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THE "MSHAK" NEWSPAPER ABOUT THE PREPARATION OF ATTACK ON ARMENIA BY KEMALIST TURKEY IN 1920

KEYWORDS

"Mshak" newspaper Shikhlinsky Kemal-Bolshevik Alliance Merdenek G. Chicherin Kyazim Karabekir Mustafa Kemal

ABSTRACT

Various Armenian periodicals and, in particular, the newspaper "Mshak" addressed the issue of Kemalist Turkey's preparation for an attack on Armenia. These materials shed light on many important historical realities related to the issue under consideration.

The war was inevitable, since it didn't depend only on the Armenian government. It was dictated by the aggressive plans proclaimed by Kemalist Turkey and was called the "National Vow," which was facilitated by Soviet Russia, which provided the Kemalist government with both financial support and support in the form of weapons and ammunition, in the hope that the Kemalist side would contribute to the victory of the world revolution and the spread of socialism in the Muslim East.

An analysis of the publications of the "Mshak" reveals the goals of M. Kemal, who intended to annul the Treaty of Sevres and destroy the Republic of Armenia, annexing one part of its territory to Turkey and the other to Soviet Russia.

Thus, the materials of the "Mshak" refute the point of view disseminated in Soviet historiography, according to which Armenia was the initiator of the Turkish-Armenian war. Articles of the "Mshak" testify to the preparation of the Turkish attack back in February-March 1920 on Armenia.

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Introduction

Preparing the attack on Armenia, M. Kemal, on the one hand, using the contradictions between Soviet Russia and the Entente states, and on the other hand, manipulating the Bolshevik doctrine of the "world revolution", received the material, financial and military assistance from Soviet Russia, which was directed against the Republic of Armenia and Greece. On September 28, 1920, the Turkish army started the main attack. The Turkish-Armenian war began, which had an unsuccessful beginning and end for Armenia. The Kemal-Bolshevik rapprochement, which began with M. Kemal's letter to Lenin on April 26, 1920, ended with the treaty of March 16, 1921, with the division of Armenia between Turkey and Soviet Russia.

The article examines the issues of Turkey's preparing an attack on Armenia, organization of border clashes, which were widely covered by the Armenian periodicals and especially the "Mshak" newspaper. This newspaper contains valuable details about the above-mentioned events. The materials included in the periodical shed new light on the issue.

The Kemal-Bolshevik Alliance as a Key Factor in the Process of Preparation of an Attack by the Kemalists on the Republic of Armenia

After the crimes committed in Western Armenia and Cilicia, M. Kemal decided to find allies and isolate Armenia to prepare for an attack. The goal was to destroy Eastern Armenians and annex the territories of Eastern Armenia. "Persuading" the goal to fight against the "evil intentions of the Entente" to divide Turkey and create an Armenian state, the Kemalites intensified their efforts to find allies. In this context, their important ally was Soviet Russia, the torchbearer of the anti-imperialist struggle, which in April of 1920 was the first to recognize the government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, headed by M. Kemal¹. It should be noted that the first foreign policy document signed by M. Kemal was the strongly nationalist letter of April 26, 1920 addressed to the government of Soviet Russia, where M. Kemal proposed and expressed his readiness to conduct "military operations against imperialist Armenia"². Another important ally, according to Kemal, were the Muslims of the Caucasus. For this purpose, at the

¹ «Документы внешней политики СССР», т. 2, 1958, 554–555.

² «Документы внешней политики СССР», т. 2, 1958, 725–726.

