

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The consequences of the Balkan Wars, the enormous human and material losses of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, stunned the Ottoman government, driving the Ittihadist leadership to find a final and radical solution to the "minority problem" that threatened the integrity of the multi-ethnic empire. After 1913 the *Eastern Question* was dissolved into the *Armenian Question*, and the nationalist political leadership began to prepare for the Armenian Genocide – maintains Vahakn Dadrian.¹ The Young Turk understanding of a solution to the Armenian Question – or *Ermeni Sorunu*, the "Armenian Problem" – the prevailing militaristic doctrine "aimed at destroying autonomous components of the Ottoman Empire" justifying and promoting ethnic annihilation, was realized and culminated in the Armenian Genocide.²

The "Armenian Problem", however, was abstracted from raw Ottoman politics by the linguistic realm of the international public sphere. The Armenian Question was a well-integrated theme of late 19th and early 20th century political discourse on the Eastern Question and global power structures throughout Europe and beyond.

Numerous attempts have been made to define the Armenian Question from the late 19th century up until the most recent times. As early as 1887 a synthesis was committed to paper by Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, former Belgian Minister of the Interior, first president of the Belgian Institute of International Law, suggesting that the Armenian Question brought forward the rightful claim of Armenians "to replace inequality by equality, and conditional protection by reciprocal independence." He further argued that the Armenian Question "claims the attention and active sympathy of the Great Powers" because "of a topographical, ethnographical, historical, and statistical nature."³ This positivist approach has prevailed over the centuries; the Armenian Question has been predominantly defined as a matter of foreign affairs and international relations, a set of questions on the autonomy and independence of Armenia.⁴ Some add that since e WWI the Armenian Question has become an existential question on the mere survival of the Armenian community in Turkey,⁵ and since the 1980s many use it with regard to Armenian terrorism.⁶

Few have, however, looked at the Armenian Question from a linguistic point of view – as a discourse, a conception of political language on power relations. Thus, I henceforth venture upon defining the Armenian Question as

a colonial discourse on statehood and authority in Armenia. I introduce the notion of *Peace-regime*, the order of discourse set by the speech community of the First Assembly of the League of Nations, the ideological struggle to claim universal authority and responsibility for the League of Nations to maintain global peace (the peace treaties) and the colonial dominance of the Allies (through mandates). Another hypothesis of this paper is that there was a direct causal relation between the ideological thematization of the Assembly's agenda and the geographical and ethnic limitation of the League's humanitarian measures: over the decade subsequent to WWI only Russians and Armenians,, former citizens of two states that, after the Great War, challenged the authority of the League and forced the Allies to revise the peace treaties, had been recognized by the League of Nations as refugees. And finally, I argue that the inability of the first Assembly to solve the Armenian Question resulted in the first crisis of the League of Nations - the prevailing *crisis-discourse* caused a paradigm-shift in the *Peace-regime*, the order of discourse on global authority and responsibility, and thus the Armenian Question was reduced to a humanitarian discourse on refugees and minorities.

To do so, I turn to the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a field of applied linguistics⁷ to study means of control and power, introduced by British linguist Norman Fairclough. He defined discourse as "the conception of language", or "language as social practice determined by social structures." He further introduced his concept on the *order of discourse*, the way in which actual discourses are determined by underlying social and linguistic conventions, constantly *shaped by* and *reshaping* social institutions, power relations, contributing to both social continuity and change.⁸ Ruth Wodak and Gilbert Weiss defined discourse simply as "text in context", suggesting that analyzing the implicit context of written or spoken words is just as significant for CDA as the explicit text itself.⁹ Martin Reisigl and Wodak saw discourse as a "complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts that manifest themselves within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as 'texts', that belong to specific semiotic types, i.e. genres."¹⁰

Politics – the exercise of power, domination techniques, government, mass (mis)information and propaganda, democratic institutions, etc. – are social interactions; thus, they are first and foremost communicative actions. They are never individual; political communities are therefore *speech communities* – maintains Márton Szabó.¹¹ Speech communities are groups of people unified by community standards like characteristics of language use (vocabulary, linguistic norms, etc.), knowledge, often locality or even birthright¹² – such as

the mini speech community of a jury, a community of judges who possess the same knowledge, values held to be right, specific norms of communicative behavior, etc.¹³ According to Wodak "[p]olitical groups need their own language and portray themselves via this language; they define their territory by means of their language; they signal their ideology through certain slogans and stereotypes; their ideological structure is joined together in a certain way and so is their argumentation."¹⁴

Analyzing a discourse requires a close look at the *actors of discourse production* (an enquiry into the composition of the speech community) and the context of the texts at hand. The Discourse-Historical Approach, a sociophilosophical approach to CDA devised by Wodak and Reisigl, pays special attention to the historical-social context of a discourse, in order to "integrate much available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded. Further, it analyses the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change."¹⁵

Fairclough laid the foundations of CDA in some key standpoints of inquiry to "interpret the features which are actually present in a text", such as vocabulary, grammatical and textual structures, and suggested questions for researchers to raise: What classification schemes are drawn upon? Are there words which are ideologically contested? Is there *rewording* or *overwording*? Are there euphemistic expressions? What *expressive* values do words have? What metaphors are used? Are *nominalizations* used? Are sentences active or passive? What modes are used? Are there ways in which one participant controls the turns of other?¹⁶ These are but a few points of inquiry that the paper puts forth.

The K-device, a term coined by Teun van Dijk with the aim of better understanding contextual knowledge management in discourse productions, is a key term in this study. He maintained that when studying the context of discourses, one should examine certain *paradigms of knowledge* set by the speech community. He defines knowledge as "shared beliefs satisfying the specific (epistemic) criteria of an (epistemic) community", that play a crucial role in the identification processes of that community. He argues that in each community's life there are certain historical moments that are established as beliefs and shared knowledge, *presupposed* in public discourses, for instance in storytelling, or for that matter, songs.¹⁷ The K-device is therefore the mutual representation of knowledge by the participants of the discourse in order to establish relevant information, knowledge and common sense, thus shaping group identity. He differentiates between several "K-strategies" (hypothetical strategies for knowledge-setting), such as personal,

interpersonal, group, institutional or organizational, national and cultural knowledge. Institutional knowledge, in light of van Dijk's typology, is "social knowledge shared by the members of an institution or organization, and in general satisfies the strategic criteria of group knowledge and discourse", while cultural knowledge, as the highest degree of established knowledge, is the "general knowledge shared by the members of the same "culture" [...] on the (possibly combined) basis of language, religion, history, habits, origin or appearance."¹⁸

His understandings of shared knowledge are not unparalleled in identity and memory studies. The theory of *cultural memory*, introduced by Jan and Aleida Assmann,¹⁹ demonstrates how shared memories (or knowledge) shape national identities as an "interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts."²⁰ Setting the patterns of shared knowledge and memory of historical events, persons or places (or as in Fairclough's vocabulary, common sense) as key elements of cultural identification is crucial in this process. Yet another approach to this phenomenon was introduced by Pierre Nora in the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, in light of which, spaces or sites, people or events, texts or institutions, etc. of the collective cultural memory of a community are the "embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists" and historical consciousness crystallizes.²¹

Dwelling on one of the key hypotheses of this paper – the *crisis of the League of Nations* – I turn to the thesis of Tom R. Burns and Marcus Carson on social order and disorder, namely that "[i]nstitutional crisis evokes particular discourses [...] formulated in terms of the conceptions, values, and principles of the prevailing institutional paradigm", communicated through, what we shall call, *crisis-discourses*. They define institution as "a complex of relationships, roles, and norms, which constitute and regulate recurring interaction processes among participants in socially defined settings or domains. Any institution organizing people in such relationships may be conceptualized as an authoritative complex of rules or a rule regime." Thus, an institution defines a particular social order, outlining legitimate actors, participants, positions and relationships within its framework; therefore, it consists of a system of authority and power. Institutions organize and regulate social interactions in particular domains, developing contexts, settings and times for "constituting the institutional domain or sphere." They set norms of behavior, a complex of potential normative equilibria (or *agenda-setting*) and, what is essential in light of this paper's scope, "core values, norms and beliefs that are referred to in normative discourses, the giving and asking of accounts, the criticism and exoneration of actions and outcomes in the institutional domain." A crisis may arise when key components of the institution and its paradigms are challenged; internal or external critics may

propose "alternatives that break with the prevailing arrangements and their particular norms, social relationships, cognitive categories and assumptions."²²

They classified discourses likely to appear in crisis-situations, when a failure or instability emerges and is found to be "neither understandable nor controllable within the established paradigmatic framework", identifying four ideal-types of such discourses. The first type is the *discourse of normality*, when a problem is understood and believed to be solvable, and willingness to solve it according to established paradigms exists among the actors and participants of the discourse. The second type is *uncertainty and discovery discourses*, characterized by a consensus about institutional authority (on who defines problems and solutions and how to proceed), but such discourses refer to uncertainty and ignorance, engaging in corresponding discourses, with a strong sense of a lack of necessary, immediate knowledge. The third type is that of *oppositional normative discourses* that emerge as problem situations in the course of which intense conflicts are challenging existing components of established paradigms, for instance, particular values and beliefs, authority and responsibility. Such discourses, while maintaining on the one hand "relative certainty about the facts of the issue and about the capability of being able to control the problem", on the other, lack solidarity over specific issues and problems. The fourth type is that of *chaos and transformative discourses*, characterized by conditions of social disintegration with ignorant and contesting actors questioning or fundamentally arguing the "content or form of established knowledge."²³

These are the fundamental theoretical and methodological premises for this paper, whose sources focus on the minutes of the First Assembly of the League of Nations.

