accept the Azerbaijani rule. The Zangezur-Karabakh Regional Council, not fearing at all and not giving in to Colonel Shuttleworth’s threats addressed to the Armenians of Zangezur, gave the following sharp response: “...we cannot submit to Azerbaijan, the nomad cannot climb a mountain. Only over the ruins of our province and the corpses of the people can Azerbaijan conquer Zangezur and dictate its terms”²⁴². Following the instructions of General Thomson, who paid an official visit to Yerevan in early April and in a meeting with Prime Minister A. Khatisyan and Foreign Minister S. Tigranyan, tried to persuade them and impose his proposal that Karabakh could not survive without importing food from the Yevlakh station of the Batumi-Baku railway, Shuttleworth did not hesitate to threaten the people of Karabakh with economic arguments to impose Sultanov’s regime, reasserting that otherwise Nagorno-Karabakh would starve if it disengaged from the eastern plain²⁴³. General Shuttleworth resolved the Karabakh issue within the framework of the British political course, without expressing any desire to oppose Azerbaijan’s aspirations. General Shuttleworth returned to Baku on April 26, 1919 and on April 29 he authorized

²³⁹ Vracyan S. 1993: 341-342.

²⁴⁰ Ishkhanyan Ye. 1999: 393-406.

²⁴¹ Ishkhanyan Ye. 1999: 378-379.

²⁴² «Nor ashkhatavor», July 7, 1919.

²⁴³ Vracyan S. 1958: 285; Sarur 1929: 128-146.

the government of Azerbaijan to make political arrests and restrict freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. Shuttleworth authorized the economic boycott of Karabakh by Azerbaijan resorting to the policy of subjugating Armenians by starvation²⁴⁴. This pressure on Karabakh was a continuing British behavior that caused some disappointment. It was expressed also in the fact that on the advice and exhortation of Shuttleworth, General Thomson put considerable pressure on the Government of the Republic of Armenia, demanding to put an end to the repatriation of refugees from the regions south of Yerevan until the Armenian government publicly renounced all insurgents in Karabakh and Zangezur. The above-mentioned punitive measures were stopped only after receiving the diplomatically formulated answer of Prime Minister A. Khatisyan and the written complaint of General K. M. Davy²⁴⁵.

The sharp response of the Zangezur-Karabakh Regional Council was not at all a surprise to General Shuttleworth, as he had already dealt many times with the events in Artsakh and was well acquainted with the resistance capabilities of the Armenians of Artsakh and the anti-Azerbaijani sentiment. After receiving the sharp response from the Regional Council, General Shuttleworth, accompanied by his guards consisting of British and Azeri soldiers, left Goris, but continued to take steps to impose his position on Zangezur.

The further developments in connection with the approach and decisions adopted by the Paris Conference in 1919 are interesting and in that sense the position of Azerbaijani historians on the political course of their government: "In early April, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente in Paris decided to withdraw the British troops from the region. It should be admitted that the Azerbaijani government initially opposed the withdrawal of the English troops from Azerbaijan because they were not sure whether they could defend themselves from the threat from the north, be it Denikin's army or the Bolsheviks. In the telegram of April, 1919 addressed to D. Shuttleworth, M. Yu. Jafarov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic opened up: "According to the official information of my government, the English troops will leave the borders of Azerbaijan in mid-August. In this regard, the Azerbaijani government decided to ask His Excellency to leave the English troops in Azerbaijan. I would like to add that the conditions under which the English troops can remain within the borders of Azerbaijan can be worked out by mutual consent in case of receiving a response from the British government that they principally agree to leave the troops"²⁴⁶. After some negotiations, in his letter to F. Smith, US Consul in Tiflis, A. Khatisyan stated: "The Government of the Republic of Armenia is of the same opinion on the fate of Karabakh as before. The Armenian government wants the Armenian-populated mountaneous part

²⁴⁴ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 187-188.

²⁴⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 190.

²⁴⁶ DRA 1998: 309-310.

of Karabakh to be declared [a territory] outside the Azerbaijani Karabakh governorate general and its governance to remain in the hands of the National Council according to the will of the population, and the Azerbaijani troops to be immediately withdrawn from the borders of Armenian Karabakh. The Armenian government considers that region an integral part of Armenia. Control over the governance, approved by the British command, can be exercised by an Englishman as the governor-general of the two - Armenian and Azerbaijani parts of Karabakh²⁴⁷. It was this approach that was defended by A. Khatisyan as the official position of the Republic of Armenia during the meetings with W. Thomson held on March 28, 1919 in Yerevan and on April 7 in Tiflis.

The alarmed RA government sent A. Khatisyan on a business trip to Tiflis where negotiations were held on May 3, 1919. The Armenian side was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Khatisyan and Diplomatic Representative in Tiflis L. Yevangulyan, and on the other side there were W. Thomson, W. Beach, K. Davy and their chiefs of staff. During the meeting accusations consisting of 20 points were brought against the Armenian side in regard to Karabakh and Zangezur based on the report prepared by Shuttleworth and Monck-Mason. Thomson and the others were accusing the Armenian side of destructive activities, they presented the miserable situation of the Tatars in those regions who were faced with obstacles in connection with nomadic movement; they opposed the disarmament of nomadic Tatars believing that otherwise the Armenians would exterminate them, which was an absolute fabrication against Armenians. They condemned A. Shahmazyan for his statement that the Karabakh troops were part of the Armenian armed forces, that Zangezur would help Karabakh in any way it could, demanding that the Armenian government immediately withdraw him from Zangezur, etc²⁴⁸. To oppose this, Khatisyan brought counter-arguments consisting of 11 points, stating that: 1) The Armenian government considers Karabakh an integral part of the Republic of Armenia, but before the Paris Conference it is necessary that the region be governed by a British governor-general, and the Armenian Karabakh - by the National Council, and the Muslim part - by the Muslim Council; 2) Karabakh National Councils should have their own armed forces, which are not military units of the Republic of Armenia, and the Armenian government does not give any instructions; 3) the Armenian government considers it possible to allow the Zangezur National Council to give permission to Muslim nomads to go to the mountains on the condition that they be accompanied by British troops and inspectors selected from Armenians and Muslims; 4) The Armenian government has not sent and does not have preachers in Karabakh, and if there are Armenian officers or local public figures who organize local forces and direct them to disobey the Azerbaijani authorities in Karabakh, it is not the result of the Armenian government's actions or orders, but the expression of the will of the 300,000 population of

²⁴⁷ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 12, part 2, sheet 88, 161.

²⁴⁸ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 133, sheet 1-3.

Karabakh which no one can change; and trying to change it through provocations and agitation contradicts the principles of the English policy in general; 5) the movement of refugees to Nakhichevan should be allowed, etc. After listening to Khatisyan, General Thomson made a few remarks, but resolutely demanded that the issue of Shahmazyan and nomadic movement be resolved, to which Khatisyan replied that Shahmazyan had already left Zangezur to report to the government. As to the nomads, Khatisyan expressed readiness to settle the issue on the condition that it be implemented in accordance with the rules approved by the Armenian government. In the end, Thomson reported that he had changed his mind, that he was convinced of the legitimacy of the Armenian arguments, and thus allowed the resumption of the Armenian troops and migrants, touching upon the issue of handing Nakhichevan over to Armenians, etc., after which it was ordered to send a telegram to Dro and Charles allowing to move forward²⁴⁹.

On May 6, 1919, in his letter to A. Aharonyan, the RA ambassador to Paris, A. Khatisyan, the RA Deputy Foreign Minister emphasized the voluntary actions of the British command in Karabakh and Zangezur, who pursued not confederate but their own imperial interests, using the subordinate or dependent peoples as an empire from the point of view of their own interests: "The British command wants to keep the outside world unaware of what is happening in the Caucasus, which may attract the attention of the political world or even make the British command change its self-imposed orders. This is why we think that the British are causing some difficulties in having a regular relationship with Europe, especially with you. The Armenian government can never, even temporarily, accept the rule of Azerbaijan over Karabakh, which is an integral part of Armenia. In the complaint to General W. Thomson, Mr. S. Tigranyan offers to establish the British command in Karabakh which should act with the support of the local Armenian National Council until the Karabakh issue is finally resolved at the Paris conference. The Congress convened on April 23 and unanimously decided not to accept the rule of Azerbaijan under any circumstances, even temporarily. They suggested our government to remove A. Shahmazyan from Goris, objecting that he had disregarded the British authorities and declared Goris a region of Yerevan. The government refused to call Mr. A. Shahmazyan saying that his statement corresponded to the government's views on the Karabakh issue"²⁵⁰.

Not satisfied with the official telegrams and requests submitted to the Government of the Republic of Armenia, on May 8, 1919, General Thomson again for the same purpose, invited Yevangulov, Armenia's diplomatic representative to Georgia, and informed him that, according to the reports by General Shuttleworth and Colonel MonckMason, the situation and order in Karabakh,

²⁴⁹ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 133, sheet 1-3.

²⁵⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 193, part 7, sheet 222-225 rev., l. 2, file 55, sheet 1-5, fund 4033, list 2, file 963, sheet 130-136.

as well as in Goris and Zangezur provinces was disturbed mainly as a result of Captain Shahmazyan's aggressive policy. According to General Thomson, for some reason Captain Shahmazyan, who had declared himself governor-general in Karabakh, based on the authority and instructions of the Armenian government, injected the local population with the idea of disobeying the Azerbaijani authorities, since Karabakh was an integral part of Armenia²⁵¹.

And the main weapon of Azerbaijan against Armenians became Shuttleworth, the commander of the British troops in Baku succeeding General Thomson. Through him the Azerbaijani Musavatists tried to impose the rule of Azerbaijan on the people of Artsakh. Leo's axiomatic conclusion about the anti-Armenian attitude of Shuttleworth and others is very accurate: "Musavat knew what they were doing, and it was not by chance that the British command was their close, bosom friend. General Shuttleworth, who succeeded Thomson, stubbornly rejects all ... demands (of the people of Karabakh – V.V.), he is Sultanov's agent, he personally goes to Shushi to attend the congress and to demand Sultanov's recognition"²⁵².

Azerbaijan used every kind of ambush to break the spirit of resistance of the people of Karabakh, using military force as well, to which Armenians, naturally, responded as best as they could. As we can see, Sultan Bey Sultanov, nevertheless, managed to deceitfully and spitefully overcome the resistance of the Armenians of Artsakh and impose the August 22, 1919 law, according to which Artsakh was obliged to temporarily submit to Azerbaijan until the decision of the Paris Peace Conference. But unfortunately the Armenian government had no doubt that the decision would be pro-Armenian, which was, in fact, the result of political miscalculations by the Armenian side, a gross political mistake and ultimately a defeat in the military-and-political conflict with Azerbaijan, which was greatly facilitated by the pro-Azerbaijani position of the British command in Transcaucasia. In this connection, R. Hovhannisyan noted very accurately: "The regulation of August 22, 1919 was a personal victory for Khosrov Bey Sultanov and a national victory for Azerbaijan. Karabakh eventually came under the temporary rule of Azerbaijan. And the Provisional Government was an influential and big step towards permanent rule. Whatever tactics the Republic of Armenia adopted in the future, it would not be able to force Azerbaijan to leave those Armenian-populated highlands. In addition to its stubborn persistence, Azerbaijan took advantage of the patronage of the British commanders, the delays of the Paris Peace Conference in taking practical action regarding the disputed territory and the general incapacity of the Armenian government. All that was left for Armenians was only the promise of autonomy to Karabakh and the contentment that Zangezur was not included in the general republic"²⁵³.

²⁵¹ «Nor ashkhatavor», April 17, 1919.

²⁵² Leo 2009: 388.

²⁵³ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 205.

During those historical and political upheavals there were also dangerous turns, political slips and deviations: thus, examining the situation and making sure that it could not receive any tangible assistance from abroad and that the British in fact defended the Azerbaijanis and in its turn the Armenian government was not able to provide any serious military-and-political support and real aid (in which case irreparable mistakes and political slips had been made by the Armenian government, particularly by certain military figures), after thorough considerations and weighing their own capabilities, the 7th Congress of Karabakh held on August 12, 1919, decided to accept the agreement with Baku on August 15, as a result of which on August 22, 1919 the notorious agreement was signed, “hoping” as if the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh would be resolved “unconditionally and justly” in the European Peace Conference of the great powers. It should be mentioned that the agreement of August 22, 1919 did not significantly change the situation of Armenians. On the one hand Sultanov, governor-general of Azerbaijan, tried to disunite the Armenians, and on the other hand, he tried to gather military forces to suppress them with weapons. On August 22, 1919, a grave mistake was made and as a result of the unnecessary military-and-political slip of the Armenian government the Armenians of Artsakh agreed to temporarily submit to the Azerbaijani authorities, but soon they were subjugated.

As a result, Dr. Sultanov’s Musavat administration, with the notorious agreement of August 22, 1919, was able to “persuade” the Armenian population of NagornoKarabakh or rather force its will to temporarily accept the rule of Azerbaijan in Karabakh until the final settlement of the issue by the Entente states of the Paris Conference playing the role of “Arbitration” and claiming to be friends of the Armenian people (England, France, etc.), thus radically endangering the interests of the Republic of Armenia in that corner of the region, which was a very huge and gross political miscalculation, reflected in the results of the Assembly of Transcaucasian Republics of April, 1920²⁵⁴.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Armenia could not achieve the desired results and strengthen the position of the Republic of Armenia by deploying regular army units in the region. Having strengthened itself in Zangezur, Armenia failed to establish itself in Karabakh, suffering painful failures and defeats, which was significantly facilitated by the British authorities with their pro-Azerbaijani policy, as well as the unpromising and reckless strategy of the Armenian government, which was fully anchored in the results expected from the Paris Conference of the Entente powers, as a result of which at first Andranik’s and Dro’s military units were deceptively removed from Karabakh, as well as A. Shahmazyan, who had won a number of victories against the Azerbaijanis, etc. This significantly weakened the position of the Armenian army in Artsakh²⁵⁵,

²⁵⁴ Virabyan V. 2004.

²⁵⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 169-215.

which, on January 21, 1919, by the decision of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, established the Artsakh-Zangezur Provisional Board and Captain A. Shahmazyan was appointed commissar-general – governor-general of Artsakh-Zangezur, who was to operate in Zangezur in cooperation and in coordination with the National Council of the province²⁵⁶, which stemmed from the concern of the RA Government regarding the appointment of Khosrov Bek Sultanov as governor of Artsakh-Zangezur and the proAzerbaijani position of the British on that issue.

Dissatisfied with the official telegrams and requests submitted to the RA Government, on May 8, 1919, again for the same purpose General Thomson invited L. Yevangulov, the diplomatic representative of Armenia to Georgia and told him that according to the reports of General Shuttleworth and Colonel Monck-Mason, the situation and order in Karabakh, as well as in Goris and Zangezur province were disturbed mainly due to Captain Shahmazyan's aggressive policy. According to General Thomson, for some reason Captain Shahmazyan, who had declared himself governorgeneral of Karabakh, based on the authority and instructions of the Armenian government, injected the local population with the idea of disobeying the Azerbaijani authorities, because Karabakh was an integral part of Armenia. During the meeting with Yevangulov, General Thomson also made baseless accusations against A. Shahmazyan, which were as ridiculous as could be expressed only by a person with a pronounced anti-Armenian mood, sick and devoid of ideology. As General Thomson stated: "Neither Enver Pasha nor the Young Turks have done or are doing as much damage to the Armenian people as Shahmazyans and their ideologues, whom I want to believe, Mr. Khatisyan will be able to isolate..."²⁵⁷.

It should be clearly noted that the role of the British military-and-political mission in Transcaucasia in the pro-Armenian settlement of the Artsakh-Syunik issue was rather negative. With their two-faced palliative political decisions they hindered the easing of tensions in the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations and the establishment of the status quo, of course, only after the elimination of the accumulated "wrinkles". At that time, the withdrawal of British troops began; on August 15 and 18 the 84th Punjab Regiment from Baku stopped in Yevlakh to take with them the detachment of Colonel Reginald Tyler, who had closed the British mission in Shushi two days earlier to allow the Armenians of Karabakh to reconcile with the Azerbaijani army; and the headquarters of Shuttleworth was closed on August 23, in honor of which a sumptuous dinner was organized on August 24²⁵⁸.

In this regard, it is important to mention that in late November, 1919, during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conference in Tiflis, Colonel G. Ray, deputy of Haskel (High Commissioner of the

²⁵⁶ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 38, sheet 4.

²⁵⁷ «Nor ashkhatavor», April 17, 1919.

²⁵⁸ Hovhannisyan R. 2014: 151.

Allies) made a statement and falsifying the real facts claimed that according to his information, Sultanov was appointed by the British temporarily, for the period of the evacuation of the Germans and Turks, and that Sultanov was later recalled by the British, after which he left for Baku and stayed there for a short period of time, and then he returned to Shushi, but already without any authorization from the British. Then Ray went further with his falsification, noting that the British were already preparing to send their troops to Karabakh as if unknowingly claiming that it later turned out that the Italians were to arrive there, occupy Shushi and rule the region. Then it was said that the Italians did not come, the British prepared to go there again, but an order was issued for their total removal through Batumi, and Dr. Sultanov still remained there, already without the British authorization, which was denied by the Azerbaijani leadership. During the conference, in response to Colonel G. Ray's statement, Usubbekov stated: "All of this regarding the recall of Sultanov by the British is absolute news to me, as Sultanov was not appointed by the British. He was appointed by the Azerbaijani government with the consent of the British. I had a very long conversation with General Corey before he left and General Corey fully agreed that he (Sultanov – V.V.) should continue to stay in Karabakh"²⁵⁹.

In February 1920, a large part of the Azerbaijani army, about 10,000 people, were gathered on the Karabakh front²⁶⁰. The people of Karabakh also, receiving some help from abroad, resisted the implementation of those plans. On February 19, Sultanov demanded that Karabakh be declared part of Azerbaijan. The people of Karabakh rejected this illegal demand at their congresses. The Armenians of Karabakh revolted, defending themselves from the atrocities and policy of massacres of Azerbaijan. As S. Vracyan mentions, the consequences could have been much more catastrophic if Dro's expeditionary unit had not arrived in Karabakh on April 13. He took power in the region, announced a mobilization on April 15 in Varanda and Dizak, strengthened the fronts and stayed in Karabakh for 45 days. On April 22, the 9th Congress of Karabakh was convened in the village of Taghavard where, with 44 votes against one, it was once again decided to reject the Azerbaijani government and to consider Artsakh-Karabakh part of Armenia²⁶¹.

During that time Azerbaijan, not taking into account anything and taking advantage of the permissiveness, continued to implement his anti-Armenian programs step by step. On September 10, 1920, the RA diplomatic representative in Baku wrote: "The Azerbaijani authorities, considering Zangezur, Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Sharur, Surmalu, Ghazakh an integral part of their republic, did not release from conscription Western Armenians living in different parts of

²⁵⁹ Tumanyan M. 2012: 248-249

²⁶⁰ Vracyan S. 1958: 394 -395.

²⁶¹ Vracyan S. 1958: 396.

Azerbaijan, such as Western Armenian refugees temporarily living in the village of Chardakhlu in the Gandzak region”²⁶².

In April 1920 gathering at Tiflis the Transcaucasian republics did not make any fundamental and final decisions, but the Assembly’s prehistory and its lessons are instructive, revealing the political-and-diplomatic orientations of each side, possible and overt mistakes in foreign policy calculations and why not the failures, which were obvious in the case of the Republic of Armenia. The Assembly was convened at a time when some “shifts” appeared to have taken place in Armenia, which again filled with hope, dulled the elements of sober thinking and restored the blind allegiance to the British-French allies. In January 1920 the government was de facto recognized by a group of great powers, and there was relative peace within the borders. The government managed to quell the Muslim uprisings in Zangibasar, Kars-Aghbaba, ZordBasargechar and other provinces, which alarmed the region. It was a temporary and unstable calm on the eve of the catastrophic developments, which weakened the attention of the Armenian government and its analytical capacity to perceive the internally accumulated alarms.

And the reason for convening this assembly of the Transcaucasian republics was the well-known events in Karabakh, which became inextricably linked with other regional issues.

In Tiflis the allies and the Transcaucasian Assembly demanded to end the bloodshed, and the parties were forced to obey. This was also demanded by E. Gegechkori who was concerned about the real dangers of Georgia getting involved in the chaos. On March 27, N. V. Zhordania, the Prime Minister of Georgia, appealed to the representatives of the allies, asking for their mediation to extinguish the fire of Karabakh and to calm down the Transcaucasian region. On April 1 the representatives of England, France and Italy O. Wardrop, Count de Martel and Colonel Melkiade Gabba sent a collective telegram to Baku and Yerevan “ardently urging” them to peacefully and immediately resolve the issues of Karabakh and other provinces where “peace is at stake”. “If this solemn call for reconciliation is not heard at a time when the fate of the whole Transcaucasia is at stake, it could have very serious consequences for your governments”²⁶³. The Armenian government immediately responded on April 2, stating that they fully agreed with the proposal of the representatives of the allies and that on April 5 the deputies would be in Tiflis to participate in the Transcaucasian Conference with the aim of resolving all disputes peacefully. On April 4, the Parliament of Armenia also addressed the events in Karabakh and approved the policy pursued by the government²⁶⁴. On April 4, 1920, Tigran Bekzadyan, the RA diplomatic representative in Tiflis informed in a telegram sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a meeting with M. Gabba took

²⁶² NAA, fund 278, list 1, file 321, sheet 95.

²⁶³ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: 200.

²⁶⁴ NAA, fund 278, list 1, file 321, sheet 397.

place on April 2, during which the Commissioner of Italy expressed regret over the Armenians' uprising in Karabakh at a time when Armenia's borders were being drawn and that such a step did not make sense, just like Azerbaijan's interference in the situation in the Kars region. Bekzadyan also informed that he had tried to persuade Gabba and the other representatives of the Allies that the reason for the Karabakh uprising was not external, i.e. the intervention of the Republic of Armenia, but the violation by Azerbaijan of the interim agreement of August 22, 1919 and the illegal attempts to disarm the Armenians of Karabakh²⁶⁵.

In its April 4, 1920 issue, "Mshak" blamed the British and others for the unfavorable course of Karabakh's fate and the establishment of Sultanov's bloodthirsty regime, considering that it was the British generals who sided with Sultanov against 200,000 Armenians and that Thomson's, Shuttleworth's and Corey's hands were covered in Armenian blood²⁶⁶.

The conference began on April 9, 1920. Influential politicians of Transcaucasia took part in the conference: from Azerbaijan - Hasan Bey Aghayev, Olgerd Bey Krichinsky, Faris Bey Vekilov (in this regard it should be noted that Hamo Ohanjanyan was not of this opinion. In his letter of April 8, 1920, addressed to Alexander Khatisyan, he, as we consider through some misunderstanding and erroneously believed that having the above-mentioned representatives in the well-known conference, Azerbaijan did not attach serious importance to that conference²⁶⁷, which absolutely did not correspond to reality and which is simply refuted by an impartial study of the conference materials. The level of the rather high preparedness of the "inexperienced" and "nonserious" representatives of Azerbaijan and on the contrary, both the inexperience and the certain unpreparedness of the Armenian delegates, and the biased unrealistic disposition and assessments of things and phenomena become obvious - V.V.); from Georgia - E. P. Gegechkori, G. S. Lordkipanidze, and from the Republic of Armenia - H. I. Ohanjanyan, T. Bekzadyan, S. H. Khachatryan and others.

The Georgian delegation wisely and prudently tried to use the situation to the advantage of Georgia, often finding hidden common ground with the Azerbaijanis, with whom back in June 1919 they signed a military-and-political alliance of a defensive nature. The Georgians did not make a decisive attempt to overcome the ArmenianGeorgian issues and to settle the disputes, despite some aspirations of the Armenian delegation, which were not sufficiently consistent and were conditional.

²⁶⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 563, sheet 62.

²⁶⁶ «Mshak», April 4, 1920.

²⁶⁷ Fatali Khan Khoyski was expected in Tiflis but he did not arrive, and taking advantage of that, the Azerbaijani delegates by no means agreed to discuss the ceasefire in his absence, citing the lack of instructions. The head of the Azerbaijani delegation explained it by Agha-oghli Ahmed Aghayev's illness. And despite the protests of the Armenian and Georgian delegates, Aghayev did not yield and the discussion of one of the most vital issues was delayed day by day, at a time when blood was flowing like a river in Karabakh, while the conference was busy discussing secondary issues, such as the publicity of the conference proceedings.

BAA 1996: 74.

This was clear from the very first moment when the issue of the cessation of hostilities was being decided, which was postponed indefinitely from April 10 until the response from the Azerbaijani government.

Then E. Gegechkori expressed the view that the territorial issue was the main source of disagreement, considering the key to its regulation to be the “pacification” of the region with a homogeneous population, which was supposed to put an end to the divisive wars. Based on that, Ye. Gegechkori emphasized the issue of unification against external danger, namely against the Bolshevik threat coming from the north, saying that they had already started it by concluding transit agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia. And as to how sincere it was, became obvious by Georgia’s further position towards Armenia and Azerbaijan separately, as it became a more or less real opportunity for trade, import of food and fuel, which was vital in Armenia’s case, especially since the necessary weapons and ammunition for the Armenian army, grain and flour were imported on the basis of the agreement on transit signed with Georgia on November 3, 1919. On April 10, St. G. Mamikonyan, a member of the Armenian delegation took the floor at the conference and first of all emphasized the issue of cessation of clashes. T. Bekzadyan joined him, however, according to Gegechkori the session was suspended because the Azerbaijani delegation had not yet received clear instructions from their government on their official position²⁶⁸.

Nevertheless, Hasan bey Aghayev, the representative of the Azerbaijani delegation, announced that his government agreed on the cessation of hostilities in the whole territory of Transcaucasia. Accordingly, Gegechkori proposed to follow up on: a) the measures to be taken by the Assembly to end the bloody conflicts, b) the proposed solutions to the territorial disputes of the Transcaucasian republics, c) the decisions to be taken on the coordination of actions on foreign policy issues, d) the issue of agreeing positions on the establishment of a confederation²⁶⁹. T. Bekzadyan stated that if the Assembly did not reach an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, the Armenian delegation could not take part in the formation of any union, which would cause a deadlock. The fuss and the atmosphere of disunity continued, and it is evident that, for obvious reasons, it was for the benefit of the Georgian and Azerbaijani sides, in line with their interests. G. S. Lordkipanidze offered the following: “The Assembly of the Transcaucasian republics, discussing the issue of the cessation of hostilities between the republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia, decides: a) to announce its firm decision to cease all hostilities; b) to notify the governments of the respective republics of the decision of the Assembly; c) to elect a commission to investigate the events that have taken place”.

²⁶⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 158-160.

²⁶⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 164.

Meanwhile, Aghayev, the Azerbaijani delegate, showed an ambiguous approach to the issue. In solidarity with the Georgian representative Lordkipanidze, he found it necessary to mention in the resolution that the war was being waged not only in Azerbaijan, but also outside its borders, which was a diplomatically calculated approach and drew the Armenian side into a more difficult phase. It is noteworthy that Aghayev, changing the real content of the national-and-political relations, saw in the ongoing clashes only war between the well-known “nations - Muslims and Armenians”. That is why he insisted on “stopping the hostilities where they were taking place”. Fairly, the Armenian delegation, rightly understanding the bias of the viewpoint of the Azerbaijani side, proposed to replace the word “Muslims” with the word “Azerbaijanis”. However, the Azerbaijani delegation insisted that the resolution state that hostilities between Armenians and Azerbaijanis were taking place both within the borders of the republics and outside the borders of Azerbaijan, for example, in Armenia. The latest assertion caused the discussion of the issue to reach a deadlock²⁷⁰.

The Azerbaijani delegation made a statement, according to which, considering that the conflict was taking place not between the “subjects of the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but between the Armenians and “Muslims”, so in order to free the border from their or other Muslim immigrants’ actions against Armenia, Azerbaijan proposed to point out in the resolution that it was a matter of clashes between “Muslims” in the Transcaucasian region and Armenians. According to F. bey Vekilov, in the conditions of general clashes there were no guarantees that the conflict zones would decrease, so it was necessary to show clearly and definitely that it was about the native Armenian population in Azerbaijan and respectively, the Muslim population in Armenia. The Armenian delegation offered to point out the places of clashes: “Stop the clashes in Karabakh, Nukhi, Nakhichevan, Ordubad and other places where they are taking place between Armenians and Azerbaijanis within the borders of Transcaucasia”. The Armenian delegation emphasized that in connection with the situation of Muslims in Armenia, as well as that of Armenians in Azerbaijan, the Assembly could express a general opinion that no persecution or violence because of nationality should be allowed within the borders of these republics. As a result of the debate and following Lordkipanidze’s proposals, the resolution was adopted as follows: a) immediately stop all the bloody clashes that are currently taking place in Nukhi, Nakhichevan, Ordubad and Karabakh; b) at the same time, the Assembly urges the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan to immediately take decisive action to rule out the possibility of any conflict between the Armenian and Muslim populations within the respective republics; c) immediately inform the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan of this decision for them to take appropriate measures²⁷¹. However, ignoring the

²⁷⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 166.

²⁷¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 167-170.

resolution already recorded by the conference to stop the hostile actions, not only the hostile actions, but also the massacre of the disarmed Armenian population continued in different Armenianpopulated areas of Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

At its April 12 session the Assembly discussed Lordkipanidze's resolution on restoring the legal status that existed before the military conflict. In this regard, Olgerd Bey Krichinsky, the representative of Azerbaijan considered that there could be no question of full restoration of the August 22 agreement and of the previous status, but only the restoration of the factual situation that existed during the agreement of November 23, 1919, in which the two countries were before the latest clashes. And Aghayev added that it undoubtedly included the August 22 agreement between the Karabakh National Assembly and the government of Azerbaijan, as well as the other acts and agreements that existed before November 23, which was certainly a reasonably calculated approach by the Azerbaijanis.

After Aghayev, T. Bekzadyan took the floor stating that "the November 23 agreement does not say anything about any legal norm and status, but only accepts the non-use of weapons and applying to intermediary arbitration in case of disagreements". According to him, this agreement seemed to include the previous agreement of August 22 between the Armenian National Assembly of Karabakh and the Government of Azerbaijan. In response, Krichinsky made a remark, saying that the November 23 act was already being absorbed by the current Assembly. "The same provisions were adopted there as those we have included in our decision", - Krichinsky stated. He then added that it was necessary to restore the factual situation that existed before November 23, continuing to keep unchanged the stereotype of the position of the Azerbaijani side towards the solution of the problem.

Trying to oppose the Azerbaijani delegation, H. Ohanjanyan made a step back in his speech, saying that the August 22 agreement was violated by the Armenian National Assembly, and only then he claimed that the November 23 agreement and connection was broken by the Azerbaijani government in the sense that the latter turned to weapons instead of arbitration. Therefore, according to him, there were two ways out of that situation - return to the "status quo" in both Karabakh and Zangezur, or acceptance of the existing factual situation, assurance of a ceasefire and stopping clashes where they were going on²⁷². Finally, at its April 12 session the Assembly of the republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia decided to: "immediately fully restore the legal status that existed before the clashes, based on the agreements reached by the Assemblies of Armenia-Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasian Republics, as well as the agreements of the National Councils with the respective governments"²⁷³.

²⁷² NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 167-170.

²⁷³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 167-168.

Member of the Azerbaijani delegation, Polish Tatar Olgerd Konstantin KrichinskyNayman, who was a rather experienced diplomat, opposed this, claiming that the August 22 agreement had been violated in many occasions, and there could only be the question of returning to the borders which existed on November 23 as the last resort, the final chord that they sought to see as the starting point, confirming the factual situation in terms of the borders²⁷⁴. Opposing it in principle, T. Bekzadyan claimed that there had been a certain confusion of concepts, not denying that Azerbaijan had taken over Karabakh (although temporarily, by deceiving the Armenians), so there could be no question of agreement with the population (there is a contradiction here, as the relevant agreement had been reached, albeit temporarily – V.V.). Then, continuing to develop his very contradictory speech, T. Bekzadyan came to the conclusion that this was no longer domination, but a well-known agreement based on special conditions. In his opinion, if that agreement had been violated by one side or the other, the status quo ante that existed before the clashes should be restored, i.e. the situation in which Karabakh could be under the rule of Azerbaijan, if there was this or that substantiation, by agreement with the National Council²⁷⁵.

Here it is appropriate to state clearly: the Azerbaijani diplomatic delegates did not leave the impression of amateurs at all, especially Krichinsky, while the Armenian delegate-diplomats gave way to sensitivity, misguided and hopeless assessments of the situation. Thus, Krichinsky, speaking immediately after Bekzadyan, insisted on the viewpoint that the August 22 agreement with the Karabakh National Council should not be accepted as an act of an international nature, but as an internal governance act of instructional nature²⁷⁶. Yes, this is a brilliant classic example of diplomatic rhetoric, a good, centuries-old way of fooling others, which has often justified itself and benefited the side that used it. T. Bekzadyan opposed the above-mentioned viewpoint and failing to find a stronger argument, claimed that if the act was not published it would become clear that it was not an instruction of internal governance, but an international agreement, invented and approved by the Azerbaijani government²⁷⁷. As expected, Krichinsky did not agree with this view and not without reason noted that the people of Karabakh, albeit temporarily, had agreed to submit to the Azerbaijani authorities, claiming that after Karabakh accepted the rule of Azerbaijan by the August 22 act, the Karabakh issue became an internal issue of the Azerbaijani government. And if it was claimed that Karabakh was in a completely isolated condition, then it created a state within a state²⁷⁸.

²⁷⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 167-169; Tumanyan 2012: 418, 449.

²⁷⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 167-170.

²⁷⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 168-170.

²⁷⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 169-170.

²⁷⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 160-170.

As painful as this is, it is necessary to emphasize here an essential consideration regarding the Armenian historical and political literature that either covered up this fact or avoided the existing problem concealing unfavorable materials, as well as demonstrating an evident attempt to avoid comprehensive coverage and realistic political assessment of the issue. It is obvious that by the act of August 22, 1919, Armenians of Karabakh and Armenia made a grave mistake, albeit temporarily, which is a very questionable, unserious and reckless approach to diplomatic-and-political relations, that by agreeing to accept the rule of the Azerbaijani government, the Armenians of Karabakh, with almost no help from the RA government and hoping for the expected support of its allies of the Entente, found themselves in a deadlock and suffered a painful defeat. It should also be emphasized that the Karabakh National Council gave such a dangerous, politically undesirable consent, having given up all hope of receiving any real help from the metropolis, the Yerevan government. And if they got it, it was belated and incomplete. It is a fact and it should be pointed out that for the Azerbaijani government this “temporarily” had no restrictions; and in this case they were “right” to exploit that circumstance. It is another thing that the Armenians tried not to accept the diplomatic-and-political defeat they suffered in this Assembly (it happens, but it should not happen) or tried to get out of the deadlock. This is already understandable.

Nevertheless, Bekzadyan and Krichinsky did not come to an agreement on the viewpoints, mutually accepting that it was just an ordinary legal act. After that, Gegechkori made a confusing statement, as if trying to bring the parties to their senses, reconcile them or find the key to an interim solution to the issue. According to him, it was necessary to restore the situation that existed before the clashes, as the agreement of November 23, 1919 was also based on it which was accepted by both parties. Continuing to hold his point of view, he considered that a mistake had been made on Karabakh or another issue and in order to restore that status the parties should be called to order. Then he concluded that whether there was an uprising in the known region or an attack on the guards by the population or violence, disarmament - these must be resolved in the Assembly. Concluding his statement, E. Gegechkori, the wellknown Georgian diplomat and skillful politician concluded that it was necessary to return to the well-known starting point, which was once again confirmed by the November 23 agreement, emphasizing the fact that the agreement included that of August 22²⁷⁹. This was just a “brilliant” classic example of verbose diplomacy, demonstrated by Menshevik Gegechkori, one of the patriarchs of Georgian diplomacy. In response to the latter, Hamo Ohanjanyan only insisted that the August 22 legal act be included in the agreement²⁸⁰. Finally, a resolution was adopted accepted by both parties, which was as follows: “Immediately fully restore the legal status that existed before the clashes, based on the agreements

²⁷⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 171.

²⁸⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 171.

reached by the Assemblies of Armenia-Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasian Republics, as well as the agreements of the National Councils with the respective governments”.

It seemed that the ice started moving, but immediately after that (at first glance, it seems accidentally) the Azerbaijani delegate Aghayev published a telegram about the violation of the ceasefire by the Armenians in the Ghazakh region. This once again shows that very often one thing can be said, but another thing can be done, at the same time moving one’s own case forward, which the Azerbaijanis did, while in Armenia they often only engaged in diplomatic card game, not seeing the real process of the development of events, and Azerbaijan often saw the way out of the undesirable situation by escalating the situation in this or that area and creating explosive hotbeds in different parts of Transcaucasia like the Allies.

Of course, it did not end there. It is noteworthy that on April 13, Krichinsky, the representative of Azerbaijan, presented the next Azeri “surprise”, making a statement on the resolution adopted by the Assembly on April 12. In his speech it was emphasized that regarding the resolution adopted by the Assembly on April 12, 1920 on the need to restore the legal “status” on the basis of the agreements reached by the National Councils with the respective governments, the Azerbaijani delegation, in order to avoid “being misunderstood”, considered it necessary to state that the legal status stemming from the act of August 22, 1919 led to the subjection of the known parts of Karabakh to the Government of Azerbaijan within the known territorial boundaries, if they had changed as a result of the clashes, and measures should be taken to eliminate them in accordance with the known resolution²⁸¹.

In his letter of April 14, 1920, addressed to the RA Prime Minister A. Khatisyan H. Ohanjanyan mentioned the Azerbaijani viewpoint, saying that the Azeri delegates to the Assembly had stated that by saying restoration of the status quo ante (initial state – V.V.) they meant only the restoration of the borders, and they understood the internal status of Karabakh only in terms of submission of Karabakh to Azerbaijan and nothing more²⁸². In response, T. Bekzadyan objected arguing that it was unnecessary to make changes in the already adopted resolution. Gegechkori offered to eliminate the issue, to hand over the adopted resolution to the press, and not to start a debate about the statement made²⁸³. For obvious reasons Krichinsky opposed the publication of the resolution in the press, and this was opposed by Gegechkori, whose proposal was accepted. The Azerbaijani side declared that its government could never agree to that decision, renouncing its own consent given on April 12. The Armenian delegation involuntarily agreed to postpone the

²⁸¹ NAA fund 200, list 1, file 516, sheet 44-45.

²⁸² BAA 1996: 80.

²⁸³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 175-176.

announcement of the resolution for two days. As a result, because of the Georgian neutrality and Azerbaijani insistence the Armenian side found itself in a deadlock.