end of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, many emissaries were sent to Azerbaijan, Dagestan and other Muslim regions, that operated freely under the leadership of Turkish officers, organizing armed groups and carrying out anti-Armenian propaganda. Soon, the Young Turks and Kemal nationalists in Baku created the socalled "Turkish headquarters" and established close ties with the Caucasian regional committee of the RC (b) P. On February 6, 1920, the encryption sent to Karabekir demanded "to make serious military concentrations from the rear against Armenia, which is considered a Caucasian bulwark, entering into direct contact with Islamic states like Azerbaijan and Dagestan"³. Regarding the planned invasion of Armenia, the Kemalites were also encouraged by the former leaders of the Young Turks, especially Enver, who dreamed of becoming the Napoleon of Turkey. Not being able to tolerate the fact of creating an Armenian state, he told the Armenian delegates in Istanbul in the summer of 1918 that "Armenia must become a new Bulgaria, if Turkey does not take measures to make it harmless for itself"4. It is no coincidence that the same Enver expressed support for the meeting of the "Islamic Liberation League" convened in Berlin in January 1920 under the chairmanship of Talaat, which, discussing pan-Islamic issues, decided to show support to the nationalist movement in Anatolia and declared the destruction of Armenia as a priority. Back on March 16, 1920, the commander of the Turkish troops, Kyazim Karabekir, was trying to clarify the time of the attack on the Republic of Armenia. He suggested M. Kemal waiting for a more favorable moment for the attack, because the preparations were not finished and the winter cold typical of the Armenian highlands had to be taken into consideration.

The study of Turkish documents by famous Turkologist Ruben Safrastyan gives an opportunity to get an idea about the practical steps taken by M. Kemal and K. Karabekir in the direction of preparing for war. "In particular, Karabekir, as the first step, published a declaration that aimed to spread anti-Armenian sentiments in the border regions and unite the Muslim population against the Republic of Armenia, presenting the latter as an enemy. The statement mentioned the need for joint actions of the Muslim population, seeking to use the Kurds in the war being prepared"⁵, R. Safrastyan concludes.

³ **Արզումանյան** 1973, 309։

⁴ «Մշակ» 16.11.1920:

⁵ **Սաֆրաստյան** 2019, 68, 69։

At the same time, concrete work was done to prepare the plan of offensive operations against Armenia. Having prepared that plan, two months later, on May 26, 1920, it was sent to the units of the military under the command of Karabekir. Here, the capture of Igdir and reaching the Araks River were mentioned as the targets of the attack. It provided that the Turkish troops from the north would receive the support of the Bolsheviks, which would facilitate their advance. It was specifically mentioned that the goal of the war would be to secure the borders of Turkey, which were outlined by the "National Covenant", which would include not only Western Armenia, but also the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, Ardvin, as well as Nakhichevan and Igdir⁶. During the preparation for the campaign, Karabekir achieved his first diplomatic success by signing a mutual aid agreement in Erzurum on April 15, 1920 with the assistant to the military minister of Azerbaijan, General Agha Oghlu Shikhlinsky. Article 7 of that treaty stated that in case of Armenia's attack on Azerbaijan or the surrender of the eastern regions of Turkey (Western Armenia, E. Minasyan) to Armenia, "both parties who have come to an agreement will protect each other's interests and act as a united army"7. Probably, it was this alliance that excited K. Karabekir, who in those same days, telegraphed Ankara saying that "one day I will announce that Armenia will be erased from the world map"8. The Sovietization of Azerbaijan forced the Kemalists to speed up preparations for an attack on Armenia, as it was clearly not in their interest to Sovietize Armenia without their participation. Already in May, they had concentrated a 22,000-strong army with 69 cannons and 200 machine guns on the eastern front⁹. The preparation of the Turkish attack is also evidenced by the following statement given by Kemal, "since the Armenian troops will try to occupy Erzurum at the right moment, therefore the Turkish military units in the territory of the three sanjaks transferred to Turkey under the Brest-Litovsk and Batum treaties should occupy Sarighamish and the Soganlugh mountain range, strategically favorable positions for the Armenian army to have "10.

The Turkish government, discussing the issue, orders the eastern army command to prepare for an attack on June 6. In order to attack Armenia, a military

⁶ **Սաֆրաստյան** 2019, 69:

⁷ **Վրացյան** 1993, 474:

⁸ Սարգսյան, Սահակյան 1963, 43:

⁹ **Չոհրաբյան** 1997, 28:

¹⁰ **Кемаль** 1966, 99.

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mobilization was announced on June 9 and Karabekir was appointed commander of the eastern front¹¹. With that, with the decision of the new Turkish government, the last stage of preparations for the war against Armenia, initiated and under the leadership of Kemal, was over for about half a year.

