

METAPHYSICS OF REASONS AND THE DEFENSE OF SOCIETY

Will POGHOSYAN^{1,*} 

¹ National Academy of Sciences, International Scientific Educational Centre, Yerevan, Republic of Armenia

* Correspondence

Will POGHOSYAN, Mamikonyants st., 47/1 apt. 33, Yerevan 0051, Armenia

E-mail:

Anastasia_Poghosyan@yahoo.com

Abstract: The chief problem of metaphysics of reasons is the theoretical substantiation of the steady existence of the best government and society. Reason (Erörterung) contains that which presupposes the formation of a concept given a priori. Montesquieu's *theory* of separation of powers inspired the Constitution of the United States. But the American founding fathers decidedly rejected Montesquieu's *experience* concerning the separation of powers in England. The article deals with the problem of defending Kant's opinion that logic had made no important step either forward or backward since Aristotle. The work raises the problem of the excrescences of the scientific empiricism of the Vienna Circle. The research attempts to solve the problem connected with the debate concerning the insights of rationalists as mere tautologies. Concerning the problem of relation between the mathematical and dialectical logic, the present work shows that the first type of logic refers mainly to natural, the second mainly to social science. The article discusses the eternal problem of middle classes clearly raised by Aristotle. This problem is successfully solved in China with the help of the differentiated theory of convergence: capitalism within the framework of socialism for the East, socialism within the framework of capitalism for the West.

Keywords: metaphysics, reason, society, logic, middle classes, M. Friedman, Ph. Harriman, B. Blanshard, A. Church

Introduction

The classical example of metaphysics of the arguments of reason and of the defense of society, we find in "Politics" of Aristotle (IV 295 b): There are in every state three parts: men of property, extremely indigent men and those standing between both first — that is, men with middle but sufficient income. It is difficult for a very rich

and for a very poor man to obey the arguments of reason. And it is easy for a middle man to follow these arguments. Both first do harm to the society and only a middle man secures its defense. Rich and poor persons are unable to take a part in the discussion of first principles. And only the middle men are able to give and take a reason.

The metaphysical *essence of being* is here the

steady existence of the best government and society. The metaphysician Aristotle first raises for all times the real problem of establishing the numerous middle class as the guarantee of beginnings and preservation of more perfect government and society.

The problem of metaphysics of the reasonable arguments refers to Hegel's problem of taking upon oneself "the exertion of the Concept" (die Anstrengung des Begriffs). Philip L. Harriman follows in Hegel's footsteps: "In metaphysics itself — man's most rigorous attempt to think clearly about first principles — even the greatest thinkers may shift from intensional to extensional terms. Thereby, they confuse the student, and disagree with one another". Therefore, "metaphysics cannot be dismissed as a major concern of speculative thinkers. Not even the eminent Immanuel Kant succeeded in removing metaphysics from philosophy. The intrusive and persisting issues which, by convention, have been assigned to metaphysics remain to this day as challengers for clear, reasoned thought" (Harriman, 1967, p. 710).

In Kant's eyes metaphysics, like first principles, has eternal value: "Because some metaphysics has been always in the world and will to all appearances also later be in the world; but also with a dialectic of the pure reason because of analogous nature. So it is the first and most important concern (Angelegenheit) of the philosophy once for all to deprive it of all harmful influence by removing the source of errors" (Kant, 1965, pp. 28-29). Kant considered his criticism to be the *revolution* in the philosophical method of thinking turning it into the scientific metaphysics, that is – the first science. This idea of the scientific metaphysics as the chief science became the main cause of repudiation of the speculative metaphysics and the conscious break with Kant by the school of logical positivism.

The enemies of metaphysics adduce the statement: "No problem can ever be solved once and for all". We can narrow the truth of this argument of understanding (empirical thinking) by adding an argument of reason. *Till this problem will be solved once and for all by the history of action of a metaphysical thought.* The beginning of completion of the action history of Aristotle's concept is clearly fixed in the Declaration of Independence of 1776. A numerous middle class is possible if the state holds "these truths to be self-

evident: That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness...". These truths are the first principles of metaphysics: God, equality, life, liberty, happiness. The Constitution of the United States of America has also metaphysical (i.e. pure philosophical) origin. It "is meant to endure for ages to come, and to meet the various crises of human affairs" (Marshall, 1819).

The next completion stage of the action history of the middle class conception were the New Economic Policy (NEP) of Soviet Russia introduced in March 1921 which lasted until 1929 and the New Deal for the American people which came into force with the March 4 1933 inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Socialism and capitalism were saved: in Russia through capitalist, in America through socialist measures. Fred Siegel enumerates these revolutionary measures: "The Great Depression had decimated the independent middle classes, the small businesspeople and farmers who had been the bulwark of self-government. Roosevelt redefined democracy for a mass society of industrial workers. He incorporated the wage-earning masses into the nation's political life by supporting the growth of trade unionism. Government, through New Deal laws like the Wagner Act which enabled labor to organize, became the guarantor of the independence once supplied by property ownership" (Siegel, 1991, p. 654).

