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**THE GENOCIDE ISSUE AS A FACTOR  
OF ARMENIA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

Among the issues on the Armenian foreign policy agenda, perhaps the problem of the recognition of the fact of the Genocide and its condemnation is in many respects the most significant one. It is the predominant item on the addenda of the bilateral relations between Armenia and Turkey. Genocide issue also has a serious domestic political and all-national meaning (in terms of functioning of the whole Diaspora-Homeland system), as well as an important foreign political resonance. Unfortunately, not everybody realizes in Armenia that, which merits an attempt to review how this issue is being projected on the foreign political priorities of Armenia.

*Armenian-Turkish Interstate Relations:*

*Theoretical Introduction*

In real life, the relations between Armenia and Turkey exist that is the two neighboring countries recognize each other's existence, from time to time official representatives of different levels have contacts, as well as negotiations are held. However, they have not been legally registered so far from the view point of the international law, so, no diplomatic relations have been established, that is strictly speaking, they are not likely to exist in the system of the modern international bilateral relations. One of the parties, Turkey, refuses from establishing diplomatic ties explaining it by several preliminary conditions. It one-sidedly locked mutual border, as well as has introduced a special visa regime toughening it time from time, allowing some indulgence depending on the results of discussion of the problem of the Armenian Genocide by the parliaments of the third countries.

Even through a short description of the state of the Armenian-Turkish interstate relations, their indisputable "value" as an object of a case study from the points of view different approaches of theory of international relations becomes obvious.

Thus, the Armenian-Turkish relations could serve as one of the main cases used for theoretical generalization when studying the ways and means of *nonconventional diplomacy* or, speaking specifically, as a research of bilateral relations between the states in case of absence of diplomatic relations. However, researchers ignore the experience of the Armenian-Turkish relation. For example, *Barridge*, which initiated the research in the sphere, did not mention the experience of the Armenian-Turkish relations<sup>1</sup>. The whole concept and the structure of his book bases on a possibility that states can have no diplomatic relations as a result of not recognizing each other or breaking their diplomatic relations. Hereby, it puts the recognition of a new state and the establishment of diplomatic relations in a direct dependence on each other. As a result, he factually rules out such a case when establishment of diplomatic relations are rejected during official recognition of a new state i.e. the very *operational code*<sup>2</sup> elaborated by the Turkey in respect to Armenia yet in 1991 and preserved by it up to now. Hereby, the field of the author's analysis is reducing to consideration of only two cases: nonrecognition of a state and breach of diplomatic relations.

Meanwhile, the case of Armenian-Turkish interstate relations has some principal differences from those that proved to be in the focus of *Barridge's* attention. In particular, choosing such a policy, a state not only gets a considerable strategic advantage to *the new state* putting the establishment of diplomatic relations in dependence on the fulfillment of some preliminary conditions, but also, officially recognizes the existence of that new state, by this preserving for itself a possibility of establishing nonconventional contacts at different levels, including the highest one, and using them to exert pressure on the state. In case of nonrecognition of the new state, the channels of nonconventional contacts would be considerably blocked, which would decrease the possibility of a diplomatic maneuvering and, at least, of the pressure on it.

On the other hand, the officially recognized new state, which had no diplomatic relations, proves to be in more severe difficulties, than if the diplomatic ties were established unilaterally and only then were broken. Suffering rather a clear lack of



experienced diplomats. such a state also loses an opportunity of collecting information through ambassadors and consuls, as well as of their society through establishing contacts with representatives of different sections.

All this leads to the fact that in case of supporting nonconventional diplomatic relations, this state has to operate *blindly*, which even more weakens its positions in disputes with the opponent party, which is always presented as a stronger and full-fledged country.

We drew the above dotted paradigm of relations on the basis of generalization of the experience of the relations between Turkey and Armenia. It has no analogues in the modern practice of diplomatic relations. Turkey refused from establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia from the very beginning, explaining their establishment by a number of preliminary conditions referring other points of the agenda in the two countries' relations, wherein he failed to achieve Armenia's compromises satisfying its demands. Such an approach of the Turkish party was based on an assumption that Armenia is interested in the establishment of diplomatic relations more than Turkey, as it is a "new state" in conditions of an armed conflict with Azerbaijan, it has no outlet to the sea and suffers considerable economic difficulties. Thus, one can state that Turkey, factually, used its possible agreement to establish diplomatic ties with Armenia as a *means of influence*, in sense frequently used by Davis<sup>3</sup>.

