

## EXPLORING THE ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT-DAY HUMAN SELF ON THE FRINGES OF LINGUISTIC ADVANCEMENT

### Abstract

The paper explores the possibility of the evolution of the present-day adult human self (PHS) with linguistic advancements. Considering fringe mentality as a genuine issue during the evolution of PHS, the paper favours that there can be various types of mentalities associated with various kinds of minds, among which present-day adult human mind (PHM) having PHS is only one kind. It explores the logical possibility of a different mentality in our remote ancestors to broaden the contours of the concept of self and mind. Part one is expository in nature and discusses the distinctive features of the present-day adult human self (PHS). Following Sleutels's (2013) approach, the second part analyses the assumption that the PHS is an innately given inner experience by positing the 'fringe mind' problem. Julian Jaynes's (1976) claim is approached with the help of the linguistic mechanism involved in the emergence of propositional attitudes (PA) to argue that PHS can also be a matter of linguistic advancement rather than mere biological or psychological adaptive advancement. An attempt to address Sleutels (2006) less developed notion of B-mind and A-mind is also made.

*Keywords:* present-day human self (PHS), software archaeology, fringe-mind/mentality, bicameral mind/mentality (BM), propositional attitudes (PA), linguistic advancement, PHM-concepts, bicameral concepts.

### Introduction

It is generally presupposed that an inner self, distinct from the physical body, has been endowed in our mental makeup since the dawn of our species. This mental or psychological self, an inner entity, is often treated as the essence of being a human. It defines and distinguishes us from other species as unique individuals. This inner, mental, or psychological self can be defined with multiple features. There can be agreement or disagreement about the ways and features that we use to describe it, the philosophical problem may arise at the level of explanation in theories, but it

is hard to contest that in our everyday experience, from a folk psychological view, there is no such inner self. The evidence to demonstrate the existence of such an inner self is also some crucial features of it. Genuine understanding, usage, and ascription of propositional attitudes (PA) are the paradigmatic case of having an inner self. Genuine understanding, usage, and ascription of PA can be considered good evidence and a vital feature to claim that the being on target has an inner self. First, we will establish that present-day modern human mental makeup, experientially, consists of an inner/psychological self by giving some crucial evidence come features.

Though evidence or features are not limited to those listed here, these are some basic ones that have preoccupied philosophical discussions on the nature of the present-day adult human inner self (PHS). The following features/evidence are listed to have a cursory understanding of PHS. It is not an attempt to define PHS. Defining PHS will involve arguing against or in favour of some standpoint. However, that is not the subject matter of the paper. The paper's subject matter is whether PHS is an innate, God-given or a later development in our mental makeup, and is it logically possible to conceive humans as devoid of PHS in the past?

#### Present-Day Human Self (PHS)

Ryle (1951) tries to bring out the element of (a) uniqueness (first feature/evidence), which is felt by anyone who has PHS. This uniqueness is associated with the inner I through a feeling of 'me', which no one *can* share or experience. He says, 'We often feel that there lives someone in the background for which this 'I' stands, which remains undescribed even after describing all the characteristics or features of it', as it is someone to whom these traits 'belong'. 'Whatever is in the background is unique, unique because anything like it cannot belong to anyone else except 'me'. Derek Parfit (1971) brings out this element of the *uniqueness* of the inner self with the help of a thought experiment. Say a new way of transportation is invented, in which the machine scans every detail of our personality and creates a replica of ourselves. Suppose that due to some device malfunctioning, the original or the unique 'I' somehow get a chance to talk to one of its replicas over a video link. The replica informs the 'I' that within a week, 'I' will be destroyed, and s/he (replica) will be continuing 'I' life, and s/he assures not to worry about anything as s/he will do all the tasks you have been doing in the same manner. However, this is unlikely to be acceptable because there remains a feeling that even after replicating each and everything that constitutes 'I', there is still something that is left

out. That is the feeling of uniqueness or 'this-ness' (as Albahari (2006) puts it). It cannot be captured by any of the physical or psychological traits. The difference arises because there is only one 'I', and everything else, including the replica made by replicating all my characteristics, belongs to the domain of things other than 'I'. In other words, the replica will always miss out on 'this-ness' belonging to 'I' and, therefore, cannot be completely equivalent. As Albahari points out, this happens because we identify ourselves as the subject that bears all psycho-physical characteristics. So, a replica can have all these characteristics, but the subject is something that bears all these characteristics uniquely and, therefore, will never be part of the replica. A replica is a replica by being a copy of some already existing subject, a unique inner self. Hence, the replica will miss the essence of being a unique one. Our sense of self-identity is strongly based on this notion of a unique subject. Therefore, there is no way we can feel identical to some other one even if s/he has all our physical or psychological traits.