At the April 14 session of the Assembly the issue of sending commissions (consisting of 6 people) to the locations of the clashes was discussed. The Armenian side insisted that first a commission be sent to Ghazakh, after which they went on to review the April 12 decision. Krichinsky emphasized that at that time they did not have the object of international discussion, in case of which they had the right to insist on abiding by any agreement. According to Bekzadyan, the agreement had lost its validity due to the violation of the terms of military actions and the amendment concerning the legal status proposed by Krichinsky should be rejected (i.e. concerning temporary demarcation lines). Krichinsky believed that if until the known time the state power in Karabakh belonged to the Armenian National Council, then, since the moment of recognizing the power of Azerbaijan, albeit temporarily, the power of that council was abolished, dissolving into the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and at the mentioned time only that sovereignty existed in Karabakh because legally there could not be two sovereignties in the same territory. The Azerbaijani government did not refuse that viewpoint²⁸⁴. It must be admitted that Krichinsky's point of view was really somewhat invulnerably substantiated from the legal point of view, which the Azerbaijani side skillfully clung to and oppressed the Armenian side with its counter-arguments. Moreover, it is undeniable that it was a unique approach from the political point of view as well, which was perfectly comprehended by Krichinsky and the Azerbaijani delegation, building each calculation from the position of priority of their own national and state interests. And if Azerbaijan managed, albeit temporarily (it was not eventually clear what was the duration of that "temporarily") to persuade the Armenian National Council of Karabakh to accept Azerbaijan's rule, it should be considered a diplomatic and political defeat for Armenia and for Azerbaijan - a unique victory.

In response, S. Khachatryan continued to insist that in case the Assembly failed, the Armenian government might agree to the above provision, but the Assembly should discuss the issue of the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan's sovereign rights over Karabakh and if the Azerbaijani government had violated the terms of the agreement, it already lost its rights. Besides, there were contractual relations, relations between the known regions and the government. Instead, Aghayev said that they did not want the Assembly to affirm the right of force, that there had been no war, but a riot, and the government had established order through the armed forces, and he offered to pass their resolution. Then Lordkipanidze claimed that, undoubtedly, the Karabakh issue was of international nature. According to him, the contractual act of the agreement stated that the Armenian population

²⁸⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 178-179.

submitted to the government of Azerbaijan before the decision of the Peace Conference (this is, of course, a remarkable approach – V.V.), and it should be taken into account as an international document. And since the ratification document on that agreement was violated, the interests of the case demanded that the two governments restore the previous situation. And if the Assembly could maintain the purity of international law, the case might benefit from it²⁸⁵. Mamikonyan, the Armenian delegate who took the floor after him, claimed that the Azerbaijani government had taken over Karabakh only temporarily. Receiving no support from the Armenian government the Armenian population had been forced to agree only to temporarily submit to Azerbaijan, stating that if the Azerbaijani government found it difficult to agree to that provision, it must ratify it publicly, otherwise there could be no question of an Assembly. Gegechkori not accidentally inflamed the situation by suggesting whether the Azerbaijani delegation could guarantee the rights of the Armenian population of Karabakh. Naturally, the Azerbaijani side immediately expressed certain readiness and in this regard Aghayev, speaking on behalf of the government of Azerbaijan, declared that his government would provide all the national-and-cultural rights they enjoyed before the clashes to the loyal Armenian population of Karabakh that would return²⁸⁶. In response, the RA delegate H. Ohanjanyan emphasized in this regard that the mention of the words “loyal” and “national-and-cultural rights” in the declaration did not satisfy them, since besides those rights there were other rights in Karabakh as well. It should be pointed out that this was a very verbose and unprincipled approach to the complex political issue, which the Azerbaijanis would obviously cling to, offering an approach convenient for them. Nevertheless, the Armenian delegation insisted that the declaration include a reservation, i.e. all the rights and responsibilities enjoyed by the Armenian population be ensured. In this regard, the Armenian delegation stated that they were not satisfied with that declaration, therefore, they could not agree with the above-mentioned decision. On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan Aghayev, agreeing with Lordkipanidze’s new proposal stated that the Government of Azerbaijan would preserve the previously enjoyed national-and-cultural rights of the Armenian population of Karabakh who would return to their homes. Taking note of this statement, the Assembly decided to send telegrams to the places where the bloody clashes were still going on, and also to address the peoples of Transcaucasia with a special statement²⁸⁷.

In its further work (April 17 session), the Assembly heard the opinion of the commission that had gone to Ghazakh. G. Makharadze, member of the commission, reported that the clashes started on April 5 and ended on April 9 at the initiative of the local population. 10 villages were burnt, 9 of

²⁸⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 180.

²⁸⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 180.

²⁸⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 548, sheet 180.

which were Muslim and one Armenian. These events took place between April 10 and April 17. It was informed that the commission had called for an end to the clashes and for returning to their places of residence. In this regard, Khan-Khoyski published the telegram from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan. According to Vekilov, the Muslim population in Ghazakh was in a state of alarm and was afraid of new attacks²⁸⁸. S. Mamikonyan, not so sure of the completeness of his own approach, stated how such a telegram could have been received, as they were there on the eve of the clashes, talked to both sides, the villagers and the governor-general, and no such statement was made²⁸⁹. In response, Krichinsky offered his own solution, stating that the Karabakh issue should be separated from the issues under discussion, and that there could be no question of the legal status of Ghazakh, but only the borders should be restored. Instead, the RA delegate S. Mamikonyan said that they were guided by the principle of expediency, and he wanted the Assembly to clarify what status should there be in Ghazakh (as if Ghazakh were an indisputable Azerbaijani territory since time immemorial. Such an approach of the Armenian delegation is very strange or were they unaware of history or? – V.V.).

Feeling threatened, Khan-Khoyski wisely expressed the opinion that such a divided approach to the issue (to Ghazakh) could complicate its solution. Khan-Khoyski expressed the opinion that the well-known demarcation line had been violated in Ghazakh, and it had been violated by the Armenians, who occupied a part of the territory of Azerbaijan. Therefore, according to him, Armenians should go back to their place of residence, and it should not be confused with Karabakh. According to KhanKhoyski, Karabakh was also a territory of Azerbaijan, and the matter concerned the internal law of the Azerbaijani government, and it was about the legal status of the Armenian population of Karabakh, about the attitude of the Azerbaijani government towards the known part of its population (interesting wording - the emphasis is ours – V.V.), and in Ghazakh it was only about the demarcation line. According to KhanKhoyski, it was about the uprising in Karabakh, and there was an opinion that the commission going there might be able to expand the privileges of the Armenian population and thus solve the issue²⁹⁰. This is the way to approach the diplomatic-andpolitical issue, this is the way to manoeuvre and confuse the other side, which was not badly demonstrated by the Azerbaijani delegates to the Tiflis Assembly of the Transcaucasian Republics. This time Ye. Gegechkori considered that it was pointless to link one issue to the other: the issue of Ghazakh to that of Karabakh, that in the case of Ghazakh it was necessary to return to the old demarkation line and return the refugees, and in the case of Karabakh it was necessary to return the

²⁸⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 576, sheet 4.

²⁸⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 576, sheet 4.

²⁹⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 576, sheet 5-6.

population to the old places of residence after which raise the issue of the legal status of the population and thus pacify the region.

According to the Azerbaijani delegation, the Assembly should have its opinion on the report of the commission on Ghazakh, and suggested the following resolution: “After hearing the report of the commission on the events in Ghazakh, the Assembly decides that in the parts of Ghazakh where Armenian-Muslim clashes are taking place, the territorial situation before the clashes must be restored”²⁹¹. Instead, the Armenian delegation, in the person of Ohanjanyan, proposed its own resolution: the Armenian delegation proposed to adopt a general resolution on the restoration of the legal status, adopted unanimously on April 12, to take it as a basis for both Ghazakh and the other regions, which was mentioned in Resolution 1 of the Assembly (April 11).

On the same day, on April 17, after the Yerevan odyssey, when Tekinsky’s espionage and destructive activities against the Republic of Armenia were revealed, Mammad Khan Tekinsky, already as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, sent a telegram to A. Khatisyan, in which he protested against the nonimplementation of the decisions of the relevant commission by the Armenian troops. On April 18 Khatisyan responded to this by denying Tekinsky’s information, and on his part pointed out Azerbaijan’s continuation of hostilities in Karabakh, asking to stop them²⁹².

Khan-Khoyski immediately disagreed with the resolution, objecting to connecting the two issues, arguing that in Ghazakh it was a matter of conquering foreign territory, and in Karabakh it was an uprising within the state itself and that the Azerbaijani government would take every measure for the population to benefit from all the opportunities of national-and-cultural autonomy²⁹³. Then, Ohanjanyan answered positively to Khan-Khoyski’s question whether the Armenians wanted to “liberate” Ghazakh, i.e. by withdrawing their own military units from the mentioned territory. Thus, from H. Ohanjanyan’s letter of April 18, 1920 addressed to the RA Prime Minister A. Khatisyan, it becomes obvious that the Armenian side had some concerns related to both Karabakh and other related issues. In the above-mentioned letter H. Ohanjanyan directly emphasized the following: “In the current conditions, it is absolutely impossible to achieve more. Judging by your letters and telegrams from the ground on the current military situation, we are forced to make the biggest concessions”²⁹⁴. At the April 18 session of the Assembly, Ohanjanyan noted that the Assembly did not want to dwell on the April 12 resolution, which was a fundamental basis for resolving the issues of Karabakh, Ordubad, Nakhichevan and other disputed territories, and suggested that the demarkation line be drawn where the Assembly’s April 11 decision on

²⁹¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 576, sheet 7-9.

²⁹² Tumanyan M. 2012: 300.

²⁹³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 576, sheet 8-9.

²⁹⁴ BAA, 1996, N 1 (98): 82.

ending the armed conflict was reached, and in each separate case, the Assembly should adopt a special decision which is agreed by the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Azerbaijan. In addition, at the 10th session on April 18, a resolution was adopted which envisaged the restoration of the factual situation in Ghazakh before the clashes and the return of the population to their homes²⁹⁵.

The British command in Transcaucasia, like in the other places where the implementers of its policy were mainly officers of the “Indian school”, began to pursue a policy of all possible concessions to the Muslim element, persistently seeking to strengthen their authority in the Muslim world. The same idea was emphasized by H. Ter-Hakobyan, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia in his message of September 16, 1919 (No. 3741) addressed to the Armenian diplomatic envoy in Tiflis: “It turns out from the messages of our delegation in Paris that during their entire presence in the Caucasus, the British have been insincere to us and have systematically pursued a Muslim policy. The reports of both Thomson and other generals (even those of General W. H. Beach, the head of the political bureau of the headquarters of the British occupation forces in Transcaucasia who was considered pro-Armenian by us) particularly on Karabakh and generally on issues concerning us have always been to our detriment”²⁹⁶.

Naturally, there was a conflict of interest, and no agreement was reached. Soon there were developments, events off the “agenda”, which nullified the efforts made, which was not a coincidence at all. After the departure of Great Britain, consequently, Soviet Russia and the reviving Turkey were the two countries that were to fill that emptiness in the Caucasus. But due to the state of affairs Armenia could not come to an agreement with any of those countries. There was the “ghost” of the Treaty of Sèvres between Armenia and Turkey, and between Armenia and Soviet Russia there was the deceptive hope of the Republic of Armenia regarding the support of great allies; and as British Caucasiologists D. M. Lang and K. I. Walker accurately noted, those allies skillfully fed Armenians and the political leaders of the Armenian people with “the dream idea of creating an Armenia extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea”²⁹⁷. Those hopes led to the fatal isolation and decline of the Republic of Armenia. There was never any significant help from the allies, there were only empty statements and encouragement. And for various reasons, it was not possible to find common ground with the neighbors.

And yet it was only after the defeat of Denikin’s army by the Bolsheviks in January 1920 that the Allies recognized the Transcaucasian republics as independent states, with the aim of keeping the Caucasus and Persia out of the Bolshevik influence. Changes in the situation and the significant

²⁹⁵ Tumanyan M. 2012: 300.

²⁹⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 62, sheet 45; fund 275, list 5, file 97, sheet 126.

²⁹⁷ Lang, Walker 1992: 31.

change in the attitude of the allies towards the Republic of Armenia were accurately noticed by D. M. Lang and K. I. Walker: “During 1920 the situation in the world underwent such dramatic changes that the promises made by the allied powers to Armenia became meaningless... After heated disputes... the ARF government decided to peacefully hand over the power to the Bolsheviks and as the saying goes, they preferred “to be red rather than dead”²⁹⁸. Already in the spring of 1920 the situation in the Transcaucasian region changed dramatically and the events started to develop rapidly, in particular in Artsakh, Zangezur and around them: a) the de facto power in Artsakh, starting from mid-1918 was in the hands of the local Armenian National Council. From May 1918 to May 1920 during the ten congresses it convened and even after that, until the infamous decision of July 5, 1921 of the Bureau of the Caucasus Territorial Committee of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Kavbyuro), the Armenian National Council did not accept and did not recognize the rule of Azerbaijan. But there were also dangerous turns of events and political slips. Thus, the 7th Congress of Karabakh held on August 12, 1919, examining the situation and making sure that they could not receive any help from outside, that the British were supporting the Azerbaijanis, and that the Armenian government was unable to provide serious assistance, considering and weighing their own capabilities decided to accept the agreement with Baku on August 15, and thus, the notorious agreement of August 22, 1919 was signed “hoping” that the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh would be resolved “unconditionally and justly” at the European Peace Conference of the great powers. Naturally, Dr. Khosrov Bey Sultanov considered it a new “era” in the life of Karabakh. The joint Azerbaijani-Turkish armed forces responded to the liberation struggle of the people of Artsakh with mass massacres of Armenians: on March 22-26, 1920, the Musavat government organized the massacre of the Armenians of Shushi, as a result of which thousands of Armenians were killed.

In this situation, with Denikin’s final defeat, Russia became a new factor in Armenia and Transcaucasia. The Red Army, breaking down the barrier against it, entered the North Caucasus and descended to Transcaucasia and Baku. And this was at a time when the government of independent Azerbaijan had concentrated most of its military force to crush the uprising of Armenians in Karabakh and to finally annex Karabakh, as well as Zangezur and the other Armenian territories to Azerbaijan. And the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan, which was already Bolshevik, sent an ultimatum to the government of Yerevan, declaring war on the Republic of Armenia, if the Armenian troops did not empty the “indisputable lands” of Azerbaijan immediately, by April 30. The Revolutionary Committee did not even find it necessary to mention the names of those lands, and it immediately made military-and-political preparations. These radical developments were the

²⁹⁸ Lang, Walker 1992: 32.

main reasons that led to the failure of work of the Assembly of Transcaucasian republics in April 1920 and, of course, the conditionality of the decisions taken. It was the period when Bolshevism, as a military-and-political and social current in Russia was in the process of strengthening and was moving towards stabilizing, but at first it was incomprehensible. As a result of that the Armenian diplomatic and political circles counted on Vrangeli, Kolchak, Denikin and others, losing precious time and all hopes of using strategic opportunities, relying on the abstract assurances of the great European powers, absolutely not guessing what catastrophic geopolitical situation would be created by the fast changes and developments in the near future, first of all for the Republic of Armenia. It was this unfortunate circumstance that left its mark on all the actions of the RA Government, which did not follow the spirit of the time and did not comply with the altered geopolitical situation.

The situation changed dramatically in late April 1920, after the Sovietization of Azerbaijan. The local Armenians gave in to the Bolshevik slogans, and Karabakh was Sovietized. And later, on July 5, 1921, by the decision of the Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b), under I. Stalin's pressure, Armenian Karabakh was annexed to Azerbaijan, grossly violating the decision made the previous day, on July 4, 1921 on Karabakh-Artsakh joining Soviet Armenia, grossly distorting the content and essence of the Leninist-Bolshevik ideology of free self-determination of nations. This was categorically opposed also by the prominent Soviet statesman Alexander Myasnikyan who assumed the position of the party-political leadership of Soviet Armenia.

Chapter 4.

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE 1919 ANTI-ARMENIAN UNREST OF THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE SOTQ-ZOD-BASARGECHAR REGION AND THE RESTORATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ACTIVITY OF COLONEL CLIVE TEMPERLEY, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVE OF GREAT BRITAIN

In 1918-1920s, the Republic of Armenia made huge efforts to prevent hostile forces and conspiracies, especially in Surmalu, Kars, Aralitch, Zangibasar, Vedibasar, Böyük-Vedi, Nakhijevan, Zangezur, Zod, Basargechar and other regions. Available archives and other documents show the difficulties the Armenian government faces in preventing the special operations of Azerbaijani-Turkish activities. During the days of the First Republic of Armenia, the successful activity of the Armenian government had significant results in revealing the apparent anti-Armenian intrigues and espionage activities of Azerbaijan in Yerevan aimed at undermining the foundations of Armenian statehood. The anti-Armenian uprisings in Zangibasar, BöyükVedi, as well as in Zod and other Armenian territories, directly sought to separate these territories from Armenia, and this took place in the immediate presence of the British military representative, Colonel C. Temperley.

One of the most important manifestations of the state and political life of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920 was the constant struggle against the forces tearing down the Armenian statehood from within. The boundary and territorial disputes with the immediate neighbors - Azerbaijan and Georgia - had old roots and were always at the basis of the foreign policy choices and orientations that arose with the emergence of the three Transcaucasian republics, when each of them embarked on the establishment of their own armed forces.

In 1918-1920, from the point of view of ensuring the territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Armenia, more importance was attached to the issue of those regions where, from the government's point of view, the chances of violating the rights of the Armenian population were greater, because a great number of Muslim population lived there and they often did not have a law-abiding attitude towards the legal authorities. During the Armenian-Tatar (Azerbaijani) conflicts, thanks to the joint measures taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the military units of the regular army, a significant number of the Muslim population was deported from Armenia. They mainly concentrated in the border zones, thus becoming carriers of a unique explosive charge, creating hotbeds of unrest.

It should be noted that back in 2003, 2009, 2011, 2015 we addressed the issue from a military and political point of view for the first time, highlighting the efforts of the RA government to ensure the security interests and territorial integrity of RA in the Zod-Basargechar region, and in 2008 the issue was very briefly discussed by Orientalist Davit Knyazyan, and in 2012 - by historian Hamlet Harutyunyan²⁹⁹. In 2018, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the First Republic, based on the facts presented by us, A. Asatryan also briefly, in a few lines assessed the Sotk-Zod events and the role of the heroes of the Battle of Sardarapat, General Daniel Bek-Pirumyan and Chief of Staff Al. Chneour in them, noting that in early 1919 Major General Daniel Bek-Pirumyan brilliantly carried out the operations of the village of Zod with the squad he led, and Chief of Staff of the squad Al. Chneour took part in them as well. The operations of Zod were one of the instructive examples of mutual cooperation between the Armenian army and intelligence³⁰⁰. This was briefly noted by Artsvi Bakhchinyan from Armenia and V. Mateosian from the USA who highly appreciated Sardarapat hero Al. Chneour's "Zod" operation aimed at suppressing the Muslim riot in the Nor Bayazet region³⁰¹.

As for H. Harutyunyan's work³⁰² published in 2012, it almost copies our study mentioned above, with minor reservations, and it is clearly seen from the references given in the author's footnote and from the content section in general. In terms of modern interpretation, notable is the work by A. Grigoryan and A. Bobokhyan³⁰³ who highly evaluate our study in terms of covering the blank pages of the Zod military operation and they emphasize that this work was written from a different starting point, namely from the point of view of revealing the activities of the RA power structures, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the army in Zod-Basargechar in 1919, closely linking it to C. Temperley's (Temperley Clive Errington, the representative of the British military and political mission in Armenia) activity in Zod-Basargechar. And this determines the scientific novelty, modern resonance and Armenological value of the presented problem.

Muslim uprisings against the Republic of Armenia followed one another, covering almost the entire territory of the republic, aimed at undermining and destroying the Armenian statehood. The frequent attacks of bandit Selim and other gangs on Armenian military units and militias in Aghbaba, Zod, Zarushat and elsewhere created hotbeds of great tension. Azerbaijani agents and officers sent and guided by Turkey were constantly calling secret meetings, arming the local Muslim population, training them to use firearms, making provocative calls to overthrow the RA

²⁹⁹ Virabyan V. 2003a: 51; Virabyan V. 2003b: 98-141; Virabyan V. 2009: 222-253; Virabyan V. 2011:128-139; Virabyan V. 2015: 423- 445; Knyazyan D. 2008: 91-93; Harutyunyan H. 2012: 283-286, 295-310.

³⁰⁰ Virabyan V. 2003a: 51; Asatryan A. 2018: 334.

³⁰¹ Baxchinean A., Mateosean V. 2018: 100.

³⁰² Harutyunyan H. 2012: 285, 295-310.

³⁰³ Grigoryan A., Bobokhyan A. 2022. 80.

government³⁰⁴. Back in July 1918, Azerbaijan began sending appeals to the Armenian government, demanding an end to violence against Muslims in the Nor Bayazet³⁰⁵ region. In response, the Armenian government informed the Azerbaijani government that the Muslim residents who were subjected to violence should turn to the RA government, not to Azerbaijan, considering it unacceptable that the Armenians of Azerbaijan turn to them, and the Muslims of Armenia turn to Baku, viewing it as an interference in each other's internal affairs.

Azerbaijani historian I. Niftaliyev notes that under the name of the Gyokcha (Sevan-V.V.) region the eastern parts of the Nor Bayazet region of the Yerevan Governorate (according to him not Yerevan, but Ierevan-V.V.) were outlined, which lay between Lake Gyokcha and the Lesser Caucasus mountain peak and which administratively belonged to the Dovalinsk, Mazarinsky and Gazaldara police stations, including Zod, Basar-Gechar, Bashkend and other settlements. Referring to the report of A. Shchepoteyev (employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic) on "the disputed territories of the Caucasus" to which the selfdetermined Azerbaijani Turks allegedly had "legal" rights, Niftaliyev notes that the entire area east of the above-mentioned border had been inhabited by a large Muslim population (100%) without including any ethnic Armenians, stating that since the very beginning of the declaration of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic this population had been striving for the latter and for these natural aspirations they had been repeatedly subjected to bloody persecution by Armenians. As an example he cites the 1919 events in Zod, Bashkend, Basar-Gechar and other villages, claiming that the entire Muslim population along the eastern and southeastern shores of Lake Gyokcha was in ethnic, religious and domestic ties with the Muslim population of Gazakh, Karabakh and Nakhijevan regions³⁰⁶.

And Nazim Mustafa, famous Azerbaijani researcher, Doctor of Philosophy, I. Aliyev's aide, writes that in order to stop the Armenian armed forces, self-defense groups were organized by the Muslim population in the Zod-Basargechar region of Gyokcha, and on March 2, 1919, the representatives of 26 villages of the Gyokcha region organized signature gatherings in the villages, allegedly on behalf of 60,000 people. Ogrucha resident Mashadi Isa Kerbalay Musa Oghli was elected the military minister of the region, and Zod village resident Agalar Bey Kasamansky was elected Commander-in-Chief, being entrusted with the mobilization of Muslim detachments in the entrusted territory, adding that the population considered him a citizen of Azerbaijan³⁰⁷. And

³⁰⁴ Yaraj, May 7, 1920, No 49.

³⁰⁵ The Nor Bayazet region included the rural communities of Hajimukhan, Ghshlagh, Pashakend, Dalighardash, Yeranos, Gyol, Gharanlugh, Zolakhach, Gholankirlan, Alichalu, Basargechar, Sariyagub, Mazra, Zod and Nadezhdino (present Jil).

Harutyunyan H. 2008: 122–124; Harutyunyan H. 2012: 11, 31.

³⁰⁶ Naftaliyev I. 2010: 22-23.

³⁰⁷ Mustafa Nazim 2018: 17, 198.

Armenophobe Bakhtiyar Najafov emphasizes the allegedly endless attacks by Armenians, which were accompanied by atrocities and violence against the population, thereby explaining the Muslim anti-Armenian outbreak in the Zod region. Najafov considered it violence by the Dashnaks against the civilian population, who explained it by the problems caused by the establishment of Armenian statehood, which the Azerbaijani author by no means wants to accept as a normal reality³⁰⁸.

This explains the activation of Muslim movements throughout 1919. In the second half of 1918 - the beginning of 1919, all the more or less significant cases of deportation of the Muslim population from the territory of RA, and vice versa, from the Armenian regions of Azerbaijan to Armenia, took place. In his report addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs on March 11, 1919, the Commissar of the Territorial Administration and Militia of Armenia emphasized that during the entire period of the Armenian-Turkish clashes 111.560 Tatars were deported outside the borders of Armenia, of which 15.000 were Kurds and 29.000 Tatars returned, but the deported Kurds did not return, emphasizing that in the territory of Armenia the number of villages free from Muslims reached 248, 50 of which were destroyed, and 56 completely free villages were occupied mainly by refugees from Turkish Armenia and 142 villages – by refugees from the Kars province³⁰⁹. The RA government sought to create a homogeneous population in the border zone, insuring against the dangers that came from Azerbaijan and Turkey. In this regard, H. Harutyunyan expressed disagreement with the above-mentioned point of view, finding that it did not correspond to reality, that such things did not happen³¹⁰. However, in this regard we would like to emphasize that it is one thing for any decent state to strive for the indigenous population to prevail in its territory and the management of ethnic minorities remains the only problem, which we can encounter today in many European countries, but it is another thing to be a minority in the territory of one's own homeland and to be constantly afraid and threatened. At the present stage, any more or less organized country, e.g. the USA, the Russian Federation and other countries, cannot at all feel threatened by, say, a few million non-ethnic Russians living in their territories, for example, Armenians. Only states that are weak and disorganized in terms of security are afraid of such phenomena and realities.

The significant mass of Muslims living in the territory of Armenia was enough (according to the memorandum of the RA government presented by Hovh. Qajaznuni to the US Senate on November 10, 1919, the number of Muslims [Tatar, Turk, Turkmen, Karapapakh] was 588.000 or 27% of the population)³¹¹ to make RA always be in a state of alarm, especially since spies from Azerbaijan and Turkey, various emissaries armed with a huge amount of fake money, were trying to organize this mass and incite a rebellion against the legitimate authorities, supporting separatist

³⁰⁸ Nadjafov B. 1994: 59.

³⁰⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 44, sheet 16.

³¹⁰ Harutyunyan H. 2012: 307.

³¹¹ Qajaznuni Hovh. 1993: 11.

sentiments. And in this matter, the RA government had a lot to do, trying to eradicate it almost everywhere - in Basargechar³¹², Zangezur, Kars etc.

The Muslim uprisings were felt wherever there was a more or less large Muslim population, and it was difficult to fight against them, therefore, to solve the issue, the military was involved, which was not strengthened, but weakened by participating in internal fights, “pacifying” the Muslim population in the territory of Armenia and reasserting the power of the legitimate authorities. It was clearly demonstrated in the suppression of the Zod-Basargechar (Vardenis) riot, when the Republic of Azerbaijan, relying on the Muslim population in the Lake Sevan basin, tried to make claims to a part of the legal territory of the Republic of Armenia. R. Ter-Minasyan writes the following: “With Zod³¹³ as their center, the Tatars had established the power of Azerbaijan there and firmly closed the roads of Jivanshir. The Tatar villages about 2000 square verst north of Lake Sevan in the Basargechar district of the region of Bayazet, which were directly connected with Jivanshir and bordered Azerbaijan, declared that they were not independent, but a part of Azerbaijan: agents and officials of Azerbaijan ruled there, and our officials did not have access to that country. The loss of that region was very harmful for Armenia not from the economic, but from the military point of view. Azerbaijan could enter the basin of Lake Sevan through it, it could keep in touch with Vedibasar and Sadarak over Jghin, and therefore with Turkey. All the roads of Armenia were open to it and it would be able to cut to the Daralagyaz and Zangezur regions, as well as the Dilijan and Yerevan regions. It was a hammer raised over the heads of the Armenian provinces”³¹⁴. It is difficult to unequivocally agree that our officials had no access to those regions, that “the importance of this danger was not felt by the government to the extent necessary” and resorted to negotiations to improve the situation, which Ruben considered inexpedient. However, it should be noted that considering the available military and political resources and opportunities, perhaps the RA government was more right to go for that option and try to resolve the conflict.

Information about these Azerbaijani-Turkish ambitions was obtained by intelligence agencies. The situation around the Sevan basin and RA is well represented by T. Devoyants: “Subsequent events are a consequence of the implementation of the Muslims’ plan by which Azerbaijan would

³¹² Basargechar - a region and a village of the same name in Nor Bayazet region of Yerevan province, in the southeastern part of the Gegharkunik province of the present-day RA. By order of June 2, 1969 of the Supreme Council of the ASSR it was renamed Vardenis. The place name is derived from the Turkish words “basar” (to attack, trample) and “gechar” (to pass).

Hakobyan et al. 1986: 609; Hakobyan et al. 1986: 782-783.

³¹³ Zod – a village in the Sotk region of the Syunik province of Greater Armenia. Zod, Agheghush, Zot, Tsavdenk, Tsot, Hog, Sod, Sodk, Sot, Sotits avan, Sotk – a village in the Vardenis region of the ASSR, on the banks of the Sot-Zod river, near the Zod mountain pass, surrounded by mountains on three sides. To the east of the village there are the gold mines of Zod, which were developed several centuries Before the Common Era. In medieval Armenian sources it is known as Vasakashen village of the Sotk region of the Syunik province. In 1991 it was renamed Sotk.

Hakobyan et al. 1988: 312; Hakobyan et al. 1998: 651.

³¹⁴ Ruben 1982: 210, 326-327.

join Turkey and Armenia would be neutralized, limiting itself to Lake Sevan, Yerevan and Alexandrapol. At the same time, the full connection between the actions of Azerbaijan and Turkey and the role of the leader of Azerbaijan in all the hostile actions that are aimed directly against Armenia is absolutely revealed while Turkey is temporarily busier with its domestic affairs and the organization of resistance to the decisions of the Paris conference”³¹⁵. The so-called Basargechar events made a lot of noise, where the Turks, ignoring the calls and warnings of the Armenian authorities, with the direct encouragement of their secular and spiritual leaders and the Azerbaijani authorities, continued to cherish the hope of joining Azerbaijan and carried out anti-Armenian and anti-government aggressive actions in the Basargechar region.

Judging by the correspondence between militia chiefs, governors and military bodies, alarming signs were discerned as early as in December 1918 and January 1919, until the well-known Zed-Basargechar Muslim uprisings, when the population, instigated by the Tatar beys, announced that they were joining Azerbaijan. The Muslim elements did not demonstrate loyalty towards the legitimate authorities in other parts of RA either, they often revolted and created a tense situation with their riotous mood. In this situation, the special services were forced to expose the enemy’s covert agents and spies in different places: Zangibasar, Kars, Basargechar and elsewhere, preventing their anti-Armenian actions.

Sometimes the RA authorities were faced with problems of “local” nature, preventing the transgressions of the provincial Armenian authorities. In 1919, in a note addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs, a colonel of the General Staff wrote that according to the information of the head of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, the Commissar of Qaravansara allowed armed men to move from Azerbaijan to Armenia for a bribe. He demanded that immediate measures be taken to stop the illegal crossing of armed men across the border³¹⁶. In a letter addressed to the counter-intelligence department, assistant to the head of the intelligence department of the General Staff, Ensign Hovsepyan reported about the Azerbaijani-Turkish ambitions in the Kars province, which was also confirmed by A. Poidebard³¹⁷, officer of the French military representation in Armenia, according to whose data at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919, Turkish agents were engaged in active propaganda in the mentioned area³¹⁸.

The summary of the intelligence reported that Ali Riza, the former “Vice President” of “Shura” (the so-called “Milli Shura”, the Muslim “autonomy” in the Kars province) escaped from the Batumi prison, passed through Tiflis to Gharachakh, and from there to the Aghbaba region, and

³¹⁵ Devoyeanc T. 1945: 96.

³¹⁶ NAA, fund 201, list 1, file 168, sheet 32.

³¹⁷ Antoine Poidebard (1878 -1955) – archaeologist, historian, pilot, cartographer and missionary who knew Armenian well.

³¹⁸ Ter-Minasyan A. 2004: 97.

then to the Olti region through Zarushat (July 1919). It added that beyond doubt Azerbaijan sought to create a “second Karabakh” in the region of Aghbaba, Zarushat, Ardahan and Olti, that “there was also a Georgian-Azerbaijani confederation, that more than 300 Georgian soldiers had arrived in the border villages of Gorlovka and Troitsk of the Akhalkalaki province”. Ensign Hovsepyan referred to the data on the cooperation of the Tatars with the Kurds, stating that he had had a conversation with A. Rawlinson, Colonel of the British headquarters in Erzurum regarding this³¹⁹. In the operational intelligence summary of May 24, 1919 Lieutenant Colonel A. K. Chneour³²⁰ reported on Kurdish-Tatar and Turkish-Georgian encroachments in Kaghzvan, Merdenek and Ardahan regions, adding that an Armenian military unit was sent in the direction of Ardahan³²¹. In the report of August 22, 1919, addressed to the RA Minister of Internal Affairs, governor of Kars St. Ghorghanyan reported on the espionage-provocative activities of the Georgian military units in the Ardahan region³²².

According to the report of Staff-Rotmister Martirosov, the operational intelligence summary of the headquarters of the Yerevan Group of the Armenian Army, which refers to the events from August 20 to September 20, 1919, states that the Tatars from Kalvijar were preparing to attack Basargechar, gathering a detachment of about 2000 people under the leadership of Asker Bey³²³. On September 7, 1919 Captain Shumov telegraphed to Tiflis, to the military attaché General H. Kishmishyan, giving information about the preparations and movements of the Muslim population in the period from August 26 to September 4 on the Basargechar-Tazakend-Daralagyaz-Nor BayazetGhamarlu line, where clashes with small Kurdish groups took place³²⁴.

Regarding the Zangezur realities, relying on the information received from intelligence, Major-General Hakhverdyan brought facts about the special measures taken by Azerbaijan in the border zone with Armenia, about the militia battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan in Okuzli and Getabek, in Gazakh, consisting of 112 people, 3 machine guns and a frontier detachment with 80 cavalymen and 50 infantrymen. It was then stated that the commander of the troops had ordered the commanders of the Dilijan and Nor Bayazet detachments to check the situation in the territories of the regions of Gazakh and Ganja (Gandzak) with constant intelligence by agents, noting that there was no doubt that in the event of the official start of military operations

³¹⁹ NAA, fund 201, list 1, file 168, sheet 38.

³²⁰ Chneour Alexander Constantine (20.08.1884 - 16.09.1977) – officer of the Russian army, Colonel, hero of Sardarapat (Heroic battle of Sardarapat 1967; Virabyan 2021.

³²¹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 73 (71), sheet 21.

³²² NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 73 (71), sheet 126.

³²³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 155, sheet 126.

³²⁴ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 177, sheet 119.

between Armenia and Azerbaijan, regular troops would be concentrated in the regions of Gazakh and Getabek to attack Dilijan or Karakilisa and Basargechar³²⁵.

In the telegram of July 26, 1919, addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs, to Dro and to Colonel Chneour, Khosroyev, the commissar of the Nor Bayazet region, reported that the spy “Kurd” (Ali Alahverdi) had learned from 2 Tatars in the village of Shishkaya that the Tatars were going to take Basargechar, driving away the Armenians, expecting to expel the Armenians from Karabakh and Elizavetpol in case of success and settle the Tatars there³²⁶.

On August 3, 1919, the “diplomatic representative-spy” Khan Tekinsky reported to the Azerbaijani government about sending artillery and shells in 8 trucks to Dilijan, Nor Bayazet and Basargechar and about the presence of the 4th regiment in those regions, concluding that “the Armenians were preparing it against Muslims” and demanding that the government “take the necessary measures”³²⁷.

The anti-Armenian provocative and destructive activities of the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative, the establishment of an espionage and intelligence network and groups of agents throughout the Republic of Armenia encouraged the Muslim masses, whose leaders provoked them to run various machinations, and pushed them to insurgent actions against the legitimate Armenian authorities and the Armenian people. And encouraged by this Muslim gangs that had started anti-government riots in Zangibasar, Zod-Basargechar, the Kars province and elsewhere, showed strong resistance to the Armenian troops and local authorities under the leadership of Turkish officers and special service agents and with the participation of military men and askyars.

In another telegram dated July 30, 1919 addressed to Colonel Chneour, provincial commissar of Nor Bayazet Khosroyev informed that a spy named “Kurd” reported that the Tatars had sent a letter of demand to Elizavetpol, asking to send troops, otherwise they threatened to submit to the RA government³²⁸. In the telegram of August 7, 1919, sent to Dro and the RA Minister of Internal Affairs, Hamazasp emphasized the threat posed by the Azerbaijani troops stationed on the Dallar-Chardakhlu-GetabekGhalakend line to the Zod-Shishkaya region, asking to urgently strengthen the area with militiamen and other forces³²⁹.

It is noteworthy that, as A. Grigoryan and A. Bobokhyan aptly point out, before the resolution of the Zod operation, the RA armed forces first tried to find a peaceful solution and approached the

³²⁵ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 73 (71), sheet 190.

³²⁶ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 73 (71), sheet 75.

³²⁷ Secret documents 1920, N 1, 15, 616.

³²⁸ NAA, fund 201, list 1, file 168, sheet 12.

³²⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 1, sheet 311.

Tatar settlements with the accompaniment of zurna and dhol, offering peace as a way to resolve the conflict, and only after being shot at responded with fire³³⁰.

In this situation, the Armenian authorities tried to suppress possible anti-Armenian Muslim uprisings, but the sending of punitive military units to the region became inevitable. In the autumn of 1918, the punitive military unit from Yerevan entered the Basargechar region after solving the problem of tax collection in Armenian villages. After the establishment of the Transcaucasian republics, Abbas Ali Bey, a resident of the village of Zod, the former provincial commissar of the region, tried to join the Basargechar region to the Republic of Azerbaijan. For the purpose of joining the Basargechar region to Azerbaijan, he sent some influential Turks to Gandzak to submit to the Azerbaijani authorities, expecting their direct military support. Having collected 60 000 roubles from ordinary people for the realization of the purpose, Azerbaijan also sent several influential Turks. In order to resolve the possible confrontation in a peaceful way, the provincial commissar of Nor Bayazet called Abbas Ali Bey to Nor Bayazet, but the latter refused, openly declaring that he did not recognize the authority of the provincial commissar. Ensign Tigran Baghdasaryan's punitive military unit arrived in Basargechar, because back on September 18, 1918 Aram Manukyan instructed the provincial commissar of Nor Bayazet to prevent the encroachments of the Tatars seeking to establish Azerbaijan's authority over the Basargechar region and to declare that they were obliged to fulfill the legal requirements of the RA government³³¹. The latter called the representatives of the Turkish villages and informed them of the Armenian government's decision to disarm the people living in the territory of the Republic of Armenia, demanding that they hand over their weapons and pay taxes within three days, otherwise threatening to bombard the villages³³². However, 3 days went by but the Turks expressed no willingness to submit to the Armenian authorities, which prompted the punitive military unit to act and bombard the village of Mets Mazra, after which the Muslim population, terrified by the sound of the cannon, came to T. Baghdasaryan with a white flag, handing over weapons and taxes, including 20,000 roubles and 450 rifles, promising to give the state grain as well, after which, on November 12, 1918, the punitive military unit left for Yerevan³³³. Thus, the region of Basargechar gradually turned into the center of the anti-state movement and separatist sentiments of the Muslim population of RA.