COLONIAL DISCOURSES AND TWO OPPOSING NARRATIONS ON THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

Colonialism is a rather abstract, yet determinative conception of modern international political thought; its literature could fill whole libraries. The concept of *colonial discourse* was defined by Peter Hulme as "an ensemble of linguistically-based practices unified by their common deployment in the management of colonial relationships,"²⁴ but it was Edward Said who elaborated it in his opus titled *Orientalism*. He defined orientalism as a world view founded upon racial and civilizational distinctions, a *Western* behavioral pattern "for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient,"²⁵ with a language of its own, a "discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial style"²⁶ demarcating the "superiority" of the

Occident and its nations from the "inferiority" of the *Orient*, the peoples of the *East* and the *South*. Participants of colonial discourse "borrowed classical racist stereotypes condensed in the word 'barbarian'"²⁷ and succeeded in cementing a sense of *otherness* and inferiority of the population of the colonies in European and *Western* public opinion. On the temporality of colonialism Mark Mazower noted that the internationalism of European powers and international law was fundamentally colonial from the early 19th century up until the establishment of the United Nations, as it intended to legitimate the hegemony of the "civilized" colonial powers over the colonized "barbaric" and "uncivilized" peoples.²⁸

As a dominant rhetorical glue of the complex of 19th century political thinking, colonial discourse prevailed among liberals and conservatives, Christians and Muslims, French and Austrians alike.²⁹ An analysis of the turn-of-the-century literature of the Armenian Question, as a case study, may shed some light on the core motives and logic of orientalism and colonial discourse.

On the eve of the Great War the Armenian Question emerged into the spotlight of global colonial thinking, of public and political discourses from Moscow to Washington. Whether a state was in alliance or in conflict with the Ottoman Empire, through channels of mass communication and on public fora, it attempted to legitimize on the one hand, or, on the other, delegitimize the "civilizational mission" of the "Turkish race" over Armenians. Both factions applied arguments, terms, rhetoric and discursive strategies quintessential to the language of orientalism, complying with the definition of Hulme on colonial discourses. As contesting alliances took shape and the Great War became imminent, two opposing narratives of the Armenian Question emerged in the linguistic realm of colonial discourse.

The narration prevailing in the Entente countries depicted the Armenians as "the oldest Christian race"³⁰ that bears "occidental civilizational and cultural values",³¹ a race that is "most apt for civilization" on a land where, since the "barbaric occupation" of Turks and Kurds, there exists "intellectual differences of the races".³² Some believed that the inferiority of the Turkish race was predestined by their Islamic faith, as it "is directly opposed to any hopeful progress towards a high civilization."³³ James Bryce also claimed that the backwardness of the Turks was not a result of any "natural stupidity of the Turkish race" but of their religious dogma.³⁴ It was a popular idea that the oppression of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was, in fact, orchestrated by none other than the German court.³⁵ The most picturesque description of an "Occidental" Armenian race was probably phrased by French theologist Émile Doumergue in 1916: "[a]s for the race, the Turks and Armenians form a

perfect contrast. The Turk is Turanian, militarist, brutal, refractory to science, arts and commerce. The Armenians are Aryans, like us, pacifists".³⁶

On the other hand, the narration that dominated the public and political discourse on the Armenian Question in Germany and Austria-Hungary put forth a rather contradictory view; the "inferior race" was that of the Armenians, often called "the Jews of the Orient" in both states; they were unworthy of self-governance, while the Turkish people were depicted as a "noble" and "civilized race", which had earned the right to rule over Armenians.³⁷ As Stefan Ihrig noted, Armenians had often been regarded in Germany as ruthless merchants, usurers, thieves, fraudsters, and terrorists who had thus brought their own extermination upon themselves, justifying the genocide as a "national and historical necessity."³⁸ In Austria-Hungary the proverb of "one Armenian is worse than ten Jews" was often used by publicists and politicians alike, while anti-Armenian sentiments resulted in the dehumanization of Jews and Armenians in popular literature. Just like anti-Semitism during WWII, anti-Armenianism served as an agent for justifying genocide during e WWI in the Axis countries. The Bulgarian ambassador to the League of Nations, Ivan Madjarov, later regarded the Armenian refugees that sought refuge in Bulgaria as people "consisting of foreign elements, unable to assimilate into the indigenous population, unproductive and equally undesirable, especially in the present conditions of the economic life of the country" - justifying his government's measures to deport Armenian refugees to Soviet Russia.³⁹

A booklet published in 1916 in Budapest titled *The Truth about the Revolutionary Movement of the Armenians* claimed that there was a significant disaccord between the "truth" and what "the enemy and 'neutral' press" - the former referring to the press in Entente countries, the latter to Swiss media - reported on the fate of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. It claimed that the "enemy press" reported false accusations when it condemned the High Porte of attempting to "exterminate its Christian population." It went on justifying the "fairly gentle retributive measures" against the "rebellious acts" the Armenians had committed.⁴⁰

These two opposing narrations were, in fact, manifestations of two sides of the same coin - a colonial world divided into two, prepared to sacrifice millions of lives on the altar of colonial dominance in a war to end all wars.

After the Great War and the triumph of the Allies, between 1918 and 1920, the discourse on post-war peace and global power-structures in Europe saw the culmination of the Armenian Question - publicists, leading political and public figures in the UK, Belgium, France, Switzerland, etc. would time and again call on the Peace Conference to establish a "National Home" for the Armenian people, on the Armenian government to "reclaim its right" for

independency.⁴¹ In September 1918, First Baron Moyné, Walter Edward Guinness, a Conservative member of the House of Commons in London - who later served as Secretary of State for the Colonies - expressed his hopes that a US-UK "combined influence in deciding Allied peace conditions may secure (1) that national freedom shall at last be guaranteed to the Armenians as some reward for their constancy."⁴² Armenian organizations incessantly stressed the need for the Allies to act decisively with regards to the Armenian state. In May 1919 the Constantinople-based organization "Azkanever" published an open letter appealing "to the Great Allied Powers" to help consolidate the Armenian Republic: "Oh You, great defenders of justice and liberty, you, supporters of the righteous and the oppressed [...] the great day has arrived! As Justice rises on her throne bringing us to our knees, we ceaselessly ask: 'Justice to the righteous, the oppressed and the martyrs!'"⁴³ The 1920 constitution of the International Philarmenian League laid down as one of its key principles "the formation, despite all the obstacles, of the Armenian Republic [...] appealing to the interests of the civilized world".⁴⁴

In January 1920 the Secretariat-General of the Paris Peace Conference issued a notification to the Armenian Delegation stating that "The Government of the Armenian State will be recognized as a *de facto* Government",⁴⁵ and eventually, on August 10, 1920, representatives of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres, establishing and *de jure* recognizing Armenia "as a free and independent State."⁴⁶ Defining the exact borders and constitutional conditions of the Republic was, however, postponed, and the realization of "subsequent agreements" with neighboring states was recommended by the conference. Although the Armenian Question was thus far from resolved, in the summer of 1920 it seemed ever so close to a final solution.

THE PEACE-REGIME AND THE TEMPLE OF RIGHT

"Before the League, it was held both in theory and practice that every State was the sole and sovereign judge of its own acts, owing no allegiance to any higher authority, entitled to resent criticism or even questioning by other States. Such conceptions have disappeared for ever: it is not doubted, and can never again be doubted, that the community of nations has the moral and legal right to discuss and judge the international conduct of each of its members" - wrote Francis Paul Walters, former deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations in 1950.⁴⁷ His book titled *A History of the League of Nations* was the first, and for a long time, the only overview on the heritage of the League, and saw many reprints under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The belief in a moral high ground, the recognition of the League's universal authority without any noteworthy criticism, and

sublime literary pictures of supranational providence and greatness dominate the special literature on the League of Nations even today.⁴⁸

Although in her 2015 book, *The Guardians* Susan Pedersen acknowledged that the governance of the mandates was in some cases more oppressive and even crueler than the colonial rule in Africa and the Middle East, she also maintained that the League was “an agent of geopolitical transformation” and democratization of mandated territories. She saw the Assembly as the parliament of the world, “a place where small states could speak up: its ethos was democratic and its Wilsonian sympathies were acute” – an international institution that was set to “defend nothing less than ‘civilization’ itself”.⁴⁹ On the other hand, some argue that the establishment of the mandate system was nothing more than a compromise between the Allies to evade yet another confrontation over colonial dominance.⁵⁰

This article does not venture to make a judgement on the democratic and humane nature of the League; however, it is dedicated to unearthing the racist rhetoric of the colonial discourse that prevailed in the Assembly, Council and Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Over the decade that followed WWI it was the victorious states and their allies that held the key positions in the institutions of the League of Nations and its speech communities via their representatives – its Council had four permanent and four, later six or nine, non-permanent members that did not include representatives of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey; the vast majority of judges at the Permanent Court of International Justice were from Western Europe and the American continent; etc. – and thus preserved the discursive norms and strategies of orientalism, the global geopolitical structures of the *ancien régime*, entailing a colonial discourse that legitimized the peace treaties and the “civilizational mission” (domination) of the *West* in the colonies and mandates.

The Paris Peace Conference committed the Covenant of the League to paper in April 1919. Its 22nd paragraph stated that “[t]o those colonies and territories [...] which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.”⁵¹ The mandate system was thus proclaimed to be a trust, and the League of Nations as a body of trustees that held the right of ownership over the properties of entire nations that were denounced as unable to “stand by themselves”, a trust that was even made sacred (“sacred trust”) in the name of civilization, development and the “well-being” of the population of the colonies.