However, about 15 years have passed, but no diplomatic relations have been established between Turkey and Armenia so far. It means that they still have considerable discrepancies, and Turkey did not manage to achieve any tangible concessions from Armenia i.e. the first one failed to spread its influence on the last one.

In the broad sense, Turkey-Armenia relations are of a definite interest from the point of view of further development of a theory of bilateral interstate relations, which based on *realistic* approach to the international relations. This viewpoint proved to be on the periphery of researchers' interest in conditions of the recent

strengthening of the influence of neo-liberal and mondial theories. Meanwhile, the analysis of the Armenian-Turkish relations in the context of such a fundamental concept of this theory as the *balance of power* could contribute to its further development.

Here is a specific example: during the last years a number of researchers have arrived to a conclusion that in our days *agenda* of both bilateral and multilateral international relations has become of a great importance in the diplomatic practice. Hence, they point out the necessity for its detailed consideration<sup>4</sup>.

However, specific methods of agenda's formation remain not enough researched. The experience of the Armenian-Turkish relations provides us with an interesting material for analysis this time as well. Thus, it turns out that even before the collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the independent Armenian state, the sides entered the struggle for formation of agenda of bilateral interstate relations, with the visit of Turkish Ambassador to Moscow *Volkan Vural* to Yerevan in the April of 1991 being an evidence of it. During his negotiations with the Armenia leadership became evident, that the sides had different approaches to the agenda's formation. If the Armenian party aspired for concentrating the agenda of bilateral relations on the economic issues, Vural was interested, first of all, in the issues of the Armenian Genocide and the Armenian-Turkish boundary, as well as the problem of the Karabakh conflict's settlement and only then in trade and economic issues.

During and after negotiations, Turkey managed to force its interpretation of the agenda. Later, when recognizing Armenia's independence at the end of 1991, Turkey refused from establishing diplomatic ties with it, a new point on establishment of diplomatic relations was added into the agenda.

In 1992-1993 in the hierarchy of the agenda's points, such changes were made, again under the pressure of Turkey, which moved the problem of the Karabakh conflict's settlement to the first place. The struggle for the agenda was completed in 1993 by the victory of Turkish side, when it finally closed its boundary with Armenia after Azerbaijan's losing Kelbajar. Hereby, Turkey made Armenia to agree with a replacement of the trade-and-



economic points of the agenda with an issue of opening the Turkish-Armenian boundary. During the following years up to now, the agenda of the Armenian-Turkish relations underwent no tangible changes, just the new leadership in Armenia, that came to power in 1998, focused on the problem of the Armenian Genocide's recognition, achieving changes in the hierarchy of the points in the agenda.

The above-described struggle for the agenda of the Armenian-Turkish relations casts no doubts on the fact that it is rather an interesting case from the viewpoint of more detailed examination of the problem of formation of the agenda of the bilateral interstate relations. In particular, Turkey's aspiration for controlling over formation of the agenda in the inter-state relations with Armenia testifies to its intention to expand its "power domain" by including in it the agenda as well. Such an interpretation of Turkey's policy bases on *Rothgeb's* determination of a state's power as an ability to control over others<sup>5</sup>.

At the same time, the changes in the hierarchy of the agenda's issues in 1998 caused by changes in Armenia's policy in the issues of recognition of the fact of the Armenian Genocide shows that a weaker country, in the given case it is Armenia, also has an opportunity not only to counteract a stronger country and ignore its demands, but also to achieve a definite advantage in the diplomatic counteraction, especially, when it refers the issues rooted in the historical memory. A group of American specialists studying prerequisites and conditions of succeeding through bellicose threats mainly has arrived to a similar conclusion<sup>6</sup>.

Consideration of the Armenian-Turkish relations seems to be more prospective from the point of view of an approach proposed by *Keohane* and *Nye* according to which the source of power and influence in the relations of states is in their tangible asymmetrical interdependence<sup>7</sup>. Operating with the concept of *vulnerability*, they show that it can be used to carry out a policy of pressure with the object of expanding the *sphere of influence*.