Thus, adequate evidence supports the claim that modern human beings consider themselves unique inner selves capable of having a first-person perspective that comes out as a subjective self. Further, this self is bounded by a boundary and is experienced differently from the rest of the world. Given the mental nature of the self, this boundary is psychological in nature.

Second, PHS is a (b) continuous self that exists through three dimensions which we use to understand time. It exists in the past, is present, and is expected to exist in the future with continuity of experience. This continuously experienced self is seen as a (c) permanent self that does not change over time and physical appearances. Psychologists like Rochat (2003) demonstrate that consciousness of a permanent inner self remains undeveloped in children prior to the age of three. This continuously experienced (d) self is also an agent.

Certain actions that we perform could have opted not to be done by us. The distinction commonly made between action and events is based

on the notion of agency. Action is performed by an agent who could have opted not to do that, whereas events simply happen. As Albahari (2006) puts it, ‘we are role occupiers, thinkers of our thoughts, and the doer of our actions’. Thus, being an agent lies at the heart of being PHS. The actions are performed because of having a sense of ‘I’ as the doer of some actions, thoughts, etc. This ownership of certain actions or thoughts is not merely limited to ‘material possessive ownership’, or as Albahari points out, there can be a different ownership mode. There is also perspectival ownership. For instance, my toothache is something that nobody else can own in the way I own it. It is mine because nobody else can have it the way I feel it. It comes from a perspective that the subject holds in relation to an object (toothache in this case). We can have personal ownership of our inner states, expressions, and actions. But Inner states associated with PHS are certainly (e) perspectival vis-à-vis ownership; there is a difference between my ownership of toothache and my sense of achievement. Therefore, perspectival ownership will vary from person to person, culture to culture, or any other influential variable. Further, understanding responsibility regarding our actions requires ownership because actions are seen as the result of the inner self who, being an active agent, is responsible for them (at least from a common or folk psychological perspective).

Being an agent is invariably tied to the concept of responsibility. From a developmental perspective, psychologists and philosophers have different theories regarding when exactly we become an agent? How do we grasp what it is like to be an agent? What exactly is the role of language in becoming an agent? etc. Agency can be defined from a developmental perspective as being responsible for what you utter, do, or perform. It can also be defined in terms of intentions. However, in whichever way we define agency, the most obvious evidence of someone having an agent-like inner self comes out through language. Therefore, PHS, being embodied, comes out through actions and language.

(f) Linguistic encapsulation is central to PHS. The way we use language reflects that there exists an agent-like psychological self, which is distinct from the body. When we use the first-person concept ‘I’ as a subject, it refers to something distinct from the objects in the world, including our own bodies. Since the body itself is treated like an object owned by the PHS, it is pretty explicit that the inner self-referred to with the help of first-person concepts is mental. The subject is a subject by looking at everything else as an object. A sharp distinction between subject and object is integral to language. It reflects our experience as subjects looking at the objects. We can only make a sharp distinction between the subject and the object because of the first-person perspective. Therefore, Propositional attitudes (PA) are the paradigmatic case of having PHS.

To sum up, it is commonly experienced that a continuous inner agent ties together our mental life. This inner experience manifests as a unique self that is only identical to ‘me’ and from a first-person perspective. Apart from these, other vital notions associated with having PHS are autobiographical narrative and autobiographical memory; it is the basis of mental activities like introspection, doubting, believing, meditation, imagination, fantasizing etc., it also acts as a functional organizer of our experience, and so on, there can be many more to discuss and debate. Those mentioned here individually are topics debated in theories, but experientially they give a cursory idea of what is referred to by PHS, which the majority of us experience in the secret theatre of our mental lives every day.

### Questioning the Givenness of the PHS

From an evolutionary psychological perspective, there have been views arguing that the kind of PHS discussed in the previous section is not innate to human beings. That is to say, the way the self is experienced does not remain static but undergoes a substantial transformation. David Martel Johnson (2003) argues that the assumption that the human mind has been the same

throughout human history is due to equating the concept of mind with that of the brain. If the brain, an organ, has not undergone any radical change in the history of the species, then it is assumed that the mind, too, would have remained the same. However, psychologists like Julian Jaynes and philosophers like Dennett (1986) argue that, unlike the brain, PHS may not exist unless we have a concept of it. As Dennett points out, certain phenomena owe their existence to us entertaining concepts about them. For instance, we cannot say that morality existed even before any concept of morality existed. Similar can be the case with PHS. Conceptual changes of such type cannot be understood by merely looking at the brain. Also, mere archaeological findings will not lead us to any conceptual changes occurring in past minds. It requires 'software archaeology' (Dennett, 1986). Dennett uses the term 'software archaeology' vis-à-vis Jaynes's theory of consciousness, where tangible evidence is interpreted to understand the intangible conceptual system. Though concepts are abstract yet, once they become embodied, they have tangible effects. In order to find a record of major 'software changes' in archaeological history (as opposed to a change in the hardware), we have to look at indirect evidence like texts and other archaeological evidence like pottery shreds, architecture, settlement patterns etc. When we do so, we are not limited to doing archaeology; rather, we engage in 'software archaeology'.