On account of the characteristics of its interaction frames and set of rules, and in light of the definition put forth by Tom R. Burns, Marcus Carson and Alan Durant, the Assembly of the League of Nations will henceforth be regarded here as a social institution and a mini speech community. It was the first diplomatic forum that enjoyed significant mass media coverage throughout the northern hemisphere and claimed the interest of the public globally. The mass information flow was soon institutionalized in the framework of the Information Section of the League of Nations' Secretariat, which published hundreds of propagandistic booklets (on various matters that varied from the Sino-Japanese conflict, minority rights, international economic relations and a calendar reform to disarmament) in a number of languages (Japanese, German, Hungarian, Polish, French, English, etc.).⁵² In 1925 the Assembly adopted a resolution on its desire for the League to "stimulate among the people that new spirit which the war produced and which the League of Nations is trying to spread throughout the world. [...] I can conceive no more effective method of forming this new spirit than by influencing the minds of peoples through the Press and molding future generations in schools"⁵³ – the very definition of propaganda.

However, it was the First Assembly, held in November and December 1920, that gave a platform to the most one-sided and biased discussions, as it was constituted solely of representatives of the Allies and their confederates – it was here that the membership of Austria and Bulgaria was put to the vote. Its president, Belgian liberal politician Paul Hymans called the Assembly the "Temple of Right" and the "Palace of Peace",⁵⁴ thus making sacred the institution. He set the most important objectives of the Assembly as maintaining "Peace" and "Justice", and these two notions evolved to be the key concepts and arguments of prevailing discourses at the Assembly. Representatives of member states would reiterate these phrases over and over as the alpha and omega of political action, the ends justifying the means, whether it was a matter of disarmament or budgetary issues. They argued for peace even when urging war or armed intervention – the notion of "humanitarian intervention" was fully fledged by this time. Moreover, even the simplest administrative issues were grounded in arguments for Peace, the ideological rhetoric of *peacekeeping* – when the question of establishing a Labor Office was raised, one of the representatives argued that "there can be no permanent peace in the world until there is industrial peace".⁵⁵ The report of the Third Committee of the Council on the establishment of the International Court of Justice argued that the tribunal body was essential "so that peace and justice may shed their light over the world."⁵⁶

On the grounds of Norman Fairclough's theoretical set of classification schemes one may identify the Assembly's "focus of ideological struggle",⁵⁷ its

practice of *overwording* in the two notions of Peace and Justice. Whenever Peace was in the core of an argument, it had a direct and outright association with the peace treaties of 1919, while Justice was most commonly associated with the management of the "new world order" – administering the colonial (and mandate) system and maintaining the redrawn political map of Eurasia and Africa. Secretary-General of the League of Nations, Sir Eric Drummond, explicitly stated that "we established the League in order to" maintain the peace created by the treaties.⁵⁸ Representatives of the Allies and members of the Assembly set universal values on the grounds of these motivations, as French ambassador René Viviani did: "[t]he League of Nations is the guardian of Right against Force. Therefore the League of Nations must unite all nations towards the universal goal."⁵⁹ President of the Swiss Confederation, Giuseppe Motta, explicitly stressed the need for the League to expand its authority in the interests of the victors and against the vanquished: "The Treaties of Peace would, in part, be impossible to execute if the League of Nations did not exist. Its material sanctions are perhaps at present and may for a long time yet be of doubtful power, but it already possesses the penetrating moral force which we call international consciousness. Coercion will be within its sphere of action, but it will rule all by moral force. [...] The more universal the League of Nations becomes, the more its authority and impartiality will be guaranteed. The victors will not forever be able to dispense with the collaboration of the vanquished, which responds to a vital necessity."⁶⁰ This was the order of discourse at the First Assembly of the League of Nations, a *Peace-regime* if you will – a poetic diction of Peace and Justice – that gave solid grounds to a revived colonial discourse, racism, and the claim of superiority and universal authority, an Allied-rule-based system in the international realm.

Reading the minutes of the First Assembly, one may identify countless examples of intentional or unintentional community-forming and identity-shaping discursive strategies hidden in sentence structures and pronouns – such as in the following declamation of Hymans, an excellent example of nominative claims: "we share one hope and one purpose – Peace. And there is no one who desires it more than we do; we upon whom a glorious destiny laid the duty of fighting for the right and liberty of the world. (*Prolonged applause.*)"⁶¹ The usage of plural first person pronouns and indicative mood leaves no room for doubt that the statement stands for the whole community, while their goal, Peace – with a capital 'P', a proper noun – maintaining the treaties of Versailles, Trianon and Saint-Germain, was cemented as the only hope, the only purpose, the single normative and legitimate value (a glorious destiny) to be shared.

Shared paradigms of knowledge and the *truth* ("a strategic criteria of group knowledge and discourse"⁶²) laid bare at the meetings of the Assembly strongly evoking the speech community's shared frameworks of a general knowledge of the world (*reality*) – assigning to this paper the context of the history of ideas. Representatives would time and again apply the K-device asserting the *fact* that the peace treaties profoundly changed "the structure of human society", and the dawn of a new age had arisen – according to Motta "[e]ven the most superficial observer knows that".⁶³ The identity-shaping force of knowledge-setting may be detected among the arguments for a "humanitarian" intervention in the Polish-Soviet war on the side of Poland: "We are with Poland in her laudable desire to protect her own borders, all the more so because we know that Poland, in protecting her borders, is protecting the borders of Civilization"⁶⁴ – yet another nominative claim recontextualizing the geopolitical reality of the new world order, redrawing the border of Civilization on the Eastern border of the Polish Republic. Moreover, paradigms of knowledge set at the Assembly were considered by many to be indisputable – for instance the Jam Sahib, Maharajah of Nawanagar, who remarked the Assembly was not less than "the best-informed and most cultured Parliament that has ever met".⁶⁵

The *Peace-regime* strictly thematized and was politically biased. The Council and the Secretariat chose the sets of questions, matters and goals that the different institutions of the League could even raise or discuss (*agenda setting*⁶⁶), outlining the themes of politically correct speech. Not long before the opening ceremony of the First Assembly, Drummond published his report on the work of the Council defining the "political duties of the League", dividing them into two groups: "(A) Special Obligations arising out of the Treaty of Versailles", such as the status of Danzig (Gdansk) or the Saar Basin, and "(B) the General Duties of the League in the interests of Peace and Justice."⁶⁷ At the top of list (B), as the greatest priority of the League of Nations was "The Protection of Armenia." The list went on with the protection of minorities in the Ottoman Empire, Poland, Austria and Bulgaria, the "reciprocal emigration" of minorities in Greece and Bulgaria, the dispute between Poland and Lithuania, Sweden and Finland, and so on. The humanitarian duties of the League were compacted into three points: battling typhus in Poland, relief for Central Europe and the repatriation of prisoners of war. The Secretary-General attached the revised provisional agenda of the First Assembly to his report – the two showed an uncanny resemblance in their thematization.⁶⁸

Not only the "political duties" of the League, but also its humanitarian endeavors were thematized and geographically limited. Battling typhus, supporting minority rights, managing migration – all these commitments,

without a single exception, were limited to the (former) territories of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. It would be futile to look for the protection of minorities in the UK and the crown colonies or in France and her overseas territories among the commitments of the League of Nations in the 1920s. At the 1923 minority protection conference of the International Federation of League of Nations Societies in Basel a proposition of the Hungarian delegation was swiftly rejected by the British and the French representatives, arguing that it would grant "rights to the colonies that disarrange the bases of old states", referring to British India and the "negros" in the United States.⁶⁹

The ideological thematization and geographical limitation of the League's agenda was repeatedly highlighted by Persian representative Zoka-ed-Dowleh at the First Assembly. On the sidelines of a debate on the establishment of a commission to rescue abducted Christian women and children in Muslim households in Turkey, he (unsuccessfully) insisted on taking measures in favor of Persian women stranded in Russia who "suffered equally" to those abducted in Asia Minor.⁷⁰ Later he warned his fellow members of the Assembly that if "the League only speaks of Armenia, people will think it is only concerned with Armenia."⁷¹ Addressing the League's commitment to battle typhus, he had found it troubling that the scope of the Assembly's measures was limited to one country. He highlighted that "not only Poland, however, is in danger of being sacrificed to this terrible disease. The danger exists in Asia also."⁷² Fridtjof Nansen was another advocate of an unbiased and universal humanitarianism. He stressed that "in the cause of humanity it is of the greatest importance that their very great ability in various respects should be used for the benefit of the whole world [...] if we exclude non-Members it is quite clear that our work will not be able to succeed fully."⁷³

An interlocking discourse with the League's duties "in the interests of Peace and Justice" was the one on its *enemies*, yet another ideological construct where colonial discourse crystallized, classifying "us" and the barbaric "others". If a state refused to recognize the universal authority of the League or acknowledge the mere reason for its existence, the *Guardians* acclaimed it the enemy of Peace and civilization, applying the classic racist stereotypes and other rhetorical techniques of colonial discourse. Analyzing the minutes of the First Assembly, two groups of enemies (of civilization, thus the League of Nations) may be identified: the "Turks" and the Bolsheviks. Mustafa Kemal and the "Kemalists" in particular, and the "Turkish race" in general were openly insulted and even dehumanized; time and again they were referred to as uncivilized and barbaric by the diplomats assembling in Geneva. The representative of the United Kingdom, George Barnes, described them as "inhuman Turks", dehumanizing the whole Turkish

nation.⁷⁴ Swedish representative Karl Hjalmar Branting depicted Kemal as follows: "What does Mustapha Kemal care about the opinion of the League of Nations, or the opinion of the civilized world, or the fact that before any tribunal of humane people his actions will be condemned? To all these considerations he is perfectly indifferent. [...] he is the leader of a disorganized band of brigands who are utterly insensible to all the motives to which the League of Nations most naturally appeals, and to which they look in the first instance."⁷⁵ In his speech he set the "bands of brigands" against the civilized world, humanity, and - what is most important with regards to the scope of this paper - against the *motives* of the League of Nations, the Genevan apprehensions of Peace and Justice.