The uprising of Basargechar encouraged the population of other regions of Armenia, and they began to openly interfere in domestic affairs, send appeals to the Azerbaijani government, asking to free them from the grave situation and from the Armenian authorities that were oppressing Islam, to occupy Armenia and to join the region to the Republic of Azerbaijan. For this purpose, on January

³³⁰ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 15.

³³¹ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 108.

³³² Zang, 1918, December 11, N 78.

³³³ Zang, 1918, December 11, N 78

2, 1919, a meeting of Muslim public figures living in Armenia was held in Yerevan, in which dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Armenian government towards the Muslim population was expressed. Beg Bayrambegov, who made a speech during the meeting, presented information about the tragic situation of the Muslims of Yerevan province. In the resolution adopted at the meeting, it was decided to appeal to the commander of the Allied forces in Baku, General W. Thomson to occupy the province of Yerevan, and if for some reason it was not possible, to force the government of the Ararat (Armenia) republic to take real measures against the atrocities of the Armenian gangs. As a result of the meeting T. Bey Makinsky, Palabeg Bayrambegov, Rashid Bey Ismailov and Aziz Bey Sultanov were assigned to go to Baku and meet with General Thomson³³⁴, who became known for his Armenophobia and anti-Karabakh position.

Thus, under the threat of the appearance of Armenian troops, the local Tatars agreed to submit to the authorities, which was followed by an increase in taxes, and Tigran Baghdasaryan's punitive detachment returned to Yerevan on November 12, 1918. In addition to that, there were starving and furious migrants near the Tatar settlements³³⁵. So, on January 31, 1919, in a telegram addressed to the Commissar of Territorial Administration and Militia of Armenia, Shahinyan, the provincial Commissar of Nor Bayazet reported that about 1000 armed refugee Armenians were attacking the Muslim villages of Verin Zaghalu, Ghezel-Vank and Subbutan in the Basargechar region, which is why the head of the militia had been sent there³³⁶. From the official letter sent by Shahinyan to the head of the territorial administration on February 2, we learn that the refugees, led by Mushegh, Vahan, Ishkhan and Nikol, supported the local Armenians, drove the Muslims out of these villages and the frightened Turks fled to the neighboring villages³³⁷. On February 6, Shahinyan got a telegram from the commissar of the Territorial Administration and Militia of Armenia, in which it was requested to immediately take decisive measures to prevent the riots and bring the perpetrators to strict judicial responsibility³³⁸. However, judging by the documents, the events got out of control and began to develop in a different scenario. Becoming uncontrollable, they created new problems, during which, as it was emphasized in the telegram of the RA Foreign Minister addressed to the Prime Minister on February 18, 1919, "...the local administration has shown criminal negligence and incompetence"³³⁹.

However, it would be one-sided to explain all that only by the administration's incompetence, because those events also had socio-economic motives, which became an additional impetus for the undesirable course of events, and the ambitious Muslim leaders of Azerbaijan took advantage of it.

³³⁴ Mshak, 1919, January 16, N. 12.

³³⁵ Kavkazskoe slovo, 1918, December 7.

³³⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 4.

³³⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 4-8.

³³⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 8, 115.

³³⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 110.

This was stimulated by the desperate steps of the refugee and starving Armenians of the Basargechar region in late January, 1919. Due to the steps taken by the administration and the division of Rotmister Silikyan, the refugees calmed down and were partially disarmed, the Tatar villages were freed from the refugees who occupied them, the administration began to return the looted property to the Tatars and started prosecuting the perpetrators. Rotmister Silikyan and cornet Khachaturov went to the Tatar to calm down the population³⁴⁰, which proves the nondiscriminatory approach of the RA authorities to the problem. With the help of the military units, they were able to disarm the refugees and resettle the Tatars in their villages and return the looted property³⁴¹. However, the events were already spreading beyond the village of Basargechar, becoming a cause of tension in inter-ethnic relations, which was complicated by the proximity of the border of Azerbaijan, about which Rotmister Silikyan telegraphed to Generals M. Silikyan³⁴² and Sardarapat hero D. Bek-Pirumyan³⁴³.

On February 12, 1919, the Council of Ministers heard the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, in which the latter complained about the actions of Armenian military units near Lake Sevan, which, crossing the border of Azerbaijan, had allegedly attacked several Turkish villages, carried out oppression and looting. He demanded to prevent such phenomena and to bring the perpetrators to justice, asking not to consider them responsible for the potential future actions by the Turkish population on behalf of the Azerbaijani government. In the decision adopted in this regard the RA Council of Ministers emphasized: “In view of the Military Minister’s report that there could be an attack by “groups”, the Minister of Internal Affairs is instructed to immediately appoint a strict investigation in order to find out the authenticity of the attacks and pressures mentioned in the telegram and to bring the perpetrators to justice³⁴⁴. In the response of the Armenian side it was mentioned that the regular RA troops had not participated in the Basargechar region riots, but about 10 000 Armenian migrants had attacked Muslim villages, and the RA authorities had returned the Muslims to their villages, given them back the looted property, and those responsible were called to account³⁴⁵.

However, it should be mentioned that in this regard D. Knyazyan supports the opposite point of view, noting that the Western Armenian migrants, who were left homeless and without food,

³⁴⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 115.

³⁴¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 115.

³⁴² Silikyan Movses Baba (Mikhail) (14.09.1862-10.12.1937) – major general, member of the RA Military Council, hero of Sardarapat.

³⁴³ Daniel Bek-Pirumyan Abisoghom (22.11.1861-1922) – lieutenant-general, Chief commander of the Sardarapat battle, hero of the Zod-Sotk operation, Hayastani Hanrapetutean Karavarutean nisteri arcanagrutyunner: 2014, 132, 136, 146, 156, 162, 169:

NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 22.

³⁴⁴ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 96, sheet 25; file 100 (43), sheet 26; fund 201, list 1, file 486, part I, sheet 37. Arev, 1919, February 13; Yaraj, 1919, February 16.

³⁴⁵ Knyazyan D. 2008: 92-93.

were responsible for the aggravation of the situation in the Basargechar region. D. Knyazyan believes that the military unit from Yerevan drove out the migrants from the Muslim villages, and the irresponsible behavior of Rotmister Silikyan, the commander of the military unit, became an excuse for the Muslim uprising and the massacre of the troops³⁴⁶.

All these led to tension and the infiltration of armed groups from the territory of Azerbaijan into the territory of Armenia and the delivery of weapons to the rebels. Preparations to capture Chambarak and Bashkend began, at the same time, military mobilization was announced, and around 1000 Georgian officers came to the aid of Azerbaijan³⁴⁷. It should be said that it was positive for Armenia that the British command and its military and political representative actually supported Armenia in the settlement of the problem, contrary to their openly pro-Azerbaijani position in Nagorno-Karabakh, Zangezur and elsewhere, and thus, they contributed to the preservation of the territorial integrity of RA in the Zod-Basargechar region. The incident also clearly demonstrated that Azerbaijan, in one way or another, laid claim to all those Armenian regions where there was a concentrated Muslim population³⁴⁸.

On February 18, 1919, in its regular session the Council of Ministers was introduced to the problem in connection with the activation of the Muslim movement in the Basargechar region and instructed the Minister of Internal Affairs to investigate the activities of the local administration³⁴⁹. Soon new facts emerged, allowing the government to achieve a more realistic and complete understanding of the problem that had arisen in the Zod region. It is clearly seen from the official letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Tigranyan addressed to the Prime Minister on February 18, 1919: "The developments in the Basargechar region, which became the reason for the intervention of the Azerbaijani government, have already been clarified to some extent. In addition to the private individuals who committed the crime and will suffer the legal punishment, I consider it necessary to draw the special attention of the government to the fact that, according to importance, the local administration has shown criminal negligence and incompetence. I find it necessary that those governors be brought to justice, be punished, and perhaps removed from public office, and the commander of the division, Rotmister Silikyan, whose intervention restored order and peace, should be thanked. Please provide me with detailed and accurate information about the motives and nature of the events, so that I can inform both the British High Command and the Government of Azerbaijan"³⁵⁰.

³⁴⁶ NAA fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 4, 6, 9-10, 15, 34, 44. Arev, 1919, February 11.

³⁴⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 47, 54-55, 60, file 294, sheet 77.

³⁴⁸ Kavkazskoe slovo, 1919, 5, April 25; Yedinaya Rossiya, 1919, March 26.

³⁴⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100 (43), sheet 28; file 96, sheet 27.

³⁵⁰ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100 (43), sheet 28, file 20, sheet 31.

And from the February 18 telegram of the RA Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, it becomes clear that as a result of the dynamic actions undertaken by the Armenian armed forces in midFebruary, in which the local administration and the bodies of Internal Affairs also participated, the Tatars were pushed back to their settlements, the property stolen by them in the Zod region was returned, and the perpetrators began to be questioned in order to be brought to justice³⁵¹. This letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the investigation of the events in the Basargechar region was sent to the Minister of Internal Affairs³⁵².

During that time Azerbaijan took feverish steps to rearrange the situation in its favor and with that intention, on February 24, 1919, A. Kh. Ziatkhanov, Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, presented an official note to General W. M. Thomson, commander of the allied forces in Baku, about the atrocities of the Armenian military units against the population of Azerbaijan and accused them of occupying a part of the territory of Azerbaijan, at the same time citing RA Foreign Minister S. Tigranyan's urgent telegrams addressed to them: "In response to your note received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Armenian Republic I assume that the events of lateJanuary are meant: "1. The Armenian military units and officers are complicit in the crimes committed in the settlements of the Basargechar region, which is included in the territory of Armenia. Measures have been taken by the government to prevent crimes and restore order. An investigation is ongoing. The perpetrators will be severely punished. February 13, No. 27. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia Tigranyan". 2. "In addition to my telegram related to the events that took place in the Basargechar region [№ 278, February 13], I report that thanks to the active measures supported by the military units and taken by the regime, the Tatars have been returned to their settlements and what was stolen from them has been returned. The perpetrators have been brought to justice. № 304, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia Tigranyan".

Based on the biased assessment of the above telegrams, the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Ziatkhanov, assuming that the facts provided by the Armenian side were clear evidence of the violence that the Armenian military units were carrying out against the peaceful Muslim population, wanting to forcibly occupy a part of Azerbaijan's territory near Lake Gyokcha (Lake Sevan), in the region of Nor Bayazet, also claiming that despite the assurances, the Armenians continued to inhumanely exterminate and oppress the Muslim population, pointing out to some Sultanov, their confidant in Nor Bayazet, that in the regions of Ganja and Shemakhu the number of Muslims who had escaped from Nor Bayazet reached several thousand, including many women, children, old people almost naked, exhausted, sick and hungry, emphasizing that the picture

³⁵¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 211, part I, sheet 27.

³⁵² NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 20, sheet 35.

was terrible. In conclusion, referring to the act of the reconciliation conference of January 24, 1919, warning of the cessation of all kinds of violent occupations, the Armenian republic was humbly requested to categorically offer the liberation of the violently occupied region of Nor Bayazet, the southeastern parts of Lake Gyokcha and a part of the Gazakh region (which allegedly formed an integral part of the Azerbaijani territory) from the rampaging Armenian military units, resettling the worn-out residents in their places”³⁵³.

On February 24, Rotmister Silikyan went with the division to the village of Mazra, where the Tatars met them with salt and bread, assuring them that they had already calmed down. In the evening, Silikyan went to Basargechar, and on the morning of February 25, he returned to the village of Pokr Mazra with the 1st squadron and half of the 2nd squadron. On the same day, on February 25, the 1st squadron returned to the village of Basargechar with Rotmister Silikyan and Cornet Khachaturov. And Silikyan, together with his adjutant Shimkevich and half a squadron left for Zod, where they stayed with a Tatar named Agilyar Samand Agha Kesmansky. Here, Rotmister Silikyan announced to the villagers that the Tatars should prepare hay, wheat and barley for the division at state prices. The Tatars promised to consult and answer in the morning. On the morning of February 27, the dignitaries of the Zod village announced to Rotmister Silikyan that they refused to give the requested forage and bread. Rotmister Silikyan’s persistent demands became a signal for the Tatars to initiate an attack, which was also facilitated by the removal of the militia post a few days before those events. In the early morning of February 27, 11 soldiers stationed in the village, in the houses of Tatars, were killed, including 4 division officers who were hosted in the houses of the Turks in Zod: adjutant Cornet Shimkevich, Cornet Khachatryan, Commander Alexander Silikyan and his younger brother Arshak Silikyan (the officers spent the night in the house of Samed Agha Kyasamanski) - they were beheaded and mockingly demonstrated in the neighbouring Muslim villages³⁵⁴.

And on February 28, the RA Territorial Administration and Militia Commissar instructed the Nor Bayazet provincial commissar to personally go to the place with the precinct investigator, conduct an investigation, identify the perpetrators and arrest them in the presence and participation of the precinct inspector, public village commissars and militiamen, and if necessary, also turn to the army for support, however, not allowing to involve a representative of the Muslim refugees in the case in order to avoid the risk of inciting a new riot and violence. At the same time, on the instructions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an assistant prosecutor was sent to the scene to lead the investigation and restore order³⁵⁵.

³⁵³ Azerbajdjanskaya Demokraticeskaya Respublika 1998: 132.

³⁵⁴ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 113, 116-117.

³⁵⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 115.93.

These facts in themselves are proof of the fact that the riotous Muslim population of the Basargechar region had set a practically serious goal to help Azerbaijan with armed actions to cut the region from Armenia and annex it to Azerbaijan. The Zod junction became the focal point of the agenda of the Armenian political and military circles, which threatened the country's territorial integrity, encouraged separatistprovocative demonstrations in other parts of the RA territory, which the RA government tried to resolve peacefully. Zod became a reason for the already aggressive government of Azerbaijan to intervene more openly in the domestic affairs of Armenia and to speak openly, considering it predetermined that the Basargechar region would be included as a part of Azerbaijan, which from a strategic point of view also included the entire basin of Lake Sevan, just like today, during the events of 2021-2022, after the ArmenianAzerbaijani capitulation war of the autumn of 2020. The Basargechar tangle escalated, it also touched upon the Armenian Bashkend region and the region of Getabek rich in copper mines, which the RA government supported as much as it could, because in many cases, supporting them with weapons and troops was not always effective.

On March 1, 1919, at the session of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Internal Affairs presented a report on the events in the village of Zod of the Basargechar region, which concerned the murder of the officers and soldiers of the Karabakh Cavalry Regiment. After thorough discussion of the situation, the Council of Ministers made a decision to create an Extraordinary Investigative Committee chaired by the representatives of the Ministry of Justice, and with the participation of the representatives of the Military Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, instructing them to immediately investigate the incidents: 1) The Extraordinary Investigative Committee is formed by the assistant prosecutor of RA as a chairman, the investigator of special cases, one representative from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and one from the Military Ministry. 2) The Extraordinary Investigative Committee is sent to investigate the reasons of the events that took place in the village of Zod of the region of Nor Bayazet at the end of February, the result of which was the murder of 4 officers of the cavalry division and about 80 soldiers, to identify the perpetrators and to imprison and send to the Nor Bayazet prison those who had anything to do with that crime. 3) In case of complaints by the Turks about the violence of Armenians, the Extraordinary Investigative Committee undertakes to investigate these complaints and bring those responsible to justice. 4) To place sufficient militia and military forces at the Committee's disposal in order to create normal conditions for the investigation³⁵⁶.

On March 4, for tactical reasons, the commission, not in full force, with only the provincial commissar and investigator, went to the Basargechar region in order to settle the conflict peacefully,

³⁵⁶ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100 (43), sheet 34; file 96, sheet 33; fund 201, list 1, file 486, part I, sheet 58.

but the leaders of the rioters responded with extreme position and declared that the guarantee of peace was possible only after the independence of “their lands” and they would do everything to force the Armenian side to give up the Basargechar region. The Turks greeted the Armenian envoys with gunfire. This convinced the RA authorities that should this continue, they would not succeed and their plans would turn in the opposite direction, since the Muslim population was resolute in its separatist actions³⁵⁷.

The Armenian government spared no effort to avoid a military confrontation with the Tatars. This is emphasized by Staff Rotmister Kudryavtsev in his telegram of March 5, 1919, sent from Nor Bayaset to Yerevan to Major Generals M. Silikyan, D. BekPirumyan and the Commissar of the RA Territory, mentioning that on March 4, at 20:00, they went to that Tatar-inhabited region with the provincial commissar and investigator to settle the incident, but they were met with gunfire. Kudryavtsev, in consultation with the Staff Rotmister, asked for reinforcements, stressing that without cannons the problem was unsolvable and would lead to great losses; he also complained about the lack of food³⁵⁸.

In his telegram of March 5-6, addressed to General Silikyan, the provincial commissar Shahinyan, referring to the alarming situation, found it necessary to send a punitive detachment with cannons to submit the Muslims to the legal authorities, adding that there were only 200 bayonets in the Karabakh division, and no artillery shells at all³⁵⁹. In response, on March 7, 1919, Military Minister Hakhverdyan sent this letter to the RA Prime Minister, and at the same time he found it necessary to send one battalion and two cannons to Nor Bayazet, taking into account the possible resistance of the Tatars. The military minister also informed that in a conversation with him, colonel C. Temperley (Temperley Clive Errington) had agreed to the use of armed force if the Tatars did not allow the investigative committee to go to the scene.

Back on January 7, 1919, Captain C. Temperley, adjutant of the 4th Battalion of the Rifle Brigade of the British troops in Transcaucasia, was appointed British Military Governor of Kars with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel according to the memorandum of General G. Forestier-Walker. In February-March 1919, the Muslim population showed a disrespectful attitude towards him which became intolerable; the Muslims did everything to ignore him. Qajaznuni’s government initially called him an “arrogant and brazen Englishman”, who, in agreement with the Kars Shura (officially the Provisional Government of the South-West Caucasus) opposed every attempt to give a position to the employees of the Armenian administration and even made strict demands to the Armenian

³⁵⁷ Harutyunyan H. 2012: 301.

³⁵⁸ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 64, sheet 3.

³⁵⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 27, sheet 85.

officials of the main railway junction of Alexandrapol, connecting Kars and Tiflis³⁶⁰. As of January 26, 1919 C. E. Temperley was the British Military governor of Kars, and to support him, the main body of the battalion that had reunited with the guards under Colonel Frederick Lattin of the 4th Rifle Brigade, was in Kars. After that, on March 2, 1919, Temperley moved to Yerevan as a military representative.

It was during his service in Yerevan that Temperley's attitude towards Armenians underwent a certain change, which is expressed in the reports he sent to the officers of the 27th military unit. In them, Temperley expressed concern about the difficulties the Armenian government faced. He had often tried to pacify the population of Muslim settlements that rejected Yerevan's jurisdiction. During that period, Temperley made considerable efforts to pacify the Muslims of Vedichai-Sadarak, who turned to riotous steps around March 10. He tried to prevent the frequent killings of Armenians and looting. Temperley tried to restrain the chieftains and khans, but to no avail. Temperley came to the conclusion that the riot was not just a separate incident, as the conscription in the Sardarak region was linked to similar incidents in Aralikh, Kaghzvan and Kars, and Colonel Lattin characterized the region as having an intransigent position, forming a common anti-Armenian chain with the Shura. Temperley's and Lattin's moderate efforts and attempts to prevent the criminal activities of the Muslim villages failed as the villagers responded by openly resorting to arms. This was already an ominous sign of rebellion that the Turkish propaganda contributed to. It spread from Maku and Aralikh to the Sadarak region through Araks, agitating the Muslim population from Böyük-Vedi to Nakhijevan. On April 28, 1919, Temperley, accompanied by General Andranik and Major William Gibbon, left for Tiflis, and on May 1, he received the temporary command of the 4th Battalion of the Rifle Brigade³⁶¹, which was followed by his activities in the Zodbasargechar region.

The course adopted by the government and military authorities is clearly demonstrated by another document, the author of which is Major General Silikyan. Thus, on March 7, 1919, Silikyan, the head of the Armenian Division, addressed the RA Military Minister with an urgent secret report, in which he also touched upon the Zodb issue, mentioning the information reported by Colonel A. Chneour that the Semyonovsky mountain pass was covered with snow, and General D. Bek-Pirumyan was still in Nor Bayazet, waiting for the arrival of the new troops in order to speak decisively, otherwise the impression would be weak, since the local Muslims were organizing themselves. Silikyan emphasized that according to Major General Daniel Bek-Pirumyan, a clash with the Tatars was inevitable³⁶².

³⁶⁰ Great October Revolution 1957: 256-258; Denikin A. 1925: 147; Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 220-223.

³⁶¹ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 252, 257.

³⁶² NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 2.

In the instruction issued to the Extraordinary Investigative Committee sent to Zod, signed by Minister of Justice Harutyunov, acting Minister of Internal Affairs Manasyan and Military Minister Hakhverdyan, it was stated that the Committee was sent to the village of Zod in the Nor Bayazet region to investigate the circumstances of the events that took place at the end of February (as a result of which 4 officers and 30 soldiers of the Karabakh cavalry division were killed), to find out the names of the perpetrators and uncover all the circumstances related to that crime. The instruction also stated that if there were declarations about violence committed by Armenians towards Tatars, the Investigative Committee had to investigate those complaints and bring those responsible to justice³⁶³. On March 8, the Extraordinary Investigative Committee arrived in Basargechar. The Extraordinary Investigative Committee sent two Muslims to Zod, offering to come to Basargechar on March 10 to find out the circumstances of the incident, to carry out the procedure and function of the investigation. Negotiations were held on March 11 in the village of Mazra. The Committee offered to hand over the bodies of the officers and soldiers killed, their belongings, weapons, horses, documents, division flag, setting the condition that only then the Investigative Committee would agree to enter the village of Zod to conduct an impartial and objective investigation of the causes, motives and consequences of the case. The Committee considered it its moral duty to also emphasize that all this was necessary in order to avoid the use of military force. According to the information obtained by the preliminary investigation, the criminal actions of the Turks had been prepared in advance by the local separatist forces and had been directed from Baku, which encouraged the local Muslims to continue the struggle, avoiding the peaceful settlement of the problem in every possible way and seeking to solve the Basargechar issue in favor of Azerbaijan through machinations, as well as influencing the pro-Turkish British generals, and in particular Thomson. Thus, the negotiations reached a deadlock; the enemy, both today and in those days, concentrated significant military forces, weapons and artillery around Zod and other settlements, which was a challenge to the RA authorities.

The RA Government wrote an official letter to the British Military Representation in Yerevan, which sent its officer to Basargechar on March 12 in order to personally make sure how legitimate the Armenian authorities were for the Muslim community, and how justified the actions taken by the Armenian authorities were³⁶⁴. We learn about this from the letter of March 10 sent from RA Justice Minister Harutyunov to Chairman of the Investigative Committee Parsadanov: “Tomorrow, on the instructions of General Thomson, English Colonel Temperley is leaving for Nor Bayazet to settle the Zod events”³⁶⁵. On March 12, Temperley visited Basargechar. On March 17, 1919, the

³⁶³ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 4.

³⁶⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 115.

³⁶⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 76.

Council of Ministers addressed the issue of Basargechar-Zod, hearing the Prime Minister's report on sending a punitive military unit to the village of Zod. At the session it was decided: 1) to leave the Investigative Committee in place, so that it could immediately start working as soon as the opportunity arose, 2) to instruct the Military Minister to issue an order to General D. Bek-Pirumyan, that he, if necessary, move the military force to the location of the riot immediately at his discretion, after seeing certain preparations³⁶⁶.

On March 17, the British military representative C. Temperley arrived at the scene and hearing the report of the Extraordinary Investigative Committee, he sent a letter through Tatars demanding that Tatar representatives immediately come to Basargechar for negotiations, but the envoys did not return and the British officer had to go back³⁶⁷. Meanwhile, the Tatars were concentrating considerable forces in the Zod region, armed with rifles and machine guns, preparing for military operations, evacuating their families, property, children, and concentrating rioters from the surrounding villages in the Zod region³⁶⁸.

On March 20, 1919, the minister-president's report on the Zod events was discussed. In the adopted decision, the Council of Ministers instructed: a) to dispatch a statement regarding the sending of armed groups by Azerbaijan to the Armenian border and crossing it, b) to instruct the Military Minister to order General D. Bek-Pirumyan to contact Yerevan by direct cable before leaving Nor Bayazet, c) to instruct the Minister of Foreign Affairs to get press coverage of the Zod events³⁶⁹.

Some important details of the issue related to the activation of the Muslim movement in the Zod region also become evident from a telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RA of March 22, 1919 addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan (with a copy to the RA diplomatic representative in Baku). In it, the RA Foreign Minister emphasized that 4 Armenian officers and more than 10 soldiers of the second Karabakh Cavalry Division had been killed near the village of Zod, stressing that the Investigative Committee sent by the government was met with volley fire and the opposition to the authorities was supported by armed groups from Azerbaijan. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of RA found the passage of armed persons from Azerbaijan to the territory of RA completely unacceptable, emphasizing that, on the instructions of the government, he strongly protested against such actions and asked for urgent orders to be made to prevent the citizens of Azerbaijan from staging armed demonstrations and from violating the order in the territory of Armenia³⁷⁰.

³⁶⁶ NAA, fund 201, list 1, file 486, part I, sheet 69; fund 199, list 1, file 96, sheet 45.

³⁶⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 115.

³⁶⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 115.

³⁶⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100 (43), sheet 48.

³⁷⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 211, part I, sheet 62, fund 199, list 1, file 73, sheet 45.

The Zod junction created problems along the entire Armenian-Azerbaijani border, becoming an explosive for diplomatic relations, intensifying tension in the work of the Internal Affairs bodies and militia of the border regions. As it turns out from the telegram of General Baghdasarov sent from Gharakilisa to Yerevan, to the commander-in-chief on March 21, 1919, which was based on espionage and intelligence data, the situation had also worsened in the Bashkend region in connection with the murders in Zod. The telegram reported that the Tatars were preparing, and gatherings were taking place in the villages to help their compatriots in Zod. It said that 200 people had been sent from the Gedabek region of Azerbaijan; and two cannons and two machine guns had been brought through the Zegam Gorge. They were not able to move one mountain cannon which they left in the village of Shakhtala. An interesting detail was emphasized: the gunners were Russians and Georgians³⁷¹. Other facts of those days become known from another telegram, the author of which is Staff Captain Mkrtichyan, the commander of the militia regiment. Thus, on March 24, 1919, in a telegram addressed to the division commander (with a copy to General Baghdasarov who was in Karvansara) Staff Captain Mkrtichyan reported that according to verified data, the Tatars had brought a field cannon to Shakhtala village, and the mountain cannon was taken to Zod through the village of Jil. At the end of the telegram, Mkrtichyan also added that the local forces would not be able to resist without cannons and asked for immediate orders on how to act³⁷².

However, the RA government had instructed General D. Bek-Pirumyan to ensure the peaceful entry into the village of the Committee established in connection with the Zod events, and armed force could be used only with the special permission of the government. In the situation of inevitability of conflict, on March 24, 1919, the National Council of Muslims of Yerevan issued an unexpected call for sobriety: "The National Council of Muslims of Erivan urges the residents of the Zod village of Nor Bayazet region not to obstruct the investigation of the Government's investigative committee regarding the murder of officers, soldiers and several Muslims. The RA government guarantees the inviolability of life and property of the population. We consider it our moral duty to inform you that if you obstruct, the Government will be forced to send military force against you, as a result of which completely innocent people may suffer. Taking all this into account, the National Council urges again to prevent bloodshed, to provide full support to the Government's investigative committee. President: Asad bey Aghabekov, Council members: Mirza Husein Vaiz and Zilfigar bey Makinsky, Secretary: A. Naziyev"³⁷³.

In the telegram of March 27, 1919 addressed to the commander of the Armenian division, Staff Captain Mkrtichyan reported from Karvansara that according to the information received, the

³⁷¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 48.

³⁷² NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 55.

³⁷³ NAA, fund 206, list 1, file 85, sheet 12.

Tatars of the Tarsacha (Getik³⁷⁴) gorge of the right tributary of Aghstev, were transporting wheat and barley to Zod, adding that on March 25, 300 poods were brought via Dilijan to Chibukhlu³⁷⁵. During this period, the Armenian civil, military and internal affairs bodies were making preparations, were organizing new military forces, replenishing the lack of weapons and ammunition, and solving conscription problems. In the telegram of March 18, 1919, sent by D. Bek-Pirumyan from Nor Bayazet to the Military Minister, it was reported that the concentration of the military squad was about to end, and the replenishment would be completed on March 28. Then it added that military intelligence had confirmed that up to 6000 Tatars armed with machine guns and cavalymen had gathered in the Zod region, and that information was still being verified³⁷⁶. In the session of the Council of Ministers of March 22, 1919, the Military Minister presented a report on establishing a military field court in the Nor Bayazet region. It was decided to approve and implement the bill, excluding the death penalty³⁷⁷. On April 2, 1919, the Council of Ministers heard the Military Minister's report on the problems of the village of Zod. They decided to instruct the Military Minister to order General Pirumyan to act in cooperation with Colonel C. Temperley and use all possible means to settle the incident peacefully and avoid military conflict. At the same time, the false claim of the Azerbaijani government that the village of Zod belonged to Azerbaijan, was denied, specifically emphasizing that it was part of the Republic of Armenia³⁷⁸. Certainly, during this time the Armenian government sought to use all the possible diplomatic means to end the incident peacefully. Simultaneously, certain military and political and police measures were being taken to strengthen the basin of Lake Sevan (having great strategic importance for Armenia) and the region of Nor Bayazet, where the ill-fated Zod junction was located. The command of the special Karabakh battalion, which had earned the honor of acting in that region, was entrusted to Major General Pirumyan; and Lieutenant Colonel A. Chneour was appointed chief of staff. The latter also led the intelligence service throughout the Zod operation. From December 31, 1918 Al. Chneour was already the head of the Separate Karabakh Brigade³⁷⁹. In K. Araratyan's request letter addressed to M. Silikyan it was said that according to Captain Medvedev and Lieutenant Colonel Chneour, the Prime Minister had ordered General Pirumyan to ensure the entry of the Investigative Committee to Zod. It was asked in the telegram to double-check everything and instruct what to do if the Investigative Committee's entry to Zod did not lead to positive results in a peaceful way. In that case, General Pirumyan was instructed to contact the government directly through the

³⁷⁴ Hakobyan et al. 1998: 422.

³⁷⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 66.

³⁷⁶ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 5.

³⁷⁷ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100 (43), sheet 51.

³⁷⁸ NAA, fund 201, list 1, file 486, part I, sheet 81; fund 199, list 1, file 100 (43), sheet 54; file 96, sheet 58; fund 200, list 1, file 26, sheet 58.

³⁷⁹ NAA, fund 204, list 1, file 104, sheet 53; fund 204, list 1, file 129, sheet 6 -7; Avetisyan H. 1997: 223.

command and not to use armed force until he received such permission from the RA government³⁸⁰. Further, the RA government introduced new adjustments in its steps, trying to get out of the critical situation. On April 8, 1919, the Foreign Minister of RA received a telegram from the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, in which the representative of Azerbaijan regarded the Zod region as the territory of Azerbaijan, considering the presence of Armenian armed forces in the territory of Azerbaijan unacceptable, and placing the responsibility of avoiding misunderstanding on the RA government³⁸¹.

In the telegram of April 3 addressed to the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan (with a copy to Bekzadyan, the diplomatic representative of RA in Azerbaijan), the Foreign Minister of RA emphasized that the Government of the Republic of Armenia had sent the Extraordinary Investigative Committee to investigate the events that had taken place in the village of Zod, to find the perpetrators and to bring them to legal responsibility. However, the Committee could not get to the scene of the incident because of the resistance of armed Tatars. He added that the government had instructed the military squad to ensure that the Extraordinary Committee had access for investigation, informing that on General W. Thomson's instructions the British colonel C. Temperley had left for Zod to facilitate the arrival of the Extraordinary Investigative Committee in Zod and the conduct of the investigation, noting also that the Armenian government had instructed to resolve the conflict peacefully, and if that failed, not to resort to armed force without the government's permission³⁸².

Involuntarily, Colonel Temperley went to Zod. This was reported in the telegram sent by Colonel Shakhanov to Major General Bek-Pirumyan on April 9. The British officer met with the population there. He was of the opinion that the maximum concession that the local Turkish population could agree to in that situation was that from April 11 Armenian troops should occupy the Tatar villages, which was the only condition under which he would agree to continue the conversation on controversial issues. The Turks agreed with Temperley on the condition that the English representative also participated in the deployment of troops, otherwise they threatened not to retreat³⁸³. It becomes clear from Major General Bek-Pirumyan's telegrams to the division commander that returning from Zod to Basargechar, Colonel C. Temperley announced to the Tatars that on April 11 the Armenian troops would occupy the villages, the only peaceful solution to the problem. To this the Tatars replied that the occupation of the villages by the Armenian troops and their deployment in those villages was possible only with the participation of the British representative. Bek-Pirumyan asked for additional troops, adding that the Tatars continued to arm

³⁸⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 59.

³⁸¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 64.

³⁸² NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 62, 64.

³⁸³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 76.

themselves, that according to the agreement with Colonel C. Temperley, on April 13 their troops could begin the occupation of the Tatar villages of Tashkend, Zod, Mets Mazra and Pokr Mazra, carrying out the disarmament of the Tatars in a peaceful way, and in case of resistance – by force³⁸⁴.

Colonel C. Temperley, an active participant of the Muslim movement, stayed in Zod for a few days, after which he returned to Basargechar, and a few days later, on April 14, a new wave of anti-state demonstrations began in Zod.

The Council of Ministers once again addressed the deepening of tension in the Basargechar-Zod region on April 14, 1919. At the session, the Military Minister reported that he had given instructions to General Pirumyan regarding the Zod developments. It was decided to instruct the Military Minister to telegraph Pirumyan so that: 1) he acted according to C. Temperley's instructions, 2) if it was necessary to resort to armed force, appeal to C. Temperley asking to submit a written proposal, and 3) try not to resort to confiscations, and take the most drastic measures to prevent violence against the population, announcing this to the people³⁸⁵. On the same day, in a special letter the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of RA informed the diplomatic representative of RA in Azerbaijan that in connection with the protest of the Government of Azerbaijan and the presence of Armenian troops in the Basargechar region, they believed that the area could not be considered the territory of Azerbaijan, that the Basargechar region was an inseparable part of the territory of the Republic of Armenia. He reiterated that the RA government protested against the passage of armed Tatar groups sent from the territory of Azerbaijan to the borders of the Republic of Armenia by the Azerbaijani authorities, who were spreading riots there and inciting the population to an armed conflict against the Armenian authorities³⁸⁶.

As it turns out from Major General Pirumyan's April 14 telegram to General Silikyan, according to Colonel C. Temperley's proposal, on April 14, at 7 A.M. the Nor Bayazet detachment of the Armenian troops started an attack in two formations to occupy the Tatar villages. However, the Tatars of Mets Mazra suddenly opened an intense rifle fire, to which the Armenian infantry did not respond, continuing their advance towards the village. Instead several artillery shells were fired at the village, which forced the Tatars to retreat. After that it turned out that the population had abandoned the village beforehand, taking with them all the property that could be moved; and the shooters were Tatar groups remaining in the village. The same thing happened during the occupation of the villages of Husein Gharali, Aghalu, Kosha Balagh, Galbash and Siri Aghuni, and near the village of Tashkend battles took place, after which the Armenian military unit captured the village and the enemy fled to the mountains. In the battles of April 14 Armenians lost 3 people,

³⁸⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 76.

³⁸⁵ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 96, sheet 65; fund 201, list 1, file 486, part I, sheet 96.

³⁸⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 79, 82.

Lieutenant Colonel Ishkhanov was wounded, and even after that he returned to the battlefield. But then 15 Armenians were killed and 8 horses. It is noteworthy that all the orders were given in the presence and knowledge of Colonel C. Temperley, who saw no violence or plunder by the troops during the fighting. The vanguard military units of the Armenian army occupied Mets Mazra, Husein Ghum, Aghalu, Galbash and Tashkend³⁸⁷. On April 15, at 7 o'clock, the Armenian side sent envoys with white flags to the village of Zod, but the Tatars fired at them, after which the Armenian side sent envoys for the second time, but they also failed to enter the village. Only after that the Karabakh battalion launched an attack and captured Zod without firing a shot - the Tatars had fled from there. The same thing happened during the occupation of the villages of Sar Yaghub, Ghara Gopli, Aghkilisa, Zarzibil, whose inhabitants had left beforehand, taking out all their property. During those battles 1 officer, 18 soldiers and 2 horses were wounded, 3 soldiers and 3 horses were killed³⁸⁸. As it becomes obvious from Major General Pirumyan's telegram sent from Basargechar to Major General Silikyan on April 16, 1919, scouts were sent to the village of Shorzhalu on April 15, but it turned out that there was no peaceful mood in the village, and shells were fired at them. On April 16, the military squads at the outskirts of the village of Taghi-Kend moved to Shorzhalu, and again shells were fired at them by the Tatars ambushed there. After shelling the village, the Armenian military unit was able to enter the village and capture it, and the Tatars who fled, took refuge in the nearby mountains. On April 17, the Armenian military units besieged Zod, the den of riots, from where the Muslim population had fled³⁸⁹. From Major General Pirumyan's telegram of April 23 addressed to Major General Silikyan we learn about the timeline and details of the military operations of the days that followed. On April 18, at 4 P.M., a company of the Karabakh battalion was sent to the village of Shishkaya and was met with fire by the Tatars. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Tatars, the village was captured, after which it turned out that there had been concentrated considerable forces - about 1000 infantrymen and cavalrymen. The Tatars had taken their property and families out of the village beforehand. As a result of these battles, the Armenian side had 8 wounded soldiers and 2 horses, 1 soldier was killed, Ensign Mkhitaryants was also wounded³⁹⁰.

On April 18, Khan Tekinsky informed his government about the resistance shown by Muslims in the Zod-Basargechar region and the battles with Armenian military units³⁹¹.

During all these operations, tension reigned along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, the Azerbaijanis resorted to various intrigues, to significant movements of troops, all of which were

³⁸⁷ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 86, 86a; fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 9.

³⁸⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 89; fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 10.