However, already on June 20, M. Kemal was forced to order Karabekir to stop military operations with the mediation of RSFSR Foreign Minister G. Chicherin. This is what the "Mshak" newspaper writes about it in its issue of October 21, 1920, referring to Kemal's speech at the Turkish National Assembly: "A Russian agent who arrived in Karin had a meeting with our delegation. Immediately after that meeting, we were forced to stop our attacks" 12.

In fact, according to M. Kemal's confession, the planned Turkish invasion of Armenia in the summer of 1920 did not take place because of the position of Soviet Russia. It is a well-known fact that G. Chicherin started negotiations with L. Shant's delegation, hoping to resolve the Armenian-Turkish relations by assuming the role of a mediator¹³. There is no doubt that the departure of Shant's delegation to Moscow and the Armenian-Russian negotiations that started there at the end of May greatly hindered the aspirations of Turkey and Azerbaijan to unleash an aggressive war against Armenia. The failure of those negotiations became the priority issue of the Azerbaijani communists. Here is what the head of the delegation, Levon Shant, wrote about it. "... Baku is trying in every possible way to prevent the signing of the treaty," was written in one of his telegrams sent from Moscow to Yerevan. The leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan wanted to take advantage of the Russian authority and Russian troops to implement the Musavat plan to seize Karabakh and Zangezur and the undisputed Armenian territories, thus strengthening position among the national population¹⁴. From the telegram sent by Shant to Yerevan, published in the "Mshak" on July 17, 1920, we learn that "Armenia wanted to assume the role of arbitrator to resolve the Armenian-Tatar dispute, and the Moscow government also took a mediation between M. Kemal and Armenia, regarding Turkish Armenia" 15. Baku's pressure on G. Chicherin was so

¹¹ **Кемаль** 1934, 117.

¹² «Մշակ» 21.10.1920:

¹³ Геноцид армян: ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества. Документы и комментарий 2003, 69.

¹⁴ «Մշակ» 17.07.1920:

¹⁵ «Մշակ» 17.07.1920:

harsh that members of Shant's delegation also felt it. In a telegram sent to Yerevan on July 1, Shant emphasized that "the only difficulty is the border of Azerbaijan, because Baku is trying in every way to prevent the signing of the agreement. The Soviet government accepts our demands rightly, does not want to satisfy all the desires of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Armenian Bolsheviks, however, under the influence of the latter's stubborn claims, the signing of the agreement slows down"¹⁶. Terteryan also connected G. Chicherin's gradual retreat from the initial agreement and the breakdown of the negotiations, under the pretext of moving them to Yerevan, with the activities of the Azerbaijani leadership and the Armenian communists. At the August 14 session of the Grand National Assembly, referring to Chicherin's letter, which reached Ankara in mid-June, M. Kemal said that they were of the opinion that military operations on the borders of the three sanjaks – Kars, Ardahan and Batum - did not mean to attack Armenia. On June 20, the latter ordered the cessation of hostilities, but at the same time urged to speed up preparations for a general attack. Although the danger of the attack of the Turkish army was prevented by the intervention of Russia in June, it did not disappear completely, because M. Kemal's government did not give up attacking the Republic of Armenia, but temporarily stopped it in order to resume it later.

The "Mshak" Newspaper about the Diplomatic Activities Carried out by the Kemalists in the Direction of Complete Isolation of the RA

Preparing for the attack on the Republic of Armenia, the Kemalists carried out extensive diplomatic activities not only to ensure the support of Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan, but also to isolate Armenia diplomatically and deprive it of possible allies. They were sure that the Entente would not intervene and provide real support to Armenia, because in the spring of 1920 there were no English military units left in Transcaucasia, except for a small detachment in Batum, which was preparing to leave. But there was neighboring Georgia, which could support Armenia, taking into consideration the Turkish threat. Considering this circumstance, M. Kemal decided to send a delegation to Tiflis and ensure the neutrality of Georgia in the Turkish-Armenian war. On November 11, 1920, the "Mshak" newspaper published the translation of the letter of the correspondent of Ankara under the title "Mustafa Kemal and Georgia", where it was said that the delegation of Turkish figures who participated in the Baku Congress of the Peoples

¹⁶ «Մշակ» 17.07.1920:

of the East, headed by Yusuf Kemal, secretly arrived in Tiflis under the instructions of Kemal, met the Georgian leaders N. Jordania and A. Gegechkori and received an assurance that Georgia would maintain neutrality in the event of a Turkish-Armenian war¹⁷.

