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ELEMENTS OF MODERNIZATION THEORIES IN THE ARMENIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

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Introduction

The term “modernization” has different meanings in modern political science and economics. In the narrowest sense, it is industrialization as part of modernization in a certain historical period, during which the majority of agricultural states go through industrialization. It is obvious that in the 18th–20th centuries, this process was not “harmonious” in all parts of the world. In some countries, it happened more rapidly than in others, and it certainly had an impact on the world’s political outline¹. Even in its narrowest sense, modernization cannot be viewed simply as a technical process, because, in any event, it is interconnected with serious social, demographic, and educational changes. Dankwart Rustow, an American researcher, made this description of modernization in the 1960s, noting that it comprises intellectual (rationalization and secularization), technological (industrialization and urbanization), and social (diversification of social groups) revolutions².

Being part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Soviet Armenia went through that kind of modernization in the 1930s. Besides, certain climatic, geographical, and other characteristics of Armenia, as well as human resources, were taken into account, allocating a certain role to our republic in

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¹ See Гешенкорн 2015, 59–92

² Rustow 1967, 37

the union's division of labor, which basically meant our share of knowledge-based production in the country³. That is one of the reasons why in those years as well as in the first decades after WWII, the Armenian SSR accumulated certain intellectual, scientific, and technological potential, which, to a certain extent, is used by the Third Republic as well.

However, by the year 1990, the industrial age had come to an end globally. One of the features of the next postindustrial modernization was that changes in the intellectual, cultural, and spiritual life were not a "side effect" of changes in production, but rather the driving force of modernization⁴. Thus, it is more than natural that different definitions of modernization (in a broader sense) appear, and many social problems arise. One of those problems is how the past and present political cultures foster or hinder the progress of modernization.

The present article discusses the following issues: What is the relationship between cultural and institutional factors, and what impact do they have on modernization? From that viewpoint, the present article examines the peculiarities of the catch-up growth in the Armenian political life.

Based on the study of the Armenian reality, the article aims to show how it is possible to overcome the opposition "unilineal evolution" vs "unique path" that is widespread in scientific circulation. In order to reach the accomplishment of the goal, the characteristics of the Armenian modernization, the justification of conservative tendencies, as well as the importance of the religious element are studied.

"Unilineal Evolution" vs "Unique Path"

One of the main topics of the modern sociological and political discourse is whether the development of different nations is in accordance with the unilineal evolution, which means that the same modernization "prescriptions" apply to all of them, or whether there is a "unique path" in each individual case, which means that there are basically no universal "prescriptions". We suppose that this contradiction can be overcome by applying the method called "Aufhebung" (sublation), introduced by the German philosopher Friedrich Hegel in his "Dialectics". It represents a stage of development that combines rejection with

³ See Тавадян 1984.

⁴ See Белл 2004.

preservation⁵. In this case, we are going to talk about the sublation of the “The unilineal-evolution” and “unique-path” approaches.

The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer applied this method to social and historical problems, trying to overcome any abstract contradiction particularly between the tradition and reason, tradition and historiography, and history and knowledge of it⁶.

A. Voskanyan posits that modernization is “reproachable for nations that are late to modernize or are left out of the process entirely. The advantage is fast track development, and the disadvantage is the externally imposed schematism. The Armenian people... are one of the catch-up peoples whom this idea of modernization applies to”⁷. The dualism of these advantages and disadvantages arises out of the debate over the value orientations that were particularly intense in the 19th century Russian Empire. Suffice it to recall the contradiction between “The pro-Slavic” and “pro-Western” movements in Russia in the 1830s. This contrast, modified and reinterpreted, had surely existed before and still exists in our days. It can be found in other nations as well. For example, Sonderweg developed the idea of a unique path into an entire philosophical movement after WWII, and was opposed to the American program of the country’s modernization. The same dualism could and still can be noticed in the Armenian public life.