Among the political leaders of the West, the "hawks" set the form. They are not able to adduce an argument of reason or to apprehend it. Hawks as Ronald Reagan slandered the Soviet Union ("Evil Empire") and inspired its destruction. Nowadays, Donald Trump is slandering China and inspiring its destruction. The hawks watch over Milton Friedman's "capitalism without alternative", that is – without socialism and numerous middle classes, but with superrich businesspeople. In our time, the attempts of the capitalist West to assimilate the socialist East will certainly fail. There are in China no neurotic traitors of the proletarian thought like Gorbachev and Yeltsin. It is formed in the socialist republic China the great society of the middle prosperity. This is just one of the two forms of the best State system and social order.

The destruction of the Soviet world power inspired by the American world power was the act

of the imperial expansion. It disregarded the anti-imperial warning best expressed by John Quincy Adams on July 4, 1821: “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy... She might become the dictatress of the world; she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit” (Adams, 1991, p. 367).

The new attempt of America to become the dictatress of the world by going abroad in search of “the Chinese monster” to destroy could once and for all put an end to her greatness. Even *the great metaphysical Constitution ment for ages to come* would hardly save America. The anti-imperial sentiment in opposition to the war is the best guarantee of her greatness.

The Defense of Rationalism

Herbert Feigl, a prominent member of the famous Vienna Circle, reviewed its logical and philosophical concepts: “Though the doctrines of the Vienna Circle have been modified considerably since the 1930’s, the basic outlook of scientific empiricism, with its exact analyses of the logical foundations of the sciences and its repudiation of speculative metaphysics, continues as a most influential factor in present day philosophy” (Feigl, 1967, p.105).

Concerning the destiny of metaphysics, of a whole isolated, speculative cognition through reason, Kant considered that it would be preserved even if all other sciences (including a possible scientific empiricism) would be wholly absorbed in a muzzle of an all-eradicating barbarism (in dem Schlunde einer allesvertilgenden Barbarei gänzlich verschlungen). This Kant’s simile was hardly understood by logical positivists having delivered philosophers and scientists from “the misery metaphysics”. The famous simile of *barbarsm* proclaims metaphysics to be the non-eradicating root of the European civilization. And its repudiation by the scientific empiricists is just their falling into barbarism.

The Vienna circle was characterized first of all by its hostility to metaphysics and by its radical empiricism. But it is no secret that hostility and radicalism are known to play the worse role in philosophy and state affairs. The radical fundamental principle of the logical positivists says: “The meaning of any statement turns entirely on the possibility of its empirical verification”. It

was from this principle that Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Hans Reichenbach and other more important members, visitors and collaborators of the school of logical positivism drew the conclusion that metaphysical statements were meaningless. They did not admit in themselves the theoretical thinking and *the possibility of the rationalist verification*.

The problem of verification was at the center of attention of one of the greatest metaphysical systems in the history of philosophy. From Spinoza’s point of view an experience “cannot act on reason and disperse its mist so as in that case when a doctrine about a subject is deduced only from axioms agreeable to reason, i.e. only by virtue of the power of reason and its order of understanding, especially if the point is a spiritual subject that is perceived by no means by external senses... If they (empiricists) just boast that they possess something that rises above the reason (natural light), it is a pure invention and far beneath the reason (Spinoza, 1957 p. 86).

For 20th century defenses of rationalism, Brand Blanshard’s research works were of great significance: “Rationalism in Philosophy is primarily a theory of knowledge. As opposed to empiricism, which holds that all knowledge comes from perception, it maintains that the most important part of our knowledge comes from intellectual insight. The clearest cases of such insight are to be found in logic and mathematics – the knowledge, for example, that a thing cannot be both square and not square, or that $2+2=4$. Such knowledge is certain; it is necessary, in the sense that we not only see it to be true, but see that it could not be otherwise; and it is universal, in the sense that it holds everywhere and always. Such insights provide the framework of all our knowledge... Rationalism in philosophy went into eclipse after World War I. The notion of rational insight was subjected to sharp criticism by the school of logical positivism, which insisted that the insights of which the rationalists made so much were mere tautologies – that is, statements of what we meant by our terms – and therefore revealed nothing about the nature of things. “ $2+2=4$ ” is true and certain, but all it tells us is that what we mean by “ $2+2$ ” is the same as what we mean by “4”. If this criticism is valid, the kind of thinking on which rationalism has relied loses most of its significance. Whether the charge is valid is still a matter of debate”

(Blanshard, 1967, pp. 230 c-d). Brand Blanshard (1892-1987) clearly defines the matter of debate: the defense of rationalism against the doctrine of tautology of L. Wittgenstein and Vienna circle.