The agreement of the Kemalists with Soviet Russia also had a successful outcome. At that time, Baku sent the following telegram to Ankara: "the roads are open" 18.

As for the allies of the Republic of Armenia, England and France, as before, they only made promises, encouraged the Armenians to continue the struggle against the Bolsheviks and Kemalists, but did not take any practical steps to help. However, in the summer of 1920, the British government granted a loan of about 1 million pounds to Armenia for the purchase of arms and ammunition in England, but only a part of the purchased ammunition reached Armenia at the time the war began.

In fact, at the beginning of the autumn of 1920, on the eve of the war, Armenia was surrounded by enemies on three sides. The delegation led by Turkish Foreign Affairs Commissioner Bekir Samir arrived in Moscow on July 24 to hold negotiations with Soviet Russia, and they continued for about a month. On August 24, a secret rapprochement agreement was signed between the two countries, known as "friendship" agreement, adding to the series of political documents directed against the Armenian people. According to the treaty, Soviet Russia not only promised financial assistance and the supply of weapons and ammunition, which was important for the Turkish aggressors in the war against Armenia, but also recognized the Turkish "National Covenant", by which Russia accepted Turkey's right to Batum, Kars and Ardahan, the annexation of these territories to Turkey¹⁹.

Yusuf Kemal returned to Ankara, taking with him B. Samir's report and one million from the five million rubles that Russia promised to Turkey as aid. Although the treaty was not signed, the delegation of Samir achieved a serious diplomatic success, especially since Turkey received Russia's agreement to capture Sarighamish and Shahtakht. That was a step to isolate Armenia and secure a victory over it. Ankara did a lot of work in the direction of preparing the attack on Armenia, especially during the days of the first congress of the peoples of the East

¹⁷ «Մշակ» 11.11.1920:

¹⁸ «Մշակ» 11.11.1920:

¹⁹ ՀԱԱ, ֆոնդ 200, ցուցակ 1, գործ 576, թերթ 176:

convened in Baku under the chairmanship of the Communist Third International in early September 1920, and achieved serious success. At the assembly, a call was made to destroy "Imperialist Armenia", which allegedly created a coalition with Georgia and Persia "to attack revolutionary Turkey and Soviet Azerbaijan." Since Turkey and Azerbaijan were declared pioneers for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the East, they were entrusted with the mission of delivering a fatal blow to Armenia. At the assembly, calls were made to "put an end to Armenia, the dog of imperialism, destroy the den of Dashnaks, and so on"²⁰.

Its continuation was the comprehensive document called "Conclusion" approved on September 17 by the presidency of the Eastern Peoples Propaganda and Action Council in Baku, which was presented to the presidency of the Executive Committee of the 3rd Comintern and the Central Committee of the RC (b) P in the form of recommendations. In it, the Republic of Armenia was considered the striking force of the Entente, whose destruction determined the fate of the victory of the revolution in the East. With that, they tried to "justify" the need for the attack by the Turkish and Russian troops on the Republic of Armenia, with the aim of Sovietizing Armenia and saving the "revolution in the countries of the East" ²¹.

The "Mshak" about the Border Clashes on the Eve of the War

Preparing for the war, Kemalist Turkey had concentrated an enormous army. According to the "Mshak" newspaper, at the council of high-ranking military officers convened in Ankara on September 7, where the issue of a large-scale attack on Armenia was decided, the commander of the eastern front Karabekir said that "he had 4 divisions, each of which will consist of 8-9 thousand soldiers and will receive support from Turkish and Kurdish forces. Artillery is also enough" Thus, even with approximate calculations, the total number of Kemalist troops who went on a raid against the Republic of Armenia exceeded 50,000°.