³⁸⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 8.

³⁹⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 97.

³⁹¹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 4, n. 60.

clearly anti-Armenian. On April 29, 1919, in a telegram addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Chief of the General Staff Colonel M. Zinkevich reported that according to the information received from the commander of the militia regiment, on April 23 groups of Azerbaijani troops went to Jil through Yaghubli, and on April 25 the arrival of Azerbaijani troops was expected in Novosaratovka and Novoivanovka. Zinkevich stated that the commander of the militia regiment was ordered to check this information and report back to him³⁹². However, all this could not prevent the Armenian army from completing the Zod operation, teaching a lesson to the aggressive Muslim forces, which sought to cut off the Basargechar region from Armenia and annex it to Azerbaijan. The Armenian military units won an impressive victory, liberating an important part of the territory of the homeland, and at the same time, they demonstrated the order and discipline of a good and capable army, refraining from robbery and plunder. Thus, having the Armenian-populated Basargechar regional center of the Zod-Sotk plateau as their center, the regular military units of the Armenian army carried out offensive attacks for 5 days with the active support of the militia and the police squads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 4 main directions: Shorzha, Ghshlagh, Zod and Tashkend. They were able to force the Turkish-Tatar fanatic mass to retreat through the mountain passes to Azerbaijan, as a result of which the Armenian authorities managed to take more than two dozen settlements under their full control, not allowing the disruption of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia.

And yet, the Extraordinary Investigative Committee sent to the Zod region by the RA government tried to reveal the motives behind the insurrectionary and seditious actions of the Muslims of Zod-Basargechar. Those conclusions were made as of April 27, 1919 and came to the following: 1) As a result of the impossibility of conducting an investigation among Muslims, it was not possible to find out the exact motives of the Muslim uprising against the Armenian authorities. It is presumed that Rotmister Silikyan's excessive demands to provide them with wheat and barley were just an excuse for the tragic denouement; and the dissatisfaction of the Muslims with the authorities grew day by day and turned into a conflict. A number of circumstances became the reason for that. 2) In August, 1918, the entire Zod region was recognized (or accepted) by the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan as a territory within the borders of Azerbaijan and was declared as the 9th police department of the Elizavetpol province, and their commissars and militia were appointed. And in October, 1919 that region surrendered to Armenia, and the Muslim residents, albeit unwillingly, expressed their willingness to submit to the authorities, without severing their ties with Azerbaijan. 3) In late 1918, Rotmister Silikyan was sent to the region of Nor Bayazet to form the Karabakh Cavalry Division, but no money from the state treasury was allocated

³⁹² NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 100.

for this. Silikyan was given the opportunity and the right to confiscate horses, equipment, weapons and everything necessary for the maintenance of the division. Confiscations were carried out, but besides the commissions provided for that purpose, they were carried out by anyone - any officer, commissar, constable, militiaman, etc. For the most part, only receipts were given for the confiscated property. During that process, there were cases of abuse, mainly during the confiscations of horses in the Muslim villages, because not all confiscated horses went to serve the needs of the division. The horses were sold at state prices to outsiders, to persons who had nothing to do with the division, or they were simply sold to their former owners, of course at higher prices, and confiscated fodder was sold. All these developments provoked the discontent of the Muslim population, which, of course, needed a pretext to rebel against the legitimate authorities of Armenia. And finally: 4) in late January, 1919, migrant Armenians led by some Nikolay Avetisov attacked and looted the Muslim villages of Zagalu, Ghezel-Vank and Subbutan, and the villagers fled to other villages of the Zod region. The Muslim District Commissar was warned in time about the planned attack, but no action was taken by him. True, an investigation was conducted regarding the case and a part of the looted property was returned to the Muslims, and generally to all those from whom the property was taken, but the perpetrators were not identified. According to the conclusion of the Chairman of the Extraordinary Investigative Committee Parsadanov, these important reasons, in fact, caused strong dissatisfaction among Muslims, who even had openly declared that there was no government in Armenia and they did not want to obey anyone. For the same reasons the militia post had been removed from the Zod village a few days before the murder of the Silikyan and others. The Extraordinary Investigative Committee sent to Zod by the RA Government came to this conclusion as of April 27, 1919, and on May 2 it was confirmed by the director of the office of the Ministry of Justice³⁹³. On May 5, 1919, after hearing the report of the Acting Minister of Justice on the activities of the Extraordinary Investigative Committee (rep. 951, May 2), the Council of Ministers instructed the Ministers of Justice and Internal Affairs to bring the perpetrators to justice³⁹⁴.

The issue brought diplomatic and political complications. On April 10, 1919, the Council of Ministers attached the Prime Minister's report on the motion initiated by Tekinsky regarding the withdrawal of the troops from the Zod region and the participation of a Turkish representative in the Investigative Committee. The Foreign Minister was instructed to announce to Tekinsky that under the existing conditions the withdrawal of the troops was impossible due to military reasons, and as

³⁹³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file. 263, sheet 68-72; fund 199, list 1, file 64 (48), sheet 11-15.

³⁹⁴ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 96, sheet 83; file 100 (43), sheet 84.

to the participation of a Turkish representative in the Extraordinary Investigative Committee, there was no objection to that³⁹⁵.

As we can see, in the Zod-Basargechar region, the Armenian authorities tried to proceed from certain principles of legality, avoiding excessive and unnecessary complications and escalations. On April 6, 1920, after hearing the report of the Minister of Internal Affairs on the “illegal actions” of the Basargechar committee, in the adopted decision the Council of Ministers considered the order of the Investigative Committee illegal and highly harmful from the point of view of state interests and instructed the Ministry of Internal Affairs to hand over all documents and materials to the Military Court³⁹⁶.

In this complicated situation, the Armenian authorities, not giving way to Muslim pressure, ensured the security interests of RA in the Sevan basin by legal means, preventing the dangerous territorial and political ambitions of Azerbaijan, which was not an easy task.

The operations of the Armenian army in the area of the Zod village were highly assessed even by the colonel C. Temperley. The actions of the military squad during the capture of the Tatar villages were so excellent in terms of discipline and the bravery of the officers and soldiers that after arriving in Yerevan Colonel Temperley felt obliged to praise the steadfast and disciplined actions of the squad before the Armenian government. After hearing the opinion of Colonel Temperley on April 24, the Council of Ministers thanked Major General Pirumyan and all the officers and soldiers for the brilliant combat operations in the Zod region. Military Minister Major General Araratyan was happy to thank the young Armenian Army represented by Major General Daniel Bek-Pirumyan (who was replaced in July 1919 by famous warrior Hamazasp Srvandztyants, the commander of the military unit stationed in Nor Bayazet), and his chief of staff Chneour as officers with glorious combat experience, who created and commemorated Zod’s squad and the flawless military operation it carried out, which for the first time even received a favorable assessment by the representative of the British Army. The military minister ordered to present especially outstanding officers to be promoted to the next military rank. And to reward the soldiers, Chief of Staff Alexander Konstantin Chneour was ordered to take 4 crosses of St. George for each company, battery and cavalry division³⁹⁷. After this operation, according to the order of the military department of April 28, 1919, the head of the Separate Karabakh Brigade, Al. Chneour, was appointed department head of the General Staff³⁹⁸.

Establishing order and rule in the Zod-Basargechar region, the RA government was guided in its steps by the principles of legality, trying to avoid unnecessary complications, creating

³⁹⁵ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 96, sheet 63.

³⁹⁶ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 146, sheet 56.

³⁹⁷ NAA, fund 204, list 1, file 132, sheet 68.

³⁹⁸ NAA, fund 204, list 1, file 131, sheet 24.

foundations of sustainability for the future. For that purpose, according to the conclusion of the Extraordinary Investigative Committee of June 2, 1919, a number of officials and 8 police officers were fired and faced trial³⁹⁹.

After the confrontational military and political events that unfolded around the village of Zod in the Basargechar region, which was one of the most brilliant actions of the Armenian armed forces, in 1919, most of the Muslim population of that region moved to the territory of Azerbaijan. They returned from there only with the establishment of Soviet rule and it was imposed on the Soviet Republic of Armenia.

A. Grigoryan and A. Bobokyan's factful and spectacular work also highlights the discovery and assessment of a number of important circumstances related to the organizers of the murders of Zod and the participants in general. According to the important conclusion of the authors, "Nemesis of Zod" was carried out against the organizers of the murders of the Silikyan brothers in Zod. And so, the authors have found out that the main organizer of the conspiracy of Zod, Samand Agha Kyasamansky, was killed on May 2, 1919. According to Azerbaijani sources, this was carried out by General Silikyan, and according to Armenian sources - by Colonel Halabov, uncle of the Silikyan brothers, by the order and knowledge of Major General M. Silikyan, who was the cousin of the brothers. According to this version, Halabov tied Kyasamansky's body to a cart and passed through the streets of Basargechar in response to the demonstration of the heads of the Silikyan brothers in the Tatar villages⁴⁰⁰.

According to the data given in the same work by A. Grigoryan and A. Bobokyan, Haji Rahim, who had beheaded Rotmister Silikyan, and Ashugh Najaf, the organizer of the Zod conspiracy, were also eliminated during the riot of the Zod Muslims in April, 1919. And another conspirator, Meshadi Isa, was eliminated on September 27, 1924. According to Azerbaijani sources, he was killed by two Dashnaks. And finally, Abbaskyul bey Shadlinsky (the son of Samand Agha Kyasamansky's sister) who is known for carrying out the massacres of Armenians in Nakhijevan and other places, and for his active participation in the suppression of the hotbeds of rebellion in Nor Bayazet during the February uprising of 1921, was eliminated in Davalu - present-day Ararat, in 1930⁴⁰¹. And so, we can conclude that the operations of the "Nemesis of Zod", born spontaneously, were not coordinated, and the actions of the Armenian avengers stemmed from the self-defense instinct of the Armenian population and were fully justified. According to A. Grigoryan and A. Bobokhyan, the Azerbaijani sources came to a distorted conclusion regarding the events of Zod-Basargechar, placing all the blame on Armenians and the Armenian authorities,

³⁹⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 263, sheet 106.

⁴⁰⁰ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 156.

⁴⁰¹ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 156-157.

trying to advance the anti-historical and antiscientific view on false grounds, as if the Sevan basin and Zod-Sotk in particular were historically Azerbaijani territories where Azerbaijanis lived until 1988⁴⁰². Moreover, as the above-mentioned authors assure, during the days of the “rebellion” of the Azerbaijanis, Samand Agha Vali Ahga Oghli Nasibbekov Kyasamansky was the one that negotiated with the Armenian clergy and government representatives in the regional center (Zod - V.V.) and reportedly Rotmister Silikov-Silikyan insulted him and Samand Agha, not forgiving the insult, organized the murder of Silikyan⁴⁰³, which is a baseless claim, as well as the false Azerbaijani news, according to which Silikyan organized murders of Azerbaijanis, set fire to houses, which is denied by archival documents. Instead of presenting the truth, Azerbaijani authors similarly distort the fact that more than 800 armed cavalymen were transferred from Azerbaijan to Zod in order to support the rioters in Zod and incite them to act against the central Armenian authorities. They participated in the looting of more than two dozen villages and brutally executed civilians, characterizing it as ethnic cleansing⁴⁰⁴, as it happened in the 1980s and 1990s, when the policy aimed at ethnic cleansing of Gandzak, Khanlar, Dashkesan and other regions was implemented. Also important is the fact that the distorted views of Azerbaijan are not based on real archival evidence, but on claims based on the falsified memories of contemporaries of the events.

It should be added as a postscriptum that even after all this, Azerbaijan did not give up its aggressive ambitions in the Zod-Basargechar region. This is proved by the note (N 3253) of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan M. Y. Jafarov addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RA on September 22, 1919, in which the real facts were distorted and aimed at justifying Azerbaijan’s aggressive goals: “Before the Turks came to the province of Yerevan in January 1918, the Armenians of the mentioned province had destroyed more than 300 settlements, killing the majority of Muslims in those settlements. When the Turks left and the allied powers came to the Caucasus, the Azerbaijani people hoped that the Armenian government would no longer allow the extermination of Muslims in order to establish peace and tranquility. However, in December 1918, after they left Yerevan province, the regiment of Sasun disarmed the Muslims of the rural communities of Karakhach and Vedichai provinces and destroyed the villages of Kadilu, Dokhpaz, Karabeklyar, Aghasi Bekli and others, exterminating almost all the Muslims of the mentioned communities. Muslims from a number of villages in the Milli Darasi region also suffered such a fate. Almost simultaneously, the Armenian troops surrounded the villages of the Basargechar district of the Nor Bayazet region and exterminated the Muslims of Kizil-Bank, Subatan, Zagali, Shahab and other villages, raped women and burnt many children of Shahab village in tandoors.

⁴⁰² Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 165-166.

⁴⁰³ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 167.

⁴⁰⁴ Grigoryan, Bobokhyan 2022: 167-168.

The Azerbaijani government, deeply outraged by these atrocities, expresses a decisive protest to the Armenian government responsible for the possible consequences, and is convinced that the violence against the Muslims of Yerevan province will be stopped by the most decisive means”⁴⁰⁵.

Some more incidents took place later, proving that Azerbaijan could not put up with such a conclusion of the Zod riot, as evidenced by the telegram of October 27, 1919 sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan, F. Khan-Khoisky to the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Georgia, M. Y. Jafarov, asking him to inform the RA representative in Georgia that the 9th department of the Ganja region was an inseparable, indivisible part of the Republic of Azerbaijan: “I have received the following telegram from the governor of Ganja: “The bailiff of the 9th department of the Ganja region, composed of rural communities that passed to the Nor Bayazet region, upon arriving in Ganja, informed that on October 12, the provincial commissar of Nor Bayazet came to the village of Basargechar, gathered the elders, dignitaries and clergy, and announced that the territory of the current 9th department belonged to the Republic of Armenia, not to Azerbaijan. No bailiff has been appointed, and the one who has declared himself the bailiff of Chaikhor is an impostor. The following demands have been made: first, to pay last year’s taxes within one week, second, to hand over the entire wheat reserve, leaving 10 poods for each person, third, to hand over the weapons, fourth, to hand over Chaikhor’s bailiff to the authorities, and fifth, to deport those who disobey from the RA borders without the right to bring out the wheat and cattle”. Having reported this, I ask you to immediately contact the representative of the Armenian government regarding this matter, pointing out that the 9th department is a constituent part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, that is why our government is protesting and insisting that the Government of the Republic of Armenia cancel the above decision by a special order, because it is an intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan”⁴⁰⁶.

As a result, just like in the modern phase, in 1918-1920 as well the Republic of Armenia faced a complex choice of foreign political priorities and particularly, serious threats to the preservation of its territorial integrity. However, at that historical stage the Zod-Basargechar issue was successfully resolved by the RA government and the emerging Armenian statehood, which at that time received high British support, which was unprecedented unlike the Artsakh-Karabakh problem, in which Great Britain and other alleged allies of RA, for the sake of their oil and colonial-imperialist interests, openly sponsored and supported Azerbaijan, which acted as a barrier against Bolshevism and Russia and which annexed Armenian Karabakh. And yet, during the tumultuous events of Zod-Basargechar, Azerbaijan failed to disrupt the territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia in the Sevan Lake basin and adjacent regions, which was rather important in view of the

⁴⁰⁵ Azerbaijan, 1919, September 25, № 205. Azerbajdjanskaya Demokraticeskaya Respublika 1998: 296-297.

⁴⁰⁶ Azerbajdjanskaya Demokraticeskaya Respublika 1998: 347.

challenges that the newly proclaimed Armenian statehood faced. The “Zod” operation is one of the most successful and flawless operations of the Armenian armed forces. It solved an issue of great strategic importance, which resolved an important communication problem, because the Zod-Basargechar region closed the rear of Karabakh-Artsakh and the only safe road leading to Syunik-Zangezur, which could essentially endanger the road passing through the Ararat valley. The Armenian side’s peaceful approach to solving the Zod issue was not successful; the only way out was to solve the problem with force, which became an instructive example from a military-scientific point of view. C. Temperley, the military and political representative of Great Britain in Armenia, who was to establish peace between the Transcaucasian republics with a mediating mission and contribute to the delimitation and establishment of stability, was involved in the process.

The forgotten pages of Zod-Sotk of 1919 are undoubtedly one of the brightest episodes in the annals of the First Republic, which reveal Azerbaijan’s territorial claims towards Basargechar, a significant part of the current Gegharkunik region of the Republic of Armenia, aimed at cutting off that vital for Armenia region from the motherland, which repeated 100 years later, once again proving Azerbaijan’s aggressive and illegal claims towards the Sotk region.

The facts clearly show Azerbaijan’s provocative and conspiratorial actions against RA. During 1918-1919 the Azerbaijani authorities incited the Muslim population living in different parts of Armenia to seditious, anti-government and anti-Armenian steps in the Sotk region, trying to cut it off from Armenia and annex it to Azerbaijan.

The archival facts demonstrate a significant circumstance as well: the peaceful approach of the Armenian side to the resolution of the Zod conflict, to which the Azerbaijani side responded with a provocative anti-Armenian move, killing the Silikyan brothers and their two companions, moreover, displaying their beheaded heads in Muslim villages, which was followed by the “Nemesis of Zod” carried out by brave Armenian warriors against the organizers of the murders of the Silikyan brothers. It is also noteworthy that before the resolution of the “Zod” operation, the RA armed forces initially tried to find a peaceful solution and approached the Tatar settlements with the accompaniment of zurna and dhol, offering peace as a form of conflict resolution, and only after being fired upon they responded with appropriate fire. This important circumstance that has great resonance today is one of the significant merits of the Armenian armed forces. It was demonstrated in 1919, at the time of the suppression of the Tatar riot, characterized by a pronounced anti-Armenian orientation unfolding in the basin of Lake Sevan. This made it possible to ensure the vital interests of the Armenian people and the Armenian statehood, as well as the solution to security problems.

The Zod episode of the Armenian armed forces is one of the most impressive pages of the last hundred years, one of the essential manifestations of the Armenian armed forces and Armenian military glory.

It is noteworthy that in the events of the Zod-Sotk region, the Armenian population resorted to self-defense, acting from a peaceful position and conciliatory approaches, striving to protect its interests, which has also been demonstrated since ancient times. Therefore, the military-and-political and historical-and-cultural significance of the “Zod Operation” is emphasized, which has essential meaning from the point of view of the future of Armenia.

It is evident that, just like today, in 1918-1919, in the grave economic and political situation of the First Republic, by sowing chaos in the Zod-Sotk region and elsewhere, Azerbaijan and Turkey, parallel to the open military and political aggression, used the anti-Armenian attitude of the large masses of the Muslim population guided by the dark instincts, implemented a clear strategy to destroy Armenia from the inside, to dismember it territorially, due to which the border zones of Armenia have become explosive, and in that sense, the Basargechar-Gegharkunik region was of key importance in terms of vital interests and security. The main supporter of the Muslim riotous sentiments was Azerbaijan, which laid claim to Armenian territories that over the centuries had been depleted of the Armenian element as a result of the Turkish-Persian war and other wars and disasters. Besides, the Armenian state born in May 1918 was from the start surrounded by a large Muslim population, and had no real friends in Transcaucasia and no common interests with any newly-born state. This demanded great efforts for overcoming the manifestations of anarchy in Zod-Sotk, Kars, Zangibasar-Vedibasar, and other regions, re-establishing the control of the Armenian state over the Armenian regions that had ended up in the range of seditious and antistate actions provoked by Azerbaijan and Turkey, and stopping the Azeri-Turkish plan of the territorial dismemberment of Armenia. During the events of Zod, the Armenian army carried out an exceptionally successful military operation. Thanks to its implementation and the brilliant and competent actions of the national armed forces, Armenia was able to nullify Azerbaijan’s devilish plan to make the Sotk-Gegharkunik region an integral part of Azerbaijan. And the military commanders leading the operation were the heroes of Sardarapat - Colonel Alexander K. Chneour and General Daniel Bek-Pirumyan.

The existing facts about the events of Zod testify to the insufficient reliability, falsifications and inaccuracy of facts in the works of Azerbaijani historians. The archival documents allow a deep understanding of the vitally important problem that the heroes of the glorious “Zod” operation solved, saving the ancient region of Sotk-Gegharkunik, and preserving it for Armenia without which it would also be deprived of vital resources that are very necessary for its survival, which again became endangered after 100 years, in 2020, during the war that ended in capitulation for the

Republic of Armenia and in the course of history that followed it. The events of Zod-Sotk of 1919 are also a unique message to the Armenian people and generations about what the Armenian armed forces can be and what they should do when they are standing in the positions of defending their own borders. It contains an Armenian meaning and message about how the strategic borders and vital military and political interests of the native country can and should be preserved.

Chapter 5.

RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 10, 1920 AND THE POSITION OF MILITARY-POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN TRANSCAUCASIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

The Russian-Armenian treaty of 1920 was a test for Armenia in relations with its allies. Not wanting to lose Armenia as a bulwark against Bolshevism, the Allies took this agreement is in shambles.

The policy of the Armenian government was twofold; its inclination towards the West was obvious, because on the same day the Treaty of Sevres was signed, which left its mark on the agreement of August 10.

In fact, the agreement of August 10, 1920 was one of the successful diplomatic maneuvers of the Soviet side, since with it the issue of “disputed” territories was removed from the sphere of diplomacy of the Western powers.

Actually, the European “allies” of Armenia, dissatisfied with the agreement of August 10, were interested in Armenia only as an anti-Russian shield. In such a hopeless situation, the government of the Republic of Armenia responded to the coercion of Bolshevik Russia by temporarily transferring those territories to Russia, since there was a somewhat naive hope of returning these territories in the future, which was completely excluded if they were captured by Turkey.

The Russian-Armenian agreement of 1920 was a test in the relations of Armenia and its Allies. Not wanting to lose Armenia as a bulwark against Bolshevism, the Allies took this agreement is in shambles. It was a surprise for them. The Entente powers were dissatisfied with the agreement. The topic has not been deeply studied, and even more so, the attitude of the military and political missions of the allied countries in Transcaucasia and Armenia towards the August 10 agreement, which only dealt with the condemnation of the RA government, demanding to continue a strict anti-Bolshevik position, but not showing any real military or other support, which led to the crushing defeat of the Republic of Armenia in the autumn of 1920, when Turkish-Armenian war led to the fall of the First Republic.

The strategy of the RA government regarding the conclusion of the August 10 agreement

The policy of the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) government was twofold, its inclination towards the West was obvious, because on the same day the Treaty of Sevres was signed, which left its mark on the agreement of August 10 and on the unrest and disagreements of

the Western countries-Russia-Armenia around it. The signature in Sevres was put under another treaty of the same name, by which Armenia connected itself with the policies of the western powers and allies with a new link. However, the Soviet government, taking note of the new step of the ARF government, unacceptable for it, but not at all unjust, continued in the person of B. Legrand's persistent and relentless efforts to take control over Armenia. And as later events showed, Russia was the first to break the agreement it had signed and the assurances given to the Armenian people and government, it found mutual consent with Turkey preferable, which led to the division of Armenia between Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey. This action also gave a share Azerbaijan - a state with which Armenia was in conflict.

In fact, the agreement of August 10 was one of the successful diplomatic maneuvers of the Soviet side, because with it the issue of "disputed" territories was removed from the sphere of geopolitics of the diplomacy of the Western powers and appeared in the sphere of political and diplomatic relations between Bolshevik Russia and Soviet Azerbaijan-Turkey. Immediately after the August 10 agreement came into force, the Minister of Defense of Armenia sent a telegram to Dro in Daralagyaz, ordering to inform the commander of Ghapan troops, G. Nzhdeh to leave Zangezur and pass to the territory of the republic without resistance, to which the latter refused to obey, declaring that he would not obey the government's order, he would stay in Kapargoght and continue the fight. In this regard, historian Aram Simonyan is absolutely right when he concludes: "If Nzhdeh categorically refused to obey the order of the RA military minister arising from the ceasefire agreement of August 10 and was determined to continue the fight against the Red Army and the Azerbaijani forces, then he was only acting in the interests of Armenia and the Armenian people. Nzhdeh could not have done otherwise"⁴⁰⁷.

The Armenian-Russian agreement of August 10 was an agreement imposed by Russia on the RA government in a harsh manner, which simply confirmed the fact of the reality, because Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur province, as well as Nakhichevan, were already occupied by Soviet troops before the signing of the August 10 agreement. This agreement cannot be considered a diplomatic success for Armenia, because it did not satisfy either Armenia, Russia and its allies (Azerbaijan, Turkey) or Armenia's Entente allies (England, France). The reason for the dissatisfaction of the Republic of Armenia with the agreement of August 10 was the military occupation of all the Armenian-Azerbaijani disputed territories by Azerbaijan's ally Russia. As for Russia, its decision was determined by the demands of its allies Azerbaijan and Turkey, which not only demanded the annexation of the disputed territories to Azerbaijan, but were also against giving Armenia the right to operate the Shahtakht station and the railway line up to Julfa.

⁴⁰⁷ Simonyan A. 2000, 161.

And as for the European “allies” of Armenia who were dissatisfied with the agreement of August 10, they were interested in Armenia only as an anti-Russian barrier and nothing more, like in 1918-1919 in terms of the anti-Armenian strategy adopted by them, asking for the belonging of Karabakh-Artsakh, Nakhichevan and other Armenian territories. In such a desperate situation, the RA government met the compulsion of Bolshevik Russia by temporarily handing over those territories to Russia, from which there was a somewhat naive hope of getting those territories back, which was completely excluded in case of their seizure by Turkey. It was a false mentality that was inspired by Armenian social and political circles for centuries, which was a victory for Russia, and a foreign-political failure and military failure for Armenia⁴⁰⁸. The subsequent negotiation process showed that the strategy of the Russian side, in terms of the fact of fighting on two fronts, put the Republic of Armenia in front of the inevitability of capitulation. According to C. Galoyan, the Armenian-Russian agreement of August 10 (signed in Tiflis) was signed on the day of the ratification of the Treaty of Sevres, because the Soviet Russian government did not want to finally lose Armenia⁴⁰⁹, which was also a countermeasure to the peace treaty signed in Sevres on the same day, and the strategic approach undertaken by Bolshevik Russia to reestablish itself in the Transcaucasian region, which the RA authorities mistakenly considered “temporary” and did pay much attention to it, continuing to connect all their foreign policy goals with the countries participating in the Treaty of Sevres. But all these hopes were broken when the disastrous Turkish-Armenian war started in the autumn of 1920, as a result of which RA renounced the Treaty of Sevres by the Alexandropol Treaty.

Regarding the agreement of August 10, S. Vracyan writes as follows: “On July 20, Legrand and Khalil Pasha arrived in Baku and after consulting with the communists of Azerbaijan, he went to Tiflis, where, in early August, a conference was convened to stop the Armenian-Bolshevik fights taking place in Nakhichevan, Zangezur and Ghazakh. Representatives of Armenia A. Jamalyan, A. Babalyan and Legrand signed the peace agreement on August 10, by which hostilities between Soviet Russia and Armenia ended on August 10, starting at 12 o’clock. The Armenian troops would occupy the line passing Shahtakht-Khok-Aznaberd-Sultanbeg and then north of Kivki and east of Bazarchay, and in Ghazakh region, the line they had captured on July 30. The troops of Soviet Russia were supposed to occupy the regions of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. The final belonging of those provinces was not predetermined by that capture. That issue was to be decided by the treaty to be concluded between Soviet Russia and Armenia. The Shahtakht-Julfa railway was to be operated by the Railway Department of Armenia before the conclusion of the agreement”⁴¹⁰.

⁴⁰⁸ Khurshudyan L. 2017, 126.

⁴⁰⁹ Galoyan G. 1999, 256.

⁴¹⁰ Vracyan S. 1993: 484-485.

Both the Treaty of Sevres and the agreement of August 10 were not implemented, moreover, Armenia, as well as its enemies and allies were dissatisfied with it. Armenia was unhappy because the disputed territories had come under the control of Soviet Russia. Azerbaijan was again dissatisfied, because it also wanted to occupy the disputed territories, and Turkey was dissatisfied, because according to the agreement, the right to operate the Shahtakht-Julfa railway was given to Armenia⁴¹¹.

S. Vracyan notes that the agreement of August 10 caused dissatisfaction among the allied representatives of Tiflis: “England’s acting commander Livk accused the Armenians that Armenia no more cooperates with its allies and should no longer be able to receive their support, while the French High Commissioner de Martel believed that the Armenians were joining the enemy’s army of the Allies. De Martel’s displeasure was also great because the Armenian government had refused to accept the weapons and ammunition offered by France on usurious terms. On August 31, Livk visited Yerevan, where he was solemnly received, and by communicating with the government and learning about the situation, he was assured his suspicions were groundless. At the same time, he presented to the Armenian government a draft of an economic agreement to hand over the ports and railways of Armenia to England and offered to sign it within three days, but the Armenian government refused”⁴¹². From this testimony of Vracyan, it is clearly evident that Armenia was in a truly international and political impasse and in a hopeless situation, because the allied states were not sincere towards it. The “allied” states of Armenia viewed the signing of the August 10 agreement by the Armenian government as an open betrayal.

R. Hovhannisyan writes that the military and political representatives of the Entente in Transcaucasia were unaware of those negotiations. The observations of the Allies led them to the conclusion that Armenian-Bolshevik relations have softened and Armenia is looking for a new strategic solution, which was also natural and what the Allies did not want to understand, that the Armenians had a certain bonding with Russia, be it tsarist or Bolshevik. The reaction of Count Damien de Martel, the French commissioner in the Transcaucasia, was particularly sharp in this regard: he had scolded the RA representative in Tiflis, T. Bekzadyan, and said that Armenia can no longer be seen as an ally and is even considered to be in the enemy camp. De Martel also did not like the fact that the RA government had refused to buy arms and weapons from France for cash or in exchange with minerals, deepening the doubt about the change of orientation⁴¹³, and France exported cotton and other important raw materials from Armenia⁴¹⁴, often ignoring Armenian

⁴¹¹ The Republic of Armenia 1918-1920, 2000, 248-249.

⁴¹² Vracyan S. 1993: 485.

⁴¹³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 607, sheet 29, Alikhanyan S. T. 1974, 128-129; Hovhannisyan R. 2016, Vol. IV, 113.

⁴¹⁴ NAA, fund 368, list 1, file 18, sheets 2, 8, 16-17, 23, 34.

interests. De Martel considered the Russian-Armenian agreement as “Armenian desertion” and claimed that the Armenians had gone to the negotiations without warning or consultation, but this was not so, because on August 8, Colonel E. Corbeil had reported that negotiations have been going on since August 6, about which Vice Admiral M. Bristol had also written from Istanbul to the American consul Charles Moser⁴¹⁵. Opinions were voiced in the French press that it makes no sense to talk about the creation of Armenia now, telegrams sent to Paris warned about the coup in Armenia, calling to cut Armenia from the sphere of Bolshevik influence, to encourage the Armenians to go to a mutual agreement with the Turks⁴¹⁶.

In deepening this state of panic, the spread of exaggerated information by a number of members of the American Committee for Aid to Armenia, who leaved Armenia heaving heard about the first news about Bolshevism, became essential⁴¹⁷.

So, the allies were somehow informed about these negotiations, it was simply used to put pressure on the RA and keep the RA in the orbit of their geopolitical interests at any cost.

And naval commander Harry Luke, who was the high commissioner of Britain at that time in 1920, in a report sent to London on August 11, noted that Armenia had agreed to Soviet occupation of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhijevan, south of Shahtakht, and that these negotiations would continue in Yerevan. And even more, during the meeting with Bekzadyan and Babalyan, Luke said that they were surprised by this change, that the RA government agreed to the occupation of Nakhichevan by the Bolsheviks, which opens the way for them to northwestern Persia and Turkey. This was considered an almost treasonous move towards Great Britain and reprehensible at a time when Armenia allegedly received a large amount of British ammunition (of poor quality, by the way - V.V.) and of which only 1/3 had reached Armenia, with a significant delay, which finally appeared in the hands of Bolshevik Russia after the Sovietization of Armenia. Luke said that the Armenian side had explained to them that this step was done due to the exhaustion of their resistance reserves, but promising and assuring them to maintain their loyalty to the Allies if the Bolsheviks did not respect their decisions. Luke warns about the approach of the British Cabinet to stop aid, about which he receives a letter from London confirming his position on August 19, although some officials of the same British Foreign Office in their views in this regard remembered that as early as 1918-1919 the British commanders in the Caucasus supported Azerbaijan's claims to most of the disputed territories⁴¹⁸, and now they give themselves the right to criticize the RA government regarding its foreign policy strategy, and in the case when 2 months later, they leave Armenia at its most difficult moment.

⁴¹⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 607, sheet 29; Hovhannisyan R. 2016, Vol. IV, 113.

⁴¹⁶ Tumanyan M. 2012, 330.

⁴¹⁷ Tumanyan M. 2012, 330)

⁴¹⁸ Hovhannisyan R. 2005, Vol. I, 113-114.

On October 15, 1920 (N 15), Arzumanyan, the head of the Information Department of the RA diplomatic mission in Georgia, informs that on October 3, the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia, Claude Stokes, will arrive in Yerevan from Tiflis, who will replace Commander Harry Luke. He held meetings upon arrival with the Prime Minister H. Ohanjanyan and Military Minister R. Ter-Minasyan and was informed that the Armenians have decided to fight against the Kemalists, that the decision of the Armenians to drive them out of the Kars region is quite difficult. He also the August 10 agreement signed between Armenia and Soviet Russia. Stokes openly says that England is powerless to provide real help to Armenia, bombarding or taking Trebizond has is really senseless, because England cannot bring out a lot of force against the Turks to move deep into the country, and only capturing the city and the port will not be quite effective. And from the perspective of Armenian-Georgian relations, Stokes concluded that Georgians are afraid to deal with Armenians, thinking that by doing so they are provoking the Turks against them. Stokes also expresses the belief that Armenians conduct an anti-Muslim policy and are always at war with Muslims, that it is necessary to put an end to this policy, that a federation should be created in Transcaucasia, which will put an end to such politics and take the path of reconciliation. Bekzadyan, responding, reports that the RA Prime Minister supports the point of view of his government. First of all many border disputes should be resolved, and then only there can be a federation, which Stokes strongly opposes. Giving clarification in response, Ohanjanyan considers the temporary agreement with Soviet Russia on August 10 to be a forced step due to circumstances, and the relations with Georgia and the importance of solving territorial issues as a prerequisite for a federal system. The meeting ends with the desired result for Stokes, because Ohanjanyan's government again shows readiness to confront both the Turks and the Bolsheviks⁴¹⁹.

Based on the created tension and the wish not to complicate relations with the Entente countries, the RA government is preparing a document in which counter-arguments justifying their move were brought, and in particular focusing on the aspirations of Turkey and Azerbaijan to unite against Armenia through the Red Army and the fact that the Armenian army was left alone, the government accepted a temporary arrangement in order to gain some time, but emphasizing that it would not give up its anti-Bolshevik position and would cooperate with Georgia and Maku Khanate⁴²⁰. On September 6, Luke sends this explanation of the RA government to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to which Dwight Osborne gives a very spectacular assessment, finding that the Armenians' justification of their agreement with the Soviets is convincing⁴²¹.

⁴¹⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 607, sheets 149-154; "Yaraj" ("Forward"), 1920, October 5-6, Yerevan.

⁴²⁰ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 607, sheets 30-31.

⁴²¹ Hovhannisyanyan R. 2016, Vol. IV, 114.

In Yerevan, Prime Minister Ohanjanyan also gave his clarifications to British representative John Gracie, Luke and French representative Emile Corbeil, considering Armenia's move as fair, as Armenia has continuously drawn the attention of the Allies to the relations between the Kemalites, Azerbaijan and Turkey, and Russia, and in that context emphasized the strategic importance of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan, but the British commanders have helped Azerbaijan to take control of Karabakh and prevent the capture of Zangezur by the RA regular army, and many appeals of Armenia for assistance remained unanswered, also not receiving the British weapons on time, they were forced to go to a temporary Armistice⁴²².

On August 24, 1920, representatives of the British and French military and political missions in the Caucasus, Colonel Corbeil, Consul Louis Neteman and a number of officials arrived in Yerevan to personally express their disappointment to the RA government regarding the Armenia-RSFSR agreement and Armenia's refusal to purchase rifles from France. In response, Ohanjanyan again gives clarifications, after which the allies believe that Armenia has not changed its political orientation, which became more obvious after the meeting with General Nazarbekyan, Gevorg E and other officials, although Corbeil advises to make an official statement: as if to dispel the suspicions and bad impression created in the Caucasus, believing that an important step will be taken with the creation of an effective Georgia-Armenia anti-Bolshevik union⁴²³. Leaving Lieutenant Charles Valadier in Yerevan, Colonel Corbeil informs his leadership that he does not see a betrayal of the Entente by the Armenian government, but a weakness that is fully explained by the difficulties of the political, economic and military situations, at the same time adding that in addition to Ohanjanyan and his several partners, the members of the RA government leave the impression of city council members rather than statesmen⁴²⁴.

Luke, the representative of the British mission, coming to Yerevan on August 31, did not hesitate to scold Ohanjanyan about the agreement of August 10, considering it incomprehensible, that it had no justification, reporting about it to Lord Curzon. Luke also complained about the Bolshevik tensions in Lori Neutral Zone and advised in a dictatorial style to end the unnecessary anarchy and come to an agreement with Georgia to end the conflict by dividing the neutral zone among themselves. Opposing this, the RA Prime Minister focuses on the strict measures taken by his government against the organizers of the May Uprising as a proof of loyalty to the allies. Returning to Tiflis, Luke reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 2 that the RA government has urged him to support the justified claims of Armenia to Karabakh and Zangezur, that they can occupy those regions if Moscow is forced to withdraw the troops from Azerbaijan.

⁴²² Hovhannisyan R. 2016, Volume IV, 115.

⁴²³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 607, sheets 35-37.

⁴²⁴ Hovhannisyan H. 2016, Vol. IV, 116.

Luke reported that he rejected the demand on the grounds that the Allies reserve the right to intervene and demarcate the borders if direct Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations are aborted, to which the ministry gives an evasive response. Luke also said that Armenia was easy prey for Bolshevism, but the government had taken the harshest measures against domestic Bolshevism, suppressing the Alexandropol rebellion and refusing to bow to Moscow's threats, that ARF had many flaws, but its nationalism, anti-Bolshevism and courage were beyond reproach. On September 16, the head of the Eastern Department of the MFA, D. Osborne informed that His Majesty's government was unable to recognize the RA claims to the disputed territories⁴²⁵.

And so, in fact, by exerting pressure on the government of the Republic of Armenia, the "allies" thereby put under question the security of Armenia and the Armenian people. On the one hand, they refused to show practical help against the Turkish threat; on the other hand, they forbade Armenia to reach peace with Russia⁴²⁶.