Although the so-called "War of Liberation" led by Kemal in the early 1920s may rightfully meet with sharp and strong condemnation in light of humanitarian considerations, the fundamental motives of criticism expressed by the representatives of the Allies at the Assembly may be identified as political motivations based on the global power struggle and the normative values of the *Peace-regime* - universal authority and colonial dominance of the superior *West* over the barbaric and inferior *East*. Kemal represented a military/political movement that openly questioned and challenged the authority of the League, posing a substantive threat to the order of the peace treaties.

The other group categorized as the enemy was the Bolsheviks. They went even further than the "Kemalists" when it came to challenging standards of international relations in the interwar period and questioning the legitimacy of the peace treaties. The Allied diplomats would repeatedly dehumanize the Bolsheviks and attribute to them inferior civilizational values. Barnes would simply regard them as the "brutal Bolsheviks",⁷⁶ while president of the Council, former prime minister of France, Léon V. A. Bourgeois, argued that the Allies bore no responsibility for Russia because the Soviets "denied the universality of the authority of the League of Nations."⁷⁷ The French diplomat thereby explicitly stated that the League of Nations enjoyed universal and supranational authority - should a political group or state fail to recognize this authority, it called down its own exclusion from the civilized world and the international community.

It is one of the main hypotheses of this paper that there is a direct causal relation between the dominant normative paradigm⁷⁸ of the *Peace-regime* and the agenda-setting of the League on the one hand, and the conception of enemies and the thematization of the League's humanitarian policies on the other - an excellent example of this phenomenon was the refugee affairs of the League of Nations in the decade subsequent to WWI. I argue that the support of Russian and Armenian refugees was a martyrological

representation of the League's discursive legitimization of the Treaty of Sèvres and justification of the Allied intervention in Russia.⁷⁹ There were only two ethnic groups throughout the decade that the international community (the "international consciousness" as Motta put it) officially recognized as refugees and provided with rudimentary refugee rights⁸⁰ – Armenians fleeing the former territories of the Ottoman Empire and Russians forced to leave the former territories of the Russian Empire.⁸¹ Although occasionally the Assembly and the Council addressed the question of supporting other refugee communities, such as Greek, Bulgarian, Central European and different ethnic groups formerly subjected to the Ottoman Empire (Kurds, Chaldean-Assyrians, Syrians), their refugee status was not formally recognized (by providing special identity certificates, so-called Nansen-passports). All the unrecognized, *de facto* refugees, whose legal protection was debated but not realized by the Assembly, fit the above-mentioned phenomenon of geographical limitation and thematization of the League's humanitarian agenda: the question of Greek and Bulgarian refugees arose from the provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly, the Kurdish and Syrian refugees were victims of the "inhumane Turks", just like Armenians, while the category of "Central European" refugees was limited to the so-called red emigration, Rumanians and Montenegrins.⁸²

In 1927 when the question of extending the rights of Russian and Armenian refugees to other groups of forced migrants was raised, the Council argued that the "mere fact that certain classes of persons are without the protection of any national Government is not sufficient to make them refugees; for on that theory all classes of persons without nationality and persons of doubtful nationality would have to be included" and, thus, refused the proposal.⁸³

Russian refugees fled famine, epidemic, war and persecution while the Armenian refugees were the last survivors of the Armenian Genocide. It is not my intention to relativize their suffering, but it should be pointed out that members of the First Assembly of the League of Nations excluded other refugee groups that were forced to leave their homes – hundreds of thousands of Jewish, Turkish, Macedonian, Serbian, Polish, and other groups of asylum seekers as well as 220,000 Bulgarian, up to half a million Hungarian and close to a million Greek forced migrants.

Therefore, the ideological thematization and geographical limitation of the League's humanitarianism contributed to the ethnic exclusiveness of early international refugee affairs, the very foundation of which, I further argue, emerged from the first crisis of the League of Nations and the dissolution of the Armenian Question.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND THE CRISIS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Armenian Question (a question of self-determination, statehood and authority in Western Armenia) was one of the most frequently addressed matters at the First Assembly, among the primal interests of the League's agenda-setting, a discourse of its own, on account of which post-war colonial discourse crystalized itself in the speech community of the Assembly. President Hymans admitted that on "the Armenian question alone I have received telegrams from all corners of the globe."⁸⁴ Long and passionate quarrels took place at the Assembly engaging the most prominent diplomats of the Allies, e.g. Henri La Fontaine, Hymans, Barnes, Viviani, Nansen, etc. South African representative Lord Robert Cecil labeled the Armenian Question "the most interesting debate we have had".⁸⁵

The Armenian Genocide was unanimously recognized (in a pre-Lemkin terminological context) by the Assembly that the Allies should advocate the protection of the Armenian Republic on moral grounds. Barnes, the first to address the Armenian Question at the seventh plenary meeting pinned down his and his government's attitude towards Armenia by stressing that "Armenia is perhaps the most tragic of all countries. After long tortures her people are now in danger of further terror" and "extinction."⁸⁶ Serb-Croat-Slovene representative Miroslaw Spalaikovitch also expressed his government's sympathy for the Armenian people and reminded the Assembly that the "cold-blooded murder and methodical extermination of people by the army of Kemal" was "still continuing".⁸⁷ Swedish representative Branting also expressed similar argumentation to justify measures on behalf of Armenia, by acknowledging the fact of the "extermination of the Armenian people [...] in a systematic manner."⁸⁸ Lord Cecil also referred to Armenians as a "nation [that] is actually in process of extermination."⁸⁹ Another commonly used expression was "the Armenian massacre" often used by, for example, Sir Arthur Balfour and Nansen in a context implying that it related to the systematic and planned annihilation of the entire Armenian population of Turkey, similar to the definition of genocide coined by Raphael Lemkin.⁹⁰

The Turkish war of independence was considered to be a threat not only to e peace in Armenia and the Middle East, but a threat to all the treaties, to Peace and Justice in general, a threat to the values and norms of the League of Nations. Thus, members of the Assembly drew up three possible strategies for the protection of the Armenian state: admission as a member state to the League, the creation of an Armenian Mandate, and international military intervention.

Article 10 of the Covenant of the League obligated every member to "preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League".⁹¹ Therefore, should

Armenia have been admitted, it would have enjoyed the protection of member states such as France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Romania, Greece, etc. The state of affairs in Armenia was enquired into by the Fifth Committee of the Council. Its conclusions were summed up in a report stressing that the Armenian Republic lacked a stable government and definite borders; hence, it recommended the refusal of Armenia's admission to the League. The matter was debated at the 26th plenary meeting of the Assembly, one day after Austria and the same day as Bulgaria, states that were successors to Central Powers, were admitted to the League. Rapporteur to the committee, Nansen, offered his excuses at the meeting - "although we much desired to be able to recommend the admission of Armenia into the League, we did not see our way to do so," adding that a membership would probably not have been "to the benefit of Armenia", as it would have made the creation of an Armenian Mandate impossible. He further expressed his desire for Armenia to be admitted as a member state as soon as possible.⁹²

Canadian representative, Newton Wesley Rowell, another rapporteur of the Fifth Committee, moved the "Resolution relating to Armenia" expressing his and the Assembly's hope that Armenia and the "Armenian race" would be "preserved".⁹³ Following the motion, the vote was held - twenty-one states rejected Armenia's membership, eight supported it.

After the ballot Lord Cecil explained why he had decided not to support Armenia's membership. He believed that it was "very doubtful if all the Members of the League intended to fulfill that obligation [i.e. intervention] if Armenia was admitted".⁹⁴ He doubted that member states would comply with the Covenant, hence questioning the actual extent of the authority assigned to the League of Nations. It was the *fear* of not being able to exercise the universal authority of the League that deterred the Allies from *de jure* recognizing Armenia as a member of the community of civilized states. This, however, conflicted with the norms and values of the *Peace-regime* and the goals set forth by the Treaty of Sèvres.

Another proposed solution to the Armenian Question was assigning a mandate over Armenia to one of the Great Powers, one that could have protected its territorial integrity against external aggression. None of the Allies, however, was ready to take up this responsibility. After all the European powers had declined, Secretary-General Drummond called upon US president Woodrow Wilson to accept Armenia's mandate in April 1920, but the US Senate rejected the president's (favoring) proposal in May.⁹⁵

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the Council and its Fifth Committee, however, considered a mandate as the only sustainable solution to the Armenian Question - Sir Drummond explicitly stated in his report that the League was obliged to establish "an Armenian Republic upon a safe and

independent basis" by means of assigning a mandate.⁹⁶ A mandated Armenia, however, would not have been independent - the Armenian Question, a question about statehood and authority, was thus transformed by the leadership of the League into a question about the possible *extent of autonomy* in Armenia not more than three months after the Treaty of Sèvres recognized an independent Armenian Republic.