According to the bulletin prepared by Military Minister R. Ter-Minasyan, there were about 40,000 people in the Armenian army, of which only 25,000 were regular forces, the rest belonged to the quartermaster, sanitary and other auxiliary

²⁰ **Սիմոնյան** 1991, 390:

²¹ **Գալոյան** 1999, 292, 293:

²² «Մշակ» 11.11.1920:

²³ **Ձոհրաբյան** 1997, 169։

services (30 % of the total number) and volunteer groups²⁴. The "Mshak" newspaper also contains many articles about the organization of Turkish-Tatar riots by Turkey and Azerbaijan in the border regions of Zangibasar (Masis), Vedibasar and Nakhichevan in June-August, creating an unstable situation in the Republic of Armenia and preparing an attack on it.

The border conflicts, although they were sometimes severely aggravated, then abated to some extent, in general did not stop and continued until the main Turkish invasion. Starting from September 10, the Armenian positions of the right wing of the Sarighamish detachment on Mount Vaskut and Mount Keroghli were subjected to artillery bombardment every day²⁵. In order for the reader to get an idea of the seriousness and scale of these clashes, let us mention some reports of the Armenian Telegraphic Agency about the clashes that took place in September, which were printed in the September 15, 1920, issue of the "Mshak" newspaper. A military message at 10 a.m. states that in the direction of Olti, on September 9, at 14:00, Turks opened cannon fire on Vaskut Mountain, our artillery responded to it. On the night of September 10, a large group of the enemy approached our guard, which is located at an altitude of 5095, two versts (km) north of the village of Gharadagh, but was repulsed by artillery and machine gun fire. At 8 o'clock in the morning on September 10, 2 Turkish airplanes made a sortie along the Sarighamish front, and at the same time, Turks opened artillery fire on our positions against Bardus. Our artillery was responding. On the same day, at 3 o'clock, 2 enemy airplanes appeared again, Turks were shooting at our trenches on Keroghlibash Mountain. At 18:45 on September 9, after two days of fighting, we captured the village of Koghb and the salt mines. One mountain cannon, two telephone sets, and other war trophies were taken. Our losses were insignificant. Manuk, the head of Sasun's cavalry group, was killed near the village of Pirlu while repelling the enemy's counterattack" 26.

The newspaper reported that "on September 13, large Turkish forces unexpectedly attacked the left wing of the Armenian military unit of Sarighamish, broke through the front and captured two mountain cannon of the 4th battery. A fierce battle took place between the 4th Armenian regiment and Turks, where Gantarjyan's battalion showed courage. With hot and bloody battles, our military

²⁴ <UU, \$. 200, g. 1, q. 602, p. 280:

²⁵ **<ովհաննիսյան** 2016, 218։

²⁶ «Մշակ» 15.09.1920։

units retreated and in the morning of September 14 they settled in Begli-Ahmed positions. The Kaghzvan military unit (5th regiment, Colonel Shaghubadyan) was forced to retreat and occupy the positions of Berna. The population of Kaghzvan also left"²⁷. About the attack of Turkish troops on September 13, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia immediately telegraphed Tiflis, the Authorized Representative T. Bekzadyan. "Early in the morning of September 13, Turks launched an attack in the direction of Olti, as well as on the right wing of Sarighamish's detachment, captured Vaskut Mountain and the village of Berdikh," was said in the telegram.

The same telegram mentioned that the Turkish attack continued. "I ask you to immediately report this to all representatives of the allies in Tiflis, as well as in Constantinople and Paris, and protest against the actions of Turks, which violate the very foundations of the peace treaty signed by Turkey" 28. The Armenian newspapers, particularly the "Mshak", already wrote on September 14 that martial law was declared in Vanand province 29.