It should be noted that even after the explanations given by the RA government, England and France do not make any promises to provide assistance to Armenia. It can be assumed that Armenia was of interest to the Entente countries simply as an anti-Soviet country that they did not want to lose, otherwise they would have provided some minor aid at least to justify the fact of being "ally". Although, it should be noted, that despite all this, the RA government did not change its adopted policy and continued to be loyal to the "allies". Regarding the complaints of "allies" L. Khurshudyan writes as follows: "Such sentiments arose among the allies as a result of the fact that the Armenian government's negotiations with the Bolsheviks were conducted without informing the allies, and they had learned about the terms of the armistice from the press. That is why the wrong opinion arose that the Armenian government is changing its orientation"⁴²⁷.

In this regard, complaints were expressed regarding the inconsistent and unfriendly attitude of the allies towards Armenia. There were also opinions that the anti-Armenian position of the Anglo-French side on the issue of Zangezur and Karabakh pushed the Armenian government to sign an agreement with the RSFSR. Moreover, Prime Minister Hamo Ohanjanyan accused the representatives of the "allies", reminding the British government's overt patronizing behavior towards Azerbaijan in 1918-1920, claiming that England "stubbornly wants to give Karabakh to Azerbaijan, but they did not allow us to send troops to Zangezur and organize the resistance of local people". After long and detailed explanations, the representatives of England and France saw that, nevertheless, the Armenian government is faithful to the Entente and has an anti-Bolshevik position, which was fatal, because in the autumn of 1920, the allies simply left Armenia all alone.

⁴²⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2016, Volume IV, 116-117.

⁴²⁶ Simonyan A. 2000, 165.

⁴²⁷ Khurshudyan L. 2017, 127.

It seems that the Republic of Armenia already had a reliable sponsor in the form of the British, expecting their diplomatic-military support. It can be said, however, that the Armenian side placed unjustified high hopes on the help expected from the neighboring states in favor of the settlement of the borders of Armenia and the sovereignty of the Republic of Armenia, which it requested. The allies gave false hopes to the Armenian people, who were considered friendly, which caused RA's failures in foreign policy and especially in foreign-political calculations and selection, which was facilitated by the allies' paper- declarative Armenian expressions.

Nevertheless, the relations with the immediate neighbors, Azerbaijan and Armenia of Georgia, remained worse than the worst, and the conflicts of a war nature were not resolved by the accumulated problems, the border issues remained unresolved, but still hoping that the peace of Paris conference will solve what the expectations did not come true. In this regard, is much more rational in terms of the evaluation of the valuation of things, some historians empirical conclusion, according to which the political leadership of Armenia expressed its interest in the development of relations with its South Caucasian neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan. in connection with the assumption of the leaders of Armenia that the arising territorial conflicts will be resolved by the great powers to their benefit as a reward and reward for the Armenian efforts during the war, according to thereby refusing to resolve them through negotiations with the neighbors. As a result of such an approach, in 1918 Recently, there was a military conflict between Armenia and Georgia, which caused considerable damage to both, and a long-term "hybrid" war began between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territories. To take over Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan, which was accompanied by the cruelest ethnic cleansing and was interrupted only by the fall of two republics. According to this, during that war, the command of the British armed forces, which was placed under the supervision of the Eastern Mediterranean region implementation (the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus and the Northern Near-Black Sea region), assuming the role of "objective and honest mediator", they actually stood next to oil-rich Azerbaijan.

Only at the end of August 1920, not later than the fall of the First Armenian Republic, the victorious powers took Armenia's interests into account when signing the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey (10.08.1920). According to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, Kazakhstan was to be given a significant part of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire, but these conditions remained on paper. In Turkey, that agreement was not recognized by either the Kemalites or the Sultanate government, and moreover, none of the winning countries expressed a desire to help Armenia join those territories with the help of military force. As a result, the government of Armenia tried to do this on its own, which led to a new Armenian-Turkish war and the complete defeat of the First Armenian Republic. Continuing to suspect Ankara of a secret agreement with the Entente, and wanting to occupy all of Armenia and invade Azerbaijan, Moscow realized that the time had come

for military intervention, with the goal of Sovietizing Armenia as soon as possible, so that it would not be completely lost to the expanding Turkish military presence. On C. Ordzhonikidze's proposal, which was approved by I. Stalin, the Bolsheviks decided to militarily drive a wedge between Turkey and Azerbaijan, in order to deprive the latter of their immediate borders by creating an Armenian buffer.

It was obvious that Soviet Russia would not unconditionally support the republic ruled by a political force clinging to the Western powers and striving for unrelenting enmity against the Bolsheviks, whose westernization was fatal, because it became obvious with delay that the political leadership of Armenia was wrong. in the calculations, because he did not even try to act faster to win public support, in addition to that, he tried to be more flexible and less provocative towards the Turkish nationalists, but in the end, the dominant factor in the decline of Armenia was the foreign political factor.

Chapter 6.

THE QUESTION OF THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA FROM THE GREAT BRITAIN IN 1918-1920

Until now, there have been superficial, incomplete and one-sided, sometimes politicized references to the Armenian-British military-political relations and British support in terms of military assistance and the supply of weapons and ammunition to the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, as well as in terms of the professional training of officers of the Armenian army. All this has left the study of the problem incomplete. There were blank pages that needed to be covered, as well as to offer rethinking, new historical and in-depth approaches. In this context, in the Armenian-British military-political relations and the British military-political mission in the Transcaucasus, there were both individual positive phenomena and cumulative pro-imperialist and pro-British phenomena that need a new assessment, revealing, in particular, the so-called Armenian-friendly British cabinet officials, as well as, in particular, purely imperialist officials, on the one hand, considering military and political figures who have a certain positive attitude towards Armenia, such as Oliver Baldwin of Bewdley, as well as Captain J. Gracie, who knows Armenian and has a positive attitude towards Armenia, Colonel Cl. Temperley. The activities and steps, on the contrary, of V. Thomson, D. Shuttleworth and the purposeful actions of others are sharply anti-Armenian, pro-Azerbaijani - pro-Turkish in their nature, as a result of which the Republic of Armenia suffered significantly, relying on its faithful allies. Different sides of the problem, some facts and details can be found in the books by R. Hovhannisyan, G. Galoyan, Arts. Hovhannisyan, as well as other sources. In the works of contemporaries and state politicians Al. Khatisyan, S. Vracyan and other statesmen, there is factual selective material, the authors of which, as well as in memoirs, for the most part, are dominated by the approach of proofreading realities and facts, due to which the truth is presented incompletely or distorted, depending on the party and political affiliation of these people and the interests of which country they served or what rank they had in world processes, their possible influence. For example, the Armenian political forces that collaborated with the Young Turks and Al. Parvus or with the main characters of the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 - V. Lenin, L. Trotsky and others. It is also obvious that the Armenian-British military-political ties and a new assessment of the military support of the Republic of Armenia, the activities of military-political mission of Britain in Transcaucasus should be covered with a deep consideration of geopolitical factors, focusing on the short existence of the Armenian statehood, its losses in the Turkish-Armenian war in the autumn of 1920 and the deepest causes of the fall of the

Republic of Armenia. This is important because in 1918-1920 Armenia never showed any results in the military sphere, not without the participation of Great Britain, an ally of Armenia, with its incomplete, untimely and insufficient military assistance, and as for the rest powers, they did not show significant interest in this issue, as the oil and socio-political interests of these countries and the same England had other priority. The former “Entente ally” of Great Britain and rival Russia also chalked up its contribution to the above mentioned, which, after the fiasco by the “efforts” of the world powers in 1917, by superhuman efforts in the late 1919 and early 1920s, gradually came to its senses, as a result of which both sides turned the issue Armenia’s support in just a tool to fight against each other, and eventually came to a consensus to control the fate of Armenia by mutual agreement.

The October Revolution of 1917 in Russia marked the beginning of a new and long-term geopolitical process, in which many peoples were involved, as well as the Armenian people, which was subjected to genocide. The Armenian people had heroic battles in Sardarapat and, in the struggle for existence, decisively stopped the advance of Turkish terrorists in the Transcaucasus and in particular, in Eastern Armenia, as a result of which, after a 900-year break, a geopolitically favorable, but difficult opportunity arose for the further survival of Armenia and the restoration of Armenian statehood.

Unpredictable developments in 1918-1920 led to the restoration of Armenian statehood, which forced the creation of its own armed forces as a guarantee of its existence, and made the young republic dependent on almost all powers in terms of acquiring weapons and ammunition, and especially after the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, when Great Britain and France became the protagonists in Transcaucasus, who were guided by their hidden deep interests, as a result of which the support provided to Armenia was conditional, half-hearted, inadequate and in many cases untimely. The military occupation of Transcaucasus by the British side significantly changed the political course of the Republic of Armenia, since they did not like the Russophilia of the Armenians⁴²⁸.1 The “orientation” of the Armenian leadership had a dual character and was constantly changing, the issue of choosing a foreign policy course was constantly dependent on powerful geopolitical factors, and it gravitated towards the Entente countries. But after the middle of 1919 and from the beginning of 1920 Bolshevik Russia began gradually to become the dominant power on the outskirts of the former Russian Empire, including the Transcaucasus, Great Britain, France and other states gradually gave way to Russia, and Armenia could not avoid this circumstance, which is also connected with the concession strategy of the former allies, which was the result, perhaps, of a mutual agreement. Again there was a desire for Russia, because the allies

⁴²⁸ Denikin A. 2002: 247.63.

could not prevent the Armenian genocide, which was carried out throughout the Transcaucasus. However, in 1918-1919, Armenia gravitated towards the main European countries: Great Britain, France, and in terms of Russia, some farsighted politicians had a premonition that one day Russia would be reborn and return to the Caucasus.

Armenia was particularly interested in the position of the British from “ethnic, economic, financial, military and other points of view.”⁴²⁹ The Armenians had almost no alternative, and in 1918, after gaining independence, Armenia was an ally of Great Britain, a member of the Entente, and this alliance is due to the fact that Armenia continued the war against Turkey, which was one of the most active opponents of the Entente⁴³⁰. The strongest evidence of this was the presence of the Armenian Legion as part of the Entente troops, as well as Armenian volunteer military units as part of the Russian armed forces on the Caucasian front.

Moreover, this is in case when the Armenian people, their political leaders, by the time the allies came to the Caucasus, believed that the victory of the allies in the First World War was their victory, that Armenian interests would triumph in the Caucasus. Armenians warned the British authorities that the last food supplies were running out, that hospitals and orphanages were not receiving bread, that the Armenian people was in danger of destruction, and this expectation was well expressed by Prime Minister H. Qajaznuni. In a letter addressed to the British on February 7, 1919, he simply writes: “The Armenians were fully confident that with the victory of the allies and their arrival in the Caucasus, the situation would improve. However, I must say that a feeling of indignation, fear and disappointment began to creep into their thoughts. They start to think that the allies don’t care if they live or die.”⁴³¹

So it was, the allies, the even more politically savvy British, saw very well how devoted the Armenians were to them, but the imperial interest remained above all, although some British officers, such as Cl. Temperley, J. Gracie⁴³² or Oliver Baldwin were somewhat different from other officers, they loved the long-suffering Armenia and its people, and repeatedly called on their government to support them with military and weapons so that the Armenians could effectively defend themselves against the Azerbaijani-Turkish encroachments, and not arm only Azerbaijan.

Already in the second half of 1919, the Azerbaijani government has already refused to accept the confirmation of the American governorship of Sharur-Nakhichevan, although it had given preliminary consent, subject to the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Zangezur, accusing the

⁴²⁹ Denikin A. 2002: 251.

⁴³⁰ Hovhannisyanyan A. 2019: 17-18.

⁴³¹ Yenukidze 1954: 118-189.

⁴³² George F. Gracie - On July 22, 1919 the British government appointed the chief British commissioner in Transcaucasus, the representative of Oliver Wardrope in Yerevan, intelligence officer, captain, who knew Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish languages - Hovhannisyanyan R. 2014: 131. After Gracie’s departure, the British military delegation was headed by Gordon Brown.

Ashkhatavor, 1920, October 20, N 231.

Armenians of continuing the occupation of the region. Al. Khatisyan refutes this claim, saying that it is a completely false pretext to thwart the Haskell plan and justify an open attack in Zangezur, which was supported by the British representative in Yerevan, George F. Gracie, informing Wardrope that Armenia did its best to keep the peace, but was constantly deceived, the Azerbaijanis and their agents have already tried to incite the Azerbaijanis in the Bashkend-Artsvashen region near Lake Sevan to attack this large village of 800 houses and seize their pastures.

At the same time, J. Gracie added to what was said: "From the self-confident smile and behavior of the representatives of Azerbaijan, it is easy to understand that they do not doubt their ability to conquer these regions by force of arms. They never hid from me that the troops were on the move, and that all this would probably lead to trouble." This situation continues to remain the same in December, during which J. Gracie again defends the Armenians, despite the fact that, in general, British support for one of the parties at intervals played a negative role in resolving the situation. Captain J. Gracie again stood up for the Armenians in response to Wardrope's instructions to reprimand the leaders of Yerevan for the fact that after the truce in Daralyagyaz, a military operation was provoked by Muslims, and heavy weapons were used in Zangezur that had nothing to do with the army, since these weapons were distributed in 1918 among Andranik's "partisans" by a British commissioned officer. Captain Gracie also accused Khosrov-bek Sultanov of new conspiracies, writing on December 12, 1919, that he would insist on taking measures to remove Khosrov-bek Sultanov from the Karabakh region, since he was a dangerous person.

Although it is worth saying that Wardrope and the American representative, Colonel James Ray, as if accusing both sides, tried to stop the bloody operations in Karabakh, Zangezur and other places, appealing to Prime Ministers Al. Khatisyan and N. Usubbekov with a demand to meet with each other and inform the Paris Armistice Commission, in connection with which the British Foreign Office considered it necessary to warn the Azerbaijani delegates in Paris, in response to which A. Crowe said that the Supreme Council knew little about the region and that only the warnings seem futile and no one is surprised that there were rational grounds. J. Gracie seems to have retained his sympathy for Armenia and Armenians. This is even evidenced by his speech on November 23, 1920, when the Republic of Armenia was going through difficult days, and J. Gracie had just returned from Yerevan. He conveys to the government a petition from the American Committee of Armenia asking the British Navy to introduce a permanent patrol service in the Black Sea and give the Sultan the authority to ratify the Treaty of Sevres. The Committee demanded that in the event of a possible revision of the treaty, the articles relating to Armenia should not be weakened, and the revision of other provisions should be conditional on the removal of the Turks from all the lands that were provided to Armenia under the W. Wilson Arbitration, as well as the return of the seized weapons and ammunition, the payment of all reparations and compensation for

all losses. However, the Foreign Ministry of Great Britain accepts the conditions of the Armenian committee presented to it with surprise and irritation, as if it did not concern them⁴³³.

However, it was so deceptive that the first Military Minister of the Republic of Armenia Hovh. Hakhverdyan disappointedly remembers: “Thomson was in no hurry to arrive in Yerevan, while the Armenian government was especially waiting for him, rightly assuming that the Armenian people, who fought the enemy to the end and remained loyal to the Allies, seemed to have the very right to special treatment from the Allies. During the first meeting with Gen. V. Thomson⁴³⁴, Qajaznuni made this clear. Thomson objected rather sharply that they had more important things to do than simply express sympathy, but then, Prime Minister Hovh. Qajaznuni told him about the government’s upcoming plans, and Thomson changed his “anger” to mercy and declared that he was pleasantly surprised by the government’s sober standpoints. It should be noted that such sober approach refers to the first period of Armenia’s existence, when Qajaznuni served as a Prime Minister. Later, along with the apparent successes of Armenia’s foreign policy and after the resignation of Qajaznuni, the approaches and way of thinking of the government led by the hotheads of the party (meaning the ARF BureauGovernment -V.V.) became more “aggressive”⁴³⁵, but rather less harsh, not deeply thoughtful and carefully prudent rather than aggressive.

Returning to the strictly self-interested and self-centered policy of Great Britain in the Transcaucasus, it should be clearly stated that the first obvious proof of this was the creation of a neutral zone in Lori for Armenia immediately after the victorious ArmenianGeorgian war, when the predominantly Armenian Lori was declared neutral against the will of its native Armenian population by British officer colonel N. Stewart.

However, the behavior of the British command and its military-political representation in Transcaucasus in the person of General V. Thomson and Shuttleworth⁴³⁶, was emphatically anti-Armenian especially in terms of artificially declared right by British side disputed territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, Syunik-Zangezur and Nakhichevan between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Openly supporting Azerbaijan, Thomson and his supporters did everything they could to subjugate

⁴³³ Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 804-805.

⁴³⁴ Thomson William Montgomery (December 2, 1878 - July 23, 1963) - Major General, from November 17, 1918 to 1919. On March 10 he was in command of the 39th Division, which occupied Baku, bringing with him about 2,000 soldiers from the British Indian Army, followed by his appointment as Governor of Baku.

⁴³⁵ NAA, fund 45, list 1, file 32, sheets 3-4.

⁴³⁶ Digby Inglis Shuttleworth (August 23, 1876-May 15, 1948) - British brigadier general known for his antiArmenian activities in Karabakh. 1905 received the rank of captain. 1912-1916 he served with the rank of major in India, Mesopotamia and northwestern Iran, 1917-1919 he was the commander of the 39th infantry brigade in the Caucasus, in April-August 1919 he was involved in the withdrawal of British troops from Baku and Transcaucasus in general, being in warm relations with the leadership of Azerbaijan. D. Shuttleworth commanded all British forces in Azerbaijan, Petrovsk and Krasnovodsk. D. Shuttleworth in 1920 in Constantinople, he was a member of the Allied Control Commission of the military administration of the Ottoman Empire and the commander of the 83rd infantry brigade during the Chanakian and Dardanelles crisis 1920-1923 during the unstable situation following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In 1936 receives the military rank of Major General.

Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur to Azerbaijan, emphasizing British oil interests and mainly wanting to create a barrier against Russia, convinced that the Armenians, who were considered incorrigibly pro-Russian, should not be helped. This was done with a cynical openness, which sometimes surprised even the other allies of the Armenians, about which there is a very interesting observation in the May 20 report of the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Yerevan, the famous Khan Tekinsky with his espionage activities against Armenia⁴³⁷.

“During lunch at my place, the representative of France in Armenia expressed his displeasure with the policy of the British, which was directed exclusively in favor of Azerbaijan, and mainly with the policy of Thomson, who managed to hand over Karabakh to Azerbaijan with his reports, which, according to the French, was an injustice. He then said that with the arrival of other allies, the policy would have to change. He openly expressed the sympathy of the French towards the Armenians, considering them somehow as an ally”⁴³⁸.

As for the sympathy expressed by the Transcaucasian representatives of France, Italy and other countries with much smaller weight, it must be said that it was also the case for the 2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani war with the support of Turkey, in which case it was a matter of declarative sympathy and impressive outbursts from the point of view of emotion. Their strategies on territorial disputes did not have radical or essential differences and were almost identical, they could propose more favorable conditions and solutions for Armenia.

Thus, it was obvious that after the end of the World War I and the forced withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Transcaucasus, the expected conditions for the implementation of Armenian plans were not created, although the borders of the Republic of Armenia which was founded under the Batumi Treaty had an incomparable expansion and included a number of parts of the Ararat valley, Surmalu, Alexandropol provinces, Kars Province not completely, the entire territory of the Republic of Armenia became about 45 thousand square meters from the initial 10-12 thousand square meters. However, it was not possible to more or less restore the ethnic-territorial integrity of the RA, from which Akhalkalak-Javakhk and the neutral zone of Lori, Nagorno-Karabakh and Sharur-Nakhijevan were left out, mainly due to the British efforts and the overt military support shown to Azerbaijan, with the delivery of weapons and ammunition, giving Azerbaijan the opportunity to claim the Arax Valley, and all this with the support and indulgence of the much-awaited and glorious Allies in Transcaucasus, Great Britain and other allies taking care to create a great and powerful Azerbaijan, which would block them from Bolshevik Russia, and not at all interested in a strong Armenia. On the contrary, until the end, they did nothing to help Armenia against the danger coming from the north, and at the moment of danger, they left and subordinated

⁴³⁷ Virabyan V. 2021: 51-81.

⁴³⁸ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 358, sheet 25.

its interests to Azerbaijan, which was Bolshevized by the advice of M. Kemal, the leader of the Turkish extreme nationalist "Milli" movement. The British military and political representations and generals, with some reservations, only encouraged and militarily supported the separatist sentiments of the Muslim rebel regions, which undermined RA's positions in the region, causing enormous material and moral damage to the Armenian people, who, being weakened, could not face the challenges of the future.

According to R. Hovhanisyan, such position of Great Britain is due to an important circumstance. "At the end of 1918, they believed that the eastern Ottoman vilayets would be allocated to Armenia. Therefore, it seemed natural to view Karabakh and Zangezur as compensation for Azerbaijan, whose claims to western lands would be rejected. Several critics single out economic exploitation as the foremost factor in British politics. ...

Great Britain managed to acquire thousands of tons of petroleum products worth millions of pounds. "Whether oil imperialism dictated British policy or not, in any case, economic factors could not be ignored.⁴³⁹"

However, those very circumstances played a disastrous role in the fate of Transcaucasus. The South Caucasus was of utmost importance for the British colonial empire, primarily due to its geographical location, which made it possible to view the three Caucasian republics (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) as a "blocking barrier" against Russian and Turkish expansion in the Middle East and India⁴⁴⁰, considering also the rich oil and other resources in the South Caucasus region.

As the military and political representations of the Allies appeared in Transcaucasus and Armenia, the initially cautious approach was gradually replaced by open pro-Muslim practices, the interests of the British and other countries were more harmonized with Azerbaijan and Georgia than with Armenia, which appeared in the role of begging for help from the Allies, including in terms of the delivery of weapons and ammunition, which was shoddy, touchy and completely out of date. However, the possibility of an alternative was small, from time to time it was possible to find some batches of weapons and ammunition from the Volunteer Army of general A. Denikin in the south of Russia with difficulty, a part of which, about 27 percent, was confiscated by Georgia at the time of transit, to some extent from Greece, which itself was fighting against Turkey, etc., that is why the main hope remained on the allies of the World War I, the Entente, Great Britain and France, which, coming to Transcaucasus, quickly transformed, other interests appeared, pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Georgian, which RA did not quickly understand, let's say there was almost no other option. The foreign policy option remained suspended and strategic maneuvers failed one after the other.

⁴³⁹ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 170-171.

⁴⁴⁰ Hovannisian R. 1971: 269.

Nevertheless, the creation of the national army was paramount, about which H. Qajaznuni says: “We had an army that was well armed with English weapons and dressed in English clothes, we had enough military supplies, and we had an important fortress like Kars in our hands.⁴⁴¹” Much of what was said is not true, because the Armenian army had severe shortages of weapons, rifles, and ammunition.

Those political speculations and games of the Allies could not be kept completely under wraps, something always leaked out from the veil of secrecy and became obvious to the socio-political and military circles. Representative of the Socialist-Revolutionary faction, deputy V. Minakhoryan, speaking at the Council of Armenia during the meeting on January 25, 1919, emphasizes that “not only the neighbors want to destroy us, but England does the same. It can be said that the responsibility for 99 percent of our misfortunes falls on the allies. Today, the only practical step of our parliament should be to show that we feel and understand all those deceptions of the allies.⁴⁴²” We meet such a very remarkable testimony of the Armenian diplomatic representative of Tiflis. On September 1, 1919, the Secretary of the Parliament of Armenia H. Ter-Hakobyan says the following in his message: “From the writings of our delegation in Paris, it is clear that the British throughout their presence in the Caucasus were insincere towards us and systematically pursued a Muslim policy. Everywhere, as well as in the Caucasus, England conducts a covert Muslim policy⁴⁴³. In 1919, on March 6, RA Foreign Minister S. Tigranyan in the letter addressed to the chairman of the RA delegation in Paris A. Aharonyan, emphasized the following idea that “it seems that England does not want to rely on any Armenian power, because in its opinion, an Armenian is more Russian than a Russian, and one cannot rely on an Armenian when anything against Russia is being undertaken⁴⁴⁴,” that the British “don’t miss an opportunity to emphasize their aversion to the idea of a united Russia”⁴⁴⁵.

In reality, it was much more complicated. From the telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia on April 24, 1919, addressed to the diplomatic representative of Armenia in Tiflis, it becomes an obvious reality what behavior the British had, what interests and goals they had in the region and in particular in Armenia, which was trying to establish itself as a state, trying to get out of economic and political isolation and the clutches of hunger. Thus, it was mentioned that the British continue to take out cannons, shells, three-line bullets from Kars. The Minister of Foreign Affairs strongly interceded in the said telegram to the commander of the armed forces of the Entente countries in Transcaucasus, British General V. Thomson to cease the

⁴⁴¹ Qajaznuni Hovh. 1923:

⁴⁴² NAA, fund 198, list 1, file 15, sheet 89.

⁴⁴³ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 97, sheet 126.

⁴⁴⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 2, file 43, sheet 1.

⁴⁴⁵ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 181, part I, sheets 35-36.

withdrawal of these goods, because of dire necessity, and particularly of shells. The Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the diplomatic attaché of Armenia in Tiflis to take vigorous measures against the withdrawal of Armenian property, and at the same time, he discussed the issue of receiving clothing accessories for the needs of the army⁴⁴⁶. Furthermore, another document states about this more emphatically.

On April 30, 1919, the Prime Minister of Armenia Al. Khatisyan, during a conversation with the British Commander-in-Chief in the East G. F. Milne⁴⁴⁷, protests against the withdrawal of military property, weapons, etc. from Kars by the British, demanding to stop it. To that, G. Milne answers very ambiguously that first of all - 1) as if “the war is over, there is no need to strengthen the army, that they fought for 4 years not to strengthen the army... it is enough to have not troops, but a good gendarmerie, 2) that there is a lot of everything in Kars, especially clothes, that not all the forts were seen there, and if the British took out the artillery and ammunition from there, then it was sent to the army of General Denikin, because Denikin is fighting against the Bolsheviks, and the Bolsheviks are considered by the British serious enemies for Armenia as well, and the remaining 2 million bullets will supposedly fully satisfy Armenia’s needs⁴⁴⁸, which was not so, and Al. Khatisyan protested against it.

It should be said that the British general’s point of view did not come from a realistic, non-calculative and comprehensive and uncorrupted accounting of all factors and a sober assessment of the real geopolitical situation, in which Armenia was at that time, surrounded by enemies. He did not take into consideration that in order to solve the problems of Armenia, not only a good police force was needed to solve internal problems, but mainly a well-armed and equipped army that could provide real security guarantees to the Armenian people. And finally, it became obvious from all this that everything was adapted to the state interests of Great Britain only, and this was already destructive from the point of view of ensuring the national-state security of the Republic of Armenia.

Moreover, the study of archival documents and various other documents clearly proves that the situation in that field was much more serious and complicated than it could be imagined at first glance. The British military representation in Armenia operated in a very discreet way, covering up and encrypting all the actions of a military and political nature undertaken by it. This anti-Armenian policy was expressed more clearly and more openly later on, and particularly in the fact that the

⁴⁴⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 211, I part, sheet 92.

⁴⁴⁷ Milne George Francis (1866-1948) - general, from October, 1915 he headed the Thessaloniki expeditionary corps, and in May, 1916 he was appointed the commander-in-chief of the British forces in Macedonia, and after the armistice also in the Middle East and the Black Sea region. In 1920, on March 16, British troops under the leadership of Milne occupied Constantinople, introducing martial law there and the parliament was dissolved. In 1920 Milne was recalled from the Middle East, and beginning with February, 1926 he held the position of Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

⁴⁴⁸ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 101, sheet 48, list 114, sheet 196.

British, despite the appeal of the Armenian side and the sharp position of General Tovmas Nazarbekyan, in the middle of 1919 still continued to take away from Kars cannons (more than 60 pieces), large quantities of shells, bullets, undertook the withdrawal of automobile equipment, cotton and other property, and moved it to Musavat Baku to reinforce General Lazar Bicherakhov's⁴⁴⁹ army⁴⁵⁰. The fact that the British military authorities withdrew more than 60 cannons and a large amount of shells and bullets, automobile equipment, cotton and other property from Kars left a bad impression in the sense that it was addressed not only to Denikin but also, perhaps, only to the Azerbaijanis. Captain A. Poidebard⁴⁵¹ addresses this issue as well, mentioning the seizure of weapons by the Turks from the Russian arsenal in Kars, and instead of handing them over to the RA government, 65 cannons, six wagons of shells and several million bullets were sent to Tiflis, as a result of which the Armenians were deprived of the weapons and ammunition that are very necessary to protect the resettled immigrants. At the same time, Poidebard found that the British command had to take into consideration the power of the antiArmenian Muslim organization created by the commander of the Turkish army, General Shevki Pasha, in Kars immediately after the armistice, the propaganda of Turkish agents⁴⁵².

The RA Minister of Foreign Affairs also intervenes in the case. On April 24, 1919, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia in a telegram (N 1327) addressed to the diplomatic attaché of Armenia in Tiflis, stressed that the British continued to take out shells, three-line bullets, etc. from Kars. At the same time, he requested to intercede with General V.Thomson to stop this, citing their great need, and especially the need for shells and bullets⁴⁵³. It is clear from a number of documents that even the rank-and-file officers of the British were not very respectful, and sometimes simply showed an incorrect attitude towards the main staff and command of the Armenian Army. The British brought out not only from Kars, but also from Sarighamish and Alexandropol the above mentioned amunition, as well as railway property, machines, locomotives, wagons, etc.

⁴⁴⁹ Lazar F. Bicherakhov (Russian, November 15 (27), 1882, Saint Petersburg, Russian Empire - June 22, 1952, Dornstadt, Germany), Russian officer, participant of the World War I and Civil War in Russia. George Bicherakhov's brother. At the beginning of 1918, he formed a small detachment (about thousand people) in Persia, serving with the British. In July 1918, the detachment left the port of Bandare Anzali by sea for Baku and joined the Turkish-Azerbaijani forces defending the city (where the Baku Commune ruled at that time). During the attack of Turkish-Azerbaijani-Dagestan troops on Baku, Bicherakhov and his squad retreated to Dagestan on July 30, 1918, where they captured Derbent and Port-Petrovsk (Makhachkala) with the help of the British. In January 1919, Bicherakhov's detachment moved to Batumi, where it was formed in April 1919. The personnel and property of the detachment was transferred to the replenishment of AFSR. In 1920 he immigrated to Great Britain.

Bezugolny A. 2011: 25.

⁴⁵⁰ Mahmuryan G. 2002: 64-65; Karapetyan M. 1996: 92-93; Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 243-245; Armenian soldier 1994, June, N 10 (24).

⁴⁵¹ Antoine Poidebard (1878-1955) - archaeologist, historian, pilot, cartographer, missionary who knew Armenian well, Ter-Minasyan A. 2004.

⁴⁵² Ter-Minasyan A. 2004: 90.

⁴⁵³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 92, sheets 208-209.

It should also be added that General Nazarbekyan, protesting against these actions, believed that the actions of the Brigadier General, head of British intelligence in the Caucasus V. H. Beach⁴⁵⁴ are completely incomprehensible, in addition to the fact that the property taken out of Kars by trains by British individuals, especially the railway property, was being taken to Georgia for resale. In this connection, a question was also raised through Major Charles to urgently request General V. Thomson to prohibit illegal export of the above-mentioned products⁴⁵⁵. However, according to another version, as claimed by R. Hovhannisyan, according to the explanation given by General G. N. Cory⁴⁵⁶ (V. Thomson's successor) to the Georgian government, the Kars ammunition was not intended for the Volunteer Army, but allegedly for the Turkmen forces fighting against the Bolsheviks⁴⁵⁷. About that action, based upon M. Silikyan's report, T. Nazarbekyan and Chief of Staff, Major General H. Hakhverdyan, on May 2, 1919, reported to the Military Minister K. Araratyan: "All this leaves a depressing impression on the army and the people, especially since this property is sent to Baku, which may appear in the hands of the Azerbaijani government"⁴⁵⁸.

However, not being satisfied with that, they also took out the N 3 armored train, which was in Kars, as reported by Major General Silikyan to the Commander-in-Chief of the RA troops, T. Nazarbekyan, in his report dated May 4, 1919⁴⁵⁹. In this report, Major General M. Silikyan protested against similar unfriendly actions on the part of the British command and requested the Commander-in-Chief to initiate a petition for the recovery of all the property they had taken⁴⁶⁰.

General Nazarbekyan received the head of the Alexandropol group of troops M. Silikyan's aforementioned report, on May 5, 1919 (N 0060 / 0228) addressed to the Minister of Military Affairs, in which he asked the minister to mediate the return of the taken weapons and ammunition, the rest of the property and to stop their withdrawal without the permission of the Government of the Republic of Armenia⁴⁶¹. Finally, the Minister of Defense presents the above-mentioned letter to the Prime Minister, waiting for the necessary order in this regard. The document was signed by the Minister of Military Affairs Major General Araratyan and the acting Chief of General Staff and one

⁴⁵⁴ Beach William - the head of British military intelligence in Transcaucasus, considered the head of the political bureau of the headquarters of the British occupation forces in the Caucasus and Transcaucasus, brigadier general.

⁴⁵⁵ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 158, sheet 4, fund 200, list 1, file 92, sheet 251, file 299, sheets 4, 7.

⁴⁵⁶ George Norton Cory (1874-1968) - Major-General, from May 10, 1919 to September 6, 1919, he was the commander of the 27th Division and in general all British troops in Transcaucasus, until their withdrawal from this region.

⁴⁵⁷ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 244.

⁴⁵⁸ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 158, sheet 4.

⁴⁵⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 67 (77), sheet 20.

⁴⁶⁰ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 67 (77), sheet 20.

⁴⁶¹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 67 (77), sheet 20, fund 200, list 1, file 92, sheet 251.

of the main organizers of the intelligence work in Armenia, Colonel Zinkevich (N 00921)⁴⁶². In addition, a corresponding order is made to send copies of this document to the delegation of the Republic of Armenia in Paris (May 6, 1919, N 1553) and the Diplomatic Representative of the Republic of Armenia in Constantinople⁴⁶³.

The confirmation of this reality becomes evident from the telegram of the diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia, Khan-Tekinsky, sent on May 10, 1919, to the president of the government, F. Khan-Khoysky. "On the pretext that the Bolsheviks are threatening Baku, ask the British to transfer from Kars to Baku"⁴⁶⁴. And it is very likely that one of the main reasons for the heavy and disastrous defeat suffered by the Republic of Armenia during the Turkish-Armenian war, which began on September 23, 1920, and, in particular, the inglorious fall of Kars on October 30, are the anti-Armenian actions of the British. During the meeting at the Armenian government on June 7, 1919, Al. Khatisyan demands from English General G. Cory to stop the illegal removal of military property from Kars, as it was RA property. For that reason, General Silikyan stopped the British train, which General Thomson used as an excuse to justify the removal of military property from the fortress of Kars⁴⁶⁵. The solution to that problem was of great importance from the point of view of strengthening the defense capability of the Republic of Armenia, and it was this circumstance that the RA Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs focused on in the letter dated August 11, 1920 (N 3155) addressed to the British military representative: "At the moment when the government of the Republic is forced to organize its army in order to suppress the Tatar rebellion on the one hand and to protect its borders from the attacks of Kurdish and Turkish guerrilla groups on the other hand, at the moment when it receives munitions from the British command, taking the munitions out of Armenia would be a blow to the Armenian people, its security. The British representatives do not allow the Armenian military authorities of Kars to undertake necessary steps and make the fortress of Kars capable of defense"⁴⁶⁶.

Complaints of the RA government continue. In a letter to British military representative in Yerevan, His Excellency Colonel Sh. Baldwin, dated August 11, 1919 (N 3155), the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, informing that General Biramov and the governor of Kars had informed that Captain Evechel of the British army and two officers of Denikin's army had come to Kars to take cannons and munitions from there.

⁴⁶² Mikhail M. Zinkevich, colonel [03.01.1883 - 24.12.1944] - Until 07.1918 was in the Transcaucasus (chief of staff of the Armenian Corps). 09. 1918 - 1920 was in the Volunteer Army, actually on a permanent mission in the Republic of Armenia, the Chief of Staff of the Armenian Army, Chief of the General Staff of the RA Military Ministry.

Ganin A. 2009: 227, 460, 593, 727, 835.

⁴⁶³ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 92, sheets 251- 252.

⁴⁶⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 92, file 299, sheet 7.

⁴⁶⁵ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 114, sheet 196.

⁴⁶⁶ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 92, sheet 357a.

At almost the same time, the British Ministry of Defence simply rejected the RA government's request to establish a factory for the production of ammunition for small arms. Back on August 28, 1919, the military advisor of the RA delegation to the Paris Peace Assembly, General G. Ghorghanyan⁴⁶⁷ having meetings with representatives of the British Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defense, requests military aid and support. For this purpose, on September 1, he met with Colonel William Gibbon and presented him the information about the military forces of the Republic of Armenia, and then handed it over to the Minister of Defense W. Churchill, in which it was reported that there are 17,729 soldiers, 824 officers, 3 armored vehicles in the RA army, as well as 4843 horses⁴⁶⁸. In November 1919, H. Ohanjanyan and General G. Ghorghanyan, as part of the peace delegation of the Republic of Armenia in Europe, in Leeds, England, studied the possibility of buying a factory that could produce 12,000 bullets per day, but it turned out that the cost was high.

On December 27, 1919 (N 220/c.o), RA Prime Minister Al. Khatisyan in a letter addressed to Captain Gracie, the representative of Great Britain in Transcaucasus, stated that they are encouraged by the attitude of the allies, the British government gives them financial, material and organizational support, which is quite reasonable. He notes about the following necessary things: 1) radiograph management and assistant specialists, 2) air fleet 3) army "ammunition"-clothing manufacturing factory, 4) a highranking military officer with several assistants in the position of general instructors of the army. To overcome these difficulties, Al. Khatisyan, on behalf of the RA government, asked the British government for a loan of one million pounds at an affordable interest rate, saying that they would come to a separate agreement on the details. Al. Khatisyan assured that they would pay back the mentioned loan in installments. He emphasized on behalf of the Government that these needs are urgent and they believe that the British government will have a favorable attitude towards this issue, stressing that they need specialists and experienced leaders in several branches⁴⁶⁹.

On April 7, 1920, General G. Ghorghanyan again raises the issue of purchasing the bullet factory, urging Av. Aharonyan to allocate the money collected for these purposes at least to buy a small factory with used equipment, which could produce up to 50 thousand bullets per day, while asking the latter for permission to continue negotiations in Leeds to start a more modest venture with a company there. James Malcolm submitted the issue of the founding of such a factory in Armenia under consideration of the British government, which we learn about from the April 27

⁴⁶⁷ Gabriel G. Ghorghanyan [3.05.1880 - 8.01.1954]. He was born in the family of a nobleman; his father was Major General G. G. Ghorghanyan. Since the declaration of the First Republic, Ghorghanyan has been involved in diplomatic work as a military adviser.