The matter was discussed at the 9th plenary meeting of the Assembly in November 1920, following a motion submitted by Lord Cecil, calling on his fellow members of the Assembly to "take into immediate consideration the situation in Armenia and present for the consideration of the Assembly proposals for averting the danger which now threatens the remnant of the Armenian race, and also for establishing a permanent settlement of that country." An amendment to the motion was proposed by Henri La Fontaine, representative of Belgium, to "nominate a Committee of six Members to consider what steps, if any, could be taken to put an end to the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists."⁹⁷ The motion was followed by an hours-long debate on the Armenian Question. Spalaikovitch, representative of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, suggested that the Assembly should address "the Parliaments of the Principal Powers of the world" via telegrams to "see them all act together" for Armenia.⁹⁸ Viviani of France, however, stressed that no telegrams would solve the problem at hand - he saw the sole solution in an Armenian Mandate. He called upon all the representatives of the forty-two member states to explicitly state, there and then, whether their government was ready to take responsibility for Armenia. After no one volunteered, he requested to move a motion stating that "[t]he Assembly, anxious to co-operate with the Council in order to put an end in the shortest time possible to the horrors of the Armenian tragedy, requests the Council to negotiate with the Governments with a view to entrusting a Power with the task of taking the necessary measures to stop the hostilities between Armenia and the Kemalists."⁹⁹ The resolution was then adopted, but the prospects for a mandate soon faded and the question was removed from the forthcoming agenda of the Assembly.

The third and last proposed solution to the Armenian Question at the First Assembly was a joint military intervention in Armenia. As early as November 22, 1920, Swedish representative Branting pointed out that no country would volunteer to oversee the Armenian Mandate. He argued that all the Allies were exhausted by war and lacked necessary resources; therefore, he regarded it as the duty of all member states "to provide it [the future mandatory state] with the necessary financial assistance, and to provide it probably with the necessary aid in men and munitions."¹⁰⁰ Although he

maintained that the sole solution was a mandate, he introduced the idea of an Allied military presence in Armenia.

It was another Scandinavian who first put forth the proposal of a joint army and military intervention in Armenia - Nansen, who came to the conclusion that the only effective solution to the Armenian Question was the establishment and deployment of an "expedition," an international army of "60 000 men at an expense of perhaps twenty million pounds".¹⁰¹ Although his proposal was first rejected, it was later reinforced by Romanian representative Take Ionescu, arguing for an International Expeditionary Force of 40,000 men "with the duty of establishing order and peace in Armenia" declaring his government ready to "assist in this work, both in material and men, and her money."¹⁰² In return, Lord Cecil argued that such a mission would better be sent to Ukraine to protect persecuted Jews, not Armenians. President of the Assembly Hyman suggested discussing the matter of Ukraine another time and acknowledged the Romanian proposal as an admirable "humanitarian and generous proposal"; however, he recommended that it should also be discussed at a later time since the Assembly's First Session was about to be closed the following day, and "therefore there will be no time for them [the Assembly] to study the question." In conclusion, he congratulated the Romanian Government for the "noble-minded" proposal, which was eventually taken off the agenda forever.¹⁰³

The protection of Armenia was the first among the "General Duties of the League in the interests of Peace and Justice", a core value set by the Assembly's normative discourses, one of the most important "conceptions, values, and principles of the prevailing institutional paradigm." It was at the top of the Assembly's agenda, a humanitarian mission of the League to guard peace in the Middle East and maintain the Treaty of Sèvres. Failing to fulfill these goals would challenge the frameworks through which representatives of the Allies judged the world; it threatened the *Peace-regime* with defeat. The Armenian Question and the inability of the Allies to solve it (challenging the established paradigms and even the authority of the League) thus evoked a crisis-discourse at the very first Assembly of the League of Nations.

During the debate on military intervention, Canadian representative Charles Doherty pointed out that "the one more precious thing than peace in this world is justice, and justice is the only foundation upon which peace can securely rest. This wrong [the Turkish war of independence and the prosecution of Armenians], and wrongs of this kind, appeal to humanity for redress, and, left unredressed, they carry within themselves a constant threat of war."¹⁰⁴ He reminded all his fellow members of the Assembly that the Armenian Question was an existential question for the Allies, for a war in

Turkey might spread to other parts of the former Axis and challenge all the treaties and the authority of the League.

Nansen expressed similar concerns when he admitted that the Armenian Question exposed "a risk for the League to take up a question which it cannot solve, but as far as I can see it is a much greater risk to do absolutely nothing, and to say it is such a difficult and dangerous question that we dare not touch it"¹⁰⁵ - referring to the dangers of an imminent identity crisis at the Assembly. Should the League fail in resolving the Armenian Question, French representative Viviani feared it "shall merely incur the ridicule of the world",¹⁰⁶ thus posing a threat of severe prestige loss for the Allies. When it came to the Armenian Question, Barnes felt uncertain whether he should even address the matter. "I come to one matter in regard to which I had some doubts in my own mind as to whether I should say a single word, and that is the matter of Armenia"¹⁰⁷ - he said.

Lord Cecil reaffirmed that the League, which "exists to maintain peace cannot stand, is not in a position to stand, indifferent to the outbreak of a new and terrible war," and that he would "regard with horror any decision of this Assembly which should definitely set aside action in this grave emergency and declare that a Society which had been brought into existence in order to preserve peace was powerless in the face of a great emergency of this kind."¹⁰⁸ He deemed the Armenian Question an emergency, but not as grave as the horror of the League of Nations being indifferent to the outbreak of a new war. He explicitly stated that the alliance assembled in Geneva simply could not abandon its duty, its very reason for existence, and fail to maintain peace - in other words, the peace treaties.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION INTO A HUMANITARIAN DISCOURSE ON REFUGEES AND MINORITIES

An institutional crisis-discourse occurred at the First Assembly of the League of Nations culminating in an *oppositional normative discourse* on the League's responsibility for Armenia. To overcome the conflict that arose from the miscarriage of the League's rule regime and the crisis of authority and responsibility, representatives of the Allies and members of the Assembly caused a shift in existing institutional paradigms and began dissolving the Armenian Question, relativizing and denying the Allies' responsibility for Armenia and the Armenian people.

After the evident failure of the Council, of which the UK was a member state, to establish the Armenian Mandate, British representative Barnes argued that the Council "has gone up to the limits of its powers" by showing its "fellow feeling with the Armenians in their trouble", when, "on behalf of" Armenia it attempted to find a mandatory power. He relativized the

responsibility of the League of Nations by declaring that it was not for "lack of will, but for lack of means"¹⁰⁹ - arguing that there was no way the League could have fulfilled its commitment to protect the Armenian Republic.

French representative Viviani came up with a groundbreaking new approach to relativize the duties and responsibility of the League when he weighed the relevance of the Armenian Question against the authority assigned to the Council. He argued that the establishment of a committee to study the Armenian Question would have inevitably thrown the League into "anarchy", for it would have usurped the rights and authority of the Council. He said that "however grave this Armenian question may be, this proposal [on reestablishing the Armenian committee] is still graver. [...] The Council is our Permanent Committee, and if any other Committee be established besides you destroy the Council's authority, and gradually rob it of its prerogatives."¹¹⁰

Probably the most illuminative example of relativizing the responsibility of the League was phrased by Swedish representative Branting, who drew up a picturesque metaphor:

It is a tragic situation. We stand like people on the shore looking at the survivors of a wreck holding on to their ship which is about to be finally foundered. We give them words of encouragement, we express our horror at their position and our sympathy with their misfortunes, but so far we have not been fortunate enough to find a method of giving them effective aid.¹¹¹

Applying such a metaphor in a political statement of a legislative body in the course of a decision-making debate serves the sole purpose of abstracting the narrator from the narration, in this case, himself and the Assembly from the Armenian Question and the responsibility of the League of Nations for the Armenians experiencing a humanitarian catastrophe, famine, war, genocide. The nominative ("We"), the Assembly, is but a spectator, without any influence on the outcome of the unfolding tragedy. He argues that a method of providing effective aid to the survivors is not a matter of willingness or authority, but is subject to fortune, on which the Assembly evidently has no influence either. On account of the existing and inalterable situation (they are on the shore, while the others are on a wreck), the only deed in their power is to express sympathy.

As the institutional paradigm of peacekeeping, the conception of the League as the Guardian of civilization, Peace and Justice could not have been maintained, a paradigm-shift, a reevaluation of recurring interaction processes and the normative equilibria, core values and norms had occurred in the organizing subcomplexes of problem-solving and policy paradigms of

the speech community of the Assembly. Although members of the Assembly relativized their responsibility in order to avoid reaching the stage of *chaos and transformative discourse* (a potential outcome that Viviani feared would throw the League into "anarchy"), taking the Armenian Question off the agenda was not possible (Lord Cecil would have regarded it "with horror"); therefore, they simply deconstructed the Armenian Question - the (colonial) discourse on Armenian civilization (the "Occidental values" and Christianity of the "Armenian race") and the question of statehood and autonomy in Western Armenia -, and dissolved it into a humanitarian question of supporting the survivors of the Armenian Genocide: refugees, internally displaced persons, orphans and abducted women and children in Turkey.