In another message of the Telegraph Agency of Armenia, which was published in the September 18 edition of the "Mshak", it is said that as a result of the fighting in the direction of Olti on September 13 and 14, "our military units retreated under the pressure of the enemy's superior forces and took the positions near Agubdir and Kedir villages. The situation in Sarighamish direction is unchanged. Intelligence officers in the Koghb area have predicted successful operations for us.... Martial law has been declared in Kars region. General Pirumyan was appointed governor-general" According to the "Mshak" it becomes clear that after the events of Olti, they started providing volunteers to the Armenian army in Alexandropol³¹. In the following days, the newspaper also published short messages, which prove that the border incidents continued intermittently and in several directions. The diplomatic representation of Armenia in Tiflis also published an official message about the military operations of those days. It is said that "in the middle of this month, Turkish troops, having a goal to occupy the coal mines, advanced in the direction of Olti region with forces superior to ours, forcing our

²⁷ «Մշակ» 15.09.1920։

²⁸ ՀԱԱ, ֆ. 200, q. 1, q. 486, թ. 226, **Վրացյան** 1993, 418:

²⁹ **<ովհաննիսյան** 2016, 220։

³⁰ «Մշակ» 18.09.1920։

³¹ «Մշակ» 19.09.1920։

military units to retreat. At the same time, a Soviet Russian military unit located in the north-eastern border, in the region of Ghazakh, appeared and pushed back the Armenian military group. The Armenian troops, resorting to a counteroffensive, drove the enemy from his occupied positions and took back the Armenian territories that the enemy had seized"32. Vahe Artsruni, one of the major statesmen and politicians of those days, also reported a lot of information about Olti's operation and the events that preceded it. According to him, on September 15 Olti's borderline was destroyed, and the strongest positions were captured by the enemy³³. A general state of desperation had begun in those days and no one on the Olti front wanted to undertake the task of front defense. According to Artsruni's testimony, Colonel Mazmanyan handed over the command of Merdenek to Officer Anushavan Dilanyan, who considering the desperate situation, did not want to assume the new position, but "actually did it, being well convinced that he would not get any special benefit with his new responsibility³⁴. As we can see, these chronicles are real military summaries and testify to the existence of a state of war between Armenia and Turkey even before the general Turkish invasion. Reports also indicate that border incidents, as well as spying in Muslim-populated areas of Armenia, were instigated by Kemal's government in order to keep the situation always tense, to have an excuse for intervention and to blame Armenians in the event of a war. That is exactly what they did later on. It is no coincidence that, in the Alexandropol conference and in other official documents sent to Europe and Russia, they made the hypothesis that the Kemal army did not attack, but counterattacked. This wrong point of view was also present in the Soviet historiography. Turkish historians also, although they do not deny the fact that Turkey started a war against Armenia at the end of September, blame the latter, as if Armenia allegedly constantly threatened Turkish nationalists, hindered the communication between Soviet Russia and Azerbaijan, organized massacres of Muslims and continuous attacks on Turks on the border, etc. However, as mentioned above, Turks were constantly preparing for military operations and only some geopolitical problems prevented them from starting military operations earlier. This is an understandable behavior typical of conquerors. It is known from history that the winners always blame the losers.

³² «Մշակ» 01.10.1920։

³³ **Արծրունի** 2002, 82։

³⁴ **Արծրունի** 2002, 82։

Already on the eve of the war, when it was obvious that the positions of the Armenian army on Olti and other fronts had become unfavorable, the Armenian press, in particular the "Mshak", began to condemn the fact of not developing the success of the Armenian army in June-July.

It should be noted that the border conflicts along the length of the Armenian-Turkish border continued until the general Turkish attack on September 28 and the beginning of the undeclared war³⁵.

It should be noted that the publications of the press, particularly the "Mshak", were important in terms of source and, together with archival materials and memoirs provide an opportunity to fully restore the pre-war situation and the detailed preparation of the attack by Kemalist Turkey.

Conclusion

Thus, the publications of the press, in particular the newspaper "Mshak", have a key sourceological significance, forming a whole together with archival materials and memoirs, which make it possible to fully restore the detailed preparation of the attack on the Republic of Armenia by Kemalist Turkey. With a comprehensive analysis of the facts, we come to the conclusion that the nationalist movement developed in Turkey under the leadership of Kemal was primarily directed against Armenia and the Armenian people. By preparing the attack against the Republic of Armenia, Kemal, using the contradictions between Soviet Russia and the Entente States and exploiting the Bolshevik doctrine of "world revolution", received the material, financial and military aid of Soviet Russia, which he used first of all against the Republic of Armenia.