The aforementioned operational code of Turkey's policy towards Armenia is fully within the frames of this concept. The same authors point out that such a policy is connected with the

risk of provoking return measures, which in their opinion, are often of military nature<sup>8</sup>.

However, the experience of the Armenian-Turkish relations showed that the response can be different: a use of a definite political problem (in the given case it refers the genocide's recognition) by a weaker country (Armenia) as a counterbalance to the policy of using vulnerability carried out by an economically stronger country with a higher fighting capability (Turkey). Thus, it is evident that Armenia carries out a peculiar policy of balance of power.

For conclusion, here is a short interpretation of the Armenia-Turkish relations through using the above developments in the theory of international relations. They are characterized as "non-conventional", and determination of the agenda of interstate relations is of great importance for them. The "operational code" elaborated by the diplomacy of Turkey towards Armenia, which is characterized by the use of several non-traditional methods of coercion, was crucial for formation of such a paradigm of relations.

On the other hand, Armenia does not yield to the pressure and ignores Turkey's demands.

Thus, on the whole, Turkey's position can be interpreted with the use of conceptual system of "offensive realism", Armenia's one with the use of "defensive realism"<sup>9</sup>.

According to an approximate assessment of *Holsti*, over 90% of interstate relations base on the policy of a *simple persuasion* and not *coercion*<sup>10</sup>. Thus, the Armenian-Turkish inter-state relations of the last ten years refer to the type of relations, which makes up less than 10% of the modern international traffic. It is for this reason that their experience and further generalization can contribute to determination of several concepts and notions applied by representatives of the realistic school of international relations today.

*The Genocide Factor as an Item on  
the Agenda of Armenian Foreign Policy*

The Genocide affirmation issue is the only vector of



Armenia's foreign policy, which reaches far beyond the regional context and enters modern global politics. The fact that in the past several decades this issue has been widely debated in political and public circles of many countries, including world powers, as well as sudden interest towards that issue by the European Union, go to show our point.

In the past decade, global political processes have been aiming noticeably at strengthening their moral component, as manifested by the growing attention to issues, falling under the category of protection of human rights. In this context, Armenia's policy of promoting the universal recognition of the Genocide and its condemnation as a crime of sweeping and massive violation of the fundamental right to live of the whole nation, takes the central stage of significance.

Another distinctive feature of the Genocide affirmation is that the intensity level of its foreign political manifestation can basically be only set by Armenia's authorities. Here again a fact confirming our idiom is quite evident: perhaps the only adjustment the new Armenian leadership made to the foreign policy agenda upon coming to power in 1998 was the official acknowledgment of the Genocide factor as a priority issue.

This is where the principle difference between the Genocide issue and the resolution of the Karabakh conflict being discussed within the OSCE Minsk Group where initiative belongs to Co-Chairs, becomes most evident. At the same time, the Karabakh problem is viewed in the context of regional realities by both the parties concerned and the observers alike. Recently, another attribute setting these two issues apart has emerged. On the Karabakh issue, Armenia has more often than not found herself rebutting various accusations by the Azerbaijani side, while on the Genocide recognition front Armenia has adopted a pro-active policy and has put forward claims on her own.

An important characteristic of the recognition issue as a foreign policy factor is the striking contradiction between its core content and its perception by some of our neighbors, chiefly Turkey and Azerbaijan. In effect, this issue is one of the foreign policy problems that are charged with a high degree of moral

humanity. Armenia, as a state established by the nation victimized by genocide right after its unacknowledged and unpunished occurrence, now includes on its foreign policy agenda the question this gravest crime under the international law be affirmed and condemned by the genocide perpetrator's successor-state, as well as and by the international community.

The above-mentioned states, and primarily of course, Turkey, however, are trying, firstly, to downgrade the problem to a level of bilateral relations, and secondly, to falsify the very essence of that policy by portraying it as conspiracy built on hatred, confrontation, even hostility. At the same time, Turkey has actively been taking steps, increasingly reminiscent of a full-scale diplomatic offensive, aimed at inflicting her point of view on the international community.

The above-mentioned features of the Genocide factor point to the uniqueness of its nature, thus justifying the vitality of its multilevel study.