The basic outlook of scientific empiricism continues as a most influential factor not only in present day philosophy. It continues also in contemporary society and state. The proposition that the individual is more important than society is common in Western philosophy. This is the fundamental proposition of the Vienna group which belonged to the right wing of liberalism. The proposition “The individual is more important than society” assigns to society a subordinate part. Thus the individual is an “argument” and the society is a “function” of an individual.

In the new empirical logic, argument and function designated as name and denotation are intended for substituting word and concept of the formal logic. And especially, the denotation as collections or classes of concrete things to be calculated is intended for substituting the abstract concept of species. This has been known as *Nous* (Anaxagoras), *Eidos* or *Idea*, *Art* (Hegel), i.e. determinate generality. But we are faced here with insuperable difficulties connected just with the vagueness of the notion “denotation”. As regards this, there is a clear opinion of Alonzo Church, the author of *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*: “A *name* is said to *denote* that thing or those things of which it is a name, or to which, in other words, we intend to *refer* when we use the name. The threatened circularity of this definition (the three italicized words are not easily defined except by means of one another) suggests that we are here dealing with a basic concept, for which an axiomatic treatment may be more appropriate than definition” (Church, 1961, p. 218).

According to Ludwig Wittgenstein the only necessary propositions are those which are true by definition. Alonzo Church deviates from this rule because “there is no definition available for denotation in general”. Nevertheless he intends to solve the problem of denotation as a basic concept by means of the axiomatic treatment. But axioms are known to be appropriate generally for the abstract concept of species. Therefore the truth characteristic of the concept “denotation” is entirely absorbed by a name, i.e. by a word. And the primacy of word over concept easily leads to distortion of the classical formal logic.

After World War I, the *Schülerszene* of Goethe's *Faust* invaded literally the historical scene of defeated and humiliated Germany. The hostility of the Vienna circle to Aristotelian logic, metaphysics, rationalism and non-liberal society entailed serious crisis of scientific education in Western Europe. It favoured significantly the distortion of religious rationalism to magic thinking and the seizure of power by National Socialists in Germany.

In the *Schülerszene*, Mephistopheles (in Faust's long robes) sets a student on the right path. He is the worst enemy of “reason and knowledge” (*Vernunft und Wissenschaft*), “the highest strength in man”. Therefore he holds up logic, metaphysics and rationalism to contempt. But how is the right path then possible?

“1990 **Meph.** In sum, on words attention center!

Then through the safest gate you'll enter
the temple halls of Certainty.

Student. Yet in the word there must some
concept be!

Meph. Of course! But don't give concepts
over-close attention,

for just where fails the comprehension”

a word steps promptly in as deputy (Goethe, 1965).

The wisdom of Mephistopheles reproduces formally true the spirit of scientific education of Goethe's era. In *Prologue in Heaven*, Mephistopheles ridicules before the Lord Vernunft of the little god because he himself has only *Verstand*.

“L.285 **Meph.:** he calls it Reason — thence
his power's increased,

to be far beastlier than any beast”.

Nevertheless he is aware of the highest strength of Vernunft coupled with science.

The distinguishing of *Vernunft* and *Verstand* was established by Leibniz and has played the key part in the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. The formula “*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*” (Nothing is in the intellect which has not been previously in sensation) was the thesis of John Locke's polemic against the doctrine of rational insights. Leibniz added to this thesis the limitation “*Nisi intellectus ipse: (except the intellect itself)*”. This *intellect itself* is just Vernunft (reason). The intellect which is conditioned by sensation is *Verstand* (understanding). In the early years of the 20th century,

the logical positivists substituted the term “sensation” for the term “emotional experience”. This strengthened considerably the conditionality of understanding by opening the gate for sophistical behavior of the individual. The reason waned in his eyes in general.

And vice versa, a humble notion “tautology” eclipses suddenly the sublime notion of rational insight. How is it possible? For an ultra-liberal individual who is more important than society, the emotional experience is a reliable guard. It will prompt him to choose an exact word (name) of an individual subject of scientific research and to solve the problem of the propositional function that is the key problem of mathematical logic. A definition of the propositional function contains the merits and demerits of the logical positivism: “An expression containing at least one variable, that becomes a proposition when a constant is substituted for the variable (Ex.: x is a man)”.