The analysis of the facts from the "Mshak" reveals the steps taken by Kemalist Turkey, which was preparing to attack Armenia, in order to isolate it and gain allies, among which we should note the alliance with not only Soviet Russia, but also Muslims of the Caucasus, the organization of Turkish-Tatar riots inside Armenia and in the border regions, ensuring the neutrality of neighboring Georgia in case of war, the failure of the Entente countries' attempts to help Armenia, etc. A comparative examination of the facts allows us to conclude that the dates of the attack prepared by M. Kemal and Karabekir on Armenia were changed several times: at first, it was moved from January, February, March to May-June, even on

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³⁵ **Հակոբյան** 2022, 149։

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June 9, a military mobilization was announced, which summarized the last stage of preparations for the war against Armenia within half a year. M. Kemal's confession quoted in the newspaper "Mshak" concludes that the planned Turkish invasion of Armenia in the summer of 1920 did not take place due to the position of Soviet Russia, as negotiations continued in Moscow with L. Shant's delegation, hoping to resolve Armenian-Turkish relations by assuming the role of a mediator. The planned large-scale Turkish invasion became a reality only in September 1920, after the draft of the Russian-Turkish treaty was signed on August 24, 1920. And with the "Conclusion" document approved at the Congress of Eastern Peoples held in Baku on September 17, Armenia was considered the strike force of the Entente, whose destruction was important for the victory of the revolution in the east and the necessity of the attack of Turkish and Russian troops was justified, by which Armenia would be Sovietized and the revolution in the countries of the east would be saved. This justifies the conclusion that the Bolshevik-Kemalist alliance became one of the main factors of the planned attack on Armenia.

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<uU, $. 200, g. 1, q. 486, ρ. 226:
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∠UU, \$. 200, q. 1, q. 602, p. 1, 28:

<uu, \$. 200, g. 1, q. 576, p. 176:

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ՄԻՆԱՍՅԱՆ Է.

Ամփոփում

Բանալի բառեր՝ «Մշակ» օրաթերթ, Շիխլինսկի, քեմալա-բոլշևիկյան դաշինք, Մերդենեկ, Գ. Չիչերին, Քյազըմ Կարաբեքիր, Մուստաֆա Քեմալ։

Քեմալական Թուրքիայի՝ Հայաստանի վրա հարձակմանն անդրադարձել են հայերեն տարբեր պարբերականներ և այդ թվում՝ «Մշակ» օրաթերթը։ Թերթի էջերում հրապարակված նյութերը լույս են սփռում քննարկվող հարցի բազում կարևոր ռազմական և պատմական իրողությունների վրա։ Պատերազմն անխուսափելի էր, քանի որ դա կախված չէր միայն հայկական իշխանությունների կամքից։ Այն թելադրված էր քեմալիստների հռչակած «Ազգային ուխտ» զավթողական ծրագրով, որի իրականացմանն ամեն կերպ նպաստում էր Սովետական Ռուսաստանը, որն աջակցում էր թուրքերին՝ թե՛ ֆինանսապես, թե՛ զենք ու զինամթերքով՝ հույս ունենալով, որ քեմալականներն իրենց ներդրումը կունենան համաշխարհային հեղափոխության հաղթանակի և մահմեդական Արևելքում սոցիալիզմի տարածման գործում։

Բացի դրանից, Խորհրդային Ռուսաստանը հույս ուներ, որ քեմալականներն իրենց հետ համատեղ պայքարելու են Արևմուտքի իմպերիալիստների (Անտանտի երկրների) դեմ։ «Մշակ»-ում հրապարակված նյութերի վերլուծությունը բացահայտում է նաև Մ. Քեմալի նպատակը. անվավեր դարձնել Սևրի պայմանագիրը և Ռուսաստանի հետ համատեղ ոչնչացնել միջազգայնորեն ճանաչված Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը՝ երկրի մի մասը միացնելով Թուրքիային, իսկ մյուսը՝ Սովետական Ռուսաստանին։ Բացի դրանից, Մ. Քեմալը մտադրվել էր Հայաստանի տարածքի մի մասը տալ նաև Ադրբեջանին՝ որպեսզի շարունակի երիտթուրքերի ցեղասպան քաղաքականությունը՝ այս դեպքում արդեն արևելահալերի նկատմամբ։