If we entertain the possibility that the ancient human self (AHS) differed from PHS, then the question arises as to why they were different? Furthermore, how does AHS become PHS over time? The same issue arises in developmental psychology concerning an infant's mind and self. There are two already explored significant approaches to deal with this issue: first eliminativism and second expansionism (Sleutels, 2013)

The eliminativists approach amounts to doing away with the concept of mind and self. It encourages reducing psychology to neuroscience. This approach does not face any problem related to AHS or the ancient human mind

(AHM) because there exists nothing that can be called Mind or Self. However, it is less appealing as it outrightly rejects the commonsense understanding of the mind and self without giving any plausible alternative. It flies in the face of our everyday experience and therefore is not a viable option for anyone who takes the idea of mind to study seriously. In its strict sense, elimination favours biology or neuroscience and prescribes not to take psychology seriously. As eliminativism proposes that there is no mind and self, this approach proves to be futile in studying either the development of any Mind or Self.

On the other hand, the Expansionist approach ascribes the concept of Mind or Self to infants, early hominids, and some intelligent non-human animals. For instance, Alison Gopnik (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999) calls small children 'little genius' and D Premack and Woodruff's (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) work on chimpanzees 'theory of mind' are examples of the expansionist approach. In such attempts, the word 'mind' is expanded to include anything that resembles PHM. However, as Sleutels (2013) points out, expansionism presupposes that the mind (as in human beings) has remained the same throughout and is equally there in other animals. Attributes or characteristics of PHM like uniqueness, thisness, linguistic encapsulation, first person concepts, autobiographical narrative, beliefs, or propositional attitudes (PA) are ascribed equally to hominids, ill formed minds, etc and to prove that the ascription is correct, behavioral evidence are given. However, expansionism inherently becomes dangerous by virtue of finding similarities, as it projects our way of understanding mental concepts onto other species minds or minds in the developmental stage. Taking this approach is like drawing a conclusion first and then fixing premises to yield a sound argument. As Sleutels (2013) aptly puts it we do not begin from a fair premise, giving equal probability to two possibilities: It can be similar to us (PHM/PHS); it cannot be similar to us (PHM/PHS). Instead, we start from the premise that P: It is similar to us (PHM/PHS) until proven otherwise. Most of the

time theories try to study the AHM through the lens of expansionist mindset. Taking an expansionist move is not only a biased reasoning it also results in serious complications as it leads to the problem of fringe mind.

According to Sleutels (2006, 2013), the problem of fringe minds arises when we try to know the conditions under which we can ascribe the concept of PHM/PHS in the pre-linguistic stage both from a developmental and evolutionary perspective. There are minds and self that are in the process of becoming PHM/PHS, but they are on the fringes and therefore cannot be ascribed as PHM/PHS in its full-fledged sense.

As Donald Davidson (1999) points out that the difficulty of ascription arises because 'there is a gap in our vocabulary, as there are neither concepts to describe minds in pre-developmental stages, nor there exists satisfactory vocabulary for describing the intermediate steps' in a developing present-day adult human mind. This lack of vocabulary exists because we have no idea of how our mind was in the past depicting its initial phases (from evolutionary as well as developmental perspective); the starting point that is given to us is our own present-day mind or self. The lack of vocabulary does not refer to any lack of words. Rather, the very process of the emergence of concepts, thoughts associated with a first-person perspective, or simply propositional attitudes (PA). Before the emergence of PHM/PHS, there was a stage where no attribute of it existed, and just after this stage, the next stage is the realization of having a PHM/PHS. Here we face conceptual difficulty in explaining the intermediary stage that comes just before the emergence of PHM/PHS.

Julian Jayne's (1976) bicameral hypothesis, as Sleutels (2013) points out, can be seen as a constructive attempt to address this issue of fringe mentality in AHM. His theory of an alternative mentality as pre-PHM overcomes the difficulties faced by eliminativism and expansionism. Jaynes explores the mental life of the ancient mind (particularly the mentality of the people near the east) through the literary text that has

survived, namely Iliad. He also focuses on other archaeological findings (such as settlement patterns, houses, graves, god's idols etc.). Jaynes's hypothesis of the emergence of consciousness (i.e., PHS) largely rests on how language emerged in humans while living in the wild and later in well-structured hierarchical societies. The language got sophisticated because of challenging times, and with the invention of writing and other factors such as trade, agriculture, population, etc., a shift took place that changed pre-PHM to PHM. The difference between pre-PHM and AHM was in terms of PHS. The Pre-PHM or AHM was marked by the absence of PHS.