It is doubtful that this definition contains an original conception. It reproduces some important features of Schelling’s philosophy of nature. The instrument of the monotonous formalism of the philosophy of nature is the substitution of something clear for the abstract concept. The instrument of the monotonous scientific formalization is the substitution of a clear propositional (logical) function for the abstract concept. The propositional function permits to formulate a definition by full mathematical analogy which Wittgenstein, the logical positivists and their followers call tautology.

In the Preface to *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Hegel subjected the formalism of philosophy of nature and the method of substitutions by superficial analogy to sharp criticism: “Inexperience may also be delighted by the good cheer of such determinations, since they substitute that can be intuited for the abstract Concept and thus make things more pleasing, and inexperience may even congratulate itself on its intimation of an affinity of souls with such glorious activity.

The trick of such wisdom is learned as quickly as it is easy to master it; its repetition, once it is known, becomes as insufferable as the repetition of a sleight of hand one sees through. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to handle than a painter’s palette on which there are only two colors, bay, red and green, one if an historical piece is wanted, the

other for landscapes”.

Walter Kaufmann quotes Hermann Glockner concerning Hegel’s sharp attack on romantic philosophy of nature” which “was indeed meant to be directed only against its excrescences but not against Schelling himself”. Kaufmann gives also his own commentary on Hegel’s criticism directed against the formalism of philosophy of nature: “What is much more interesting and important than these historical considerations, however, is that Hegel once again goes out of his way to attack the very views which posterity, ironically, came to associate with him. Ever since the mid-nineteenth century, Hegel himself has been ridiculed for allegedly holding the views which he mocks here”.

Excrescences of the Scientific Empiricism

The problem of excrescences in philosophy of nature and in scientism is closely connected with the problem of natural philosophizing as healthy common sense and as genius. The analysis of this connection by Hegel is topical. “It is not pleasant to remark that ignorance, indeed even crudeness that lacks form as much as taste and is incapable of concentrating thought on an abstract sentence, not to speak of the connection on several, assures us now that it is the freedom and tolerance of thought, now that it is nothing less than genius. As is well known, such genius, now the rage in philosophy, once raged no less in poetry; but when the products of such genius had any meaning at all, they were not poetry but trivial prose or, when they were more, mad oratory. Thus a supposedly natural philosophizing that considers itself too good for Concepts and thinks that this lack makes it an intuitive or visionary and poetical thinking, in fact brings to market arbitrary combinations of an imagination that has merely been disorganized by thought – fabrications that are neither flesh nor fish, neither poetry nor philosophy” (Kaufmann, 1965).

The fabrications of the logical positivism are neither flesh nor fish, neither logic nor philosophy. These fabrications (Gebilde) are a flat logical-philosophical syncretism. Hegel opposes his own view on nature against Schelling’s philosophy of philosophy of nature: “Instead of the inner life and the self – movement of its existence, such a simple determinateness is taken from intuition,

which here means the knowledge of the senses, and expressed according to a superficial analogy, and then this external and empty application of a formula is called *construction*. – Such formalism is like any other”. The formalization is an aggravated formalism.

The inner life and the self-movement of its existence is to be expressed by “the dialectical movement of the proposition itself” (Hegel): “It is of the nature of representational thinking to follow the attributes or predicates and to go beyond them, quite rightly, too, because they are mere predicates and attributes; but because that which in a proposition has the form of a predicate is really the substance itself, representational thinking is stopped in its advance. To represent it that way: it suffers a counterthrust. Beginning with the subject, as if this remained basis, it finds, because the predicate is really the substance, that the subject has moved into the predicate and has thus been sublimated. Thus that what which seemed to be predicate has become the whole and independent mass, and thinking can no longer stray freely but is brought to a stop by this gravity” (Kaufmann, 1965).

Hegel is expounding a new and difficult theory of the *counterthrust* (Lehre vom Gegenstoß) which is the important argument in favour of the existence of substance and the speculative metaphysics. This is also the theory of the objective truth. In the same time, Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) is elaborating the doctrine of the *resistance* which the subject experiences in the time of primary meeting with the outer world. Destutt de Tracy calls this experience the argument in favour of the reality of the outer world as united corporal substance. Hegel’s theory of the counterthrust refers to the resistance of the predicate becoming the substance by means of absorbing the subject of the proposition to the arbitrary opinion of a thinking subject trying to retain it. The movement of the substance as subject is expressed by the dialectical movement of the proposition itself.

Hegel explains the both movements with the help of two examples. “Examples may help to explain this. In the proposition “God is being”, the predicate is “being”. It has substantial meaning in which the subject dissolves. Being here is not meant to be a mere predicate but rather the essence, and God apparently ceases to be firm subject, in spite of his position in the sentence.—

Thinking here does not progress in the transition from the subject to the predicate: the subject gets lost, and thinking feels inhibited and, missing the subject, is thrown back to the thought of the subject. Or, because the predicate is expressed as itself a subject, as being, as the essence which exhausts the nature of the subject, thinking finds the subject immediately in the predicate; and now, instead of attaining in the predicate the free position to argue, it is still absorbed in the content—or at least the demand is present that it ought to be so absorbed.