⁴⁶⁸ Galoyan G. 1999: 172-173.

⁴⁶⁹ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 101, sheets 100-101.

memorandum. J. Malcolm expresses himself in favor of the desire of the Republic of Armenia to produce its own munitions, offering to transport the necessary equipment to Armenia along with the intended weapons. The British War Office, which was wary of providing Armenia with even one shipment of weapons, rejects Armenia's request. On May 12, Colonel V. H. Gibbon informs J. Malcolm that after reviewing the issue “the Army Council does not find it appropriate to support in this way”, finding that “the supply of such equipment is not necessarily in the interests of Armenia in the long term”, in connection with which even some employees of the British Foreign Office come to the opinion that it will be difficult to convince the Armenians that the British want to help the Armenians⁴⁷⁰.

On May 20, 1920, RA Prime Minister H. Ohanjanyan, the diplomatic representative of Armenia in Georgia T. Bekzadyan was asked by the British military representative in Transcaucasus, Colonel Stokes’⁴⁷¹ deputy, through Commander Harry Luke, to report to Paris, where Aharonyan was, that the British government had authorized him and Poghos Nubar to give a bond of up to one million pounds at 5 percent for 12 months for arms and equipment sold by the British government to the Armenian government⁴⁷².

Another high-ranking British official, A. McDonnell was convinced that it would be a fundamental mistake to arm Armenia and not to arm the other republics of the Caucasus, finding that such a move would nullify all sympathy for them both in Georgia and Azerbaijan, that it was this policy of supporting the Armenian armed forces in 1917 that threw Georgia and the Tatars [Azerbaijani] into the arms of their enemies, saying at the same time that refusing to supply arms to Azerbaijan would deprive them of any influence over that people, and they would certainly try to get arms from elsewhere, and if the only people receiving arms were the Armenians, they would certainly try to act in their own way⁴⁷³.

Various authors and military specialists have recorded many times that, naturally, in such a situation, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia could not effectively organize the defense of the country. Stokes stated that they refrained from supplying arms and munitions to the three republics, which would have enabled them to face various threats, including the Bolshevik threat, but at the same time emphasizing the securing of their economic and political interests in the Transcaucasian region⁴⁷⁴.

⁴⁷⁰ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: 413.

⁴⁷¹ Stokes Claude Bayfield (October 27, 1875 - December 7, 1948) - In 1907-1911 he was a military attaché in Tehran, served for many years in Asia as the intelligence department of the General Staff of the British Indian Army from the beginning of the World War I.

⁴⁷² NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 231, sheets 126-127.

⁴⁷³ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: 406-407.

⁴⁷⁴ Galoyan G. 1999: 188.

One thing was bad, that in the absence of an alternative, the calculations in many cases were based on the expected help from the Entente allies, which was well noticed by R. Hovhannisyan. “And indeed, the British infantry unit composed of Englishmen, Scotsmen and the formidable Indian Gurkha, Rajput and Punjab soldiers was the only visible external support for all the Transcaucasian republics against the renewed encroachment of the Turks from the south and the penetration of the Russians from the north”⁴⁷⁵, the announcement of the subsequent gradual withdrawal from Transcaucasus in August-September 1920 “just spread appalling across the entire Caucasus”⁴⁷⁶.

In 1920, in general, in the Armenian political-military field, as well as among the top political and military officials of the Allies, there was a half-hearted mentality that the Armenian state, which was being created and was showing development tendencies, could not be viable without Western Armenia and universally guaranteed access to the sea. It was also obvious that this calculation was built solely on external support, particularly military support, which was a pending issue. It was also clear internally that the Allies had practically failed the issue of taking over the guardianship or mandate over Armenia, and had left the option of military assistance actually. The allies, not wanting to take a direct part in these issues, shifted the center of gravity to the sphere of arms and munitions transfer to the Armenian armed forces, even though they did not show sufficient consistency and compassion here. It meant leaving the men of the Armenian state with the difficult task of opening a way for themselves and fitting into the world community of nations, being satisfied with ineffective and paper-declarative hollow words.

It became obvious that the Allies, even in the pre-August period, were not determined enough to complete the Versailles process with Germany, and even more so to be determined to the end with Turkey, in particular for its disarmament and the imposition of a full version of peace. Therefore, it seems that the British and their war office, having moved the center of gravity to the field of weapons and ammunition transfer to the armed forces of Armenia, had uncertain approaches, moreover, they connected it with the processes of withdrawing their troops from Batumi and the Transcaucasus. The British intention to subjugate the Armenian army had been a matter of contention for months in the cabinets of the British War Office, it was not aimed at strengthening the Armenian state, but was more aimed at blocking the South Caucasus from Bolshevik Russia, although there were strange deviations here as well. It was related to the long-range strategy of the British cabinet, allegedly for the sake of securing appropriate trade and economic interests with Soviet Russia for the beginning, or in the case of Turkey, in the case of new

⁴⁷⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2014: 23.

⁴⁷⁶ Hovhannisyan R. 2014: 23.

military-political developments, to support their ambiguous intentions to have their military-political interests in the Middle Eastern region.

Throughout 1919 and the first half of 1920, the RA delegates made attempts to “convince” the Allies to show proper determination to go all the way in the restrictions against Turkey stipulated by Mudros, but they did not take any serious measures to deprive Turkey of the huge reserves of arms and ammunition that it had and practically did not prevent the Turks from taking possession of the extremely rich warehouses of munitions and weapons, artillery, and firearms left in Erzurum after the retreat of the Russian army. Moreover, the Turks, taking advantage of the allies' indecisiveness, insufficient consistency, and the almost absence of control operations, in order to undermine the foundations of the newly created Armenian state and military forces, in order to fulfill their intentions to create a foothold in the Caucasus in the form of Azerbaijan and Georgia, sent agents, spies, to provide arms and ammunition to the anti-Armenian forces, forming insurgent-rebellious forces in different regions of Armenia, inciting them to oppose the pro-Armenian decisions of the allied states and the Paris Peace Assembly.

The situation was getting worse, because Azerbaijan and Georgia in particular became the owners of the rich heritage left after the collapse of the Russian Empire: Russian imperial arsenals, munitions and other property, which did not satisfy them, and even after the defeat of the White armies, the Georgians and Azerbaijanis took possession of their huge stocks of weapons and munitions. General G. Ghorghanyan in the cabinets of the British Ministry of Defense, trying to ensure the resolution of the issues of finding military support and inviting military instructors for the reorganization and modernization of the Armenian army, linking the needs and capabilities of the armed forces with the liberation of Western Armenia and the gradual establishment of the Armenian state there, still did not achieve the expected results. G. Ghorghanyan did not receive any real promises and commitments from the British War Office⁴⁷⁷, and the Minister of Defense W. Churchill had an unenthusiastic premonition that any munitions would end up only in the hands of the Red Army and the Turkish nationalists, which made sense, since the British Cabinet had already adopted a different strategy, deciding to pull the defensive line back to the railway tracks in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Birjand in north-eastern Persia, and under such conditions it was considered expensive and dangerous to maintain an isolated British garrison at Batumi. This was explained by the advance of the Red Army and the threat of a joint Soviet-Turkish invasion, which would endanger the small number of British troops and force the British unit to leave Batumi in an inglorious manner⁴⁷⁸. However, it is quite another thing to claim that, as stated in an archive document, the British Government provided the Armenian army with weapons and ammunition for

⁴⁷⁷ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: 398.

⁴⁷⁸ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: 399, 404.

a 40,000-strong army, which at the prices of that time was worth 1,200,000 pounds⁴⁷⁹. but as accurately stated by Al. Khatisyan, “the Armenians accused the British of the fact that the weapon arrived too late, that the weapon was not of the type that the Armenian soldiers were used to, and these accusations and dissatisfaction coincided with the disastrous outcome of the Armenian-Turkish War in the autumn of 1920”⁴⁸⁰.

By the way, the 22 airplanes bought by the Ankara government in Germany were delivered to Turkey through the territory of Russia without any customs and tax duties. From the port of Novorossiysk, the planes were quickly brought to the Turkish coast by the ship "Shakhin" in great secrecy. The delivery of the planes coincided with the attack of the Turkish army, they were successfully deployed on the Anatolian front.

In the same way, arms and ammunition were sent from Novorossiysk to Turkey. Three Soviet submarines were used for the transportation of diplomatic delegations and envoys between Sevastopol and Inebolu⁴⁸¹. On March 27, 1920, French Marshal Foch wrote to the Turkish government: “Russia’s continued sea supplies at any cost, as well as the unprecedented self-sacrifice of the Turkish people, will never put them in a difficult situation.” According to modern researchers, in total, Russia provided assistance to the national liberation movement of Turkey in the amount of about 80 million Turkish golden liras, which was more than half of the Mejlis budget in the early 1920s.

Soviet specialists helped to regulate military production. Under their leadership, two gunpowder factories were built, and Russia provided financial assistance to purchase field printers and film equipment. M. V. Frunze handed over 100,000 roubles in gold to the Turkish authorities in Trabzon to build an orphanage for children who lost their parents during the war. An abstract from M.K. Atatürk’s letter to Lenin states: “In terms of history, filled with the bloody wars that took place for centuries between the Turks and the Russians, such a rapid reconciliation between us astonished other nations. Turkey is closer to Russia, especially the Russia of recent months, than to Western Europe. Turkey will not back down from its course towards Soviet Russia, and all rumors to the contrary are baseless. I assure you that we will never sign an agreement or enter into an alliance directly or indirectly against Soviet Russia.”⁴⁸²

In this regard, professor of political science and history A. Andersen, and the researcher from Georgian Technical University and State University, cartographerhistorian G. Partkhaladze have a very interesting standpoint: “The naivety of the political leadership of Armenia was also expressed in the development of relations with the South Caucasian neighbors, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Here

⁴⁷⁹ NAA, fund 200, list 1, file 498, sheet 768, fund 199, list 1, file 146, sheet 96. Khatisean 1968: 183.

⁴⁸⁰ Khatisean Al. 1968: 183.

⁴⁸¹ Embassy Russia in Ankara: 2021.

⁴⁸² Embassy of Russia in Ankara: 2021.

the leaders of Armenia assumed that the territorial conflicts that had arisen would be resolved by the great powers in their favor as a reward for the Armenian efforts during the war and accordingly refused to resolve them through negotiations with the neighbors. As a result of such an approach, Armenia's military conflict with Georgia at the end of 1918 caused significant damage to both, and a long "hybrid" war began between Armenia and Azerbaijan for control of the disputed territories of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan, which was accompanied by the most brutal ethnic cleansing and was partially interrupted only by the fall of the two republics. During those conflicts, the command of the British armed forces, which was entrusted with the exercise of control over the Eastern Mediterranean region (the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Caucasus and the Northern Mediterranean region) and assumed the role of "objective and honest mediator", actually stood by the side of oil-rich Azerbaijan, in particular when the Karabakh issue was on the agenda.⁴⁸³ Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the conflict that arose parallel to it and was provoked by the efforts of the British military-political mission based on the right of the owner in the Transcaucasus and the Republic of Armenia and by the hollow declarative regulations, and later exacerbated by the imperial policy of even more Bolshevik Russia, with the foci of new conflicts in Sharur-Nakhichevan, Syunik-Zangezur and other legal territories of Armenia, became a permanent conflict and a process threatening the Transcaucasus, the roots of which with some intervals come from the depth of almost 100 years, again became a topic of severe tension during the Azerbaijani-Turkish aggression against Armenia in the autumn of 2020, at the same time acquiring new colors of tension and features in the conditions of deaf solidarity of European countries and the Russian Federation:

1) Turkey was involved in the active conflict, including the elite Turkish Special Forces, which had been trained in punitive operations against the Kurds, enjoying the concession of NATO, thus becoming an important factor threatening the peace of the region.

2) Russia's new position was sudden and can be interpreted from the starting point of the strategy of imperialism, which openly repelled and alienated Armenia, and unlike the 1991-1994 war, when it seemed to favor the Armenian side in some issues in the Karabakh problem, which was a result of its unstable and unclear geopolitical situation, in 2020 did not show any significant support to Armenia within the framework of the existing alliance, and even on the contrary, openly supported Azerbaijan, strengthening close and friendly ties with Turkey, as it was during the 1920-1921 cooperation, and the main propagandists of the Moscow Kremlin without hesitation put the blame for the Karabakh conflict on the Republic of Armenia, claiming that Azerbaijan only "liberated" its legally "occupied territories." As a result, what happened was what the Allied

⁴⁸³ Andersen, Partskhaladze 2020; Virabyan: 2021: 72.

European-Entente powers did in 1918-1920, using the human and other resources of the Armenian people during the war, they began to consider the small, but rich in natural resources, Armenia as a saucer full of problems, not at all in a hurry and not wanting to meet its just territorial demands, even questioning the existence of its independent statehood and the preservation of territorial integrity within its current borders.

The peculiarity of the 1918-1920 situation and the developments had such content that no matter how much the government of the Republic of Armenia made its best, as it was not sufficiently experienced in only two years, not much could be achieved. Moreover, we should mention about the black gold of Baku, the oil, on which the British focused on. The Republic of Armenia born in Sardarapat was shattered, and Russia, together with Turkey, left only a small, fragmented Armenia to survive under the Soviet veil, under the dictates of the Moscow Kremlin. Azerbaijan took Artsakh-Syunik, Nakhichevan and other territories from Armenia with the active support of Bolshevik Russia, Great Britain, and Turkey, and during that time many Russian and Georgian officers and soldiers served in the Azerbaijani army.

Naturally, in those years, it was not possible to arm the more or less complete Armenian army, provide it with military equipment, the obstacles and biased solutions were numerous.

On March 10, 1919 (N 60) in Georgia, the military attaché of the RA, Major General H. Kishmishyan⁴⁸⁴ reported in the secret report submitted to the Minister of Defense that he together with the RA diplomatic commissioner in Tiflis L. Yevangulyan and Umikyan, left for Batumi to receive the bullets, artillery shells, as well as the French airplanes brought by the steamer "Cossack" and transport them to Armenia. It was said that upon arriving in Batumi, they hear the declaration of the British command that they do not have the right to allow the transportation of bullets and shells. They applied to General Milne for permission. RA military attaché in Tiflis, General H. Kishmishyan informed that in the conditions of such an attitude of the English command, he and Yevangulyan made a mutual decision to send the cargo to Poti. However, due to the fact that the crew of the steamer was in a Bolshevik mood and threatened to throw the cargo into the sea, they hired a special guard of three people, who, together with two Cossacks, were supposed to guard the cargo until it reached Poti, accompanied by an officer of the Volunteer Army and Second Lieutenant Umikyan, who was to take care of sending the cargo to Armenia. Referring to the issue of airplanes, General Kishmishyan reported that the British command has again created obstacles on the way to transfer them to Armenia, again insisting that they should contact General Milne. It was said that the negotiations conducted together with Yevangulyan and Umikyan in order to resolve the

⁴⁸⁴ Hovsep A. Kishmishyan (Kishmishev) (born in Tiflis, 1881 - 1921). Was an assistant prosecutor of the Caucasus Military District Court in 1916-1917, and a military representative (military attaché) of the diplomatic representation of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia from July 1919.

Virabyan V. 2015: 37-42, 50-52, 151-153, 258- 267 etc. Gogitidze, Bezhitashvili 2014: 64.

issue did not lead to any results, based on which they requested the support of the RA Military Minister⁴⁸⁵.

On March 24, 1920 (N 71), General Kishmishyan informed the Chief of the RA General Staff that the cargo with bullets and shells was not even allowed to be unloaded at the port by the order of the British command of Batumi, and the steamer “Cossack” was sent to Poti for a raid, from where the cargo had to be loaded into wagons to send to Armenia⁴⁸⁶. Already on March 29, 1920 (N 71), General Kishmishyan in a letter addressed to the Assistant Minister of Defense of Georgia reported that according to the verbal negotiations between Minister of Defense Lordkipanidze and Yevangulyan, he had the honor to ask not to reject the written order, so that the Georgian government would not create obstacles in case of transit through Georgia⁴⁸⁷.

On April 3, 1920 (N 100), in the report submitted to the Minister of Military Affairs, General Kishmishyan reported that the complete device and 4 new English-made 1916 “Sopwich Triplan”⁴⁸⁸ destroyer airplanes, which were imported by the Georgian authorities, are in their hangars⁴⁸⁹.

On April 5, 1920 (N 110), General Kishmishyan reported on the receipt of 1,200,000 bullets and artillery property sent from the Volunteer Army by the steamer “Cossack”, which arrived in Batumi on March 5 and encountered obstacles from the British to settle it. Kishmishyan and Umikyan are going to Batumi to find means to deliver them to Poti, while having the Deputy Military Minister General Prince A. K. Gedevanov’s⁴⁹⁰ assurance that the necessary orders have been made by him. Meanwhile, the representative of the Volunteer Army, General Porokhonsky, comes forward, allowing the steamer “Cossack” to go to Poti, on the condition that the ship will be supplied with coal, but the British do not allow it to stop in the port and sent it to sail. However, it doesn’t help either, because they fail to convince the British, who this time claim that they cannot release the cargo without a written agreement from the Georgian government, to solve which, Umikyan goes to Tiflis and meets with Gedevanov to get permission.

The ship arrives in Poti on March 21. The People's Guard intervenes in the course of the case and a new misunderstanding occurs, which declares that without permission of N. Zhordania and V. Jughely the cargo will not be released from Poti. In the current situation, Umikyan leaves for Tiflis, and together with Prince Mikael Tumanyan⁴⁹¹, advisor of the RA diplomatic representation in

⁴⁸⁵ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 209, sheets 60-60.

⁴⁸⁶ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 209, sheet 68.

⁴⁸⁷ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 209, sheet 82.

⁴⁸⁸ Hovhannisyan R. 2005: 14.

⁴⁸⁹ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 209, sheet 108.

⁴⁹⁰ General A. K. Gedevanov (16.02.1870 -1933, general since 1914).

Jamalian 1928: 85; Gogitidze 2001: 74; Hayazn, Ghazaryan 2009: 290.

⁴⁹¹ Mikael G. Tumanyan (b. November 28, 1887, Tiflis). A lawyer by profession. In 1930s was the last victim of Stalinist violence. M. Tumanyan was an adviser to the RA diplomatic mission in Tiflis, actually being the second person after the diplomatic chargé d'affaires.

Georgia, goes to meet with the assistant of the Georgian Foreign Minister Karpivadze, who informs that it is not allowed to transport military goods in transit, that they put veto also on the Azerbaijani cargo. Umikyan disputes that question, saying that Georgia acted like that in terms of the transit cargo of Azerbaijan in connection with some events that took place at the Yalam station. The Georgian side reports that they reached an agreement as a result of the negotiations conducted by Yevangulyan with Lordkipanidze. At that time, Karpivadze announced that if the Armenian side gives at least 50 thousand bullets to Georgia, then they will find it possible to tell Azerbaijan that they have seized part of the cargo, to which the Armenian side categorically refuses. However, two days later, Karpivadze informs that all obstacles have been overcome, and Umikyan was received by the Chairman of the Government of Georgia, informing him about the obstacles. On March 26, Zhordania gave his consent and handed him a letter signed by the Secretary of the Council of Ministers Tsitsadze, after which Umikyan left for Poti.

However, the events took a surprising turn again, because Umikyan had not yet reached Poti, when on March 29, Zhordania's telegram (N 1198) was received with the order to immediately take the cargo to the Tiflis arsenal. The Armenian guard was removed, the keys of 14 locks were taken from Umikyan. Everything starts again, Umikyan meets with Karpivadze and receives his assurance that there are no more obstacles and the Armenian side can receive the cargo from Tiflis. On March 29, General H. Kishmishyan meets with Gedevanov and negotiates again, after which on March 31 General Gedevanov orders an armed guard of 10 men and an officer to accompany the cargo to Sanahin, which reaches Armenia on April 8, despite countless obstacles from the Georgian side⁴⁹².

On July 1, 1920 (No. 3), Colonel R. Martirosyan, on behalf of the representatives of the RA Military Ministry, informed the Minister of Defense that on May 17, according to the order, they left for Crimea, Sevastopol, where the Russian army representation was located, as well as the RA diplomatic representation. They tried to receive from Colonel Turbin information regarding the Artillery Department, as the Russian side promised to show support. Despite the difficulties of the Russian army in Crimea, however, Colonel Turbin promised to support by giving one million bullets for Armenian needs, adding that in a few days he will be able to provide another 2 million bullets⁴⁹³. It was reported that Lieutenant Umikyan arrived in Sevastopol on July 4, who, together with Saghatelyan presented General Shatilov, assistant commander-in-chief, new demands. Only on July 4, Umikyan was attacked by the authorities as a result of his separate activities, and said that the representatives of the RA government, on behalf of General Kishmishyan and others, had reached an agreement with the Georgian military ministry to share the munitions from Crimea, and

⁴⁹² NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 209, sheets 114-116.

⁴⁹³ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 154, sheets 204, 207.

until then, they decide to take the promised 3 million bullets on the ship "Phoenix", as was agreed with Yervand Ter-Minasyan in Batumi.

The two Armenian military representatives acted separately from each other, and it was too problematic, but both sides were interested in the issue and wanted to resolve it as soon as possible, using the transit provided by Georgia. However, it was reported by Colonel Martirosyan, they were meeting in Crimea with another representative group of the RA Military Ministry, Captain Aniyev and M. Makaryan, which were authorized by the Military Minister, without waiting for information from the RA representative in Tiflis about those, who were already in Crimea. Satisfaction was expressed that thanks to the agreement reached by their representative office in Tbilisi with the Government of Georgia, it was possible to solve the issue of 3 million bullets, dividing it equally between Georgia and Armenia, and moreover, it was possible to get aluminum under certain conditions, assuring that in the near future it will be possible to get another million bullets, if the course of events would be favorable for the Armenian representatives. It was emphasized that the responsibility of receiving those bullets was placed on Umikyan, who remained in Crimea to finish the negotiations. In addition, they receive a promise from Turbin that in the near future they will also receive a thousand machine guns, cannon bombs and other generally necessary munitions⁴⁹⁴.

On July 24, 1920 (N 1292), the assistant to the Military Minister of the RA, acting Chief of the General Staff, went on a business trip, receiving General Hovh. Hakhverdyan's resolution, stating that according to General Kishmishyan, Lieutenant Umikyan, according to the order of the Minister of Defense, was sent to South Russia to purchase a large amount of ammunition. Baghdasaryan set the problem of finding out the course of the business trip of Captain Aniyev and M. Makaryan, because he personally did not know about it. Baghdasaryan reported that he only learned that they went to Theodosia to bring back the 500,000 bullets already bought and taken by Shkuro. It was recorded that if General Kishmishyan knew about this before giving additional assignment to Aniyev and Makaryan, then, of course, he should have instructed Lieutenant Umikyan to arrive in Crimea, first of all find Aniyev and Makaryan and act in full cooperation with them. A question was raised that if General Kishmishyan knew about the new assignment given to Aniyev and Makaryan, then the misunderstanding was the omission of him and Umikyan. On July 24, B. Baghdasaryan, Acting Chief of the General Staff, sent copies of this letter to the General Artillery Department on behalf of the Military Minister, with a request to inform him regarding the report addressed to the Military Minister, which was done⁴⁹⁵.

However, the problem does not end there. In connection with this case, Military Minister R. Ter-Minasyan ordered on July 27, 1920 (Bx 1321) to check the following: 1) on what basis were

⁴⁹⁴ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 154, sheet 204.

⁴⁹⁵ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 154, sheet 206.

Aniyev and Makaryan allegedly already delegated, and Umikyan was sent along with them with new instructions and new conditions, 2) why there was a contradiction and dualism in the case, 3) then it is required to inform General Kishmishyan⁴⁹⁶.

On August 11, 1919 (N 8), the representative of the Military Ministry of the RA in Tiflis, military attaché General Kishmishyan, in a report sent to the Military Minister, states that the Armenian troops are in need of three-line bullets, he and the mission's advisor M. Tumanyan appealed to the British High Command with the request. It was reported that in response to their petition, they received an answer from the British that they did not have such bullets at their disposal. At that time, as Kishmishyan reports, they asked if there might be any of them in Batumi, whose chief of staff, General Cory, replied that they should contact Colonel Bellew for information, who, however, denied the existence of the bullets, hinting at the same time that the bullets can be found in Tiflis. Accordingly, Kishmishyan asks the British to provide them with transportation means to take cargo to Yerevan, and gets an agreement to load two wagons, based on which Makaryan promises to deliver 30-40 thousand bullets. Kishmishyan informs that according to their information, there are many war reserves in the Neutral Zone of Lori, especially in the village of Uzunlar⁴⁹⁷. As it turns out from Kishmishyan's report of August 15, 1919 (N 128), they learned from the representative of the Volunteer Army, Dan, about the telegram of General Sannikov, according to which the General Staff was ready to give our representative 1 million bullets, and the Armenian side, in its turn, should give two million Lebel cartridges. Kishmishyan reports that they have given their consent, while taking measures to deliver immediately the bullets to Armenia⁴⁹⁸.

Kishmishyan's report to the RA Military Minister dated August 16, 1919 (No. 8), again refers to the acquisition of bullets in Tiflis. It was reported that the Minister of Foreign Affairs received irrefutable assurances from Advisor Tumanyan that a sufficient amount of bullets would be sent from Tiflis, but later it turned out that difficulties suddenly arose with the purchase of bullets due to the risk of arrest by civil authorities, as well as the unwillingness of the owners of these goods, which was reported to the British authorities, and on August 11, also to the Georgian government. It was reported that in any case, efforts are being made to send the English echelon, new sources of ammunition purchase are being considered, noting that this task is assigned to Makaryan, the property manager of the mission's military department. It was said that when the number of bullets reaches 20-25 thousand, they will be sent to Armenia by the military representative of France in Armenia A. Poidebard. A telephone and several topographical maps will be sent along with that cargo, which will be brought to Armenia accompanied by an English officer. Kishmishyan reported

⁴⁹⁶ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 154, sheet 206.

⁴⁹⁷ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 177, sheet 25.

⁴⁹⁸ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 177, sheet 36.

that another million bullets were expected from the Volunteer Army, but to find out the details, appropriate instructions were given to Lieutenant Aniyev in Batumi. It was mentioned that in any case, every effort was being made to organize the transit of these goods through the British⁴⁹⁹.

In another report of August 16, 1919 (N 134) addressed to the RA Military Minister, General Kishmishyan once again refers to the problems of weapons and ammunition, stating that on August 14, Colonel Zinkevich, Major General Voskresensky arrived in Tiflis with an escort group alongside with General Baratov. There was talk of providing 1 million bullets. According to Kishmishyan, General Baratov promises to support, offering to contact Colonel Dan. The latter promises to help, saying that a month or two ago they contacted Ekaterinodar with a request to facilitate the purchase or exchange with "Lebel". Later, he finally informs that at the last moment the British prevented him from taking advantage of the created opportunity⁵⁰⁰.

⁴⁹⁹ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 17, sheet 45.

⁵⁰⁰ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 177, sheets 47-48.

Chapter 7.

THE QUESTION OF THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA IN 1918-1920

In 1917-1918, the unpredictable course of events led to the re-establishment of the Armenian statehood, which forced the creation of its own armed forces as a guarantee of its existence, which made the young republic dependent on almost all powers in terms of arms acquisition, in particular after the October 1917 Russian coup. From the Entente countries, Britain and France, which became major actors in the Transcaucasian region and were guided by their hidden deep interests, the assistance to the Republic of Armenia was conditional, partial, inadequate and in many cases outdated. Allied military-political representations in Transcaucasia and Armenia gradually replaced the initially cautious approach with outspoken pro-Muslim practices, and the interests of Britain and other countries became more in tune with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Armenia appeared in the role of a beggar for help, including the delivery of weapons and ammunition, which was incomplete, low-quality, accidental, completely outdated.

In the spring of 1920, the British version of reorganizing and arming the Armenian army seemed to be on the agenda, and it seemed that it could become sort of a support for Armenia's many problems, and contribute to the delayed establishment of the army. At the same time Av. Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar added to the issue of problematic weapons and ammunition for the Armenian army, the issue of inviting military advisers, instructors and inspectors, the memorandum about which was sent through the RA Foreign Ministry to the conference of the allied powers in London in March 1920, but received their skeptical and evasive response, which was followed by the incomprehensible struggles especially in the British cabinet and in particular in the British Ministry of War (War Office), causing some disappointment in the Armenian party and military circles. The issues of financing the invitation of no less than 30-40 councilors went from one cabinet to another, and although J. Malcolm asked for an annual loan of 100,000 pounds for five years, Av. Aharonyan and P. Nubar expressed readiness to provide bonds, as in the case of providing American flour, but the case took a diametrically different course. During that time, the discussions were artificially prolonged, the amount of the loan was increased to 500 000 pounds, which would make the work of British advisers possible, but the end of April came, and neither the treasury nor the war ministry moved even a bit, because sending them to the Republic of Armenia without their support was considered a dangerous occupation.

In regard to the “borrowing of independence” in July 1920, Al. Khatisyan visits the British Foreign Ministry and again requests to send military as well as financial advisers, not denying the lack of funds on behalf of RA and assuring the request for the salary to be paid or to compensate the experts in a loan or other way. The British Army Council reacts, and Curzon finds further steps in that direction desirable, and the ice seems to be melting. Ideally, the advisors would be headed by a division general attached to the RA Military Ministry, assisted by three senior colonels, who would be responsible for infantry, cavalry and artillery training, and oversee artillery, supply and medical services. The reorganized 40,000-strong army was to consist of 30,000 infantrymen, who would be deployed in 3 military divisions, each consisting of 3 brigades (brigades), each of which in turn would consist of 3 battalions. 2,000 horsemen were to be divided into 5 regiments, each with 400 swordsmen, and the artillery force was to consist of 3,000 men, the other services - 5,000 men. Over a dozen British officers were to be attached to the infantry, 2 to the cavalry, 3 to the artillery, and 5 to the other services. According to that draft, the officers would not be limited to an advisory status, but would also have broad executive authority. Along with that, working conditions were defined: salary, business trips, customs duties, etc⁵⁰¹. However, everything was predetermined from the beginning, and on August 26, the British Foreign Ministry only informed the Ministry of War about the negative decision. "taking into account the peace terms recently concluded between the Armenian government and the Soviet authorities of Russia, according to the news, His Excellency considers that the proposal to send British officers to the Armenian army should be suspended for the time being"⁵⁰², although the opposite issue was also raised - the sending of Armenian officers abroad. From this point of view, the meeting of the government on March 7, 1920, which, based on the report of the Military Minister, decided to send 8 officers abroad, opening a loan of about 6 million rubles for this purpose⁵⁰³.

As directly testified by R. Hovhannisyan, the delivery of 25,000 rifles and 40,000 uniforms by the British Ministry of Defense should have been made only after Av. Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar Pasha signed for the transportation costs and to deposit the treasury bonds required by the English Bank, i.e. to give them to the British⁵⁰⁴. The Bolshevik riots of May jeopardized the implementation of that deal, and despite a number of expressions in the British cabinet regarding the fate of the Yerevan government, in the end, unlike the British negative approach to the aircraft, Osborne even declared that British promises to Armenia should be honored, even if Armenia should adopt the Soviet regime⁵⁰⁵.

⁵⁰¹ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 415.

⁵⁰² Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 416.

⁵⁰³ Protocols of the sessions of the Government of the Republic of Armenia, 2014: 405-406.

⁵⁰⁴ Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 563.

⁵⁰⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 424

In London in April 1920, Colonel Cl. Stokes meets with Deputy Foreign Minister J. Tilly and continues to put pressure on the Foreign Office, receiving an offer from him on 3 April to return to Transcaucasia to replace the ailing Chief Commissioner J. Oliver Wardrop, but Stokes persisted, saying that the appointment would be of no use to him if only the Armenians were to receive arms. Colonel Cl. Stokes is worried by British Assistant Foreign Secretary John Anthony Cecil Tilly's explanations that whatever the actions of Great Britain are, a decision has already been made to provide Armenians with means for self-defense and that Armenia's interests should be paramount in terms of military supplies. Stokes counters this by arguing that such a policy would "throw Azerbaijan into the arms of the Turks" and, as the Azerbaijanis fear being left at the fragile mercy of the Armenians, it would lead to confrontation and a joint Turkish-Azerbaijani attack. Thus, supplying arms only to the Armenians would actually be a very disservice to them, not to mention the elimination of all British influence in Baku.⁵⁰⁶ This position of Stokes was enough that, after a conversation with Lord Curzon, it was decided to allocate certain quantities of weapons both in Azerbaijan and in Georgia. Stokes believed that Armenia, in the interests of survival, should make friends with Azerbaijan and Georgia, which should be equally armed, which allegedly could contribute to their rapprochement, which J. Milne was categorically against it, although in the end, after a struggle, there was even a proposal to put the control of the distribution of weapons and ammunition on the same Stokes and a number of other officers⁵⁰⁷.

Prime Minister Khatisyan's circular of March 8, 1920 (N 602) related to the principle regulation of military administration is one of the interesting steps on the way to establishing the army: "in non-coded telegrams, never touch on matters of war or national defense and security"⁵⁰⁸.

Nevertheless, even the delivery of ammunition, weapons and clothing by the British was not done "cleanly", because as the subsequent processes showed, a significant part of the rifles supplied to the Armenian Army turned out to be unusable, to which the Government of the Republic of Armenia on May 19, 1920, listening to the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in English of a proposal to buy arms worth a million pounds, approved and authorized the Armenian delegation to sign the proposed terms. The Treasury allocated 75 percent of the market price for arms and ammunition, 5 percent for munitions, 50 percent for used clothing, 100 percent for new clothing, and 75 percent for harnesses and saddles⁵⁰⁹.

In the period from May 1 to October 20, 1920, 29,000 sets of clothing (coats, jackets, hats, shoes) and weapons (cartridges, belts, water bottles, etc.) were received from Great Britain and allocated to the Armenian army, as well as 25,000 units of firearm. A significant part of the rifles

⁵⁰⁶ Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 545.

⁵⁰⁷ Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 545.

⁵⁰⁸ NAA, fund 210, list 1, file 7, sheet 34.

⁵⁰⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 146, sheet 96.

supplied to the Armenian army turned out to be unusable. Military historian Artsrun Hovhannisyan has a very subtle observation-clarification regarding the above: often the names of the weapons and other technical details were wrongly stated. According to A. Hovhannisyan's Canadian rifles mentioned above are sometimes mistakenly called "Bosh" in Armenian literature. The hand machine guns were of the American "Lewis" model. The combat qualities of Canadian rifles were considered by the Armenian military to be heavy, inconvenient and useless, and in fact they had problems that the Canadian troops had abandoned during the First World War. According to the author, "they had certain problems with reliability, and even English and Canadian sources admit it. The Armenian sources spoke negative about the combat qualities of Canadian rifles."⁵¹⁰ In particular, such an opinion was voiced by S. Vracyan, the famous Hajduk captain K. Sasuni, that those rifles were heavy, uncomfortable and unusable...the weapons actually had problems. During the First World War, they were happy to give them up⁵¹¹. However, later, military scientist Artsrun Hovhannisyan, in the second volume of his absolutely spectacular book "Art of War" published in 2020, contradicting himself a little, which sounds subjective, states: "However, we believe that our sources are also somewhat exaggerating everything and seem to be trying to find an additional excuse for further defeats. The author in Great Britain personally had the opportunity to interact with and even shoot this weapon and make sure that in fact the weapon is a very powerful and especially accurate rifle, it just has some problems with the bolt and required some skill to operate it."⁵¹² Observing this issue, it is difficult to agree with Y. Ter-Hakobyan that during the Turkish-Armenian war of 1920, the Armenian army was "well dressed and armed thanks to the British assistance... the Armenian soldier was no longer naked, but was clothed from head to toe like the British army"⁵¹³, which is completely denied by the many facts brought by us, the fact that it was just outdated weaponry that the British did not need, that was lying in the British military reserves as a reserve product, etc. On May 10, 1920, during the meeting of the United Delegation, Poghos Nubar Pasha again discussed the issues of army organization and recruitment, but many uncertainties were clearly seen. Italian Prime Minister Francesco Nitti⁵¹⁴ speaking about the number and capacity of the Armenian army in connection with the report to General Gabriel Ghorghanyan, states that in terms of expectations, if they have ammunition,

they can increase the number of the army to 40 thousand, saying that the British have sent, and the Greek government sent a thousand rifles, but as it turned out later, a significant part of the

⁵¹⁰ Hovhannisyan A. 2020: 2, 170, 248-249.

⁵¹¹ Vracyan S. 1993: 508; Sasuni K. 1926: N 5, 80.

⁵¹² Hovhannisyan A. 2020: 249.

⁵¹³ Ter-Hakobyan Ya. 1921: 86.

⁵¹⁴ Francesco Severio Nitti (1868-1953) - Nitti Francesco Severio Vincenzo de Paola, Italian politician and statesman, Prime Minister of Italy from June 23, 1919 to June 15, 1920.

British weapons was simply not suitable⁵¹⁵. The British and their war office shifted the center of gravity to the field of weapons and ammunition transfer to the armed forces of Armenia, and here they had uncertain approaches, moreover, they confused it with the processes of withdrawing their troops from Batumi and Transcaucasia. The British intention to subjugate the Armenian army had been a subject of controversy for months in the cabinets of the British Ministry of War, it was not aimed at strengthening the Armenian state, but was more aimed at blocking the South Caucasus from Bolshevik Russia, although there were deviations here as well. It was related to the long-range strategy of the British cabinet, ostensibly for the sake of securing appropriate commercial and economic interests with Soviet Russia for the beginning or, in the case of Turkey, for the life support of ambiguous intentions to have their interests in the Middle Eastern corridor in the event of new military and political developments, which were already noticeable and still uncertain at that time, but already from the starting points of the new strategy being outlined. Here it is appropriate to add that it was not at all a manifestation of a benevolent attitude on the part of the British, or at all it was not aimed at providing disinterested assistance to the "friendly" Armenian state in the creation of its armed forces. The May 1920 Bolshevik riots led to Allies' dissatisfaction with the RA government and seemed to jeopardize the implementation of the deal, and despite a number of statements in the British cabinet regarding the fate of the Yerevan government, in contrast to the British negative approach to aircraft, Osborne even stated that British promises to Armenia must be honored even if Armenia accepts a Soviet regime of government⁵¹⁶, while demanding severe punishment for the rioting Bolsheviks. In this regard, Art. One can hardly agree with a controversial statement of Hovhannisyan, which is also denied by the many archival and other facts cited above: "At first glance, especially in the case of the supply of aircraft, the unfriendliness of the British Ministry of Defense is obvious, they really did not want to provide aircraft, but on the other hand, it was a clear truth that such devices are very expensive and complicated, and their operation is problematic for the Armenian side. At the same time, it will be more useful to use that money for other weapons, which the Armenian army needed more... airplanes were considered a strategic, political weapon at that time. Providing such funds is quite problematic, and the British authorities were afraid that these funds would end up in the hands of the Bolsheviks.⁵¹⁷" Such an interpretation is unfounded, especially since with the Sovietization of Armenia, those weapons would either fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks or their friendly and allied Turks, and how it happened.