The Western political idea of catch-up growth was developed mainly in the 1960s and owes its existence largely to the “decolonization”. After WWII, many countries gained independence, and there was an assumption that they would sooner or later join the “civilized world”.

According to the ideas that were popular in the West at the time: a. modernization is a gradual process; b. modernization implies homogenization; c. modernization is Europeanization or Americanization; d. modernization is an irreversible process”⁸. Those points seem doubtful today, the last one in particular. The irreversibility of modernization, as stated in the above-mentioned points, is denied by the Iranian (1979) and especially the Afghan experiences (2021). The norms of political culture existing in those countries were in serious

⁵ See **Hegel’s Dialectics** 2020.

⁶ **Гадмер** 1988, 336.

⁷ **Ոսկանյան** 2021, 44.

⁸ **Giovanni E. Reyes** 2001, 2.

conflict with the modernization projects which were carried out superficially and, to a large extent, mimicked the Western ones.

The second half of the 20th century and especially its end saw political scientists realize the limitations of the aforementioned “uncompromising” definitions, and they began to use more cautious definitions such as partial modernization (the best example of it is the reforms in China since the late 1970s), expedited modernization (this is what we experienced in the Soviet era and, to a great extent, with the use of Western technologies and even specialists), recurrent modernization (it is when you constantly need to relive the stages that you have already passed) and so on⁹.

Brazilian sociologist Wernek Sodre figuratively described this last type of modernization which is characteristic of the post-Soviet countries, including Armenia, as a “movement of the square wheel,” in which each stage is a process of overcoming the next corner of the square, and this is followed by a certain period of immobility¹⁰.

If we follow in Sodre’s footsteps, we can say that the “corners of the square” hindering modernization are political culture, including the society’s ideas of modernity, and its goals. The logical assumption would be that, for example, the modernization scenarios introduced in Iran or Afghanistan were unacceptable for the societies of those countries, and they rejected the “schematism imposed on them from outside”. Back to Hegel’s sublation: the domination of “conservatism” in political culture does not mean a complete rejection of “reformers”. Both the aforementioned countries and the post-Soviet states need modernization, and certainly not all Western models are unacceptable for them.

The events of the second half of the 20th century and the initial decades of the 21st century loosened the grip on modernization of most “enthusiastic” liberals with overly optimistic expectations. They gave rise to the opposition of the generally conservative approach. Consequently, the goal of catch-up growth became “interconnectivity of social institutions and structural diversity at the cultural level, which form the balance of homeostasis”¹¹. These definitions stem directly from Samuel Huntington’s idea that political stability depends not just

⁹ See **Штомпка** 1996.

¹⁰ See **Вернек Содре** 1976.

¹¹ **Levy** 1967, 195.

on democracy and the market, but also on correspondence between the political institutions and the political culture¹².

This is the way how balance and stability are established, and their absence can lead to serious contradictions and even revolutions. To ensure stability, Huntington offers 4 necessary features of political order: adaptability (an ability to adapt to different challenges), complexity (a variety of functions and subsystems), autonomy (independence from the political order, which makes it possible to engage new groups), and coherence (an integrity of the system)¹³. According to Dankwart Rustow, quoted above, modernization has to meet the following requirements: national unity, stable governance, and equality. The first and second requirements are more important than the third one. Thus, in recent decades political scientists use "sustainable development", rather than democracy, as a criterion of modernization¹⁴.

This again raises the question of how coherent the proposed models of catch-up growth are. The past experience proves that rapid political modernization, i.e., poorly thought out, unprepared introduction of Western democratic institutions, most of the time leads to corruption, severe polarization of the society, alienation of citizens, educational and cultural degradation. Since dozens of countries, not only post-Soviet, have experienced the same unfavorable consequences, one can conclude that the problem is that the society as a whole, or, at least, some social groups inside the society are not ready to accept the proposed "remedies".

With all challenges of modernization having been mentioned, we should now move on to examining the dialectics of "rejection" and "preservation," which in this case takes the form of "enthusiastic liberalism" and "hardline conservatism". Coming back to the Armenian political life, let us first recall the principle of "three consensuses" widely accepted in political science. It has been established that the following consensuses are necessary for effectively reforming the states: 1. on the earlier development of the society in order to avoid "witch hunt"; 2. on the primary goals of social development, 3. on the rules of the "political game" of the ruling regime¹⁵. In our opinion, none of

¹² See **Huntington** 1968.

¹³ **Huntington** 1968, 65

¹⁴ **Rustow** 1967, 48.

¹⁵ **Хенкин** 1993, 189.

those consensuses exists in modern-day Armenia. However, the analysis of the historical experience of our people will give us a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. We know that in the history of our people, there existed such an assent, at certain points, at least, with reference to goals. However, as a starting point, one should accept the presumption that Armenia, all in all, was strongly predisposed to the Western, Christian culture, but, for some reason, it sometimes got “out of step” and needed political, economic, and state management, in order to “sync up” with the Western world, and carry on the progress. Over the centuries, Armenian political science and philosophy progressed in that direction.

Let us revisit the group of Armenian intellectuals who perceived and formulated the idea of catch-up growth for the first time in our history. We are referring to Armenian scientists of the 5th–6th centuries A.D. who were representatives of the so-called “Hellenistic Orientation” – Davit Kerakan, Movses Khorenatsi, Ghazar Parpetsi, Davit Anhaght. They made translations from Greek and created their own scholarly and particularly philosophic literature. R. Mirumyan opines that their purpose was “to take the Armenian culture to the level of the Greek culture in order to make an egalitarian dialogue between them possible”¹⁶. The author also draws a parallel between that period and the 18th century when the Mekhitarist Congregation was engaged in the same “pro-European” work¹⁷.

Based on these examples, one can argue that the “unilineal evolution vs unique path” dilemma is solved by the dialectical relationship between the general and the particular as Hamlet Gevorgyan, following in the footsteps of Arnold Toynbee, suggests with regard to national cultures. According to the Armenian philosopher, it is not about either logical or historical “priority”, and thus, no one raises the issue of merging or staying completely “unique.” There is a certain “pattern” that the given national culture may or may not follow. The philosopher bases his theory on the same example of Hellenism. “Hellenistic culture was open, and over time peoples on a vast geographical area became influenced by it. However, the culture that developed in that vast territory and included many ethnic groups, did not become a symbiosis of ethnic cultures....

¹⁶ **Мирумян** 2017, 92.

¹⁷ **Мирумян** 2017, 81–90.

It envisaged the model, modus, “scenario” of the development of national cultures. In the Hellenistic cultural and historical world, acknowledging the difference of national cultures does not lead to arbitrary disruption of the world’s integrity. The whole manifests itself in separate individual parts”¹⁸.

This example, in our opinion, dispels fears of progress. Fighting for a certain model, accepting a certain scenario does not mean that a country tries to blindly adopt state, political, or any other institutions of another country. If Armenia wants to have, let’s say, an effectively functioning parliament, it does not mean that we intend to copy the Belgian parliament, for example, and by doing that “catch-up” with Belgium. It means that our desire is to govern the country using mechanisms of real representative democracy. If, however, we just want to have an institution called “parliament,” no matter how well we copy the structure, rules, and rituals of the Belgian parliament, it will never be a catch-up growth, but rather an imitation. This makes the positions of the proponents of a “unique path” stronger, because one cannot see the expected or announced results in real life, modernization does not happen, and thus the society’s demand either weakens or becomes marginalized or disappears completely. The “Hellenistic” modernization in the 5th–6th centuries A.D. and the “pro-European” modernization in the 18th century were based on the consensus among the Armenian intellectual elite on which “models” and “scenarios” would be acceptable for our people. However, in other periods of our history – today as well – there is no such consensus. For example, in the 1830s, Khachatur Abovyan chose the German model of enlightening modernization. One should note that Kh. Abovyan was engaged in these activities in the territory of the modern-day Republic of Armenia, but the population of that territory at the time – roughly two centuries ago – had neither education, nor economic infrastructure, and, in fact, everything needed to be built from scratch. In his 1836 article written in German (“On Ways to Improve the Economic and Cultural Conditions of Armenia and of the Armenian People”), Kh. Abovyan posits that “the most important thing for that country [Armenia – A.A.] is to have a pedagogical institute” where the native language and Russian will be taught, along with geography, physics, religion, and art, as well as partly, but more profoundly arithmetic, geometry, natural science, pedagogy, and agriculture

¹⁸ Геворкян 1991, 85.

and technology, in particular”¹⁹. According to that plan, the teachers of practical subjects would form “a small colony of German artisans and agriculturalists, consisting of no less than 10 families. This would be most useful for that purpose, because that nation, as is well-known, stands out among nations as having moral and other qualities and even a unique household management”²⁰.

The great enlightener believed that Germans’ moral and other characteristics (surely, those “others” include forms of social organization and economy) are necessary for Armenia’s modernization. It was not just his education in Dorpat that put him on to it, but also the fact that this model was the main reference point for the economy, army, and science of the Russian Empire, and Kh. Abovyan held an official position in that empire.

The Armenian clergymen strongly opposed these programs and accused their author of “Lutheranism.” Of course, the accusation itself was absurd, but the question how realistic Kh. Abovyan’s proposals were, needs further analysis. The important thing here is that there was no consent among Armenians on the scenario of catch-up growth. Even in our days, the Armenian society, the Armenian people do not have a common understanding of what that “scenario” in its entirety should look like, and there is a certain predisposition – influenced probably by the Russian political thought – to the “unique path.”

“Weighty Arguments” of Conservatism

In the globalized world, however, a country like Armenia is unlikely to be capable of taking its own, unique path of modernization considering both the previous historical experience and limited possibilities of creating one’s own technologies in the postindustrial economy. We discussed above some of the features of Armenia’s previous experience, and that experience in a way suggests that the “scenario” should be European. Levon Zekyan, an Armenian-Italian armenologist, based on his study of Armenians’ life and culture in the 17th–19th centuries, posits, “Armenians are closely related to Europeans, have borrowed and adopted most of their achievements, are advocates of many innovations inspired by the Enlightenment, but all in all they do not accept all the proposed ideas and trends without weighty arguments”²¹.

¹⁹ Աբովյան 1958, 93.

²⁰ Աբովյան 1958, 94.

²¹ Զեքեան 1997, 70–71:

Apparently, the “weighty arguments” for opposing modernization are associated with fears of losing national identity, which found its most prominent expression in conservative groups. In mid-19th century, in particular, there was a strong debate in the Armenian discourse on the interrelationship between “nation and religion,” and that debate still echoes in modern-day Armenia. Does religion play a “regressive” role and hinder the nation’s progress? Or is religion – along with language – one of the necessary factors to ensure the nation’s further existence, as Gabriel Aivazovsky, one of the most famous representatives of Armenian conservatism in the 19th century, put it? “The very moment our nation forgets its nationality, i.e., its noble language and the sense of respect for and pride in the holy orthodox faith, it will be led to destruction”, he stated. For him, religion is a prerequisite for the principle of “nationalism”²². R. Mirumyan argued that the formula “religion is the decisive factor of nationality” can be described as a methodological key, which one can use to build the national concept of the thinker [Aivazovsky – A.A.]”²³.

It was only natural that the proponents of modernization were opposed to this approach, since, following in the footsteps of the 18th–century enlighteners, they posited that modernization and secularization were interconnected. However, there is a certain nuance here. For Mikael Nalbandian, a supporter of modernism, the national was of primary importance. Armenian thinkers of that period, regardless of their political views, had traits of healthy nationalism, and in that sense, there is no insurmountable gap between Aivazovsky and Nalbandian. The latter just placed a priority on the “national” and did not subject it to religion. “We remember that the church is the nation, and the clergy are the servants of that church. The nation has the right to honor and love the clergymen for their goodness and judge and punish them for their badness,” Nalbandian says²⁴.

As can be seen, Nalbandian does not reject the religious part, he just subordinates it to the national one. However, in modern-day Armenia the political thought is generally influenced by the conservative approach (especially when it comes to religion). The events of the 20th and 21st centuries have reinforced their skepticism of secularism, which Professor Zekyan calls “weighty

²² «Մասյաց Աղավնի եւ Ծիածան Հայաստանի» 1860, 107:

²³ Միրումյան 2018, 42:

²⁴ Նալբանդյան 1954, 16:

arguments". "At the end of the day, it is difficult to claim that the ideological path of M. Nalbandyan, a prominent representative of liberals and their radical wing, was the most promising one in terms of ensuring the national security of Armenia", E. Hovhannisyan wrote in 2007²⁵.

We can assert that the 19th-century modernization projects of Khachatur Abovyan and Mikael Nalbandian leaned toward European models and faced resistance due to the peculiarities of Armenian culture. Unlike Soviet historians, we are not inclined to consider this resistance as a mere reaction of the "regressive" or – even less so – "clerical-feudal" forces. It is not the case; we do not think that those forces stood in the way of progress and were concerned only about exploitation of workers. In fact, that reaction was an expression of quite "legitimate" fears, which reflected the perceptions of the Armenian society both then and now²⁶.

The combination of "progressive" (modernist) and "regressive" (conservative) trends cannot be unequivocally characterized as "positive" or "negative" in terms of modernization. Most of the time, rejecting the present and referring to the past, looking for things to be proud of is a progressive approach, which ultimately leads to modernization. Many nations, including Armenians, contrasted the past with the present in the process of building their own identities and gave preference to the former. For Germans, 1810–1820 were years when poets Brentano and Arnim first published a collection of romantic stories called "The Boy's Magic Horn," and later on the Brothers Grimm published a collection of German folk stories, which read, as an ancient poet beautifully put it, "we want to help awaken the sleeping creature, revive the wonderful urge covered with darkness"²⁷. At the beginning of the 18th century, one of the ideologists of that nationalist movement was Herder, who, by the way, was the first to use the term "political culture," rightfully claiming that political modernization of a nation should begin with its culture. When asked what the culture of the new Europe should look like, Herder claimed that it depended on what people were like and what they wanted to become. "Those who despised

²⁵ Հովհաննիսյան 2007, 86:

²⁶ See Պարսամյան 1979:

²⁷ Cited by Скурла 1989, 127:

work, culture, art, those who corrupted and distorted them remained the same,” the German thinker wrote²⁸.

Thus, national awakening is directly connected with conservative ideas, which, under certain circumstances, do not hinder modernization, but, what is more, contribute to it. 19th-century Armenian writer Raffi’s political manifesto, the novel called “Sparks,” is basically a tour of Western Armenia with references to “artifacts” of the glorious and magnificent past. It is common knowledge that this work, along with the other works of this author, had a direct impact on the liberation movement of the Armenian people in the second half of the 19th century, raising generation after generation in the spirit of patriotism²⁹. It should be noted however that the republication of the novel in Armenian in 1947 and in Russian in 1949 was strongly criticized by Soviet ideologists as an example of “bourgeois nationalism”³⁰.

Raffi like many 19th-century Armenian intellectuals, was opposed to Westernization, seeing it as a threat to national identity. As for secularization, one can notice an interesting feature here. Raffi and Muratsan drew special attention to “Lutheranism,” which was an equivalent of secularization for them, Lutheranism’s contradiction to our political culture’s unique hierarchy being probably the reason for that.

The idea, stemming from the Age of Enlightenment (17th–18th centuries), that religion contradicts and hinders modernization was revisited in the 20th century in different forms. As regards values, Ronald Inglehart, an American researcher, conducted a large-scale study from 1981–2001 on the classification of value priorities of different nations. One of the pivots is the opposition of survival to self-expression, and another pivot is “competition” between traditional, religious values and secular-rational values. According to that theory, nations are spread on the so-called Inglehart map. It is obvious that in class societies, the more secular your values are, the higher the level of democracy and well-being in your country will be³¹. As already mentioned, the 21st century saw the revision of that approach, particularly as far as secularism was concerned. However, it is unclear to what extent successful Western countries

²⁸ Гердер 1977, 608.

²⁹ See Խորհրդյան 1985:

³⁰ Шнирельман 2003, 61.

³¹ World Values Survey, 2017–2020.

are secular. Second, if we do not confine ourselves to Western Europe and North America, the stories of “success” and “failure” in the 21st century will be more diverse. Summarizing the theoretical and practical experience of recent decades, Robbie Shilliam, an American researcher, states, “It is becoming increasingly difficult to take as a starting point... that the problem of pursuing a modern ethical life arises from the loss of the religious foundation of moral traditions.... Furthermore, this challenge to one of the central planks of modernization theory undermines the Orientalist assumption that religious public spheres can only ever exhibit stultified, parochial, and non-progressive ethical codes and thus must be secularized in order to take part in the modern world”³².

It should also be mentioned that earlier on, after WWII, the neoconservative tradition that was quite influential in Western social sciences also had some reservations about the “healing powers” of secularism. Arnold Gehlen, who advocated for preserving the authority of the church, was one of such thinkers. The German philosopher considered discrediting sacred institutions such as the state, the church, the army as a “symptom of a pathology”³³. Here too secularism was not considered as one of the essential elements of modernization.

Thus, the “modernism vs conservatism,” “religion vs secularism” dichotomies join the “unilineal evolution vs unique path” dichotomy and are also sublated within the scope of the Hegelian dialectics. The modernization that Armenia needs to undergo, composes elements of each of those three dichotomies and does not lead to any of them simultaneously. The substance of modernization needs to be based on the understanding that it is a combination of “braking” and “accelerating” factors. This should be taken into account when undertaking any project of reforms. Any movement toward modernization without due attention to that fact will be faced with serious internal resistance.

In the above-mentioned article the author states that “schematism imposed from outside... can be mitigated only when institutional reforms are combined with enlightenment, i.e., internal assimilation of the substance of modernization”³⁴. However, before giving the society a signal to “enlighten,” it

³² Shilliam 2010.

³³ Cited by Шепелев 2015.

³⁴ Ոսկանյան 2021, 44:

is necessary to have a clear perception of what the substance of modernization of modern Armenia should look like, considering the country's track record and the features of today's political culture.

Within the scope of this article, one can answer the above question only with "recommendations in the negative", i.e. what present Armenian modernization SHOULD NOT be:

1. Not urbanization, because Armenia went through that in the second half of the 20th century.

2. The substance is not Westernization, because since the 1990s, it has been implemented externally. It is a completely different matter that the assimilation of more profound Western values should continue. Samuel Huntington acutely defined superficial and deep patience, "Western values imply Magna Carta, not McDonald's"³⁵.

3. Secularization should not be the substance, because the past experience shows that society loses ethical guidelines in the process. The examples given at the beginning of the article clearly show that rejection of the past cannot be an impetus to modernize, on the contrary, one should revisit some of the lower layers of the past. So, it is quite possible that one of the elements of Armenian modernization will be desecularization or sanctification.

Conclusion

– Modernization in the 21st century does not necessarily lead to Westernization, globalization, or urbanization.

– Modernization is not an irreversible process.

– There is no insurmountable gap between "modernist" and "conservative" movements in the history of the Armenian political thought.