It is similar when one says: the actual is the general. The actual as a subject vanishes in the predicate. The general is not meant to have merely the meaning of the predicate, as if the proposition were merely meant to say that the actual is general. Rather, the general is supposed to express the essence of the actual.—Thus *thinking* loses the firm objective ground it had in the subject whenever the predicate throws it back to the subject, so that in the predicate it returns not to itself but to the subject of the content” (Kaufmann, 1965).

The question is the excrescences of the formalism of philosophy of nature (the understanding is electricity, animals are nitrogen or equal the south or north, etc., or represent it), not of the philosophy of nature itself. The excrescences of formalization by substituting something that can be intuited for the abstract concept are the hostility to the classical formal logic, metaphysics, rationalism and the society. Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) conceives the concept as function with one or several variables. He opposes the subjects (Gegenstände) to functions values: true or false.

It is obvious that Frege’s formalization of notions from Hegel’s criticism of formalism: “Confronted with such power that brings together what seemed far apart, and with the violence that the calmly restful things of sense suffer from such connections while they thus receive the semblance of a concept, though they spared the main thing, namely to express the Concept itself or the significance of the notion of the senses—confronted with all this, inexperience may well be plunged into admiration and amazement, and it may even venerate in all this the signs of profound genius”.

The dialectical movement of the proposition itself is substituted for the tautological movement of the propositional function. But tautology does

not possess the magic power of self-movement, as believe Wittgenstein and the logical positivists. The driving force of the substitution of a constant (Socrates: a name, a word) for the variable x is the superficial arbitrary analogy equating the movement of the propositional function to the dialectical movement of the proposition itself. The driving force of the movement of the propositional function is the arbitrary analogy to which resorts the subject of cognition. Hegel calls it “the second subject”. The first subject is the subject of a proposition.

Kant gave in “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science” (1786) the first critical philosophy of nature of modern (mechanical) natural science proving the inevitable use of metaphysical principles by all natural philosophers and natural scientists. “Hence all natural philosophers who have wished to proceed mathematically in their occupation have always, and must have always, made use of metaphysical principles (albeit unconsciously), even if they themselves solemnly guarded against all claims of metaphysics upon their science. Undoubtedly they have understood by the latter the folly of contriving possibilities at will and playing with concepts, which can perhaps not be presented in intuition at all, and have no other certification of their objective reality than that they merely do not contradict themselves. All true metaphysics is drawn from the essence of the faculty of thinking itself, and is in no way fictitiously invented on account of not being borrowed from experience. Rather, it contains the pure actions of thought, and thus a priori concepts and principles, which first bring the manifold of *empirical representations* into the law-governed connection through which it can become *empirical* cognition, that is, experience. Thus these mathematical physicists could in no way avoid metaphysical principles, and, among them, also not those that make the concept of their proper object, namely, matter, a priori suitable for application to outer experience, such as the concept of motion, the filling of space, inertia, and so on. But they rightly held that to let merely empirical principles govern these concepts would in no way be appropriate to the apodictic certainty they wished their laws of nature to possess, so they preferred to postulate such [principles], without investigating them with regard to their a priori sources” (Kant, 2004).

Michael Friedman shows very well and clearly in his *Introduction* (2004) to “Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science” that Kant’s revolution in metaphysics is the foundation of the contemporary European spiritual and political civilization. “Much of Kant’s intellectual energy, throughout his long career, was devoted to issues in the philosophy of natural science. Kant was not a “philosopher of science” in the sense now familiar within the Anglo-American tradition – a specialist focused on the nature and methods of scientific inquiry, say, or on the foundations of some particular science, such as physics or biology. Kant was a generalist philosopher in the classical sense, concerned with all human thought as such (both practical and theoretical) and with the structure and character of all distinctively human activities and institutions (science, art, religion, law, morality, politics, and so on). Natural science, however, was a particularly central and important example of human thought. Indeed, for the eighteenth century as a whole, the age of Enlightenment and the triumph of Newtonianism, the recent culmination of the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the work of Newton had elevated natural science to previously undreamt of heights within the intellectual firmament. Thinkers as diverse as Voltaire, Hume, and Kant himself all took the Newtonian achievement in natural science as a model of the human intellect at its best, and as a model, more specifically, for their own philosophical activity” (Kant 2004, *Introduction*, p. VII).