And yet the political calculations were in most cases based on the expected help from the Entente allies, on the British infantry stationed in the Transcaucasus, which was the only visible

⁵¹⁵ Aharonyan A. 2011: 118.

⁵¹⁶ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 424.

⁵¹⁷ Hovhannisyan A. 2020: 2, 250-251.

external support for all the Transcaucasian republics against renewed Turkish encroachments from the south and Russian infiltration from the north. In that sense, the announcement about the unexpected withdrawal of those troops from the Transcaucasus in August-September 1920 shocked the naive Caucasian peoples, because such disloyalty and deceit were not expected. After that, the promises of military assistance by the British and other allies also became inconsistent, particularly for the Republic of Armenia, which was already considered a doomed and hopeless state, and its people were even subject to the end, which no one really wanted to help, and the Italians also found it unprofitable to deal with Armenia. , which led to the disastrous and capitulation Turkish-Armenian war in the autumn of 1920, when Armenia fell from the supposed "heights" of Sevres and even at that moment, not sobering up from the Sevres scandal, begged for salvation from the allies, and in particular from Great Britain. The British rifle and trooper, as Oliver Baldwin, an officer of the Armenian yard, was keenly aware, turned out to be useless and useless, the Armenian army, which was praised externally by the allies, suffered a crushing defeat from the Turks, and the Armenian government, stubbornly clinging to the Treaty of Sèvres, in the infamous "negotiations" of Alexandropol by Kyazim Karabekir⁵¹⁸ signed the unconditional capitulation of the Treaty of Sèvres under heavy bayonets, followed by the fall of the First Republic and the inevitable and forced Sovietization, which was almost repeated in the 2020 Artsakh War, when the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish forces capitulated the Third Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Armenia, begging for help, was shamefully left blind. during the process, both by the OSCE Minsk Group and by the allied countries of Azerbaijan in that war, and especially by the Russian Federation, for which it seems that the Armenian people were not on the map and could not be seen.

Nevertheless, during that entire period, RA tried to solve the problems. still on March 20, 1920, the Council of Ministers heard the report of the Minister of Military Affairs on a number of issues, including 1) in terms of giving officers 1000 rubles each for summer uniforms, the question should be addressed to the Allied Powers and rejected, 2) first of all, meet the needs of the troops, leaving out 16,000 bushels of flour and 4,000 bushels of rice or semolina per month and decides to satisfy it, 3) To ask the Allied countries for linen, footwear and clothing for 30,000 people, as well as 30,000 Lebel rifles, 10 million Lebel bullets and tri-barreled rifles bullets, and finally goods-carrying, passenger-carrying and sanitary vehicles, on the basis of which it is decided to initiate a corresponding petition⁵¹⁹.

⁵¹⁸ Karabekir Kyazim Pasha - commander of the XV Army Corps stationed in Erzurum, general, professor, is the son of Mehmed Emin Pasha. He participated in two Balkan wars, was captured by the Bulgarian troops in 1913, became a major in 1914. At the beginning of the First World War, in 1915, he headed the XIV Army Corps, then became the Chief of Staff of the First Army and later the VI Army. On December 22, 1918, he was appointed commander of the First Caucasian Army Corps, and on March 2, 1919, he was appointed commander of the XV Army Corps.

⁵¹⁹ NAA, fund 199, list 1, file 100, sheet 48.

It is interesting to note that Hamo Ohanjanyan's series of letters written to Al. Khatisyan from April 6 to April 22, 1920 are full of concerns about the procurement of weapons and ammunition, which is very necessary for Armenia, and in particular the financial difficulties related to their transportation from Batumi and Poti to Armenia, which were difficult to obtain, which even did not provide the Caucasian Bank, which seems to be favorable towards them, to which it was provided with salt for 80 rubles, which it resold for 380 rubles, in order to provide it to Armenia.

In addition to that, the fact that, as written in Ohanjanyan's April 6 letter addressed to Khatisyan, the Georgians themselves did nothing, but forced the Armenians to share with them, otherwise they caused delays in cargo transportation from Poti and other places. And the April 8 letter informs about the negotiations with Italy's representative M. Gabba and France's military representative Lt. Col. E. de Corbeil to exchange Armenian cotton and leather for bullets and "Lebelle", in response to which Corbeil promises that it is possible for the Constantinople letter addressed to General Anton Denikin and to be provided from the flows of the Salonika war cargo. Ohanjanyan also wrote that Italy's military and political representative Colonel M. Gabba assured that they rejected Azerbaijan, but according to their agency information, it was confirmed that this was not the case, because 40-50 wagons of military uniforms and other military property, and to some extent ammunition, which the Azerbaijanis received from the Italians, entered Azerbaijan from Poti⁵²⁰.

In H. Ohanjanyan's letter to Al. Khatisyan dated April 14, 1920, it appeared that they went to negotiations with Georgia for arms, in which generals Kazbegi and H. Kishmishyan, noting that the Georgians were willing to allow the transportation of only "Lebel" rifles, 1000-1600 rounds, "Colt" machine guns, designed for three-line cartridges, instead asking for three-inch mountain cannon shells and howitzer shells, "Lewis" machine guns, which the Armenian side answers that they also need them⁵²¹.

The situation was also complicated in the organization of the Armenian uprising; in particular the British government, the Ministry of War and its military-political representation in Transcaucasia caused great obstacles.

In the report submitted to the Council of Ministers on February 28, 1919, RA Military Minister Hovhannes Hakhverdyan, referring to the state of the Armenian Air Force, informed the government about the unfitness of the existing aviation equipment and only one operational aircraft, that the situation could be rectified after a few months, when it would be possible to destroy two collect another one from the existing planes. Hakhverdyan also informed that there were 5 pilots, 1

⁵²⁰ Balikyan O. 1996: 74

⁵²¹ Balikyan O. 1996: 81-82.

observer-pilot, 1 mechanic instructor, 3 engine operators, 6 engine operator's assistants, 2 drivers, 2 driver's assistants, 10 foremen in the air force.

Based on all this, the RA military minister proposed to the government to form an aviation squadron and send a number of military personnel to France to learn aviation and acquire new equipment⁵²². General Hovh. Hakhverdyan informed that the study in France will last about 1-2 years, after which it would only be necessary to acquire modern air force equipment. General Hovhannes Hakhverdyan also noted in the report that according to Antoine Poidebar, the missionary, archaeologist, pilot, scout captain and then major representing France in Armenia, it was considered appropriate to use the airborne squadron mainly for the protection of the state border.

Based on all that, General Hovh Hakhverdyan asked the RA government to send 5 to 6 officers and 15 to 18 soldiers to France to study aviation, as well as to buy new planes and necessary equipment. 22 According to the "Christian Armenia" encyclopedia, Captain Antoine Marie Joseph Poidebar, the military representative of France in the Republic of Armenia, was awarded the "St. Gregory the Illuminator" order established by the Catholicos of All Armenians Gevorg Y. Surenlyants probably before October 1, 1911⁵²³.

In the Transcaucasus, relations with the British military-political mission are particularly bad, due to the disputes over the purchase of two attack and two reconnaissance planes with their own funds in February 1920 and the reluctance to conclude a deal with Armenia. In addition to this, the British military authorities in Transcaucasia and Armenia, in addition to emptying the Kars and arsenals of the republic, in the person of the military governor of Batumi, General William James Norman Cooke-Collis, unequivocally blocked the transfer of 2 airplanes to Armenia, which were bought by the RA leadership in Paris, fake arguing that it is necessary to find out the "origin" of these airplanes⁵²⁴.

Finally, although British military personnel in Paris, including Brigadier General W. Beach assures the RA delegation that took part in the case that there is no objection against the operator, after completely unnecessary delays, the first two of the 12 airplanes bought in France are sent with Air Force captain pilot Arthur Ghulyan, but as soon as they arrive, they are confiscated by the British governor of Batumi on the way by Brigadier General William James Norman Cooke-Collis, who refuses to hand them over to the Armenian government, saying he is awaiting further instructions from his government⁵²⁵.

⁵²² Hovhannisyan A. 2018.

⁵²³ Ter-Minasyan A. 2004: N 2 (104), 79-105.

⁵²⁴ Makhmuryan G. 2014: 211.

⁵²⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 556. Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 417.

It is then falsely argued that the French military authorities said that they had not been informed of such a deal, so that the British Ministry of War, which did not like the less lenient approach of the French, confirms Collis's right in the order of rejection.

On March 7, 1920, Cooke-Collis telegraphed to the War Office that the aircraft were apparently the first of 12 aircraft destined for Armenia, and that he was holding them pending instructions from London. However, on March 19, the British Army Council sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the decision of the Supreme Council of Allies on arming Armenia did not say anything about the supply of aircraft, and the French military authorities did not provide any information about such a deal, so the Ministry of War approves the general governor's step⁵²⁶. The British also disliked the fact that the aircraft were purchased from France, a constant competitor, raising suspicions among them. The Armenians were forced to convince the British that there was no secret in buying 2 aircraft for their landlocked country, especially since the neighboring countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan, were already acquiring additional aircraft and munitions from the disintegrating White armies.

The issue of the release of the aircraft lasts for weeks, the Armenian government sends many petitions to Paris, London, Batumi and elsewhere to lift the British blockade, with which the French military mission in the Caucasus also appeals in connection with the confiscation of the aircraft intended for Armenia by James Cooke-Collis, but in vain⁵²⁷.

Meanwhile, the RA Prime Minister and Foreign Minister tried to overcome the arbitrary obstacles created by the British military-political representation on the way to the creation of the Armenian Air Force.

In the letter of Foreign Minister Khatisyan dated March 31, 1920 (N 2035) addressed to M. Tumanyan, the advisor of the RA diplomatic representation in Georgia, it appeared that a telegram was received from Batumi that the military governor of Batumi, General Cooke-Collis, again refused them permission to transfer the two aircraft to Armenia. Captain Aniev, who was in Batumi, warned the Foreign Minister that it was necessary to take immediate steps, because the airplanes were damaged by the rain in the open air. Based on this, Al. Khatisyan asked M. Tumanyan to urgently contact the French and American military and political representations in Tiflis⁵²⁸.

On April 6, 1920, in a letter addressed to Khatisyan, Ohanjanyan addresses the issue of airplanes and documents the mediation undertaken by French General Francis Depere to the British, adding that John Wardrop at the latter's insistence telegraphed Cooke-Collis, who almost agreed,

⁵²⁶ Hovhanisyan R. 2015: III, 417.

⁵²⁷ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 211, sheets 78-79, Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 55.

⁵²⁸ NAA, fund 275, list 5, file 211, sheets 78-79.

but at the last minute, for some reason again hindered the request for airplanes available to Armenia⁵²⁹.

When Commander Harry Luke, a member of the staff of High Commissioner Admiral John Michael de Robeck in Constantinople, arrives in Yerevan in April 1920, Prime Minister Khatisyan complains that the Allies expect the Armenians to defend themselves, but block 2 aircraft and a shipment of ammunition purchased from General Denikin, and at the same time they do nothing to limit the military build-up of neighboring states. Luke reports to his superiors that the 2-aircraft issue raises serious questions about the sincerity of the British government.

On April 7, 1920, the leaders of the Ramkavar club in Egypt, Levon Mkrtichyan and Vahan Malezyan, appealed to the High Commissioner of Great Britain, Field Marshal Edmund Allenby in Cairo, that, being a moderate party and followers of the democratic principles of Poghos Nubar Pasha, and encouraged by L. George's speech in the House of Commons, they asked for a how many aircraft for the defense needs of the RA government, promising to cover the transportation costs with their own funds. Allenby also sent a message to London, informing him that in the Middle East, according to the Royal Air Force Commander R. Groves, there were more than 700 surplus aircraft with engines and another 150 without engines that could be put to work, also finding that some of the obsolete machines parked in Alexandria could be sold with permission from the Air Ministry.

Before that, James Malcolm, the latter's representative, intervened in the case on the instructions of Poghos Nubar, who raised the issue of the aircraft before the British Foreign Ministry, which later became the subject of a long dispute between the latter and the Ministry of War, expressing great confusion as to where the Armenians would get money from, how they would transport and by what means, raising the issue of pilot personnel or finding that this initiative should not be encouraged, because it is possible that these aircraft will fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Or the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 5, 1920, that some of the best pilots of the former Russian air force were Armenians, who could make the aircraft look like the device, if the materials and spare parts were provided, was not convincing, thinking that it would be logical to do everything possible to the friendly people in the Caucasus in order to support, directing the inquiry to the Army Council⁵³⁰. Even after Curzon's statement that the advantage of raising the morale and resistance of the Armenians was much greater than the danger of the aircraft falling into enemy hands, the matter did not move, and the process was not significantly affected by the call of the Foreign Office to the Army Council to reconsider the matter. There is a question of transferring the problem of surplus aircraft to the Liquidation Department,

⁵²⁹ Balikyan O. 1996: 3

⁵³⁰ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 420-421.

after which the War Office washes its hands, and War Office officials under Churchill continue to avoid unnecessary ships.

Finally, as if a solution was found, on July 18, 1920, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram to the High Commissioner E. Allenby that the proposed sale was approved subject to satisfactory bilateral arrangements being reached in discussions between the Armenian delegation in Egypt and the liquidation department's agent in Cairo. Seeking to help, Deputy Foreign Minister John Tilly tried to show the Ministry of Munitions Curzon's personal interest in the matter. In his opinion, the fact that the objective of the policy of His Majesty's Government should be to help the Republic of Armenia to reorganize its armed forces, His Excellency believed that the Republic of Armenia should be granted the easiest possible terms so that they could acquire the most suitable aircraft⁵³¹.

In 1920, various specialists in the field of aeronautics came to RA from different countries. Armenia bought a certain number of airplanes from England, which, however, having appeared in Batumi since the beginning of 1920, were not transferred to Armenia due to the arbitrariness of Cooke-Collis. From May 1 to October 20, 1920, the specialists of the air force repaired 6 helicopters, some of which were unable to fly due to malfunctioning or missing propellers. The processes of establishment of the air force did not go smoothly and encountered many obstacles. In addition, the unfortunate accident at the airport, the victim of which was the pilot Mihran Khayeyan⁵³² (may be Khayeyan as well). Ruben H. Babayan and Nikolai Khorozov were also among the first Armenian pilots. Two French planes were sent from Batumi to Armenia on June 16, 1920 by train, accompanied by Ghulyan-Rilsky⁵³³.

But the British side took no steps. Artificial barriers, first by the War Office and then by the Ordnance Office, prevented any surplus aircraft from being sent to Armenia. Months passed and in August 1920, the situation in the Caucasus took such drastic turns that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was no longer willing to pursue the issue, and the surplus aircraft of the United Kingdom Air Force did not appear in the skies of Armenia.

In May 1920, Khatisyan again complained to Luke, the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia at that time, that the blocking of the planes confirmed the claims of the Bolshevik rebels that Armenia had been abandoned by the Allied Powers, based on which Luke urged the Foreign Ministry to ensure the release of the planes, which was their real will have a moral effect and consequence far greater than its value or importance⁵³⁴. On May 15, 1920, Av. Aharonyan, reminding about many memorandums and other documents, saying that everything was in vain,

⁵³¹ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 422.

⁵³² Matteosian V. 1998: 135.

⁵³³ Hovhannisyan A. 2018.

⁵³⁴ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 418.

reminding about the latter's promise to sell some weapons to Armenia, but the British authorities in Batumi blocked the delivery of 2 airplanes, which were bought and sent by the Armenian delegation, that the weapon promised in January has not moved yet. Concluding, Aharonyan reports that the time has come when the Armenian nation has the right to know whom to rely on for advice, help, protection, salvation and justice⁵³⁵. And already on May 17, the British Foreign Ministry, reacting quickly, reports that they have already applied to the Ministry of War to release the aircraft, which remains suspended in the air, and despite this assurance, the Ministry of War has been resorting to dodge ships for about 2 weeks, giving ambiguous instructions to General Milne, if the latter deems it expedient for the Armenians to receive them, then he is authorized to carry out their release. On May 26, Curzon formally complained to the Army Council about the delays, and only in June did General Cooke-Collis finally lift the artificial blockade he had set up, the main recipient of which was the British War Office, which did not want to strengthen the Republic of Armenia – the enemy of their friends Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Armenia had a reason to question the willingness and orientation of the Allies to help Armenia, it was manifested many times in the attitude of W. Churchill, who headed the War Ministry, again in another matter related to aircraft, in connection with several hundred British surplus aircraft in Alexandria, a batch of which the rich Armenian community in Egypt had expressed a desire to buy and send to Armenia. The Armenian community of Egypt was dominated by the influence of the Constituent Ramkavar Party and the Armenian Benevolent General Union, which regardless of its disagreements with the federal government, made certain changes in its strategy, expressing a desire to participate in the demonstration of aid to Armenia, especially since both organizations were closely related to Poghos Nubar and with the Armenian National Delegation. The ringleaders hoped that Great Britain would provide the Little Alliance, Armenia, with spare aircraft and parts for free or at nominal prices, and that their party would pay the £100-£200 required to transport each aircraft from Alexandria to Batumi⁵³⁶.

On May 24, 1920, on the instructions of the British government H. Luke, gave authorized by the RA government Av. Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar Pasha 1 million 60000 pounds, according to which the military loan was granted for one year at 5% rate, but with the condition that the weapon should be purchased from the British government⁵³⁷. However, the peculiarity of the situation was that the Menshevik Georgian government, taking advantage of the opportunity, demanded that the RA government leave 23 percent of the weapons and ammunition to be delivered through its

⁵³⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 418.

⁵³⁶ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 419.

⁵³⁷ Galoyan G. 1999: 187.

territory to Georgia, which was ratified by the relevant agreement signed between the two neighboring states on May 26, 1920⁵³⁸.

Certain hopes were attached to Lloyd George's government, which on May 25, 1920 made a speech in the House of Commons, addressing the problems of Armenia, expressing hope that Armenians will defend their independence; they are exceptionally intelligent people, that they can easily organize an army of 40,000, that they will be happy. to assist them in arming their army, which will increase their self-respect, and when they have done this, the Turk will have too much respect, not for them, but for himself, to make any other attempt at massacres in that direction⁵³⁹.

Those processes were ambiguous. On June 5, 1920, US Ambassador Davis sent a top-secret coded telegram to Washington, in which he was informed that the British government had released a military loan of 1 million pounds to Armenia, for which 25,000 rifles, 50 million bullets, 400 machine guns were to be purchased, 12 field cannons, 32 mountain cannons and military equipment for 40 thousand soldiers, adding that France also intends to deliver Russian rifles to Armenia through the transit routes of Georgia⁵⁴⁰. And already on June 10, 1920, in the report sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luke informs about the additional document he received from the RA government in confirmation of the 1 million 60 thousand pounds sterling previously given to Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar Pasha to pay for the weapons supplied to Armenia. After submitting detailed invoices to Paris on July 26, 1920, Poghos Nubar and Av. Aharonyan handed over thirteen bonds worth £829,634 9 shillings and 3 pence⁵⁴¹ to Ambassador Lord Edward Derby, which after signing could be used at the discretion of the Government of the Republic of Armenia. Ammunition was unloaded at Poti, and six months after the Supreme Council of Allied Powers agreed to send arms to Armenia, the first shipment of supplies crossed the Sanahin border crossing by train in the Neutral Zone and entered RA territory⁵⁴².

And thus, a part of the purchased weapons was sent to Armenia in the summer of 1920, but as it turns out from a document of the British Ministry of Defense dated August 10, 2,500 rifles were left to Georgia, and on September 10, during the meeting with Luke, Al. Khatisyan makes a statement that the RA government has already received all the military equipment, and is also informed about additional supplies from France and Greece⁵⁴³.

Therefore, we cannot agree with the conclusion of Artsrun Hovhannisyan, according to which significant military assistance was provided by Great Britain and the supply of weapons was free⁵⁴⁴,

⁵³⁸ Galoyan G. 1999: 188.

⁵³⁹ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 420.

⁵⁴⁰ Galoyan G. 1999: 188.

⁵⁴¹ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 427.

⁵⁴² Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 429.

⁵⁴³ Galoyan G. 1999: 187.

⁵⁴⁴ Hovhannisyan A. 2019: 28.

especially since it arrived too late, and as we said above, that only a third of the weapons and munitions arrived, in a certain sense, unsuitable. One more adjustment we should note. Partially agreeing with Artsrun Hovhannisyan with the conclusion that Great Britain played a major role in the reunification of Kars, Nakhichevan, as well as other areas with the Republic of Armenia, that British troops worked hand in hand with Armenian forces to liberate those areas⁵⁴⁵, which is a very controversial process. has had and not always favorable for the Armenian side, let's take the forcible withdrawal of weapons and artillery from Kars by the British, which militarily significantly weakened and weakened the Armenian army at the time of the fall of Kars and ultimately contributed to the independence of the Republic of Armenia in the Turkish-Armenian war of the autumn of 1920. Therefore, Artsrun Hovhannisyan's in his one-sided approach to the issue of Armenian-British cooperation, the author ignored the extremely tough, openly anti-Armenian position of the British on the issue of Artsakh-Syunik, as a result of which it was annexed to Azerbaijan⁵⁴⁶.

The arrival of British weapons in Armenia was a disappointment, especially since it was preceded by a cold-hearted British bureaucracy and a heartless attitude towards a small ally and the poor quality of the ammunition transferred. It was well noticed by A. Babalyan: "...two years of pleas and appeals were in vain, we received clothing and ammunition for 40,000 soldiers from the British government..."⁵⁴⁷. It is sad that even during the disastrous days of the Turkish-Armenian war, the issues of the quality of arms and ammunition received from England were disputed, when the matter was already over.

In addition, on September 29, the Turks were already in Sarighamish, and on October 30 in Kars, which was left almost defenseless and had resisted to the extent possible, the capture of which, which at that time contained enormous reserves of munitions of the Russian imperial army, was absolutely impossible for the Kemalites. It was a great success⁵⁴⁸. According to K. Ataturk, there was almost no resistance⁵⁴⁹, and the Turks, encouraged by this, continued the attack, which forced Yerevan to appeal for help to the Entente again on October 30 and to the United States on November 5, but without results, and already on November 6, the Turks took Alexandropol⁵⁵⁰.

None of the great powers wanted to interfere with Bachman, Armenia was left to the whims of fate⁵⁵¹. The Turkish attack was accompanied by slaughter, and in fact it became the most brutal ethnic cleansing in the territory controlled by them, S. Vracyan's government was forced to record

⁵⁴⁵ Hovhannisyan 2019: 28.

⁵⁴⁶ Virabyan 2022: N 1 (15), 39-73.

⁵⁴⁷ Babalian 1997: 182

⁵⁴⁸ Mukhanov 2009: 187.

⁵⁴⁹ Mustafa Kemal 1934: 3, 118-119.

⁵⁵⁰ Elchibekyan 1957: 172-173.

⁵⁵¹ Mukhanov 2019: 142.

the desperate situation of Armenia, which was followed by the infamous Treaty of Alexandropol, Armenia capitulated, which was also the first international document of the Ankara government. It turned out that the arms and ammunitions and munitions bought from Great Britain with treasury bonds deposited in the Bank of England (gold as a collateral) arrived late and had quality problems, one third was pocketed by Georgia, almost one third fell into the hands of the Turks, as well as At one time, with the permission of the British officers, the reserves of the extremely rich weapons and ammunition of the Russian Imperial Army in Erzurum were looted. And the rest of the weapons most likely fell into the hands of Bolshevik Russia, which hastily Sovietized Armenia, which directed it against neighboring Georgia, forcibly Sovietizing it, and what's more, a part was again allocated to friendly Turkey, which directed it against Armenia and Greece, crushing them with which the odyssey of this problem had its sad end.

The letter of Prime Minister Ohanjanyan dated August 28, 1920 to the head of the RA delegation in Paris Aharonyan regarding the quality of the rifles given by the British shortly before the Turkish attack is noteworthy. Ohanjanyan reported in it that the Armenian army is spread over a distance of 750 km, without weapons and ammunition, and the "Ross" rifles sent by the British are in bad condition and most of them are not usable, and the Greeks gave the Armenians 4,000 rifles of a type completely unknown to the Armenian army. half of the 3,800 rifles sent by the French had to be given to the Georgians as the price of transportation and transit, and more than half of those that arrived in Armenia need repair, the 5 million bullets received from General Wrangel and other sources are rusted and may not work, adding to that the important fact that Armenia's transportation system is paralyzed, as trains and cars do not move due to lack of fuel, there are few horses left, and very little bread for the soldiers⁵⁵².

This is also confirmed by the report of Lieutenant Charles Valadier, a member of the French military mission in Yerevan, on October 15, 1920, who inspected the Kars front on October 9, according to which "some of the battalions of the Armenian army operating on the Kars front had already received new arrivals." "Ross" rifles, which, despite their weight and stiffness, gave almost all infantrymen the opportunity to have a weapon, the Armenian army is trained to use "Lebel" rifles, and the recently received "Ross" rifles from Britain cause problems, it is a great inconvenience for people with a weapon arming, the mode of use of which is unknown. For this reason, "Ross" rifles were mainly distributed only to reserve and irregular forces.⁵⁵³

In this regard, much can be understood by referring to the letter of November 8, 1920, sent by Av. Aharonyan from Paris to the RA Foreign Minister, about discussing the issue of Armenia at the

⁵⁵² Hovhannisyan R. 2016: IV, 235.

⁵⁵³ Hovhannisyan R. 2016: IV, 282.

general meeting of the League of Nations to be held in Geneva, about buying weapons: “Mr. Minister, I consider it my duty to address the following points in your letter dated September 27.

1. It was very surprising to us, especially to General Korkanian, that you consider the guns from England unusable because of their weight. However, it is surprising that the British conducted the entire war with this exact system.

2. We were saddened that the rifles we received from France were so few - only 1,900, and that too in need of repair, but we were informed by Marshal Foch's headquarters that a large number of rifles with bullets were sent to us from Bulgaria. At the same time, these days we will buy 5000 Lebel rifles. General Korkanian has written to the military minister in details about this all”⁵⁵⁴.

However, the facts showed that the British rifles were very different from the Mosins, Lebel and other types of weapons used in the Armenian army. Harcourt, a representative of the semi-private foundation for Armenian refugees in Yerevan (Lord Mayor's Fund), later accused the British Ministry of War of dumping useless rifles on Armenians and then charging a fee for them: “At the same time, the usefulness of the cargo was greatly diminished by the fact that the Ministry of War took the opportunity to attach to the Armenians Canadian Ross rifles, which had already been tested in France and proved useless for general service.

The rifle is heavy, difficult to use, and the mechanism is complicated, it is easily out of order, and there are no shoulder straps to carry them with the rifles sent to Armenia. In addition, this rifle also has an almost useless bayonet, which on all examples of rifles tested in Erivan did not mount well and wobbled. It can hardly be expected that a gun that was useless for the military exercises of the British troops could be useful to the illiterate peasants of Armenia”⁵⁵⁵.

One of the reasons contributing to the defeat of the Armenian troops in the 1920 Turkish-Armenian war was considered to be that the allied states of the Entente supported their younger ally to the extent that their interests dictated, in many cases supplying the Armenian army with old-fashioned, obsolete weapons and outdated, worn-out weapons lying in British army depots in Egypt and elsewhere, rusting, in many cases without the necessary spare parts, which they sold if they wished or expediently or at half price to backward nations or to belligerents in countries mired in civil strife. And it was, of course, an accepted practice, by which it was possible to keep a monopoly on renewable weapons in one's own hands, and to have the ability to impose on the other, which such traditionally strong countries as Great Britain, which held almost until the end of the 19th century, could afford the privilege of machine production, thanks to which it was able to maintain a high reputation as a manufacturer of high-quality weapons. And the Republic of Armenia was in the background and was forced to be satisfied with secondary weapons of others,

⁵⁵⁴ NAA, fund 200, list 2, file 158, sheets 1-2, 7.

⁵⁵⁵ Hovhannisyan R. 2015: III, 429.

there was simply no alternative, and there could not be, because relying on illusions has devastating consequences.

This is evidenced by L. George's coalition government minister who served in the Armenian army in 1920, British politician, member of the British Labor Party, journalist, son of three-time Great Britain Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, Labor MP and campaign participant journalist and cousin of the famous writer Regard Kipling at Khatisyan's invitation⁵⁵⁶. In 1920, he met Alexander Khatisyan, the second Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, in Cairo, with whose agreement he volunteered to serve in the army of the First Republic of Armenia as an officer in the uniform of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia in 1920-1921. Oliver Baldwin arrived in Yerevan in the autumn of 1920 as an artillery instructor and enthusiastically began training the artillery units of the Armenian Army. RA Minister of Defense Ruben Ter-Minasyan awarded him the military rank of lieutenant colonel and assigned him to train the military regiment of the Yerevan region.

O. Baldwin wrote in his memoirs how insignificant British aid to the Armenian army was, that the rifles sent to Armenia were of the old "Ross" system, which "were almost guaranteed to explode after the first shot, the military boots sent were too small for an Armenian peasant and for long legs, therefore useless"⁵⁵⁷, and besides, according to Sepuh, the soldiers were generally untrained and did not know how to use the newly received rifles: "That rifle was new to me, and I have been fighting for so many years"⁵⁵⁸. As for London, referring to the Canadian historian Margret McMillan, it is noted that Great Britain, recognizing the Transcaucasian republics, supplied them with low-quality weapons "The Ministry of Defense took advantage of the situation, in order to get rid of the surplus of Canadian rifles of the "Ross" company, which were distinguished by their failures even in non-combat conditions"⁵⁵⁹.

Reflecting on those bitter days, Oliver Baldwin clearly wrote: "Kars fell on the morning of October 30, and the entire Armenian army returned irregularly to Alexandropol.

The true story of treachery, incompetence and idleness that enabled the capture of this hitherto impregnable fortress may never be revealed, but the fact remains that under the cover of a dense fog the Turks passed all the distant fortifications and entered the city before the High Command awoke. It is remembered that during the irregular battles that followed, only two fortresses opened fire.

⁵⁵⁶ Baldwin Ridsdale Baldwin (Oliver Ridsdale Baldwin -1.03.1899-10.08.1958) - during the First World War, in 1916, he joined the Irish Guards and served in France. However, just weeks later, the Republic of Armenia was subjected to Kemal-Bolshevik aggression, occupied and divided by these two internationally unrecognized groups. On December 9, 1920, the Bolsheviks arrested and imprisoned Baldwin, and he was later imprisoned by the Turks for another five months. He was only able to be freed after the February 1921 uprising. Oliver Baldwin was also a member of the ARF until the end of his life and had a party membership card. – "Yaraj", 1928, May 30, daily newspaper, Hovhannisyan A. 2011: N 39 (904), 06.10.2011 - 12.10.2011, Baldwin O. 1933: 23. <https://meroughin.am/2022/04/16,https://bit.ly/48E70cP> (date of viewing: 1.08.2022)

⁵⁵⁷ Baldwin O. 1933: 200.

⁵⁵⁸ Baldwin O. 2022: 36; "Latest news", February 8, 1921.

⁵⁵⁹ Mustafayev R. 2018: 223. MacMillan M. 2003: 443.

Panic then gripped the garrison and a headlong flight began, leaving the Turks with thousands of prisoners, including the entire general command staff and half-destroyed arsenal.

Individual stories of heroism will always be remembered, but the appalling negligence of General Bek Pirumov and his staff is inexcusable. It was obvious that Bolshevik propaganda was undermining the morale of the troops, but what made the general's aide refuse to wake his superior when the police commissar rushed to give the first news of the Turkish advance will probably never be known. The sight of the Turks advancing with their flags led the Armenians to believe that the Russians were with the enemy, for in the hazy dawn the Turkish flag resembled the Soviet flag.

As the army fled, many of the civilian population were unable to reach Alexandropol. Their murdered bodies were seen in the waters of the river a few weeks later and were photographed by several members of the American Middle East Relief Fund⁵⁶⁰.

Vracyan claims the same, saying that some of the Armenian troops were hastily armed with "Ross" rifles, newly received from England, which they were not used to.

The organ of the Social-Democratic Hunchakyan party "Young Armenia" also has an interesting observation about these rifles: "instead of helping our soldiers, the Canadian weapons delivered by the British at the last moment greatly harmed them. They were not only the worst type, outdated, most of them were useless weapons", whose columnist S. Snaryan adds to what has been said that there was also a lack of weapons, cannons, machine guns and helicopters, adding to that the difficulties of communication and especially food⁵⁶¹.

However, it is important to record the fact that a significant part of the weapons purchased from Great Britain never reached Armenia, because at the end of the 1920s, when the Soviet government was already established, a large batch of these weapons fell into the hands of the Kemalist troops, which was reported by Great Britain. A senior official R. Mac Donnell, in a writing dated February 24, 1920, stated that the weapons delivered to Armenia increased the military reserves of the Turkish nationalists by almost 100 percent, for which General K. Karabekir sent a telegram of thanks to the British military authorities⁵⁶². Everything has been said, to which nothing needs to be added, especially the higher authorities of the Allies in the Transcaucasian region and in Constantinople, who were supposed to control the disarmament of Turkey, which had lost the war, practically did not pull a finger, and with their responsible position contributed not only to the arming of the Kemal troops, but also to the largest arsenals. - the looting and looting of arms and ammunition from Erzurum, Kars and other places, including facilitating the placing of British-French arms in the hands of the Turks, who used them against the Armenians and Greeks.

⁵⁶⁰ Baldwin 1924: 24-25.

⁵⁶¹ "Young Armenia", 1921, N9.

⁵⁶² Galoyan G.1999: 188.

Naturally, not by chance, we have already said about this, all of this was also contributed to by the extremely delayed, last-minute delivery of British weapons to Armenia, that too during the difficult days of the war, when there was no chance of reorganization, and that too half-finished, often of poor quality, without spare parts, and one-third of which only belatedly reached the Armenians, one-third to the Georgians and the same amount to the Kemalists. Obstacles were raised in the issue of military advice and instructors of the Armenian army, the delivery of aircraft and many other issues. In the end, the plans of the British regarding their satellites in the Transcaucasus were not fully implemented, and if they were implemented, then at the cost of the sacrifice of the Transcaucasian peoples, and mainly the Armenians, and the British hand never reached Baku's black gold, the oil. Of course, V. Lenin's call for anti-colonial revolution to the Muslim world, which effectively put pressure on England, which they quickly grasped and went on the defensive, changing the political course and everyone got what they got in the international game. Russia regained imperial control in Transcaucasia and a commercial contract with England, M. Kemal, through Lausanne, his Turkish republic and became the "father of civilization". It turned out that M. Kemal and V. Lenin were wise enough not to cross the line drawn by their adversary, England, that is, to enter into a struggle for border territories.

According to that, the representative of Great Britain in the Republic of Armenia Cl. Stokes offered his services to the British Cabinet to contact Kemal through agents in Tiflis. And based on this, Colonel Stokes even cynically and without any conscience advised the British General Staff in Constantinople to suspend the preparations for loading the weapons and ammunition for the Republic of Armenia on ships, because the Armenians have already reached an agreement on peace with the Turks, offering to hand over these weapons and ammunition to Georgia, which, in his opinion, is fully prepared to fight to the end against both the Bolsheviks and the Turks. Based on this, the British Ministry of War quickly made a decision to prevent the delivery of additional weapons to Armenia, and on November 13, the Admiralty issued an order not to supply any more fuel to Armenia⁵⁶³.

Of course, it was not only Great Britain that acted like this and gave priority to its interests, so was the newly created Soviet Russia, armed with outwardly extremely impressive slogans of self-determination of nations, whose leader Lenin became the strategic ally and spiritual father of the Muslim world. This is very vividly demonstrated by the complex games of Lenin's delegate Boris Legrand in Yerevan in October 1920 and the conditions proposed by him. British colonel Claude Stokes, who advised the RA government to sharply reject the conditions of the Soviet side, is also surprised by the dexterity of Boris Legrand, of Jewish origin, who, resorting to double standards,

⁵⁶³ Hovhannisyan R. 2007: 787.

seems to offer acceptable conditions for Armenia on the one hand, but with a sharp rejection in the matter of weapons in response⁵⁶⁴.

Various authors and military specialists have repeatedly recorded that, naturally, in such a situation, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia could not effectively organize the defense of the country, in connection with which the military and political representative of Britain in Transcaucasia, Lieutenant Colonel Stokes, stated, that they refrained from supplying arms and munitions to the three republics, which would have enabled them to face various threats, including the Bolshevik threat, but at the same time giving importance to securing their economic and political interests in the Transcaucasian region.

It can be said that all this had a negative impact on the security of RA, and practically all the tactics contributed to the capitulation defeat in the 1920 war against Turkey, after which the First Republic, abandoned by the allies and deceived by the request for arms and ammunition support, ceased to be able to defend itself and was practically destroyed. In this regard, the solemn speech of Oliver Baldwin, the son of British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin (in French) at the event organized in Paris on May 28, 1928 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Armenia, which was also attended by the former leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan: "Hello, (in Armenian). When I heard Armenian folk songs a while ago, I thought I was in Armenia. Nakhijevan, Dilijan and all of Armenia, which I love so much, appeared in my mind. I served in the Armenian army, saw the Bolshevik occupation on December 2, 1920, and then saw the uprising on February 18 with sympathy.

Today, on this solemn occasion, the main thing that I have to tell you is as follows: never trust the words and promises of big states. England completely forgot Armenia. England forgot even her former warriors. They will die of a hunger and no one cares about them and today they are victims. Trust only in your strength, your children and your grandchildren. They are the only ones who will put the tricolor flag on Ararat again. I believe that the day is not far when chaos will erupt again in the Middle East. But, Armenians, if at that time you trust only in your own strength, then I believe that you can succeed..."⁵⁶⁵.

However, both Great Britain and the British military-political mission in Armenia, including the son of the British Prime Minister who appeared there at that historical moment, Oliver Baldwin, who served as a general in the Armenian army, the outwardly beautiful, but highly controversial and obscure, complicated character still needs to be revealed and appreciated. From the valuable memoirs left by him, it is evident not only that the activities of the British officer in search of adventure are outlined in both positive and dark aspects, the charge meter of his devotion to

⁵⁶⁴ Zohrabyan E. 1997: 229.

⁵⁶⁵ "Yaraj", 1928, May 30.