#### The Absence of Present-Day Adult Human Self (PHS) in Ancient Human Mind (AHM)

According to Jaynes, before language evolved or when it was in evolution, there was a different mentality/mind based on hallucinated voices named bicameral mentality/mind (BM) (bicameral: two-chambered). The BM used to hear voices as a hallucination. These voices dominantly came from the right part/chamber/hemisphere of the brain, which he calls the 'silent' or the order-giving chamber. The brain's left hemisphere used to obey these hallucinated voices, considering them as the commands or orders of the gods, chiefs, deceased, etc. These authoritative and commanding voices were the actions controlling the capacity of the bicameral mind/mentality (BM). Actions were not tied to the 'agent' or 'I' as in PHS; rather, they were like 'obeying' the hallucinated voices, which appeared to be coming from outside the body and were not recognized as a voice of their own mind. Decisions were not made with the help of first-person linguistic concepts that addressed the self like in PHS. The mental representation of the self was not in the form of a private mental world of the inner 'I'. BM, as per Jaynes, has many distinguishable features like hearing voices, a different neurological brain model for heard speech, their cultural ways of living, different ceremonies



related to heard voices, infrastructure for ceremonies, and a hierarchy settlement based on heard voices etc. Out of various features of the bicameral system, the absence of first-person concepts 'I' or propositional attitude (PA) will be analyzed in the next section. A sense of agency along with responsibility remained absent in BM. The reason or cause of novel decisions or actions were ascribed to the concept like a god, chief, etc., because of the voices heard from these authorities. There was no actual usage of first-person concepts like I, as in PA. As per Jaynes, BM was a pre-PHM that changed after the evolution of PHS. He argued that it happened because of advanced linguistic development in AHM, where they came to have an inner 'I' and 'inner space', which were understood metaphorically or functionally. With the help of lexicons that earlier were used to describe the bodily or physical world. The advanced linguistic technique that emerged in AHM was a thorough grasp of 'metaphorical language'.

For him, PHS is structured in and through metaphorical language where it is analogous to the bodily or physical self, and the inner world, which he calls 'mind space', is an analogue of the physical outer world or space. It is built up with a vocabulary or lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogues of the physical world. For instance, the most prominent group of words used to describe mental events are visual. We 'see' solutions to problems, etc. The term *inner world* is just a metaphor taken from the experience of the physical world to describe the inner self (Jaynes, 1976). Therefore, looking for this inner self in a factual sense will be like making a 'category mistake'.

Propositional Attitude (PA) as  
Paradigmatic Expression  
Assuring the Existence of PHS

PHS comes out vividly through the genuine understanding and usage of propositional attitude (PA). These attitudes entail a genuine ascription of the first-person concept 'I'. Consider the in-

stance: I *believe/doubt/hope* that there is water in the cup. These attitudes of believing, doubting etc., imply that there is an inner 'I', acting as an active agent, which can stand in relation to proposition P. In the example, proposition P, 'there is water in the cup' comes after the 'that' clause. A propositional attitude comes before the 'that' clause. My belief, hope, doubt etc., becomes an attitude, 'A' towards the proposition 'P'. So, a propositional attitude 'PA' will have two parts, a subjective attitude and a proposition or object as the content towards which the attitude is developed or directed at. Two types of PAs can be identified. A PA of belief is true if the world turns out to be the way it is believed to be, whereas a PA of hope, wish, desire etc., is satisfied if the world satisfies the object or proposition desired, hoped etc. The difference is in direction and in terms of truth condition and satisfaction condition (Humberstone, 1992). PAs entail certain types of intentions; these attitudes are always directed or involve the object other than the subject.

PHS is a subject by virtue of being an attitude holder. Possessive ownership is possible in any mind devoid of PAs, but perspectival ownership necessarily entails actual ascription and usage of PAs. A personal perspectival mode of ownership will not occur without inner PHS. Any mind devoid of PHS will own and have attachments that are limited to possessive instincts but being devoid of inner 'I', there will be no PAs, and hence the personal perspectival mode of ownership will not exist. It can be formulated as (1) Absence of a PHS results in the absence of propositional attitudes (PA).

Any mind which is devoid of PHS will be less sophisticated and advanced as the understanding of itself being an owner of something will be limited to instinctive physical ways. PHS is advanced and sophisticated as it can conceive itself as an active subjective agent who can develop various subjective attitudes towards any object and have the agency to make decisions and choices in the light of her subjective attitudes.