*The Genocide Factor in Foreign Policy of Armenia:  
a Diachronistic Analysis*

After passing through several stages, the issue of recognition and condemnation of the Genocide, as a key all-Armenian issue, initially concerning mainly the Diaspora and subsequently being embraced (of course, within the limits set by the authorities) by Soviet Armenia as well; and a public and political discourse of the past four decades, has been crystallized into a factor of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia. Let us discuss them all in brief.

In the period, immediately preceding the declaration of independence, two approaches were outlined. The Armenian National Movement (ANM), that headed the national democratic liberation movement in Armenia, had in their platform the point calling for struggle for the recognition and condemnation of the Genocide. However, at the same time, it made an attempt at revising postulates traditional of Armenian public and political school of thought, by introducing the idea of the genocide issue not standing in the way of normalizing the Armenian-Turkish



relations. The majority of the remaining political forces centered around Armenian Revolutionary Federation Party (the Dashnaktsutyun) advocated the "traditional" approach, which hinged the establishment of normal relations with Turkey upon her affirmation of the Genocide. Both camps considered that issue in the context of the bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations.

After coming to power in 1990, the ANM had to compromise and agreed to incorporate that issue into the Declaration of Independence (1990), thus booking a spot for it on the Armenian foreign policy agenda. Afterwards, however, the Party tried to ignore the issue by giving it a status secondary to the issue of normalizing relations with Turkey. This policy was then voiced through the concept of Armenia's readiness to establish normal relations with Turkey without any preconditions.

In its turn Turkey, which recognized the Republic of Armenia's independence as early as December 1991, had refused to establish diplomatic relations with her until a number of preconditions has been met. In so doing, in its attitude towards the young state Turkey has chosen a rare *operational code* for modern international relations, where severance of existing diplomatic relations or refusal to recognize a newly-established state are more common practices for similar situations. The choice of that operational code can be attributed to Turkey's desire to achieve a strategic upper hand in her relations with Armenia, compelling the latter, which had aspired to normalize her relations with the neighbor, to accept *nonconventional* relations with Turkey.

The lack of a diplomatic representation and the resulting narrowing of reliable channels of information on the political life of the Turkish state had further weakened the positions of young Armenian diplomacy.

In general, Turkey's policy towards Armenia from the very beginning can be described as a policy of *coercion*. That policy is being articulated with particular clarity in Turkey's tendency to impose her own issues on discussion agenda with Armenia.

The shaping of that agenda began as early as in 1991 and already by the mid 1990s it has been fully formulated, whereby Turkey tried to compel Armenia to:

- Relinquish its policy of pressing for the affirmation of the Genocide;
- Officially recognize the inviolability of the Armenian-Turkish borders border, as established by the 1921 Kars Treaty;
- Make unilateral concessions to Azerbaijan in the Karabakh settlement.

The Armenian side was interested in developing trade and economic relations with Turkey as well as using its communications. Later on, after Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in 1993, a new item had been added to the agenda: the conditions of opening of the border. From 1991-1997, Turkey exerted a firm diplomatic pressure on Armenia, trying to get concessions across the entire range of the above-mentioned issues. Twice, in 1992 and 1993, Turkey even threatened to use military force, moving troops closer to the Armenian border.

In these conditions, Armenia chose defensive tactics, and attempted to distance itself from the Genocide recognition policy by conceding the leadership on that issue to the Diaspora. Official Yerevan's drive to dissociate from that issue was so resolute that the then Armenia's Foreign Affairs Minister had to resign after making unauthorized remarks on the Genocide in a 1992 statement.

After coming to power in 1998, the new leadership of the country amended the foreign policy agenda by placing the abovementioned problem on top of the state's most important issues. Meanwhile, the formula designed by the past leadership, according to which the Genocide recognition issue should not impede the establishment of normal relations between Armenia and Turkey, remained intact. So here we have a unique fusion of the traditional approach with that of the ANM.

Initially, after the indicated above amendments had been made, the issue was largely viewed by Armenia within the framework of Armenian-Turkish relations, and in the context of strengthening ties with the Diaspora. Later on, though, set off



primarily by the increased efforts to have the issue placed on the agendas of the US Congress and the French Parliament in 2000, a tendency to view it in a larger context of the expansion of Armenian's relations with the West has emerged.