According to Moritz Schlick, “the cognition consists, in its essence, in a reproduction of the order, the structure of the world; the matter or contents which possesses this structure cannot enter into it; because the expressive (*das Ausdrückende*) is not just the expressed (*das Ausgedrückte*) itself. So it would be a senseless undertaking to want to want to “express” the “contents” itself. By this, the sentence is pronounced on any metaphysics; because it has wanted just this at all times as it made its purpose to get to know the actual “essence of being” (Schlick, 1950, p. 463).

According to a superficial analogy, the reproduction of the structure of the world as the knowledge of the senses is substituted here for the metaphysical “long chain of concepts” (Spinoza). The scientist formalization of this substi-

tute only aggravates the sophistical element of any formalism.

The formalized substitute consists in the empty application of the sophistical formula “the expressive is not just the expressed”. In Hegel’s logic, the dialectical movement of the proposition itself turns the predicate into the substance into which enter the subject, the contents. In Schlick’s logical conception, the movement of the propositional function weakens the predicate to the last degree. The all-powerful subject joins the humble predicate by extremely superficial analogy with itself which assumes the appearance of the tautology.

In Schlick’s sophistical and antimetaphysical formula, “the expressive” is meant as a predicate and “the expressed” as a subject of the proposition. The predicate as the concept is turned into a vague image. Therefore the subject cannot enter into the predicate to create the substance. But it can add the predicate to itself. Schlick’s belief is that by it we can arrive at ultimate “atomic facts” logically independent both of one another and of being known. Schlick is characterized by his hostility not only to metaphysics but to philosophy in general: “The philosophy is not a science though it penetrates through all sciences. While the sciences must consist of the systems of the true propositions and contain the cognition, the philosophy consists in search of the meaning of the propositions and creates an understanding which leads to the wisdom”. He attempts here to build a general theory of meaning. But unwittingly he creates a negative metaphysics which is a negative philosophical system and a negative philosophical science. Therefore “an understanding which leads to the wisdom” is to be understood as the way to philosophical science. And the way to the science is just the science.

During the 1970’s and 1980’s, academician Theodore Oiserman (Moscow’s M.V. Lomonosov State university) was at the head of a group of philosophers which elaborated problems concerning the scientific development of philosophy. Prominent among the members were A.S. Bogomolov, E.V. Ilyenkov, V.A. Lektorski, N.V. Motroshilova, V.V. Sokolov, F.K. Kocharli, S.M. Abdildin, V.I. Shinkarouk, and Will Poghosyan. The group made essential contributions to the theory of the historical philosophical process of the formation of the philosophical sci-

ence and scientific method – that is, the dialectical method.

Dialectical and Mathematical Logic

Herbert Marcuse points out the main difference between Hegel’s dialectical method and that of Karl Marx: the Marxian dialectic is a historical method. “The dialectical method has thus of its very nature become a historical method. The dialectical principle is not a general principle equally applicable to any subject matter. To be sure, every fact whatever can be subjected to a dialectical analysis, for example, a glass of water, as in Lenin’s famous discussion. But all such analyses would lead into the structure of the socio-historical process and show it to be constitutive in the facts under analysis. The dialectic takes facts as elements of a definite historical totality from which they be isolated. In his reference to the example of a glass of water, Lenin states that the whole of human practice must enter the “definition” of the object”; the independent objectivity of the glass of water is thus dissolved. Every fact can be subjected to dialectical analysis only in so far as every fact is influenced by the antagonisms of the social process. The Marxian dialectic is a historical method in still another sense: it deals with a *particular stage* of the historical process. Marx criticizes Hegel’s dialectic for generalizing the dialectical movement of all being, of being-as-such, and getting therefore merely “the abstract, logical, speculative expression of the movement to which of history. Moreover, the movement to which Hegel gave such abstract expression, and which he thought was general, actually characterizes only a particular phase of man’s history, namely, “the history of his maturing” (*Entstehungsgeschichte*). Marx’s distinction between the history of this maturing and the “actual history” of mankind amounts to a delimitation of the dialectic. The *Entstehungsgeschichte* of mankind, which Marx calls his prehistory, is the history of class society. Man’s *actual* history will begin when this society has been abolished. The Hegelian dialectic gives the *abstract logical* form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its *real concrete* movement. Marx’s dialectic, therefore, is still bound up with the pre-historical phase” (Marcuse, 1964)

Hegel poited out the main deficiency of mathematical method: *it remains external to its material*. It should be here especially emphasized that the German speculative metaphysics has predetermined by its criticism the scientific side of the development of mathematical logic.