### Linguistic Advancement and Metaphorical Language

Davidson (1999) proposes a 'triangular' social interaction method necessary for the emergence of PAs. This social interaction happens among the world and at least two agents. Each agent continuously interacts with the other (agent and the world); thus, it becomes a twofold interaction from the agent's point of view. This social interaction between creatures and the environment is necessary for the emergence of thoughts about propositional content but is not sufficient. This interaction can be seen even in minds that lack PHS or those in the developmental or evolutionary stages to become PHS, i.e., a fringe mind/mentality. Therefore, there must be some other supporting condition for the emergence of thoughts about propositional content. According to him, another important condition is language. It is the baseline of the triangle that connects the two agents. Language renders objectivity to propositional attitude (PA) by fixing the truth value of the content of our thoughts, and it also accounts for the empirical content of our thoughts. It is a medium through which this interpersonal interaction is realized. And this language for the emergence of beliefs and thoughts about propositional content must be more complex and advanced (even more sophisticated than a language of proper names and predicates). It has to be complex and advanced in the sense that it exhibits a correlation between predicates and singular terms with objects. As Davidson points out, this correlation is positive evidence that depicts that the speaker can predicate properties of objects and events.

Consider, for instance, how being 'free' is comprehended in a more complex and sophisticated way (because of such language) in PHM, which has PHS compared to a mind which is devoid of PHS or is a fringe mind. Let us assume that  $\neg$ PHM denotes a mind devoid of PHS.  $\neg$ PHM will feel 'free' in the sense of being bodily free. It will not feel free when kept in a small cage. Being 'free' will be primarily physical in

nature. But when freedom is grasped metaphorically in relation to the PHS as someone who can cause actions as an agent with responsibility, a narrative of free will and freedom in personal, political, cultural sectors, etc., will evolve. Because of an inner 'I', PHS can grasp and further frame the concept of 'freedom' in new abstract and metaphorical ways. In PHM, apart from bodily freedom being free in day-to-day activities may manifest differently depending upon the situation. But being 'free' in  $\neg$ PHM cannot manifest at a personal perspectival or subjective level as it happens in a PHM associating freedom with PHS. Therefore  $\neg$ PHM remains less advanced and sophisticated than PHM in respect to the experience of being 'free'. In PHM, being 'free' is tied to the inner 'I'.

Metaphorical understanding of freedom has its basis in the very process of learning and using linguistic expressions to formulate the concept of freedom. Further grasping 'being free' in different contexts requires a rich linguistic, conceptual network and a genuine understanding of each linguistic concept (instead of mere utterances of words). Nevertheless, PHM's understanding of freedom is also limited to this very metaphorical understanding and formulation of it. However, understanding that limitation exists or there is finitude opens the possibility of infinitude, and hence it is plausible to maintain that there can be a different mentality other than PHM, which cannot be grasped at the level of PHM vis-à-vis being 'free' or any other relevant concept.

Jaynes (1976) explains how linguistic metaphors emerged from the physical world and language became more advanced and complex. He proposes a fourfold process in which the first phase is '*objective*' in the sense that in the very beginning, a linguistic term would have simply referred to an object or event of the physical world. The second phase was '*internal*' in nature when these observations came to mean something mental; it was a transition from physical to psychological. This transition from the first phase to the second phase came in the initial stage of the breakdown of the bicameral mentali-

ty. The third phase, called the '*subjective*' phase, was crucial for forming a mind-space or a psychological space/world. When these terms refer to anything happening psychologically or mentally, they transform from a mere internal stimulus to an inner or mental space where metaphorical actions done by an inner agent can emerge. Here a mental or mind space is necessary for a subjective self to perform various activities like reflective thinking, fantasizing etc. The last phase is 'synthesis', where the unity of the experience is realized, leading to the emergence of an inner self. Considering this account of the evolution of PHS (tentatively<sup>1</sup>), we can say that (2) In the process of learning sophisticated linguistic abilities like that of metaphorical usage of language, we became metaphorically inner self-conscious or gained PHS.

We have considered how being free is differently grasped in PHM and  $\neg$ PHM. However, what about a fringe mentality or BM? In the case of PHM, because of PHS, complex or sophisticated conceptual networks emerge that give metaphorical reality to non-physical entities, it not only changes the nature of the representation of an existing concept (like in the case of being free), but it also gives rise to new concepts.