Իր ծրագրերն իրականացնելու նպատակով Մ. Քեմալին հաջողվեց սադրել Հայաստանի հետ սահմանամերձ ընդհարումներ, կազմակերպել թուրքթաթարական անկարգություններ, դիվանագիտական մեկուսացման ենթարկել Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը և, բոլշևիկյան Ռուսաստանի հետ դաշինքն ամրապնդելով, ռազմական գործողություններ սկսել Հայաստանի դեմ։

Տվյալ համատեքստում թեմայի ուսումնասիրությունը խիստ արդիական է, քանի որ, կարծես թե 100-ամյա վաղեմություն ունեցող իրադարձությունները կրկնվում են մեր օրերում։

«Մշակ» օրաթերթի նյութերը մերժում են խորհրդային պատմագրության մեջ տարածված այն տեսակետը, որ թուրք-հայկական պատերազմը նախաձեռնողը Հայաստանն էր։ Իրականում «Մշակ»-ում հրապարակված մեծաքանակ նյութերը վկայում են Մ. Քեմալի և Ք. Կարաբեքիրի կողմից դեռևս 1920 թ. փետրվար-մարտին նախաձեռնվող հարձակման մասին։

ГАЗЕТА «МШАК» О ПОДГОТОВКЕ КЕМАЛИСТСКОЙ ТУРЦИИ К НАПАДЕНИЮ НА АРМЕНИЮ В 1920 ГОДУ

минасян э.

Резюме

Ключевые слова: газета «Мшак», Шихлинский, кемалистско-большевистский союз, Мерденек, Г. Чичерин, Кязим Карабекир, Мустафа Кемаль.

К вопросу о подготовке кемалистской Турции к нападению на Армению обращались разные органы армянской периодики и, в частности, га-

зета «Мшак». Опубликованные на страницах газеты материалы проливают свет на многие важные исторические реалии, касающиеся рассматриваемого вопроса.

Война была неизбежна, поскольку это не зависело лишь от армянских властей. Она была продиктована захватническими планами, провозглашенными кемалистами и названными «Национальным обетом», чему всячески способствовала Советская Россия, оказывавшая кемалистам как финансовую поддержку, так и поддержку в виде предоставления оружия и боеприпасов в надежде, что кемалисты внесут вклад в победу мировой революции и распространение социализма на мусульманском Востоке. Помимо этого, большевики надеялись, что кемалисты вместе с Россией будут бороться против империалистов Запада (стран Антанты).

Анализ публикаций «Мшака» раскрывает цели М. Кемаля, намеревавшегося аннулировать Севрский договор и в союзе с Россией уничтожить международно признанную Республику Армения, присоединив одну часть территории Армении к Турции, а другую – к Советской России. При этом М. Кемаль намеревался какую-то часть территории Армении предоставить также Азербайджану с целью продолжения геноцидальной политики младотурок, на этот раз в отношении восточных армян. С целью осуществления своих планов Кемаль провоцировал вооруженные столкновения на армянской границе, турецко-татарские выступления, пытался добиться изоляции Республики Армения дипломатическим путем и, скрепив союз с большевистской Россией, начал военные действия против Армении. Изучение рассматриваемого вопроса весьма актуально в контексте сегодняшних событий, поскольку события столетней давности словно повторяются и в наши дни.

Таким образом, материалы газеты «Мшак» опровергают распространенную в советской историографии точку зрения, согласно которой инициатором турецко-армянской войны была Армения. На самом деле огромное число материалов, изданных в «Мшаке», свидетельствует о подготовке нападения во главе с М. Кемалем и К. Карабекиром еще в февралемарте 1920 г. на Армению.