Armenia, but also that he was often not always impartial in his actions and evaluations of events and cases, as a witness of his. Much of the information reported and presented was simply inaccurate, misrepresented and suffering from one-sidedness. O. Baldwin's memoir also documents his lack of firmness towards Armenia, for example, documenting the extreme measures he takes to save his own skin to escape the oppressive reality of Armenia, citing the Bolshevik slaughter as the reason, until then thinking that he had fallen into heaven and that the trials were only they are for the Armenian people, not for himself, whom Khatisyan invited to serve in the establishment of the RA armed forces, he also came, but he failed the first great tests and looked for ways to leave that unfortunate country at any cost, as did the American colonel Haskell, who gained a reputation of a philanthropist as others. And so, according to his own testimony, on the way to escape from Armenia, he quickly gets rid of the badge awarded to him by the RA government, which he allegedly cherished from the beginning. "The only thing I decided to get rid of was my Armenian military badge, which I immediately threw on the Russian stove, where it rang carelessly." Colonel Oliver Baldwin's Caucasian silver belt, which was exchanged for one Turkish pound, with which he bought cottage cheese, suffered the same fate⁵⁶⁶.

There was no longer the fairyland full of adventures of the adventurous Baldwin, and what was the need for the badge of the country's army, which the British naively and blindly relied on, which he carelessly and easily gave up, which was not an act worthy of a true officer. However, the reality was this, just as it was a harsh and obvious reality of Great Britain's abandonment of its small and helpless ally, Armenia - Artsakh, Syunik-Zangezur and Nakhichevan were donated to neighboring Azerbaijan by the efforts of the British and other European countries, and finally, with their help, Armenia appeared under Bolshevik Russia and Kemalism. In the clutches of Turkey, and in the greatest BOOK of humanity, the promised land remembered in the Bible was ravaged and mutilated, and the Armenian people were subjected to extermination and terrible, inhuman torture and violence, genocide.

It is obvious that for both the British government and Oliver Baldwin, the Armenian activities were only an episode, touching, even if observable. But only in August 1920, in the city of Alexandria, Egypt, from a chance meeting with the first Prime Minister of RA Al. Khatisyan and an invitation to serve in the Armenian army, a small touch of adventure was born, which was based on purely self-centered adventurous impulses, the reflection of which was the memoir left by Oliver Baldwin.

And thus, the unpredictable development of the events of 1917-1918 led to the recreation of the Armenian statehood, which forced the creation of its own armed forces as a guarantee of its

⁵⁶⁶ Baldwin Oliver 2022, 220, 297.

existence, which in terms of the acquisition of weapons and ammunition put the young republic in a state of dependence on almost all powers, and in particular after the October 1917 Russian coup. The Entente countries, Great Britain and France, which became the main players in the Transcaucasian region, were guided by their hidden deep interests, as a result of which the support provided to the Republic of Armenia was conditional, incomplete, inadequate and, in many cases, out of date. The military and political representative of Great Britain in the Republic of Armenia, colonel Claude Stokes, advised amicably to come to terms with the idea of defeat, just as today Russia advises to go to find the edges of peace and friendship with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, which still continue the bloody feasts, provocations and the encroachments against the Armenian people and the Armenian statehood.

BINLIOGRAPHY

SOURCES

ARCHIVES AND DOCUMENTS

1. Azerbaijan Democratic Republic 1998, Foreign policy (Documents and materials). Baku (Baku, in Russian).
2. Azerbajdjanskaya Demokraticheskaya Respublika. Vneshnyaya politika (Dokumenty i materialy), Baku, 1998 (In Russian). Archive of the Armenian Republic (Boston, In Arm.).
3. BAA - Bulletin of the Archives of Armenia. Yerevan.
4. Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Foreign policy (Documents and materials), Baku, 1998 (in Russian).
5. DRA - Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Foreign policy (documents and materials). Baku, 1998 (in Russian).
6. Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. The Army (Documents and materials), Baku, 1998 (in Russian).
7. Great October Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia, 1957 (collection of documents, eds. A. Mnacakanyan, A. M. Akopyan, G. M. Dallaqyan), Yerevan (In Russian).
8. Hayastani Hanrapetutyuny 1918-1920 tt. (qagakan patmutyun), Pastatxteri ev nyuteri jogovac, Xmb.` G. Galoyan ev urish., Erevan, HH GAA «Gitutyun» hrat., 2000, 455 ej: (In Armenian)
9. Hayastani Hanrapetutean Karavarutean nisteri arcanagrutyunner: 1918-1920 (editor and compiler A. Virabyan), Yerevan, Hayastani Azgain archive, 2014 (In Armenian and Russian).
10. Heroic battle of Sardarapat (written by General Corps colonel Alexander K. Chneour, memoirs of a participant (transl. by A. Amurean [Andre Ter-Amurean]), 1967, Frezno (In Arm.).
11. NAA - National Archive of Armenia. Yerevan- NAA (In Armenian, Russian)
12. MK - Mountainous Karabagh in 1918-1923. Collection of (ed. V.A.Mikayelyan). Yerevan: National Academy of Sciences, 1992.
13. Mountainous Karabagh in 1918 -1923, 1992 (collection of documents and materials, eds. Akopyan V. A., Balikyan O. S., Virabyan A. S., Mikaelyan V. A., Evoyan V. S.), Yerevan, National Archive of Armenia (In Russian).
14. Protocols of the sessions of the Government of the Republic of Armenia. 1918-1920, 2014 (Chap. ed., composition: A. Virabyan). Yerevan. National Archives of Armenia.
15. Secret documents 1920. A page about the conspiracy of Azerbaijan, Yerevan (In Arm.).
16. The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920 (political history) 2000. Collection of documents and materials (G.Galoyan, V.Ghazakhecyan, V.Melikyan et al.). Yerevan. (In Arm.).

PERIODICALS

1. Azerbaijan (Baku, In Russian)
2. Arev (Baku, In Arm.)
3. "Armenian Soldier" (Yerevan, In Arm.).
4. Armyanskij vestnik (Moscow, in Russian)
5. "Banber Armenia Archives" (Yerevan, In Arm.).
6. Zang (Yerevan, In Arm.)
7. Hayastani ashkhatavor (Yerevan, in Arm.)
8. Hay zinvor (Yerevan, in Arm.).
9. Hayrenik (Boston, in Arm.)
10. Horizon (Tiflis, in Arm.)
11. Kavkazskoe slovo (Tiflis, in Russian)
12. "Latest news" (Constantinople, In Arm.).
13. Martkoc (Paris, in Arm.)
14. Mshak (Tiflis, in Arm.)
15. Nor Ashkhatavor (Tiflis-in Arm.)
16. Slovo (Tiflis, in Russian)
17. Vem (Paris, in Arm.)
18. Yaraj (Yerevan, in Arm.)
19. "Yaraj" (Paris, In Arm.).
20. Yedinaya Rossiya (Baku, In Rus/)
21. "Young Armenia" (Chicago, In Arm.).

STUDIES

1. Abbasov E.M. 2020. Military-diplomatic struggle of the Bolsheviks for Baku: from the October Revolution to the denunciation of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty (October 1917 - November 1918), A question of history. Monthly journal 1 (10), 41-96 (In Rus.).
2. Adamia V.I. 1961. From the history of English intervention in Georgia (1918-1921), Sukhumi, 1961. (In Rus.).
3. Aharonyan Av. 2001. From Sardarapat to Sevres and Lausanne, Political diary, 1919- 1927. Yerevan: YSU Publishing House (In Arm.).
4. Akhmedova A. 2019. British Foreign Policy in Azerbaijan, 1918-1920. A Thesis Submitted to the fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Department of History, 2018 (<https://bit.ly/39DvHgs>) Babalyan A. 1923. The fall of Kars, Hayrenik, 1923/12, October (In Arm.).

5. Akhmedova F. 2009. The problem of the status of Mountainous Karabagh: History and modernity. In "Karabagh yesterday, today and tomorrow", Materials of scientificpractical conference. Baku (in Rus.).
6. Alixanyan S. T. 1974, G. K. Orjonikidzen ev Sovetakan kargeri hastatumy Hayastanum, Erevan, «Hayastan» hrat. (In Arm.)
7. Andersen A., G. Partskhaladze. 2020. A new round of the Karabakh conflict in the context of Armenian-Russian relations. October 10, <https://www.academia.edu/44305785/>. (in Rus. Engl.).
8. Aslanov E.M., Akhundov A.Ya., Abdullaeva S.F., Alieva F.B. 2018. About the armed forces of the Democratic republic of Azerbaijan (1918-1920), World Science, № 2(30), Vol.5, February 2018, p. 51. [Http://ws-conference.com](http://ws-conference.com). (in Rus.).
9. Asatryan A. 2018. The activity of General Daniel Bek Pirumyan during the First Republic of Armenia, in «Republic of Armenia - 100», Collection of papers of an International conference, Yerevan, 328-334 (In Arm.).
10. Arcruni V.2002. Armenian-Persian war, Yerevan, 2002. (In Arm.).
11. Avetisyan H. 1997. Armenian question in 1918. Yerevan (In Arm.).
12. Avetisyan H.A. 1997. General Gavriil Grigorievich Ghorganyan Bulletin of Social Sciences 2, 155-177 (In Arm.).
13. Aydin Bayram 2019. A century on the guard. Special forces of Azerbaijan celebrate 100th anniversary, «Region», Baku, March 15, 2019, p. 8-9, 12. See www.elibrary.az/docs/jurnalbjrn2019_24.
14. Babalyan A. 1923. The fall of Kars, Hayrenik, 1923/12, October(in Arm.).
15. Babalian Art. 1997. The history of Armenia's independence and other memories. 81 Vanik Virabyan FUNDAMENTAL ARMENOLOGY № 2 (18) 2023 Glendale: "Navasard" Publishing House (In Arm.).
16. Baldwin O. 1924. Six Prisons and Two Revolutions, Adventures, in Trans-Caucasia and Anatolia, 1920-1921. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
17. Baldwin O. 1933. Six prisons and two conversions: adventures in Transcaucasia and Anatolia, 920-1921 (Translated by Sh. A. Stepanyan). Alexandria: A. Stepanyan (In Arm.).
18. Baldwin O. 2022. Six Imprisonments and Six Revolutions (English translation by L. Jilfugharyan). Yerevan: Antares (In Arm.).
19. Balikyan O. 1996. Hamo Ohanjanyan's letters to Alexander Khatisyan, 1996, N 1, April 6-April 22, 1920, "Armenian soldier", 1994, June, N 10, (24), 71-88. (in Rus.).
20. Baykov B.L.1923. Memories about the revolution in Transcaucasia (1917–1920), The Archive of Russian revolution, Berlin, vol.9 (in Rus.).
21. Baxchinean A., Mateosean V. 2018. Alexandr Chneour - participant and witness of Sardarapat, in «Republic of Armenia - 100», Collection of papers of an International conference, Yerevan, 94-105 (In Arm.).

22. Bezugolny A.Yu. 2011. General Bicherakhov and his Caucasian army. Unknown pages of the history of Civil wars and intervention in Caucasus, 1917-1919, Moscow (in Rus.).
23. Danielyan E.L., A. A. Melkonyan 2008. History of Armenia (from antiquity until modern period), Yerevan (In Arm.).
24. CEMoGUZ C., The relations between the Ottoman empire and bolshevik Russia (1917-1918): A thesis submitted to the department of international relations in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of master of international relations Bilkent university institute of economics, administrative and social sciences, Ankara, august, 1998. (in Eng.)
25. Danchenko A. 2021. Around Turkey. Dangerous region in the second half of May. Political and economic review. Relations with NATO, EU, UN, etc., May 26, 2021-
<https://zen.yandex.ru/media/id/5efdc51002e2f8540b00a31d/vokrug-turcii-opasnyiregion-vo-vtoroi-polovine-maia-politikoekonomicheskii-obzor-otnosheniia-s-nato-esoon-i-dr-60ae8792a6a8397bba0a06fc>. (In Rus.).
26. Denikin A. 2002. Essays on Russian Troubles: The Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Disintegration of the Russian Empire. October 1918-January 1919. Vol. 4. Minsk (In Rus.).
27. Denikin A. 1925. Essays on Russian turmoil. Armed forces of Russia, vol. IV, Paris-Berlin, (In Russian). Devoyants T. 1945. From the episodes of my life, Hayreniq (Boston), No 5 (250), September-October, 93-100 (In Arm.).
28. Devoyants T. 1938a. Memories of the intelligence agent (an answer to critics), Vem, 1938/January-May. (In Arm.).
29. Devoyants T. 1938b. Memories of the intelligence agent, Vem 1938/3, June-September (In Arm.).
30. Devoyants T. 1943a. From the episodes of my life, Hayrenik, 1943/3 (236), May-June (In Arm.).
31. Devoyants T. 1943b. Military intelligence and counter-intelligence, Hayrenik, 1943/3 (236) (In Arm.).
32. Devoyants T. 1944. From the episodes of my life, Hayrenik, 1944/6 (245), November-December (In Arm.).
33. Devoyants T. 1945a. From the episodes of my life, Hayrenik, 1945/2 (247), March-April (In Arm.).
34. Devoyants T. 1945b. From the episodes of my life, Hayrenik, 1945/4 (249), July-August (In Arm.).
35. Denikin A. 2005. Essays on Russian turmoil, in 3 volumes, Book 3, vol.4, 5, Armed forces of Russian south, Moscow (In Rus.).
36. Elşad Qoca 2018, Azərbaycan kəşfiyyatı və əks-kəşfiyyatı, Bakı. "Elgün" nəşriyyatı, 2018. səh.88. (In Azer, Rus.).
37. Elchibekyan A. M. 1957. The Great October Socialist Revolution and the victory of Soviet power in Armenia. Yerevan: Armenian Academy Press (In Rus.).
38. Embassy of Russia in Ankara Rusya Büyükelçiliği Ankara: <https://www.aravotru.am/2021/03/16/352472/>. Uploaded on 22.08.2021. (In Rus.).
39. Galoyan G. 1999. Armenia and the Great Powers, 1917-1923. Yerevan. (In Arm.).

40. Galoyan G. 1999, Hayastany ev mec terutyunnery 1917-1923 tt., Erevan, HH GAA Patmutyan inst-t, Gitutyun Publishing House. (In Arm.)
41. Ganin A.B. 2009. The corpus of officers of the General headquarters during the Civil war, 1917-1922, Resource materials, Moscow (In Rus.).
42. Ganin A.B. 2016. Spies of the period of amateurs. The Confrontation of special forces in Azerbaijan in the first half of 1919, Proceedings of the Laboratory of ancient technologies, 2016, № 4 (In Rus.).
43. Ganin A.V. 2009. Corps of officers of the General Staff during the Civil War, 1917-1922, Reference materials, Moscow (In Rus.).
44. Gasanli D. 2010. History of Diplomacy of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1918-1920), Moscow (in Rus.).
45. Gevorgyan H. 2007, Dro (life and deeds), Yerevan. (in Arm.).
46. Ghazakhecyan V. 2018. New document about the Turkish-Azerbaijani policy of the Armenian genocide, 1-3 p. See <http://www.academhistory.am/imagesdownloadfiles/KAZACHECYAN%20rus.pdf> ghazakhec, viewed in 02.04.2018. (In Arm.).
47. Ghorghanyan G. 1934. Republic of Armenia and States, from Brest-Litovsk to Sevres, "VEM" (Paris), issue 3, May-June, 29-41 (In Arm.).
48. Ghorghanyan G. 1934. The Republic of Armenia and the States, II, from Sevres to Lausanne, "VEM" (Paris), 1934, issue 4, July-August, 54-72 (In Arm.).
49. Gogitidze M. 2001. Georgian generals (1699-1921). Biographical guide of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Institute of Archeography and Source Studies. M. Hrushevsky, Ukr. Center of biographical necropolis (Compiled by M. Gogitidze. Kiev (In Rus.).
50. Gogitidze M. 2014. Georgy Bezhitashvili, Military elite of Armenia (Armenian generals, natives of Georgia). Biographical guide. Tbilisi (In Rus.).
51. Grigoryan A., Bobokhyan A. 2020. The operation «Zod». How Armenia kept the Sotq front in 1919. Yerevan (In Arm.).
52. Gyulkhandanyan A. 1967. Transcaucasian Republics, Hayrenikh, 1967/4 (In Arm.).
53. Hakobyan A. 2022, The military and political situation of the Republic of Armenia in 1920, Yer., RA NAS Institute of History, (In Arm.).
54. Hakobyan T. Kh., Meliq-Bakhshyan St. T., Barsegyan H. Kh. 1986. Dictionary of the Toponyms of Armenia and surrounding regions, vol. 1 (A-D), Yerevan (In Arm.).
55. Hakobyan T. Kh., Meliq-Bakhshyan St. T., Barsegyan H. Kh. 1988. Dictionary of the Toponyms of Armenia and surrounding regions, vol. 2 (D-K), Yerevan (In Arm.).
56. Hakobyan T. Kh., Meliq-Bakhshyan St. T., Barsegyan H. Kh. 1998. Dictionary of the Toponyms of Armenia and surrounding regions, vol. 4 (P-F), Yerevan (In Arm.).
57. Harutyunyan Kl. 2002. Armenian national military units in 1918-1945, Yerevan (In Arm.).
58. Harutyunyan H. M. 1996. Mountainous Karabagh in 1918-1921. Yerevan (In Arm.).
59. Harutyunyan H. M. 2008. The province of Nor Bayazet in 1828-1913. Yerevan (In Arm.).

60. Harutyunyan H. M. 2012. The province of Nor Bayazet in 1914-1920. Yerevan (In Arm.).
61. Hasanli J. 2016. Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan: The Difficult Road to Western Integration, London and New-York.
62. Hayazn T. (T. M. Petrosyants), G. Ghazaryan 2009. 1000 Armenian generals, admirals. Yerevan (In Arm.).
63. History of Azerbaijan 1963. The History of Azerbaijan vol. 3, part 1, Baku (in Russian).
64. Hovakimyan B. M. 2005. Dictionary of Armenian pseudonyms, Yerevan (In Arm.).
65. Hovhannisyan A. 2011. Firearms of the Army of the First Republic of Armenia, "Armenian Soldier", N 39 (904) 06.10.2011 - 12.10.2011 (In Arm.).
66. Hovhannisyan A. 2018. Air Force of the First Republic of Armenia, "Armenian Soldier", 24.10.2018 - 30.10.2018 (In Arm.).
67. Hovhannisyan A. 2019. Historical Notes on the Armenian-British Military Collaboration. 1918-1920, Review of Armenian Studies 3 (21), 17-31 (In Engl.).
68. Hovhannisyan A. 2020. Martial Arts, Volume 2: Land breakthrough. Yerevan: Author's publication (In Arm.).
69. Hovhannisyan R.G. 2005. Republic of Armenia, vol.I. Year 1. 1918-1919, Yerevan (In Arm.).
70. Hovhannisyan R.G. 2014. Republic of Armenia, vol. II. From Versaille to London. 1919- 1920, Yerevan (In Arm.).
71. Hovhannisyan R. 2015. Republic of Armenia, from London to Sevres. February-August, 1920, Volume III. Yerevan: Tigran Mets (In Arm.).
72. Hovhannisyan R.G. 2016. Republic of Armenia, Volume IV, between the hammer and the anvil. Split and Sovietization. Yerevan (In Arm.).
73. Hovhannisyan R.G. 1971. The Republic of Armenia: vol. I, The First Year, 1918- 1919 (Near Eastern Center, UCLA). Berkeley - Los Angeles-London.
74. Hovhannisyan R.G. 2007. International relations of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, Yerevan (In Rus.).
75. Ibragimov D. 1975. General Ali Agha Shichlinskij, Baku (In Rus.).
76. Isgenderli A., McCarthy J., Axundov Y. 2011. Realities of Azerbaijan. 1917-1920, Washington.
77. Ishkhanyan Ye. 1999. Mountainous Karabagh in 1917-1920. Yerevan (In Arm.).
78. Jamaljan A. 1928. Armenian-Georgian wrinkle, Homeland 7, 145-152 (In Arm.).
79. Karapetyan M. 1996. The army of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, Yerevan, 1996 (In Arm.).
80. Kelbizade E. 2014. Muhammed khan Tekinskij – History of Diplomacy, Baku, online (<https://bit.ly/3zDOEYv>: <https://bit.ly/35Bj3ZL>)
81. Khatisean Al. 1968. Creation and Development of the Republic of Armenia, second edition, Beirut (In Arm.).
82. Knyazyan D. 2008. Caucasian policy of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920. Yerevan (In Arm.).

- 83.Lang D.M., Walker Ch.J. 1992. Armenians (the history of Armenian people). Yerevan (In Arm.).
- 84.Leo 2009. From the past. Memoirs. Yerevan (In Arm.).
- 85.Leo 1935, The ideology of the Turkish-Armenian revolution. Volume B, Paris, print. Pahari Yeghbarts. (In Arm.).
- 86.Lo Hui Min 1978 (ed.). The Correspondence of G. E. Morisson, 1978, Vol. II. 1912- 1920. London - New-York - Melbourne - Cambridge.
- 87.MacMillan M. 2003. Paris 1919. Six months that changed the world. New York: Random House Inc.
- 88.Mamulia G., R. Abutalibov 2021. On the issue of accepting the de facto state independence of Azerbaijan at the Paris Peace Conference: Research: [https://kafkassam.com/% F.html](https://kafkassam.com/%F.html): Uploaded on 10.11.2021.
- 89.Makhmuryan G.G. 2002. British policy in Armenia and Transcaucasus in 1918- 1920, The White Man's Burden, Yerevan (In Rus.).
- 90.Makhmuryan G. 2014. The Independence of the Republic of Armenia in the protocols of the Armenian National Assembly // "Historiographical series", N 1 (195), 214-235.(In Arm.).
- 91.Matteosian V. 1998. Armenian National Association of Buenos Aires (1918-1920). Beirut: "Haykazian Armenological Conference", 131-152. (In Arm.).
92. Meruzhanyan A. 2014 (ed.). Marshals, generals and admirals of Armenian origin in St. Petersburg. Biographical guide (3rd revised edition). St. Petersburg (In Rus.).
- 93.Melkonyan A. 1998. History of Armenia. Course of lectures, Yerevan (In Arm.).
- 94.Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow, 1986. (In Rus.).
- 95.Mustafa Nazim 2018. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti işığında (1918-1920), Bakı (In Azer.).
- 96.Mustafa Kemal 1934. The Path of a New Turkey. v. 3, Allied intervention. The Greco-Turkish War and the consolidation of the national front, 1920-1921. Moscow: State Publishing house Litizdat N.K.I.D. (In Rus.).
- 97.Mustafayev R. 2018, The First Republic between the interests of the great powers, Diplomatiya Aləmi, World of Diplomacy Journal of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan No. 48, 218-230. (In Rus.).
- 98.Mukhanov V. M. 2019. The Caucasus in a turning point (1917–1921). Moscow: Modest Kolerov, (Selecta. XXVII) (In Rus.).
- 99.Nazim M. 2018a. Muhammed khan Tekinskij – the first diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in Armenia «Azerbaijan», May 27, 2018 ([http://www. Azerbaijannews. az/index. php?mod =3& id=147821](http://www.Azerbaijannews.az/index.php?mod=3&id=147821)).
100. Nazim M. 2018b. Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyyəti işığında (1918-1920), Bakı (In Azer.).
101. Nazim M. 2018c. Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. A bright page in the history of the Azerbaijani statehood. Materials of international conference. June 26-30, Gyanja, 400-403 (1905.az/əbdürrəhim-bəy-haqverdiyevə-qarsi-ermənistan-hokumətinin-təskil-etdiyi-quldurluqhadisəsinin-təfsilatı) (In Rus.).

102. Nazim M. 2019a. The process of the unification of Nakhijevan and Azerbaijan in Zangezur of Armenia – 11.12.2019. Blog №: 2019/69 (<https://bit.ly/3xpxiwG>).
103. Nazim M. 2019b. Azərbaycan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kütüphanesi Bölüm Başkanı, 1-18: Blog No: 69 11.12.2019. (In Azer.).
104. Nadjafov B. 1994. The face of an enemy. The History of Armenian nationalism in Transcaucasia at the end of the XIX – beginning of the XX century. Part II. Baku (In Rus.).
105. Naftaliev I. W. 2010. Azerbaijani SSR in the expansionist plans of Armenians (20s of the XX century). Baku (In Rus.).
106. Nersisyan A. 2007, Ruben: [Ruben Ter-Minaseani kyanqn u gorcuneutyuny] /A. Nersisyeany; Arajab.` A. Melqonean; Xmb.` E. Minasean, Erevan, Edit Print. (In Arm.).
107. Qajaznuni H. 1993. Republic of Armenia. Yerevan, «M. Varandean». (In Arm.).
108. Qajaznuni Hovh. 1923. "Armenian Dashnakcutyun has nothing else to do", Vienna. (In Arm.).
109. Petrosyan G.H. 2005a. Relations of the Republic of Armenia with the non-socialist political formations of Russia (1918-1920), Yerevan (In Arm.).
110. Petrosyan G.H. 2005b. Relations of the Republic of Armenia with the non-socialist political formations of the former Russian empire (June 1918 – April 1920), PhD dissertation (E. 00.01-«Armenian history»), Yerevan: Institute of History, NAN RA (In Arm.).
111. Petrosyan G.H. 2011. Relations of the Republic of Armenia with Russia (1918- 1920), Yerevan (in Arm.).
112. Pilipchuk Ya.V. 2021. The Azerbaijani state in the context of Russian-Turkish relations. In South Caucasasia in the Context of Social, Economic and Political Progress in the Post-Cold War Era (Editors Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vefa Kurban, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Muvaffak Duranlı). Ankara.
113. Puchenkov A.S. 2012. National policy of the general Denikin (Spring 1918 – Spring 1920), Saint-Petersburg (In Rus.).
114. Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, (Political history) 2000. The collection of documents and materials, Ghazakhetsyan V. (ed.), Yerevan. (in Arm. Russian).
115. Ruben 1982. Memoirs of Armenian revolutionary, vol.9, 3 edition. In abroad, Sassun and the Republic of Armenia, Teheran (In Arm.).
116. Sahakyan H. 1937. Two years in the Armenian army, Paris (in Arm.).
117. Sasuni K. 1926, The Armenian-Turkish war, "Homeland" magazine, Boston, N 5, 79-85 (In Arm.).
118. Sassuni K. 1968. Riots of May and the revolted Tatar regions (Armenian in 1920), Beirut (In Arm.).
119. Sarur [Asur] 1929. The attachment of Karabagh to Azerbaijan. Hayreniq, vol. VIII, June, 1929, 128-146.
120. Secret documents 1920. A page from the conspirative activity of Azerbaijan, Yerevan (In Arm.).
121. Shamistan Nazirli 2015. Executed generals of Azerbaijan, Baku. (In Rus.).
122. Shikhlinskij A. 1984. My memories, Baku. (In Rus.).

123. Simonyan A. 2000, Zangezuri goyamarty Չափազանց (1920-1921 tt.), Erevan, Erevani hamals. Hrat. (In Arm.).
124. Simonyan A. 2017, Zangezuri goyapayqary 1917-1920 tt., A. Simonyan, Erevan, EPH hrat. (In Arm.)
125. Steklov A. 1928. The army of the Mussavatist Azerbaijan, Baku. (In Rus.).
126. Sun Tsz 2006. A study on military art (transl. by R. Sahakyan, Yerevan. (in Arm.).
127. The proclamation of the Independence of Armenia and the formation of the central bodies of the government (May-June 1918). Collection of documents and materials /author - H.K. Sukiasyan, Yerevan, 2009. (in Arm.)
128. Der-Yakobian Y. 1921, the last disaster in Armenia. The Kemal campaign, the falls of Kars and Alexandropol, the collapse of the Armenian army, the reasons for the attack and destruction, the Bolshevik rule, K. Polis, Print. M. Der-Sahakian. (in Arm.)
129. Ter-Minasyan R. 2004. Antoine Poidebard and Armenia, Bulletin of the Archives of Armenia, N.2, 79-105 (In Arm.).
130. Torlakyan M. 2001. With my days, 3rd edition, Beirut (in Arm.).
131. Tumanyan M. 2012. Diplomatic history of the Republic of Armenia. 1918-1920. Yerevan (In Rus.).
132. Vaal de T. 2005. Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan between peace and war. Moscow (in Russian).
133. Vekilov R.A. 1998. The history of the rise of Azerbaijani Republic. Baku (in Russian).
134. Virabyan V. H. 2003a. Armenian Intelligence during the First Republic (1918– 1920). Yerevan (In Arm.).
135. Virabyan V. H., 2003b, The Militia and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the First Republic (1918- 1920). Yerevan (In Arm.).
136. Virabyan V. 2009. Intelligence and army of the First Republic of Armenia (1918- 1920). Yerevan (In Arm.). Virabyan V. H. 2011. Republic of Armenia in Hayastani Hanrapetutyuny 1918- 1920 (Textbook for the students of higher education). Yerevan (In Arm.).
137. Virabyan V. 2004. Armenia in the April 1920 assembly of Transcaucasian republics. Yerevan (In Arm.).
138. Virabjan V. 2016. Armenian-Georgian military-political relations in 1918-1921, Yerevan (In Arm.).
139. Virabyan V. 1918. The 1918 Georgian-Armenian war, military-political activities of the government of the RA and political parties, Yerevan (In Arm.).
140. Virabyan V. 2007. Pages from the intelligence activities of Tigran Devoyants, Armenian army, 2007/1 (51), p. 82-88 (In Arm.).
141. Virabyan V. 2015. Creation and operation of the State Security System of the Republic of Armenia (Intelligence, Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs), Yerevan (In Arm.).

142. Virabyan V. 2021a. International developments and the Entente states in Transcaucasus in 1917 after the October coup, *History and Culture* 2, Yerevan, 65-82 (In Arm.).
143. Virabyan V. 2021. Al. Chneour at the origins of Armenian intelligence (1918-1920), *Mesrop Mashtoc Hamalsarani Lratu. Gitakan hodvacneri joghovatsu*, 88-105 (In Arm.).
144. Virabyan V. 2021b. Revealing the Khan Tekinsky Conspiracy (from the history of counter intelligence of the First Republic of Armenia), *Fundamental Armenology* 2021/1 (13) 51-81.
145. Virabyan V. 2022. Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial conflict and the Karabakh Issue In the context of the activities of the military-and-political representation of Great Britain in the Republic of Armenia and Transcaucasia in 1918-1920, *Fundamental Armenology* N 1 (15), 39-73.
146. Virabyan V. 2015. The creation and activities of the State security system of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920 (Intelligence and army), Yerevan (In Arm.).
147. Volkhonsky M., Mukhanov V. 2007. On the Trails of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, Moscow (in Russian).
148. Vracyan S. 1966. Through the life. Events. People. Emotions, vol.5, Beirut (In Arm.).
149. Vracyan S. 1993. Republic of Armenia, Yerevan (In Arm.).
150. Vracyan S. 1958. The Republic of Armenia. Beirut (In Arm.).
151. Xursudyan L 2017, Hayastani bajanumy 1920 tvakanin, Erevan, EPH hrat, 352 ej: (In Arm.)
152. Yenukidze D. 1954. The collapse of the imperialist intervention in the Transcaucasus. Tbilisi (In Rus.).
153. Yovhannesean R. 1993, The role of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in the Republic of Armenia// "Droshak", No. 19 (1402), January 13, pp. 31-35. (In Arm.).
154. Zalesskiy K.A. 2003. Who was who in the World war I, Biographic encyclopedic dictionary, Moscow. (In Rus.).
155. Zohrabyan Ed. 1997. 1920 Turkish-Armenian war and powers. Yerevan: "Oskan Yerevantsi" Publishing House (In Arm.).
156. Zohrabyan E. 2002. From the problem of Nakhijevan and «allies» of Armenia (December 1918-April 1920), Yerevan (In Arm.).

INTERNET RESOURCES

1. <https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=32431357>. , viewed in 29.01.2021.
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digby_Shuttleworth: See <https://bit.ly/3OoOs63>.
3. Oliver Baldwin | A Crusader for Armenians | Mavi Boncuk.

4. Andersen A., Partskhaladze G. 2020. A new round of the Karabakh conflict in the context of Armenian-Russian relations, October 10, <https://www.academia.edu/44305785/>, Date of view - December 16, 2021.
5. British General Digby Shuttleworth.// [https:// Peoplepill.Com/ People/ DigbyShuttleworth](https://Peoplepill.Com/People/DigbyShuttleworth): Anar Isgenderli, Justin McCarthy.
6. Historical cycle – Peacekeepers | Esse.am: Aug 2, 2021 See <https://www.esse.am/2021/08/02/istoricheskij-cikl-mirotvorcy/>.
7. Margiev Z. 2021. British occupation of Adjara 1918-1920 – Margiev.ge: [https:// margiev.ge/anglijskaya-okkupacziya-adzharii-1918-1921-gg/](https://margiev.ge/anglijskaya-okkupacziya-adzharii-1918-1921-gg/): Date of view - 03.09.2022
8. Vaal de T. Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan between peace and war, p. 4. See <https://bit.ly/3O6P0hj>.
9. Obituary: Colonel C. B. Stokes, C.I.E., D.S.O., O.B.E., Journal of The Royal Central Asian Society. Volume 36, 1949 - Issue 3-4, pp. 206-207. Published online: 25 Feb 2011-<https://bit.ly/3JOIEUJ>.
10. Claude Stokes: https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Claude_Stokes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digby_Shuttleworth:
11. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digby_Shuttleworth
12. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Digby_Shuttleworth.

*At sunset I reached the gates of Heaven,
I tried to knock on the door of my trembling heart...
It was peaceful, cloudless after a gentle rain.
I knocked on the door and waited...
It took hold of my heart and soul forever
And I was ready to wait forever...
My heart was calm...
Like a sky full of rolling thunder
Like a tired day from running...
I had reached the door of Heaven and was waiting...
The rain was pouring down on my head,
Time was passing...
It was the autumn of Patriarch...*



VANIK HRANTI VIRABYAN

Doctor of History, Professor

Armenian State Pedagogical University after Kh. Abovyan,
Republic of Armenia, Yerevan

Doctor of historical sciences, professor Vanik Hrant Virabyan was born in the village of Khachisar-Chardakhlu, of the province of Gardmank-Utik of the Greater Armenia. In 1988 Defended his candidate's thesis, and in 2008 - the doctoral thesis. Scientific interests are in the field of the formation and operation of the Armenian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, National-State Security System, the history of Armenian-Georgian military-political relations in 1918-1921, and in general, the history of the 20-21st centuries.

Vanik Virabyan's monographs include:

1. Virabyan V. H. Special service of The First Republic of (From the pages of Political History of Armenia), Yerevan, 1999, 40 p.
2. Virabyan V. H. The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920: The military-political activity of government and parties, Yerevan, 1999, 64 p.

3. Virabyan V. H. The Armenian Intelligence Service in the years of First Republic (1918-1920) / The Armenian Intelligence Service in the years of First Republic (1918-1920), Yerevan, 2003, 228 p.
4. Virabyan V.H. Georgian-Armenian war of 1918. The military-political activity of government and parties, Yerevan, 2003, 252 p.
5. Virabyan V. H. The Militia and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920), Yerevan, 2003, 1-150.
6. Virabyan V. H. Armenia on the april 1920 confarence of Tsanscaucasus Republics. (Over the one problem of Armenian political history), Yerevan, 2004, 44 p.
7. Virabyan V. H. The situation in Armenia in 1918-1920: The orientation of Social groups // The Collection of Scentific-methodical articles of the department of Social-political disciplines and Common Economics. The Minrstry of Education and Science of RA, Yerevan, 2004, PP. 24-31.
8. Virabyan V. H. The Creation And Activity of the State Security System of the Republic of Armenia (1918 -1920). Investigation, Army and MIA (Monography), Yerevan, 2006, 288 p.
9. Virabyan V. H. On major issues of the History of Armenia, Yerevan, 2007, 100 p.
10. Virabyan V. H. The First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920): The Abbrrivating Lectures, Yerevan, 2008, 80 p.
11. Virabyan V. H. The Intelligence Service and the Army of Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920, Yerevan, 2009, 416 p.
12. Virabyan V. H. The Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920. Educational textbook Institution of Higher Edication, Yerevan, 2011, 204 p.
13. Virabyan V. H. The Methodical Guidance of the course of History of Armenia, Yerevan, 2011, 68 p.
14. Virabyan V. H. The Methodical Guidance of the course of History of Armenia, Yerevan, 2011, 76 p.
15. Virabyan V. H. History of Armenia. Educational textbook, 2013, Yerevan, 160 p.
16. Virabyan V. H. The Creation and Activity of the State Security System of the Republic of Armenia (1918 -1920. Investigation, Army and MIA (Monography), Yerevan, 2015, 746 p.
17. Virabyan V. H. The Armenian-Georgian Military-Political relations and Lori Neutral Zone (1920-1921). (The Border-Territorial Demarcation), Yerevan, 2015, 92 p.
18. Virabyan V. H. The Armenian-Georgian Military-Political Relations (1918-1921), Yerevan, 2016, 830 p.
19. Virabyan V. H. The Intelligence Activity Of Tigran Devoyants, Yerevan, 2018, 152 p.
20. Virabyan V. H., Poghosyan S. A., Eprikyan A. M. The Armenian Armed Forces During 1914-1920, Yerevan, 2020, PP. 5-14, 242-715 (715 p.).

21. Virabyan V. H., Declaration of Transcaucasian Federation and formation of the First Republic of Armenia // The Collapse of Empires in the 20th century: New States and new identities, Poghosyan S., Galstyan G., Hovhannisyan Ed., Yerevan, 2020, PP. 65-80.
22. Virabyan V. H. From the Heroic History of Khachisar (Chardakhl), Yerevan, 2022, 128 p.
23. Virabyan V. H. On the Question of the Causes and Beginning of the Georgian-Armenian War of 1918, the Role of the Armenian Army and the Government of RA // New approaches to studying and teaching some basic issues of history and culture of Armenia, Yerevan, 2023, PP. 110-121.
24. Virabyan V. H. The Conflict of European And Russian Special Services in The Transcaucasus 1918-1920 // Europe and its Eastern Countries and in particular Armenia, Colección Derecho Europeo nº9 Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos “Salvador de Madariaga” Universidade da Coruña- Armenian State Pedagogical University, Artak Mkrtichyan Minasyan Samvel Poghosyan (Coord.), La Coruna, Spain, 2023, PP. 135-157.

VANIK HRANT VIRABYAN

**ARMENIA IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN MILITARY-
POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS IN TRANSCAUCASUS
(1917-1920)**

Doctor of History, Professor
Armenian State Pedagogical University after Kh. Abovyan,
Republic of Armenia, Yerevan

vanik.virabyan@mail.ru
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8874-1780>

Computer layout and design:
V. H. Virabyan

Printed by: Real Print
Address: Griboyedov 44
Printing: digital
Size: 21 X 29.7cm
Paper: 80 grams
Quantity printed: 25