“If this should boastful or revolutionary, though I know that my tone is altogether different, it should be noted that the scientific finery furnished by mathematics—such as explanations, divisions, axioms, rows of theorems, their demonstrations, principles, and inferences from them—is at least according to current opinion quite outmoded. Even if the unfitness of these procedures is not yet clearly understood, one makes little or no use of them; and if one does not disapprove of them, at least they are not loved. And we must have the prejudice in favor of what is excellent that it will get itself used and loved.

But it is not difficult to see that positing a proposition, adducing reasons for it, and in the same way refuting the opposite by giving reasons, cannot be the form in which truth appears. Truth is its own self-movement, while this is the method of knowledge that remains external to its material”.

The problem of “the prejudice in favor of what is excellent that it will get itself used and loved” was raised already by Plato in connection with his critique of vulgarization of the language of the mathematical science by mathematicians themselves. “Consequently if geometry compels the soul to contemplate real existence, it does concern us; but if it only forces the changeful and perishing upon our notice, it does not concern us.

Yes, so we affirm.

Well then, on one point at any rate we shall encounter no opposition from those who are even slightly acquainted with geometry, when we assert that this science holds a position which flatly contradicts the language employed by those who handle it.

How so?

They talk, I believe, in a very ridiculous and poverty-stricken style. For they speak invariably of squaring, and producing, and adding, and so on, as if they were engaged in some business, and as if all their propositions had a practical end in view: whereas in reality I conceive that the science is pursued wholly for the sake of knowledge.

Assuredly it is.

There is still a point about which we must be agreed, is there not?

What is it?

That the science is pursued for the sake of the knowledge of what eternally exists, and not of what comes for a moment into existence, and then perishes.

We shall soon be agreed about that. Geometry, no doubt, is a knowledge of what eternally exists.

If that be so, my excellent friend, geometry must tend to draw the soul towards truth, and to give the finishing stroke to the philosophic spirit,—thus contributing to raise up what, at present, we so wrongly keep down.

Yes, it will do so most forcibly.

Then you must, in the most forcible manner, direct the citizens of your beautiful city on no account to fail to apply themselves to geometry. For even its secondary advantages are not trifling” (Plato, 1943, Book VII, 527).

Wittgenstein’s model of knowledge issuing from the possibility of reduction of the whole knowledge to a totality of the elementary propositions wholly repeats Marx’ course of thought concerning the wealth of nations as applied to the spiritual wealth. “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities”, its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity” (Marx, 1943, p. 1). And it is the ultimate aim of “Capital”, “to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society” having the substantial significance. But the ultimate aim of Wittgenstein is to make the individual responsible for the preservation of the liberal society above which he may raise himself. The spiritual wealth of liberal societies presents itself as “an immense accumulation of propositions”, its unit being a single proposition. The model of Wittgenstein is a mercenary one. The long – discarded methods “of squaring, producing, and especially adding” are instruments of Wittgenstein’s analysis of a proposition. *The adding is here a full mathematical analogy presenting itself as tautology.*

Hegel influenced the forming of the mathematical method. He fairly criticized the “quite outmoded” method of mathematics because this is the method of knowledge that remains external

to its material. Hegel's reproach has induced Wittgenstein to attempt to remove this fatal deficiency. Hence the doctrine of tautology: All necessary propositions say the same thing—that is, *nothing at all*. Kant emphasized the difference between philosophical and mathematical analogies: “In philosophy, the analogies mean something quite different than in mathematics. In mathematics, the formulas are so called which express the equality of two relations of quantities... But in philosophy, the analogy is the equality of two not quantitative, but qualitative relations...” (Kant, 1965). Wittgenstein's tautology is a full mathematical analogy. In his doctrine of tautology, the mathematical analogy is substituted for philosophical analogy.

The revolution in mathematical thinking has created the mathematical logic. But the mathematical thinking owes the speculative metaphysics this revolution. The mathematics could cope with Hegel's criticism: “The mathematical method is method of knowledge that remains external to its material”. The doctrine of tautology is of importance in this upheaval. But the sphere of the application of tautology has its limits. Wittgenstein's tautology is inapplicable to formal logic. The insuperable obstacle is here the group of adjective, more often of participle, with dependent prepositive words - that is, *the prepositive widened attribute* (das erweiterte Attribut). It exists in German, Russian, Armenian, but does not exist in English. This problem is thoroughly discussed by me in the article “The Widening of the Logic and the Care of the State” (Poghosyan, 2023).

According to statement of Russell “Plato has no understanding of philosophical syntax”. This statement is refuted by the prepositive widened attribute with a group of words dependent on adjective: “Platon ist der *im Verständnis für die philosophische Syntax starke Mann*”. In English in analogous case only postpositive words independent of the adjective: “Plato is the man *strong in understanding of philosophical syntax*”. It is obvious that “the great gap between the universal “man” as the name of a pattern man created by God” (Russell, 1964) is successfully narrowed by power of the adjective and the language order.