*The Genocide in Armenian Foreign Policy:  
a Synchronistic Analysis*

How does the Genocide factor really come across in the diplomatic activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia? We suggest several analysis levels.

*1. Bilateral relations*

In Armenian-Turkish relations, the problem of the recognition of the Genocide and the whole set of associated issues have not yet been seriously discussed by the two sides. This stems from the policy of a total denial of the very fact of the Genocide, traditionally employed by Turkish authorities until recently, when Turkey has put forward an idea of discussing the issue by historians from both countries, being fully aware that this proposal, which transforms a political problem into a historical debate, would be unacceptable for Armenia. As expected, Armenia immediately rejected that suggestion, in her turn advising the Turkish leadership to expand their familiarity with the available scientific and historical materials.

In the situation where no direct contacts with Turkey on this issue exist, in addition to the obvious objective set forth by Armenian leadership the affirmation of the Genocide and its condemnation by Turkey - Genocide factor in the Armenian foreign policy, acquires additional functions of a containment instrument for Turkey's policy of coercion against Armenia.

Actually, we have the following picture of diplomatic interactions between the sides. Turkey, which seeks concessions from Armenia on a number of issues, using the latter's unfavorable geographic location to its advantage, is exerting pressure on her, and as it was noted above, puts forward preconditions for establishing diplomatic relations, opening land border, and developing normal trade and economic contacts with Armenia.

In contrast to the Turkish approach, Armenia proposes two fundamental principles underlying the concept of her relations with Turkey: the establishment of normal relations without preconditions, and Turkey's readiness to discuss all disputable issues, including those set forward by Turkey as preconditions.

A conflict between the operational codes of the two approaches to bilateral relations is apparent. In this situation, the Genocide factor becomes especially important for Armenia, as the only sphere allowing for more independent and flexible policy towards Turkey and counterbalance to the Turkish policy of coercion against Armenia. The previous Armenian leadership had demonstrated this approach, which, however, was overall unsuccessful, because it was based on a "defensive" operational code.

The incumbent authorities have apparently built on the negative experience of their predecessors, which is why on this issue they have chosen an "offensive" operation code. Thus Armenia's options for resisting and confronting the Turkish coercion policy have increased, make it possible to neutralize their negative diplomatic consequences. Armenia's strong rebuttal to the Turkish proposal to downgrade the issue of the Genocide recognition from the political domain to academia discussions was only be possible because of the "offensive" operational code, which just proves our point.

## *2. Regional policy*

The conflicts in the South Caucasus and the virtual nonexistence of regional integration are making increasingly obvious that the regional states will intensify their competition for a more respectable position in the hierarchy of the global political process. Each has two distinct types of "trump cards" - the virtual image projected by the country, and the real one based on the actual development progress or availability of resources. Georgia has successfully been exploiting their image of a catalyst for the second wave of democratic revolutions in post-Soviet area. Azerbaijan in lieu of any discernible progress in democratization of its society relies heavily on the oil factor. With democratization



process currently in the pause mode in Armenia and no resources to speak of, the Genocide factor lends itself perfectly to serve as an "image trump card" of a country, seeking affirmation and condemnation of the grave crime of genocide, which had in the past been ignored by the world. Although this image is certainly not as powerful as the Georgian projection, it nonetheless is strong enough to be included in the modern global political process, albeit not as a mainstay.

### 3. *"Big policy"*

In 1987, the European Parliament passed the resolution on the "Political Solution to the Armenian Issue," in which the tragic events of 1915-1917 on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which targeted the Armenian population, are qualified as genocide, as prescribed by the UN Convention on the "Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide." The same Resolution call upon the European Council to exert pressure on the Turkish Government in order for it to recognize the Genocide. The process of placing of the genocide issue on the agenda of the "big European policy" has clearly begun. Since the 1990s, a similar process has been noticeable in the United States.

Therefore, the leadership of the newly independent Republic of Armenia has from the very beginning had an opportunity to extend the Genocide factor beyond the frameworks of the bilateral Armenian-Turkish relations and apply it to Armenia's relationship with the West, thus trying to acquire an instrument against the coercion policy exercised by Turkey towards Armenia. However, since the then Armenian leadership had chosen the "defensive" operational code in relations with Turkey, they preferred not to do it.