Henceforth the League of Nations established a "Commission appointed to Study the Question of the Settlement of Armenian Refugees",¹¹² a "Commission of Enquiry with Regard to the Deportation of Women and Children in Turkey and Adjacent Countries",¹¹³ the Constantinople Office of the High Commission for refugees,¹¹⁴ and introduced the system of identity certificates for Russian and Armenian refugees as well as creating "a revolving fund to provide for the cost of the transportation and settlement of refugees."¹¹⁵ The Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations decided in 1927 "that a sum of 15,000 francs be allowed" for the relief work of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Nansen. At its following session the Assembly approved "the provisions in the budget for the refugee Service in addition to the supplementary credit of 7.500 Swiss francs for the service for establishing Armenian refugees in Syria."¹¹⁶

The League of Nations failed, however, to guarantee the Treaty of Sèvres, which eventually culminated in signing the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, *de jure* recognizing the Turkish Republic and *de facto* excluding the Armenian Republic from the international community of independent states.¹¹⁷ Nansen - who, on numerous occasions, submitted his resignation on account of falling short of finding a solution to the Armenian Question - reminded his fellow members of the Assembly in 1927 of the obligation that the League had failed to meet:

When I speak of obligations, I do not mean merely the repeated resolutions of the Assembly urging the establishment of a National Home for the Armenian people; I mean, too, the separate and solemn pledges which were given by the Governments of Western Europe to the Armenian nation during the course of the world war. Do they remember that in the war two hundred thousand Armenian volunteers were killed fighting for the Western Powers? Do they remember that the Armenian nation was almost destroyed? Do they remember that all the Armenian property was taken and confiscated and that the League has not been able to help them to get it back? If they had got it back, the problem of the refugees would not have existed.¹¹⁸

By that time, however, the Armenian Question had been dissolved into the humanitarian discourse on refugees and minorities.

CONCLUSION

The Armenian Question, a colonial discourse on statehood and authority in Armenia, manifested itself through two opposing narrations by the competing alliances of the global power structure in the late 19th and early 20th century - the one prevailing in the Entente-states claimed that the Christian "Armenian race" was superior to the Muslim and "barbaric Turks", as it held higher ("Occidental") civilizational values; while the one that prevailed in the Axis depicted them as an unproductive and undesirable population, "the Jews of the Orient," ruthless merchants, usurers, thieves, fraudsters, and terrorists, who had thus brought their own annihilation upon themselves, justifying the Armenian Genocide as a "national and historical necessity."

The speech community of the Assembly - which in 1920 consisted solely of representatives of the Allies - revived the colonial discourse of the *ancien régime*, setting the order of the prevailing political discourses - the *Peace-regime* - with the claim of superiority and universal authority, an Allied-rule-based system in the international realm to manage the colonial and mandate system and maintain the peace treaties. Members of the Assembly would time and again proclaim themselves the guardians of Civilization, Peace and Justice throughout the whole globe - as its president phrased it: "we upon whom a glorious destiny laid the duty of fighting for the right and liberty of the world." By setting the agenda of the Assembly, the President, the Secretary-General and the Council recontextualized the geopolitical reality of the new "world order", redrawing the border of Western Civilization on the Eastern border of the Polish Republic and Armenia. The ideologically thematized and geographically limited the humanitarian agenda of the *Peace-regime*, which had ideological themes and was geographically limited, addressed matters such as minority protection or health care strictly with regard to the former territories of the Axis - Poland, Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire - refusing to cope with human rights abuses in the colonies.

Two enemies were identified by the Assembly - the Bolsheviks and the "Kemalists", the two major political/military groups on the borders of "Western Civilization" that questioned and challenged the universal authority of the League. The two groups were dehumanized by members of the Assembly applying classic racist stereotypes. The thematization and limitation of the League's humanitarian measures reflected this distinction of the civilized "us" and the barbaric "them", and resulted in the ethnic limitation of its refugee protection policies - over the decade after WWI there were only

two ethnic groups that the League of Nations recognized as refugees, the Armenians and the Russians.

The Armenian Genocide was unanimously recognized by members of the Assembly in a pre-Lemkin sense - representatives would time and again speak up against the "systematic extermination" of the Armenians in Turkey, as moral grounds for and Allied intervention on behalf of the Armenian Republic. The Assembly, however, had proven to be unable to solve the Armenian Question, and thus, unable to fulfill its proclaimed function as the *Guardian of Peace and Justice*, which resulted in a crisis-discourse at the very first Assembly of the League of Nations. To overcome the "anarchy" that threatened the League on accounts of the challenge its authority and reputation faced, representatives of the Allies relativized their responsibility for Armenia and dissolved the Armenian Question into a discourse on humanitarian support for refugees and minorities.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Dissolution of the Eastern Question into the Armenian Question," in: *The History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*, Providence, Berghahn Books, 1995, pp. 192-8.
 - ² James J. Reid, "Total War, the Annihilation Ethic, and the Armenian Genocide, 1870-1918," *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian, London, Macmillan, 1992, pp. 21-52.
 - ³ M. G. Rolin-Jauquemyns, *Armenia, the Armenians and the Treaties* (Translated from the *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée* (Brussels), and revised by the Author), London, John Heywood, 1, Paternoster Buildings, E.C., 1891, pp. 2, 13.
 - ⁴ One Armenian historian defined the Armenian Question as "the integrity of problems concerning the political history of the Armenian people: the liberation of Armenia from foreign rule, the restoration of Armenian independent statehood in the Armenian highland, the policy implemented by Ottoman Empire authorities to exterminate and uproot the Armenians by means of perpetrating mass massacres and deportation at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and, as a result, the constraint imposed by the European Powers on the Ottoman Government to effect Armenian reforms, the Armenian liberation movement, the international recognition of the Genocide." (Arman Kirakosyan, *Haykakan Hartse' ev Hayeri Tseghaspanutyune': Patmairavakan Yerralezu Teghekanq*, (The Armenian Question and the Genocide of Armenians: Historico-Legal Trilingual Material), Erevan, Noravanq, 2006, p. 72.
 - ⁵ Anahide Ter Minassian, *La Question Arménienne*, Roquevaire, Ed. Parathèses, 1983, p. 9. All translations are my own.
 - ⁶ Seyhan Bayraktar, "The Grammar of Denial: State, Society, and Turkish-Armenian Relations," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 47, no. 4 (2015), p. 803.

- ⁷ More precisely, CDA is a field of critical linguistics, with its sociophilosophical grounds laid by the Frankfurt School and was, thus, inspired especially by Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault.
- ⁸ Fairclough claimed that traditional methods for analyzing texts (such as sociolinguistics, pragmatics, cognitive psychology, etc.) are not sufficient for understanding discourse, as all three elements of it - text, interaction and social context - must be carefully analyzed. He further maintained that a critical language study is not yet another approach to language study, but "an alternative orientation" to it, implying "different demarcation of language study into approaches and branches, different relationships between them, and different orientations within each of them." (Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power*, New York, Longman, 1989).
- ⁹ Ruth Wodak and Gilbert Weiss, "Analyzing European Union Discourses: Theories and Applications," *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity*, ed. by Ruth Wodak and Paul Chilton, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005, p. 127.
- ¹⁰ Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*, London-New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 36.
- ¹¹ Márton Szabó, *Diszkurzív Politikatudomány: Bevezetés a Politika Interpretatív Szemléletébe és Kutatásába* (Discursive Political Science: An Introduction to the Interpretative Approach and Research of Politics), Budapest, Osiris, 2016, p. 21.
- ¹² Peter L. Patrick, "The Speech Community," *Handbook of Language Variation and Change*, ed. by J. K. Chambers, Natalie Schilling-Estes and Peter Trudgill, Oxford, Blackwell, 2004, pp. 573-97.
- ¹³ Alan Durant, *Meaning in the Media: Discourse, Controversy and Debate*, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 134.
- ¹⁴ Ruth Wodak, "The Power of Political Jargon – a »Club-2« discussion," *Language, Power and Ideology: Studies in Political Discourse*, ed. by Ruth Wodak, Amsterdam-Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1989, pp. 137-63.
- ¹⁵ Reisigl and Wodak, pp. 31-35.
- ¹⁶ Fairclough, pp. 110-1.
- ¹⁷ Teun A. van Dijk, "Contextual Knowledge Management in Discourse Production: A CDA Perspective," *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis*, p. 73.
- ¹⁸ Van Dijk, p. 79.
- ¹⁹ Jan Assmann, *Das Kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und Politische Identität Frühen Hochkulturen*, München, C.H. Beck, 1992.
- ²⁰ Astrid Erll, "Cultural Memory Studies: An Introduction," *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, ed. by Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning, Berlin-New York, de Gruyter, 2008, p. 2.
- ²¹ Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations*, 26, no. 1 (1989), pp. 7-24.
- ²² Tom R. Burns and Marcus Carson, "Social Order and Disorder: Institutions, Policy Paradigms and Discourses: An Interdisciplinary Approach," *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis*, pp. 283-309.