The doctrine of tautology is of importance in natural science and in the knowledge guided by

calculation though here it is subjected to miscalculation. The famous Prussian soldier Alfred Schlieffen (1833-1913) had wittily shown an unreliable character of calculation-based experimentation: “In whatever calculation, the easiest thing is a miscalculation as to the forthcoming resistance of a girl and the course of a battle”. (“Über nichts verkalkuliert man sich leichter, als über den Widerstand eines Mädchens und den Verlauf einer Schlacht”. In: ZWEIG, Arnold. *Die Zeit ist reif*).

In contemporary Russian fighting with Ukraine, Putin's intricate politics is guided by calculation subjected to miscalculation. He is trying to free the next territories populated by Russians. But it is a petty question in behalf of a petty section of the citizens. It is not question in behalf of the whole population of the slandered and behalf of the state as a whole, of the society as a whole is that of establishing the more perfect Union of the former Soviet republics. The problem of a more perfect Union is simple and clear to the whole world. And the solution of this State problem requires revolutionary measures. Without these there are the permanent civil wars. But Putin and the traitors of the proletarian thought have repudiated the great Russian revolution of 1917 because they tremble for the destiny, of the riches amassed by robbery of the “people's privatization” realized by the neurotic gang of cynical cretins Yeltsin, Gaidar, Chubais, Kudrin.

Conclusion

The repudiation of metaphysics and rationalism, the Widening of Logic and the defacement of sciences entailed the darkening of the human reason and the eclipse of the State morals. The chief problem of Russia is to realize with the help of typically Russian revolutionary dialectics its legal right to establish a more perfect Union. The chief problem of America is to hold the metaphysical principles of her Constitution and to repudiate the imperial role of the dictatrix of the world. Only the theory and practice of the convergence of civilizations will save us, namely — capitalism within the framework of socialism for the East and socialism within the framework of capitalism for the West.

References

- Adams, J. Q. (1991). *Expansion, continental and overseas*. The Reader's companion to American History. Boston: Houghton Mufflin Company.
- Blanshard, B. (1967). *Rationalism*. The Encyclopedia Americana, Volume 23. New York: Americana Corporation.
- Church, A. (1961). *Denotation*. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Volume 7. Chicago London Toronto.
- Feigl, H. (1967). *VIENNA CIRCLE*. The Encyclopedia Americana, Volume 28. New York: Americana Corporation.
- Friedman, M. (2004) *Introduction*. In: Kant, I. (2004) *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Translated and edited by Michael Friedman, Cambridge.
- Goethe, J.W. (1965). *Faust*. The Bayard Taybor translation, Revised and edited by Stuart Atkins. Collier Books. New York, Collier – Macmillan LTD London.
- Harriman, Ph. L. (1967). *METAPHYSICS*. In *The Encyclopedia Americana. International Edition, Volume 18*. New York.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1980). *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. (Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 9) Hamburg: Meiner.
- Kant, I. (1965). *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Verlag von Felix Meiner in Hamburg.
- Kant, I. (2004). *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. (M. Friedman, Trans & Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaufmann, W. (1965). The Preface to the Phenomenology. In: *Hegel. Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary*. London.
- Marcuse, H. (1964). *Reason and Revolution. Hegel and Rise of Social Theory*. Boston.
- Marshall, J. (1819). *Chief Justice*. McCulloch v. Maryland.
- Marx, K. (1943). *Capital. A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production*. (S. Moore & E. Aveling, Trans.; F. Engels, Ed.). London: George Allen and Unwin LTD. Bradford and Dickens, London, W.C.I.
- Paghosyan, W. (2023). The Widening of the Logic and the Care of the State. *WISDOM*, 27(3), 110–118. <https://doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v27i3.1069>
- Plato (1943). *The republic of Plato*. With an Analysis, and Notes, by John Llewecyn M. A. and David James Vaughan, M. A. London: Macmillan.
- Russell, B. (1964). *A History of Western Philosophy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Schlick, M. (1950). *Philosophen – Lexikon. Handwörterbuch der Philosophie nach Personen. Verfaßt und herausgegeben von Werner Ziegenfuss und Gertrud Yung. Zweiter Band. Walter De Gruyter und Co. Berlin*.
- Siegel, F. (1991). Liberalism. In E. Foner, & J. A. Garraty (Eds.), *The Reader's companion to American History* (p. 654). Boston 1991: Houghton Mufflin Company.
- Spinoza, B. (1957). *Tractatus Theologico – Politicus*. In *Izbranniye proizvedeniya* (Selected works, in Russian). (Volume 2, V.V. SOKOLOV, Ed.). Moscow: "Gospolitizdat".