For instance, the concept of responsibility is essentially a PHM concept. Responsibility can be understood and ascribed providing there is PHS. Fringe mentality like BM will lack a sense of responsibility in his actions. This claim has a wider implication, i.e., a mind devoid of PHS, i.e.,  $\neg$ PHS will lack moral agency and so the concept of responsibility in a moral sense too. It happens so because the notion of performing actions from a personal perspective owner is absent. If Jaynes's claim is true, then moral agency and the concept of moral responsibility are also of recent origin. However, we will refrain from

discussing moral mentality here as the focus of the matter is why we have PHS the way it is. But the point to notice is that moral mentality will remain absent without PHS, as in animals or in small children. It is futile to ascribe the concept of responsibility to a  $\neg$ PHM or a fringe mentality like BM, as responsibility is PHM concept that will neither be present nor can be grasped by anyone who does not have a PHS.

However, a fringe mentality like BM, by virtue of being at the fringes of PHM, can develop or evolve a PHS (with the help of some essential and auxiliary conditions). Concepts in fringe mentality like BM are capable of becoming sophisticated and more complex/abstract, yet they are not entirely PHM concepts. Consider the example of the concept 'king' and how BM and PHM would differ in understanding it. A fringe mentality like BM can have a cultural concept of 'king', yet it will not be conscious of it in PHM's way. Since BM is not conscious of the PHS, it cannot genuinely frame or ascribe sentences like 'I am conscious of the concept of the king' or even use PAs like, 'I believe that I will see my king today' 'I doubt my king that he will give me wealth and health'. Concepts like 'Hammurabi' (a proper name) may exist in BM. Also, simple propositions like 'Hammurabi is a king' may exist, but more abstract and complex propositional content and propositional attitude like 'what it is to be an ideal king' 'I doubt my king' etc. will not exist. At this point, one may ask, if there is no conscious self in B-mind, then who understands the simple concept such as a 'king' or 'Hammurabi'? (As we are concerned about the everyday experience of a fringe mentality like BM.) If there is no self, how can they make sense of 'Hammurabi is a king', the king Hammurabi is a king for *someone* even if s/he does not understand itself like a PHS. This brings us close to the very theme of the whole paper. Indeed, any fringe mentality like BM was conscious without being metaphorically inner self-conscious like a PHS. Its self-consciousness is not *metaphorical inner* self-consciousness with an inner 'I'. It is conscious of itself without hav-

<sup>1</sup> There can be agreement or disagreement over the exact account of how PHS emerged, yet that is not the concern of the matter, what concerns us is that there was some mechanism that led to the evolution of PHS back at some time in history because of some advancement in language.



ing a concept of the 'inner I'. Most of the time, this Bicameral self or fringe self will eat, drink, and live her life working in the field, harvesting, storing grains, engaging in temple construction, etc. However, the inner psychological life is minimal, less sophisticated, complex, and abstract.

We have so far discussed how the metaphorical inner self, i.e., PHS transforms existing concepts and creates new concepts (PHM-concepts). We have also discussed how PHS gives rise to PAs that are linguistic in nature. Therefore, it can be said that: (3) PHS is a learned phenomenon rather than an innate trait accompanying our species since its dawn. However, Block (1977) is critical of this claim and calls it preposterous. The following section deals with Block's (1995) take on consciousness and tries to formulate it associated with PHS.

#### Entertaining the Possibility of Different Models of Self-Consciousness - from Simple to Complex

Block's (1995) theory about the concept of consciousness argues for state consciousness to be divided into phenomenal and access consciousness and puts self-consciousness and monitoring consciousness as creature consciousness. Jaynes's (1976) theory is more directed toward the transitive<sup>1</sup> creature's self-consciousness and how it gets transformed through a metaphorically understood inner/psychological self. These different types of consciousness will be analyzed in this section to know whether Block's (1977, 1995) criticism of Jaynes theory and Jan Sleutels's (2006) formulation of B-concepts are consistent with the notion of BM.

Block (1995) explains self-consciousness as having 'self-conception and the ability to use this concept in thinking about oneself'. Discussing

self-consciousness, He starts by mirror tests reports about identifying the bodily self. Primates (like chimps between seven to fifteen years old) try to rub a spot on their forehead when looking into the mirror to recognize their bodily self, while human babies can identify their bodily self in reflection not before the last half of the second year. However, other creatures like monkeys and dogs do not pass the mirror test. They may not build complex models of the self, but they have P-conscious states (discussed in the next paragraph). Block maintains that going down on the phylogenetic scale, there may be P-conscious creatures, but they lack self-node or the representation of oneself. The same can be argued to be the case for fringe mentality.

Block (1995) explains phenomenal consciousness as experiential by nature. They include the property of sensations, feelings, and perception, such as a state of pain or heat, sound, etc. He also considers thoughts, desires, and emotions as P-conscious states. The inclusion of these mental states broadens the concept of P-consciousness as now P-conscious states are not limited to sensuous experience but also include internal experience. There can be 'various types of P-consciousness of the same kind.' These states have a 'me-ishness' about them as 'phenomenal content often represents the states as a state of me'. He argues for a non-reductionism of self-consciousness to P-consciousness. As the 'me-ness' is the same in states whose P-conscious content is different, for instance, the phenomenal state of red and blue are two different experiential states; however, their experience in the 'self' is of the same orientation. This orientation manifests as self-consciousness in the creature. Therefore, creature consciousness<sup>2</sup> is basic for self-consciousness. If any state (for instance, a state of pain) is to be conscious of, then the

<sup>1</sup> Transitive creature consciousness means that the creature is conscious or aware in some particular 'such and such' way of some percept or is having 'such and such' experience. It follows that transitive creature consciousness about the self refers to a particular or 'such and such' way in which the self manifests to the subject.

<sup>2</sup> Creature consciousness refers to an experience which is particular to the creature itself. It cannot be equated to an individual state because it will involve n number and types of states. One way to conceive of creature consciousness is in Nagel's (1974) sense that It is something to be a bricklayer as opposed to the mere inanimate brick.

subject in which it occurs needs to have another state which will be about the pain in the subject, for someone or for 'me' to be P-conscious is to have one or more states that are P-conscious, if in dreamless sleep one experience pain he is to that extent P-conscious. It follows that creature consciousness is primary to self-consciousness. By minimal self-consciousness, Block refers to 'an ability to think about oneself that can manifest in any way, no particular way is required. Self-consciousness, therefore, is a fluid concept that can be of different types ranging from minimal to complex models of the self 'no particular this way or that way is required' (Block, 1995). Inner consciousness of the self or PHS is one such complex model of self-consciousness. This can be framed as (4) A minimal notion of self is an essential condition to have a mind; no this or that kind of mind is required. If a mind lacks a complex model of the self like PHS (5), then the possibility of a mind devoid of PHS cannot be ruled out. We have already argued that (3) PHS is a learned phenomenon rather than an innate trait accompanying the species since its dawn. If (3) and (5) hold, then there must be times when humans were on the fringes of becoming a PHM. Therefore, a possibility of a fringe mentality like BM cannot be ruled out on logical grounds and is neither absurd nor contradictory to reason. Let us now see how this transition of self affects other mental states, specifically access-conscious mental states, which can be responsible for changing the nature and emergence of new concepts associated with PHS.

#### Influence of Complex Self-Conscious Models on the Access-Conscious States

In this part, we argue that access-conscious mental states are directly proportional to the creature's self-consciousness. The more sophisticated and abstract self-consciousness is, the more sophisticated and abstract access conscious states

can be and vice versa.<sup>1</sup>

Block (1995) defines any mental state as an A-conscious state if its content, i.e., what the state represents, is available for use in reasoning and for rational control of the behaviour of speech and action. Access-consciousness can be seen present in mind through rational control of action or speech; therefore, they can be said to be more functional states than phenomenal experiential states. Though reportability is the best practical guide to understanding the A-consciousness states of anyone, reportability carries the smallest weight because Block wants to ascribe the concept of A-consciousness even to non-linguistic animals.

But reportability being the distinctive feature of A-conscious, makes propositional attitudes the paradigmatic case of access-consciousness. It follows from the previous discussion that propositional attitudes presuppose PHS. This brings us close to how PHS affects access-consciousness. As A-conscious states are system relative, these mental states can undergo a radical change whenever they operate in a cognitive system with PHS. Access to information cannot be represented through propositional attitudes (PA) without PHS. When PA emerges, decision-making becomes a mental activity facilitated by PHS. Consider the example of a decision to move away from the source of P (pain) due to F (fire). The representation of access-conscious states (as per their identity criterion) is limited to moving away from F(fire). However, understanding PA reports imply talking about one's or other's inner self-represented by inner I, proper noun or pronoun moving away from the source P (pain) due to F (fire), which will be 'I moved away from that source of P (pain) caused due to F(fire)'. Where fire can be metaphorically interpreted as a rift between two people or anything as per the context in a conversation, this change at a mental representational level in access to information

<sup>1</sup> The discussion is about the *relationship* between creature's self-consciousness and access state consciousness rather than whether these can exist without each other or not.

can bring changes in attitude and actions at a behavioural level. When aided by PHS, access to information becomes sophisticated and abstract, and it further increases one's capacity to think and perform more rational actions for favourable outcomes. PHM can think of different ways of coming out from the dangerous situation differently than merely getting away from the source of pain, as the concept of fire is not limited to mere physical fire, and pain has another psychological dimension than mere physical pain. The experience of pain will be embedded in his inner narrative, which will be shared with others during a conversation for more solutions. For Block (1995), access-conscious content is system relative, and what makes a state A-conscious is what a representation of its content does in a system. He remarks, 'it depends on how the executive system utilizes the information. Now, if the very mode or model of self-representation goes through a transformation in the executive system or in mind, A-consciousness will also undergo a radical transformation. This happens because when internal monologue takes place in PHM through first-person concepts (i.e., inner I), the ability to think about one's role, revision of errors, and consider right and wrong increases, i.e., one's rationality also increases (practical as well as theoretical). For instance, hostility in PHM may result in developing and accumulating the finest technology for warfare like nuclear etc. (as compared to the hand axe of the BM). Further manipulation, deceiving for a long time, becomes possible only when there is a private PHS. Therefore, the level of sophistication through which access to information takes place will vary in a PHM than in a fringe mentality or PHM.

Sleutels (2006) argues in favour of Jaynes's approach and defines B-mind as having no access to inferential relations between concepts (which he calls B-concepts). His understanding of A-concepts seems a bit inconsistent concerning BM. Following Block's account of A-consciousness, Sleutels summarizes that: minds with B-concepts have no access to inferential relation as B-concepts are not mentally articulated. How-

ever, the ability to make an inference is one thing (no matter how proto it is), and being capable of making an articulated inference is another thing (as in logical, mathematical reasoning). As per Block's definition of A-consciousness, whether in proto form or a sophisticated articulation, both will be included under A-consciousness or will be A-concepts. Bermúdez (2003) argues that a proto understanding of inferential rules like *modus tollens* is there even in non-human animals for practical rationality. Therefore, any fringe mentality like BM (having B-concepts) will also have access to information for rational control (which is important from the survival point of view) no matter how less articulated or less theoretical it is. Sleutels consider A-mind (having access consciousness) to be synonyms to PHM. However, the peculiar feature of PHM will not be merely in terms of A-conscious rather in terms of PHS, as PHM might have an articulated mental representation because of an inner mental 'I'. However, Sleutels is right in pointing out that we (PHM) have an articulated representation of inferential relation. But as his paper is not about A-mind concepts and BM concepts, he does not engage much into it, but the mentioned bifurcation between A-mind and B-mind tallies less with Block's understanding of Access consciousness and with Jaynes's understanding of bicameral mentality/mind.

Block (1995) is critical of the thesis that consciousness is a cultural construction. For Jaynes, those things common with other animals like the phenomenal experience (P-consciousness) or even A-consciousness (which Block allows in lower animals) are not to be counted as consciousness. Consciousness for Jaynes is having PHS in a metaphorical sense and experiencing everything as and when required with the metaphorical inner 'I' assistance. A complex model of self-consciousness like monitoring consciousness (as mentioned by Block) comes close to Jaynes's theory of consciousness. Block gives few definitions but focuses more on its irreducibility to P-consciousness. He refers to it as a higher-order or third meta-consciousness, which can take many

forms. One is the form of some sort of inner perception (it can also be a form of P-consciousness, 'P-consciousness of one's own states or of the self'). Another way he puts it is in terms of information processing, like internal scanning. He admits it is a higher-order thought and 'a monitoring conscious state, that is a state accompanied by a thought to the effect that one is in that state'. However, it is not to be equated with P-consciousness because artificial intelligence may show a self-scanning type of information processing feature. But what an artificial system lacks is P-consciousness. By virtue of being higher-order consciousness or meta form, epistemically, monitoring consciousness will manifest in any creature non-inferentially and non-observationally. Block allows the possibility that there were times when people were less introspective than today. Indeed, propositional attitudes are significant in introspection as they facilitate internal monologue in a private mental space. Though with fewer details about monitoring consciousness and its possibility to exist even without P-consciousness like in artificial systems, it cannot be equated with present-day human inner self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a cultural construction for Jaynes in the sense that it is a learned phenomenon based on acquiring the linguistic and metaphorical understanding and usage ability of the literal lexicons rather than a given innate self.

### Conclusion

Self-consciousness can be minimal as mere body identification, and it can also manifest as a metaphorical inner self, PHS, different from the body. Keeping in mind the difference between Jaynes and Block's paradigm, an alternative form of self-consciousness can exist, and therefore, a range of being self-conscious can be maintained. The Bicameral hypothesis (as proposed by Julian Jaynes) as an actual existing historical fact can be debated on many grounds (like dates, archaeological findings, interpretation of evidence etc.). However, BM, taken to be a

fringe mentality, as Sleutels (2013) pointed out, cannot be dismissed as 'preposterous' or 'banal'. Also, it cannot be maintained that PHM, having a distinguishable feature of PHS, is innately wired as it is possible to conceive fringe mentalities like BM, which lacks the richness of inner subjective experience because of certain concepts and propositional attitudes (PA). However, criticism, like it is contrary to reason, makes the whole endeavour of philosophizing fringe mentality less serious and ostracizes it from mainline discussions over self-consciousness.

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