- ²³ Burns and Carson, pp. 293-7.
- ²⁴ Peter Hulme, *Colonial Encounters. Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797*, London–New York, Methuen, 1986, p. 2.
- ²⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London, Pantheon, 1978, p. 3.
- ²⁶ Said, p. 2.
- ²⁷ Amar Acheraïou, *Rethinking Postcolonialism. Colonialist Discourse in Modern Literatures and the Legacy of Classical Writers*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 42.
- ²⁸ Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea*, New York, Penguin Books, 2012.
- ²⁹ Duncan Bell maintains that *thinking colonial* was such common sense in the 19th century that it was a characteristic of each faction of political ideologies: socialists, communists, liberals and conservatives from India through the Middle East to Europe. (Duncan Bell, "Empire and Imperialism," *The Cambridge History of the Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, ed. by Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 867.
- ³⁰ Emily J. Robinson, *Armenia and the Armenians*, London, The author, 1916, p. 8.
- ³¹ Marcel Léart, *La Question Arménienne a la Lumière des Documents*, Paris, Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1913, pp. 5, 23.
- ³² Felicia Rudolphina Scatcherd, *Armenia: How She is Helping the Cause of the Allies*, London, East and West, 1915. James Bryce also claimed that in terms of education and civilization Armenians in Sivas "were on a level with the corresponding commercial and professional classes in Western Europe." (*The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire*, Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ed. by James Bryce, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1916, p. 282).
- ³³ Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, New York, Robert Carter & Bros., 1877, p. 348.
- ³⁴ James Bryce, "The Future of Asiatic Turkey," *Fortnightly Review*, June (1878), p. 928. For more information see: Oded Steinberg, "James Bryce and the Origins of the Armenian Question," *Journal of Levantine Studies* 5, no. 2 (2015), p. 13-33.
- ³⁵ René Pinon, *La Suppression des Arméniens. Méthode Allemande – Travail Turc*, Paris, Librairie Académique, 1916.
- ³⁶ Émile Doumergue, *L'Arménie, les Massacres et la Question d'Orient*, Paris, 1916, p. 8.
- ³⁷ For more information see: Péter Pál Kránitz, "The Armenian Genocide in Interwar Hungarian Political Discourse," *Journal of Levantine Studies* 5, no. 2 (2015), pp. 71–86.
- ³⁸ Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 163.
- ³⁹ Déclaration de Monsieur M. Madjaroff faite à la V-me Commission de la VI-me Assemblée de la Société des Nations. Le 17 Septembre 1925. Централен държавен архив [Central State Archives, Sophia, Bulgaria], Fond 176, 10/459, pp. 98-9.
- ⁴⁰ Attila Orbók, "Az Igazság az Örmények Forradalmi Mozgalmáról a Császári Ottoman Kormányynak az Örmények Államellenes Mozgalmáról Beszerzett Eredeti

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- ⁴¹ Frédéric Macler, „Introduction,” *L'Exil Arménien*, by A. Krafft-Bonnard, Genève, Société Générale D'Imprimerie, 1926, p. VI.
- ⁴² Walter Guinness, *Impressions of Armenia*, London, Spottiswoode, Ballantyna & Co., 1918, p. 4.
- ⁴³ *Témoignages Inédits sur les Atrocités Turques Commises en Arménie: Suivis d'un Récit de l'épopée Arménienne de Chabin-Karahissar*, Recueillis par la Société des Dames Arméniennes, ed. by Azkanever de Constantinople, Paris, Imp. Dubreuil, Frérebeau et C., 1920, p. 5.
- ⁴⁴ *Ligue Internationale Philarménienne. Constitution, Siège Genève* [s.n.], Aigle, Imprimerie A. Boinnard, 1920, pp. 5-6.
- ⁴⁵ *La République Arménienne*. [S.n.], Paris: Délégation de la République Arménienne Pour la Conférence de la Paix, 1920, p. 26.
- ⁴⁶ *Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Signed at Sévres, August 10, 1920. [With Maps.] Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*, London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920, p. 9. Treaty Series No. 11 (1920).
- ⁴⁷ Francis Paul Walter, *A History of the League of Nations*, London-New York-Toronto, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1952, pp. 1-2.
- ⁴⁸ It is a deeply rooted notion in the Hungarian literature that “the League of Nations was the first attempt in the history of humankind to establish an organization with a universal will to preserve world peace.” (“»A Népszövetség Halála»: Dokumentumok az Olasz-etióp Konfliktus Történetéből (1935-1936)”) [“The Death of the League of Nations”: Documents on the history of the Italian-Ethiopian conflict (1935-1936)], ed. by Balázs Szélinger, Szeged, University of Szeged, JATE Történész Diákkör, 2000.
- ⁴⁹ Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 4-6, 50.
- ⁵⁰ Antony Anghie, “Nationalism, Development and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies of the League of Nations,” *Texas International Law Journal* 41 (2006), pp. 447-63; Nele Matz, “Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origins of Trusteeship,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 9 (2005), pp. 47-95.
- ⁵¹ The Covenant of the League of Nations (<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1>) last accessed: 25.04.2019.
- ⁵² For a fragmentary list of these publications (some 400 titles) visit: <http://worldcat.org/identities/lccn-no93000427/> . Last accessed: 25.04.2019.
- ⁵³ Résolution de la Sixième Assemblée. Collaboration de la Presse a l'Organisation de la Paix. Genève, le 10 Octobre 1925. C. 611. M. 196. 1925 (https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilMSD/C-611-M-196-1925_FR.pdf) . Last accessed: 25.04.1925.

- ⁵⁴ Provisional Verbatim Record, 31st Plenary Meeting, Saturday 18th Dec. 1920, at 4 P.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920 (Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie, Archiwum Jana Paderewskiego [Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw, Jana Paderewskiego Archives, hereinafter: AAN AJP], File 873, p. 284).
- ⁵⁵ Provisional Verbatim Record, 7th Meeting, Monday 19th Nov. 1920, at 10.30 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, File 874, p. 63.
- ⁵⁶ Provisional Verbatim Record, 13th Meeting Saturday 18th Dec. 1920, at 4 P.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 873, p. 151.
- ⁵⁷ Fairclough, p. 115.
- ⁵⁸ Report by the Secretary-General to the First Assembly of the League on the work of the Council. London 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 872, pp. 55–6.
- ⁵⁹ Provisional Verbatim Record, 15th Meeting, Saturday 7th Dec. 1920, at 10.30 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 874, p. 171.
- ⁶⁰ Provisional Verbatim Record, 1st Meeting, Monday 15th Nov. 1920, at 11 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 873, p. 4.
- ⁶¹ Provisional Verbatim Record, 31st Plenary Meeting, p. 283.
- ⁶² Teun A. van Dijk, pp. 77–9.
- ⁶³ Provisional Verbatim Record, 1st Meeting, p. 4.
- ⁶⁴ Provisional Verbatim Record, 13th Meeting, pp. 147–9.
- ⁶⁵ Provisional Verbatim Record, 15th Meeting, p. 183.
- ⁶⁶ Although the theory of agenda-setting is usually applied to mass media, the ability of the press “to influence which issues, persons and topics are perceived as the most important of the day” is an ability shared by legislators and policy makers, defining problems and thus setting the political agenda (Maxwell McCombs and Sebastián Valenzuela, “The Agenda-Setting Theory,” *Cuadernos de Información* 20 (2007), p. 44; David Dery, “Agenda Setting and Problem Definition,” *Policy Studies* 21, no 1. (2000), pp. 37–47.
- ⁶⁷ Report by the Secretary-General, pp. 30–88.
- ⁶⁸ Other than general administrative matters – such as the election of the president and the adoption of the rules of procedure – the agenda put forth the admission of Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Finland, etc. to the League of Nations; the question of mandates; the preparations required to enable the Economic Weapon of the League to be used in case of necessity; and the reduction of Armaments (Revised Provisional Agenda for the First Session of the Assembly. 20/48/3/1. AAN AJP, Folder 872, pp. 19–21).
- ⁶⁹ Report of Béla Póka-Pivny, director of the Hungarian Association of Foreign Affairs [Magyar Külügyi Társaság] to Prime Minister István Bethlen. 24 March 1923, 684/923, Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [Central Archives of the National Archives of Hungary, hereinafter: MNL OL], Fond K28, File 18, 1923-A-2386, pp. 27–8.
- ⁷⁰ Provisional Verbatim Record, 15th Meeting, p. 189.
- ⁷¹ Provisional Verbatim Record, 24th Plenary Meeting, Wednesday 15th Dec. 1920, at 10 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 873, p. 154.

- ⁷² Provisional Verbatim Record, 15th Meeting, p. 189.
- ⁷³ Provisional Verbatim Record, 16th Plenary Meeting, Tuesday 8th Dec. 1920, at 10 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 873, p. 198.
- ⁷⁴ Provisional Verbatim Record, 7th Meeting, p. 172.
- ⁷⁵ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil concerning Armenia. Provisional Verbatim Record, 9th Plenary Meeting (Salle de la Reformation), Monday 22th Nov. 1920, at 10:30 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 874, p. 93.
- ⁷⁶ Provisional Verbatim Record, 13th Meeting, p. 149.
- ⁷⁷ Provisional Verbatim Record, 13th Meeting, p. 150.
- ⁷⁸ A "cognitive framework which structures normative judgment and prescription," (Philip Melanson, "The Dominant Normative Paradigm and Political Science," *Political Science* 25, no. 1 (1973), p. 2).
- ⁷⁹ On the "connection between procedures of legitimization of political authority and martyr figurations" see: Baldassare Scolari, "State Martyrs: Aesthetics and Performativity of a Contemporary Political Discourse," *Journal of Religion in Europe* 10, no. 1-2. (2017), pp. 71-106.
- ⁸⁰ The first arrangement framing specific rights for refugees was that of the Arrangement of 30 June 1928 relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees. It acknowledged the necessity of the High Commissariat for refugees appointing representatives to "the greatest possible number of countries" to further refugee policies and services provided for Russian and Armenian refugees, such as certifying their civil status (based on "documents issued or action taken in the refugees' country of origin"), family position, signature, copies and translations of different documents "drawn up in their own language," or testifying to the "regularity, validity, and conformity with the previous law of their country of origin", and their university or academic standings. It further *recommended* that the contracting states provide refugees with the right to education and permission to reside in the country permanently. Thus, the first (recommended) international "refugee rights" were framed on the grounds of fundamental civil rights (family status, education, etc.) and in the spirit of practicality (certifying university degrees, signature, etc.). However, the arrangement was signed only by a handful of governments, by 1930 not more than eleven states, and proposed only recommendations, guidelines (League of Nations, Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, 30 June 1928, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2005, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8cde56.html> [accessed 14 September 2016]. For more information see: James C. Hathaway, *The Rights of Refugees Under International Law*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 84-87).
- ⁸¹ The definition of refugees was as follows: "*Russian*: Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and who has not acquired another nationality. *Armenian*: Any person of Armenian origin formerly a subject of the Ottoman Empire

who does not enjoy or who no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the Turkish Republic and who has not acquired another nationality" (League of Nations, Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identify Certificates to Russian and Armenian Refugees, 12 May 1926, League of Nations, Treaty Series Vol. LXXXIX, No. 2004, Find at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b5802.html> [last accessed: 02.05.2019]).