– Armenian conservatism has often expressed and continues to express quite relevant concerns, which stem from our people's track record and desire to preserve (or reconstruct) the national identity.

– The necessity of universal "remedies" comes from the idea of unilineal evolution of the whole society, the practical application of which is dubious.

– Catch-up growth does not necessarily imply the use of "unilineal" methods.

³⁵ ХАНТИНГТОН 2003, 77.

– The “unilineal evolution vs unique path” dichotomy can be “overcome” by a higher-level of synthesis based on the concepts of “model” and “scenario.”

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ԱՐԴԻԱԿԱՆԱՅՄԱՆ ՏԵՍՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՏԱՐԵՐԸ ՀԱՅ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՄՇԱԿՈՒՅԹԻ ՀԱՄԱՏԵՔՍՈՒՄ

ԱՐՐԱՀԱՄՅԱՆ Ա.

Ամփոփում

Բանալի բաներ՝ արդիականացում, աշխարհիկացում, արեւմտականացում, ինդուստրիալիզացիա, հետամուտ զարգացում, քաղաքական մշակույթ, պահպանողականություն:

Քաղաքագիտական, սոցիոլոգիական եւ տնտեսագիտական հետազոտությունների մեջ արդիականացման խնդիրն անխուսափելիորեն հանգում է մի շարք տարրերի, որոնք, ըստ ձեւավորված ավանդույթի, բնութագրում են արդիականացման գործընթացը՝ աշխարհիկացում, արեւմտականացում, ինդուստրիալիզացիա: Սակայն XXI դարի զարգացումները ցույց են տալիս, որ միայն այդ տեսանկյունից արդիականացումը դիտարկելը հանգեցնում է միակողմանի մոտեցման, մասնավորապես այն պատճառով, որ բազմաթիվ երկրներ, այդ թվում՝ Հայաստանը, այդ փուլերը հիմնականում անցել են, սակայն դարձյալ կանգնած են քաղաքական, սոցիալական եւ տնտեսական արդիականացման անհրաժեշտության առջեւ: Հայ հասարակական միտքը թե՛ այսօր եւ թե՛ նախորդ դարերի ընթացքում հաճախ դիմադրում էր վերը նկարագրված միակողմանի մոտեցմանը՝ ելնելով առաջին հերթին ազգային ինքնության պահպանության հրամայականից: Նման պահպանողական տեսությունները հայերի եւ այլ ազգերի իրականության մեջ պարտադիր չէ, որ ենթադրեն հետընթաց եւ «ծխական» քաղաքական մշակույթի հաստատում: Հակառակը՝ պահպանողականությունը կարող է դառնալ ազգային եւ պետական զարգացման խթան:

ЭЛЕМЕНТЫ ТЕОРИИ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИИ В КОНТЕКСТЕ АРМЯНСКОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ КУЛЬТУРЫ

АБРАМЯН А.

Резюме

Ключевые слова: модернизация, секуляризация, вестернизация, индустриализация, догоняющее развитие, политическая культура, консерватизм.

Политологические, социологические и экономические исследования модернизации с неизбежностью сводятся к ее элементам, которые, согласно традиции, характеризуют процесс модернизации – секуляризация, вестернизация, индустриализация. Однако процессы, происходящие в 21-ом веке, показывают, что рассмотрение модернизации только с этой точки зрения приводит к одностороннему подходу. Причина, в част-

ности, в том, что многие страны, в том числе Армения, в основном прошли эти этапы и тем не менее стоят перед необходимостью политической, социальной и экономической модернизации. Армянская общественная мысль как сегодня, так и на протяжении прошлых веков, часто сопротивлялась вышеуказанному одностороннему подходу, исходя прежде всего из жизненной необходимости сохранения национальной идентичности. Подобные консервативные теории как в армянской действительности, так и у других народов необязательно предполагают «регресс» и установление «приходской» политической культуры. Напротив, консерватизм в определенных случаях является стимулом для государственного и национального развития.