Armenia's joining the campaign for the international recognition of the genocide in 2000 has given it a new momentum by having it integrated in global processes. Having thus adopted the "active" operational code, our state has at the same time strengthened its position vis-à-vis Turkey.

In 2004, the above process was given new dimensions when the public opinion of the EU countries, as voiced by influential intellectuals, began actively demanding from Turkey, which seeks

membership in the EU, to condemn the dark pages of its history, while leaders of the EU countries started raising this issue in bilateral negotiations with the Turks.

On the whole, one can say that the internationalization of the Genocide factor is being accomplished on two levels. In the realm of Realpolitik, it is being used by influential political circles in Europe and the United States for their own gain – as an additional vehicle to put pressure on Turkey. At the same time, it has already been adopted by global discourse on the problems of genocide and other crimes against humanity.

Armenia's interaction with European countries and the U.S. on the level of Realpolitik strengthens its overall position in the world and, particularly, its relations with Turkey. The active participation in the above discourse enhances Armenia's authority in the world.

#### *4. Geostrategic aspect*

The Genocide factor has also been influencing the choice of a geostrategic direction in which Armenia will develop. On the regional level, two out of its four neighbors - Turkey and Azerbaijan - have aggressively resisted the affirmation of the Genocide, and two others, Iran and Georgia, have been manifestly indifferent.

In the recent period, Russia's political circles and the public alike have also displayed indifference. However, it is Russia that has been traditionally perceived by Armenians as one of the most consistent allies on this issue. Russia's recent inclination to establish closer relations with Turkey, as well as general weakening of its positions in the world, seem to dash all hopes that Russia would assist in this matter which had remained some of the Armenian political elite.

In fact, Armenia today can realistically expect support in having the genocide recognized and condemned only from the European Union and the United States, and count on them to keep pressuring Turkey on that issue. This situation is an additional geostrategic factor contributing to the movement of Armenia toward the West.



### *Perspectives*

Operational<sup>TM</sup> code, adopted by the incumbent Armenian authorities in regard of Turkey, assumes that there will be no unilateral concessions on such a key and wide-scale pan-Armenian issue, as the Genocide affirmation. Following its introduction into the agenda of the Armenian policy on Turkey, the room for maneuvering for the Armenian side seems to have shrunk quite considerably. On the other hand, the establishment of an appropriate interaction modus with the Western politics and global political processes makes Armenia's position in its bilateral relations with Turkey more sustainable. For that reason it appears that the path towards further integration with the West can uncover additional resources required to successfully counter the coercion policy of Turkey.

The official recognition and condemnation of the fact of the genocide by Turkey would be the ultimate justification of this operational code. After the affirmation has been achieved, this question could be moved from the political realm to the domain of international law thus preparing ground for raising legal issues of retributions for the crime of genocide against the Armenian people the crime, perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire, the successor of which is the present Turkish Republic.

### ANNOTATIONS

1. *G. R. Berridge*, *Talking to the Enemy: How States without 'Diplomatic Relations' Communicate*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
2. On concept of "operational code" see: *A. George*, *The «Operational Code»: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making*. In: *International Studies Quarterly*, 1969, 13, p. 190-222
3. *James W. Davis, Jr.*, *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence*. Baltimore and London, 2000, p. 10-25.
4. See, for instance, the following works: *Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye*, *Complex Interdependence and the Role of Force*. – In: *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*. Fifth Edition. Edited by: *Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis*, New York, 2000, p. 241-

242; as well as: *Chris Brown*, *Understanding International Relations*. New York, 1997, p. 228-230.

5. *John M. Rothgeb, Jr.*, *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*. New York, 1991, p. 27-36.

6. *Peter Karsten, Peter D. Howell, and A. F. Allen*, *Military Threats: A Systematic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success*. Westport, Connecticut, 1984.

7. *Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye*, *Power and Interdependence*. Third Edition. New York: Longman, p. 9-17.

8. *Ibid*, p. 14

9. See on this types of realism: *Benjamin Frankel*, *Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction*. – In: *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*. Edited by *Benjamin Frankel*. London-Portland: Frank Cass, p. XV-XXIII.

10. *K. J. Holsti*, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. Sixth Edition, Englewood Cliffs, 1992, p. 126.