- ⁸² Ruthenians, Montenegrins, "Refugees in Central Europe without protection, especially former Hungarians who number: 10,000 in Austria, France and Roumania," Cf. *Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of the Measures Taken to Assist Russian and Armenian Refugees*. Extract from the minutes of the sixth meeting of the forty-sixth session of the council, held on September 15, 1927. MNL OL, Fond K78, 42/XII-1. Original reference number: C.L.159.1927.VIII.
- ⁸³ *Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of the Measures Taken to Assist Russian*.
- ⁸⁴ Provisional Verbatim Record, 10th Plenary Meeting, Saturday 23rd Nov. 1920, at 10.30 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 874, p. 108.
- ⁸⁵ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil, pp. 98–9.
- ⁸⁶ Provisional Verbatim Record, 7th Meeting, p. 63.
- ⁸⁷ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil, pp. 90–2.
- ⁸⁸ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil, p. 100.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid.
- ⁹⁰ Daniel Marc Segesser and Myriam Gessler, "Raphael Lemkin and the International Debate on the Punishment of War Crimes (1919–1948)," *Journal of Genocide Research* 7, no. 4 (2005), pp. 453–68.
- ⁹¹ *Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920*.
- ⁹² Provisional Verbatim Record, 26th Plenary Meeting, Thursday 16th Dec. 1920, at 10 A.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 873, pp. 180–6.
- ⁹³ Provisional Verbatim Record, 26th Plenary Meeting, pp. 186–7.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 188.
- ⁹⁵ For more information see: Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*, New York, HarperCollins, 2003, pp. 358–62.
- ⁹⁶ He stressed that a mandatory state would therefore assure Armenia the "evacuation of the territories assigned to it under the Treaty, secure to the Republic free access to the sea, and provide for the defence of Armenian territory until it could be assured by other means." (Report by the Secretary-General, pp. 30–58).
- ⁹⁷ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil, pp. 90–1.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid, pp. 91–2.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 94–7.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 92–3.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid, pp. 96–8.
- ¹⁰² Provisional Verbatim Record, 29th Plenary Meeting, Friday 17th Dec. 1920, at 4 P.M., First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva 1920. AAN AJP, Folder 873, p. 230.

- ¹⁰³ For more information see: Péter Pál Kránitz, "(Un)protecting the Armenian Republic at the First Assembly of the League of Nations," *Patmut'yun yev Hasarakagitut'yun: Taregirk'*, 3 (2017), pp. 105-27.
- ¹⁰⁴ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil, pp. 96-7.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 96.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.
- ¹⁰⁷ Provisional Verbatim Record, 7th Meeting, 63.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 99-100.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- ¹¹⁰ Provisional Verbatim Record, 31st Plenary Meeting, p. 264.
- ¹¹¹ Discussion of the Proposition of Lord Robert Cecil, p. 94.
- ¹¹² It was led by Nansen and further consisted of M. G. Carle, C. E. Dupuis, Pio Lo Savio and Vidkun Quisling, future fascist leader of Norway (Number etc. of Armenian refugees. The Problem to be solved. Report by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, ՀԱԱ, Fond 1168, 1/362, pp. 1-25).
- ¹¹³ It was led by Karen Jeppe, W. A. Kennedy and Emma Cushman and provided evidence in 1921 of an ongoing cultural genocide. It reported on the forcible assimilation of thousands of women and children: "These children, for a period of time extending from one week to three months, will deny strenuously that they are Christians. Some, indeed, will go so far as to believe the Christians as infidels, and declare that they are loyal Moslems, while at the same time their history is sufficiently doubtful to keep them under observation, and sooner or later proof will be forthcoming that they are, indeed, Christians." (Letter from Miss E. D. Chusman. Stamboul, July 16th, 1921. Work of the Commission of Enquiry with Regard to the Deportation of Women and Children in Turkey and Adjacent Countries, Հայաստանի Ազգային Արխիվ [National Archives of Armenia, hereinafter: ՀԱԱ], Fond 430, 1/1231. p. 11752).
- ¹¹⁴ Short report on the Armenian refugee situation in Constantinople. High Commission for Refugees; Constantinople Office. 25th October 1923, ՀԱԱ, Fond 430, 1/1259, pp. 574-575. For more information see: Kránitz Péter Pál, "Survivors, Asylum Seeking and Repatriation: The Case of Armenian Refugees in Constantinople," *Patmut'yun yev Hasarakagitut'yun: Taregirk'*, 1 (2015), pp. 88-100.
- ¹¹⁵ Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish Refugees. Report to the Tenth Assembly. MNL OL, Fond K 78, 43/XIII-8.
- ¹¹⁶ Letter from the Secretary-General to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Geneva, November 6, 1927. MNL OL, Fond K 78, 43/XIII-7. Original reference number: C.L.154.1927.VIII.
- ¹¹⁷ At the closing ceremony of the First Assembly in December 1920, its president, Hymans, regretfully acknowledged that the "sorrowful apparition of Armenia rose up before us" and no means was found to protect it against external aggression (Provisional Verbatim Record, 31st Plenary Meeting, pp. 269-6).

**ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՐՑԻՆ ԼՈՒԾԱՐՈՒՄԸ ԵՒ ԱԶԳԵՐՈՒ ԼԻԿԱՅԻՆ ՏԱԳՆԱՊԸ
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Հայկական Հարցը՝ Հայաստանի պետականության ու իշխանության մասին գաղութատիրական տրամախոսություն իրրել, ինքզինք դրսևտրեց հակադիր երկու պատումներով: Ասոնք կ'արտացոլացնէին ԺԺ. դարավերջ-Ի. դարասկզբի համաշխարհային իշխանության երկու ուխտերը: Համաձայնական երկիրները կը համարէին թէ քրիստոնեայ հայ ցեղը գերակայ էր իսլամ եւ 'բարբարոս թուրքերէն', քանի որ կը դաանէր բարձր (արեմտեան) քաղաքակրթական արժէքներ: Առանցքի երկիրները – միա կողմէն – հայերը կը նկատէին ապարդին եւ տհաճ ժողովուրդ մը՝ 'արեւելքի հրեաներ', եւ կ'արդարացնէին Հայոց Յեղասպանութիւնը իրրել «ազգային եւ պատմական անհրաժեշտութիւն»:

Ազգերու Լիկայի (ԱԼ) մասնակիցները, որոնք 1920ին միայն Համաձայնական-ներու ներկայացուցչներ էին, վերակենդանացուցին գաղութատիրական իին համակարգին պատումը: Ըստ անոնց՝ համաշխարհային խաղաղութիւնը պահպանելու եւ գաղութային/հոգատարական պետութիւնները վարելու համար, Համաձայնականներու օրէնքներու համակարգը պէտք է կիրարկել:

Այս գաղափարախոսութիւնը որոշակի բովանդակութիւն հաղորդեց եւ աշխարհագրականօրէն սահմանափակեց համաշխարհային օրակարգը: Լուսարձակի տակ առնուեցան Առանցքի երկիրներու տարածքներուն փոքրամասնութեանց պահպանման եւ առողջապահութեան խնդիրները, եւ ժխտուեցան Համաձայնականներու գաղութացուցած երկիրներուն մէջ մարդկային իրաանց բռնաբարումները: ԱԼն երկու թշնամի մատնանշած էր. պոլշեփկներն ու քեմալականները, որոնք սակայն ԱԼի համաշխարհային հեղինակութիւնը հարցականի տակ դնող գլխատր զինտորաքաղաքական ուժերն էին: Խտրութիւն յառաջացաւ քաղաքակրթօած 'մեքէ'ին եւ բարբարոս 'անոնց'ին միջեւ: Այս պատճառով ալ 1920-30ականներուն ԱԼն երկու գաղթական խումբեր ճանչցաւ՝ հայերն ու ռուսները:

Հայոց Յեղասպանութիւնը – նախալեմքինեան հասկացութեամբ – միաձայնութեամբ ճանչցուեցաւ ԱԼի Ընդհանուր Ժողովին (ԸԺ), ուր ներկայացուցիչները բազմիցս արտայայտուեցան Թտրքիոյ մէջ հայերու «համակարգօած ոչնչացման» դէմ, բարոյապէս հիմնատրելով յօգուտ Հայաստանի Հանրապետութեան իրենց միջամտութիւնը: ԸԺն, սակայն, փաստած էր արդէն որ անկարող էր լուծել Հայկական Հարցը, ուստի եւ՝ կատարել ի'ր իսկ հռչակած գործառոյթը՝ խաղաղութեան եւ արդարութեան իրրել պահապան: Ուստի, հաստատութեանկան հակասութիւն մը յառաջացաւ ԱԼի առաջին իսկ ԸԺին: Յաղթահարելու համար այս տագնապը, ներկայացուցիչները Հայաստանի հանդէպ իրենց պատասխանատուութիւնները լուծարեցին կամ վերաբանձեցին իրրել փոքրամասնութիւններու եւ գաղթականներու աջակցութեան տրամախոսութիւն: