

LILIT HOVHANNISYAN*
PhD in History, Associate Professor
Institute of History NAS RA
lilithovannisian@yahoo.com

THE USA POLICY ON THE ARMENIAN QUESTION FROM THE TREATY OF SÈVRES TO W. WILSON'S ARBITRAL AWARD

Key words: Major Allies, Armenian Question, Independent and United Armenia, Treaty of Sèvres, Woodrow Wilson, Arbitral Award, delimitation.

Introduction

On August 10, 1920, the Sèvres Peace Treaty was signed between the victorious Allied Powers¹ and the Ottoman Empire defeated in World War I. Thus, the summary of the results of the war and the formation of a new, Versailles system of international relations² completed by Paris International Peace Conference, show that the Sèvres Treaty is most complete and progressive of the

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¹ The Allied Powers were divided into two groups: the Major Allied Powers and the Allied Powers. The Major Allied Powers were the British Empire, the United States, France, Italy, Japan and the Allied Powers were Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian State, Czechoslovakia, Armenia and Hejaz (see **Կիրակոսյան** 1972, 676).

² The Versailles system, as a set of treaties regulating the new legal relations between the victorious and defeated states of the war, was formed as a result of Paris International Peace Conference. It consisted of the peace treaties signed by the Allied Powers with Germany (Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919), Austria (the Treaty of Saint-Germain, September 10, 1919), Bulgaria (the Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919), Hungary (the Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920), Ottoman Empire (the Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August, 1920).

The Versailles system was completed and renamed the Versailles-Washington as a result of Washington Conference, 1921-1922, during which the nine maritime powers (the USA, the British Empire, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, China, Portugal and France) signed the "Agreement of Four" on the Pacific Islands on December 13, 1921, the "Agreement of Five" on the limitation of naval armaments and the agreement on their "open doors" policy in China on February 6, 1922 (see **Громыко** 1965, 161-164, 213-214, 244, 246-248).

five treaties, which are a part of the aforesaid system, because the full legal toolkit used in the other four peace treaties in the sense of defining the responsibility for war crimes, is taken into account in it³.

The Solution of the Armenian Question According to the Sèvres Treaty and its International Legal Significance

The articles directly and indirectly related to Armenia and the Armenian people in the Sèvres Treaty can be viewed in the following three interrelated aspects:

1. **Armenia's independence** as a new way of fulfilling the international legal obligation of the Great Powers to ensure the physical security of the Armenian people in their Homeland,
2. the financial liability of the Turkish State and the criminal liability of its officials for the alienation of the property of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire through committing a genocide,
3. the confirmation of the right of the Armenian people to return to their Homeland.

The Sèvres Treaty confirmed the Turkish State's political responsibility for the Armenian Genocide by secession of some Armenian Vilayets from Turkey (articles 88–91)⁴. Thus, the problem was removed from the sphere of Armenian–Turkish bilateral relations initiated by the Batumi Treaty of June 4, 1918, by transferring it to the international political dimension. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire had to accept the rights of the Armenian State to a larger territory than the territory of Armenia recognized by the Batumi Treaty.

The attitude of the Great Powers to secession of Western Armenia from the Ottoman Empire and recognition of its right to independence had gradually

³ Note, that the fixing of articles on the responsibility for war crimes and imposing sanctions not only in the Sèvres Treaty, but also in the Treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, Ney and Trianon that preceded it, was conditioned by the activity of the Commission upon the determination of responsibility and the punishments for unleashing the war, formed on January 25, 1919, at Paris Conference. The Commission consisted of 15 prominent international lawyers representing different countries. The crimes violating the Hague Convention and the extermination of an entire Armenian nation as an individual ethnic group in 1915–1916, were emphasized by the Commission among the crimes committed by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. On this occasion on March 14, 1919, the Greek delegation presented the Armenian note to the Commission through its representative Nicholas Politis (see **Բաբերոս** 2005, 256–260).

⁴ See **Կիրակոսյան** 1972, 676.

matured during 42 years prior to the Sèvres Treaty. The obligations on the implementation of the reforms in the Armenian Vilayets, the legal-political evaluation of the Turkish Government's guarantees of ensuring the physical security of the Western Armenians and prevention of Turkish violence against them were undertaken by international legal principle of collective intervention and the subsequent international diplomatic documents – the San Stefano Treaty on February 19 / March 3, the Russian-English Agreement on May 18 / 30, Anglo-Turkish Convention on June 4, Berlin Treaty on July 1 / 13, 1878. They were reflected in humanitarian intervention activities such as the Notes of Great Powers on June 11 and September 7, 1880, the Reform Program on May 11, 1895, the Russian-Turkish Act on the reforms for Western Armenia on January 26, 1914. However, these actions not only failed, but also deepened the problem ending in the Armenian Genocide. It is not accidental that during the World War the termination of the Turkish possession over Western Armenia became a new demand of the Great Powers. Its legal basis was laid in 1915–1916 by the Anglo-French-Russian secret agreements related to the division of Asian Turkey. In 1917–1918, the heads of Government and ministers of foreign affairs of the Entente states⁵ also made official statements on reunification of the Eastern and Western parts of Armenia into an independent, united state and recognition of the legal personality and territorial rights of that state⁶. It should be noted that, regardless of the Sèvres Treaty, these were unilateral international acts of states, on which the principle of conscientious fulfillment of international obligations also extended.

Each of the above-mentioned international legal documents on the Armenian Question was a source of law for the signing of the next document. Accordingly, the articles of the Sèvres Treaty, related to Armenia and the Armenians are based on the secret agreements on the Armenian Question signed between the Entente powers during World War I, as well as the unilateral international acts of the states and the decisions adopted within the framework of Paris Conference. In

⁵ The Entente or Triple agreement is a military-political alliance of Great Britain, France and Russia, which was founded in 1891–1893, with the signing of the French-Russian agreement, and its formation was completed in 1904–1907, with the signing of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements. During World War I a coalition of Allied Powers was formed on the basis of the Entente.

⁶ See **Եաբսերոս** 2005, 225–226.

particular, according to Article 89 of the treaty, the border between the Ottoman Empire and Armenia was going to cross Vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis and Van, because the transference of those Armenian territories to Russia was planned by the 1915–1916 Anglo–French–Russian secret agreements. The final demarcation between the Republic of Armenia and Turkey was assigned to the U.S. President. “Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties ...” were agreeing “... to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarization of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier” (Article 89)⁷. The choice of Allies was due to the fact that since 1878, the United States, based on the Monroe Doctrine, had never participated in diplomatic discussions on the Armenian Question, had no international legal obligation associated with that problem and had not fought against the Ottoman Empire during the World War. At the same time, the United States was in relationship with both the Government and the nationalist circles of that state. Moreover, the United States defended the right of oppressed peoples to self-determination, which was included in Woodrow Wilson’s “14 points”⁸. Therefore, the head of that state could make an impartial decision on the final demarcation between Turkey and Armenia.

According to the treaty, territories beyond the Kharberd (Kharput) line, which were geographically and ethnically an **integral part of the Armenians’** Homeland, but would not be handed over to Armenia, were left within the Turkish borders. The sanjaks of Dersim, Kharberd, Arghana and the northern part of Diarbekir sanjak reserved for the future Kurdistan state, were among them. Undoubtedly, the Armenians were interested in creating an independent Kurdistan, because in this way, the Kurdish question was going to receive an international legal settlement. But it was unacceptable for Armenians, that Kurdistan was to be created, as it was planned, on the Armenian territory on the

⁷ Կիրակոսյան 1972, 676. See also Treaty of Peace with Turkey, August 10, 1920. Signed at Sevres. <http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1920/TS0011.pdf>

⁸ The «14 points» were presented in the session of Congress, on January 8, 1918, as U.S. President W. Wilson’s Message to the Congress on the goals of the United States war, the conditions for peace and principles of post-war settlement.

basis of Anglo–French–Russian secret agreements, according to which Western Armenia was divided exactly along the Kharberd line⁹.

Articles 125, 142, 143 of the Sèvres Treaty are important from the point of view of unifying the Armenians living on the territories seceded from the Ottoman Empire in Armenia, restoring the Christian beliefs of the forcibly Muslimized Armenians and protecting their right to free movement¹⁰. Article 144 envisaging financial liability of the Turkish State and criminal liability of its officials for material deprivation of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire through committing a genocide, and Articles 151, 288 supplementing it, are also central to the treaty¹¹. The question of criminal liability for material deprivation is vital in terms of restoring the rights of the Armenian people, as a victim of genocide, to its own property – to native land, to property created and preserved with great difficulty, to national material values. And depriving Turkey of its right to control Armenia, Kurdistan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other non-Turkish territories meant to take political action against Turkey, which has been partially realized over the past century.

Articles 226–230 of the Sèvres Treaty provided preconditions for preventing atrocities against humanity in the territories that formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire and passed to other states under the mentioned treaty, for prosecuting perpetrators of already committed crimes, as well as war criminals hiding in those territories¹². If these articles were implemented, the Government of Constantinople could not avoid handing over those accused of the massacres of Armenians in the deserts of Mesopotamia under the pretext that those territories no longer belonged to the empire. From a legal point of view, this provision came first from the 1878 treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, then from May 24, 1915, official announcement of the Entente Powers¹³. The Allies also had the right to set up a special international criminal court for the purpose of carrying out trial of accused persons, and the Ottoman Government was obliged to recognize the jurisdiction of that court. This was a new phenomenon in the practice of

⁹ Ադոնց 1989, 19.

¹⁰ Կիրակոսյան 1972, 677–678.

¹¹ See Կիրակոսյան 1972, 678–680; Treaty of Peace with Turkey, August 10, 1920. Signed at Sevres. <http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1920/TS0011.pdf>; Եաբցերոս 2002, 530.

¹² See Եաբցերոս 2002, 530–531.

¹³ Ներսիսյան 1991, 727.

international law. Unfortunately, at that time the League of Nations did not establish a competent court to judge the suspects of crimes against humanity. The procrastination and inconsistency of international diplomacy in this matter had tragic consequences for the future of all mankind.

The treaties signed by the Ottoman Empire until August 1, 1914, and later till the entry into force of the Sèvres Treaty, also the conventions and agreements with Russia, as well as with states and Governments which previously existed as a **part of Russia's territory, were annuled**¹⁴.

Armenia was given the right to use the ports of Batumi and Trebizond on a permanent lease basis.

The demarcation of the site to be allocated to Armenia and its connection to the existing railways were to be determined by a commission appointed by Armenia, the Ottoman Empire and the League of Nations. Those terms could be reviewed every ten years¹⁵.

The International Legal Significance of the Sèvres Treaty

The rights of the Armenian people to Western Armenia, the financial liability of the Turkish state for material deprivation of Armenians, the political status of Armenia, as an independent and united state, are recognized in the Sèvres Treaty more clearly and in detail, than in any other international document on the Armenian Question. In this respect, the treaty is the first and only international document, in which an adequate response to the issues of criminal and political responsibility, arising from the crime of genocide is presented on the basis of international law.

***W. Wilson's** Consent on the Arbitration of the Border between Armenia and Turkey*

Still on January 19, 1920, the head of the British Foreign Office George Nathaniel Curzon predicted, that the **de facto** recognition of Armenia's Government by the Council of Five¹⁶ would not oblige the Allied Powers to

¹⁴ See **Կիրակոսյան** 1972, 680.

¹⁵ See **Կիրակոսյան** 1972, 681–682.

¹⁶ The Council of Five was one of the governing bodies of Paris Peace Conference after the Supreme Council, or Council of Ten, consisting of the French, British, U.S., Italian and Japanese heads of Government and foreign ministers, and the Council of Four, consisted only of the

precisely define the principles of demarcation of the state border between Armenia and Turkey¹⁷. It is not accidental, that after the signing of the Sèvres Treaty the issue of defining the Armenian–Turkish state border by the U.S. President was on the agenda. On January 27, 1920, the U.S. Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk telegraphed to the U.S. Ambassador to France and the head of American delegation in the Council of Five Hugh Campbell Wallace and instructed him to report to the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers, that the USA agrees with the latter's decision to recognize the Armenian Government de facto on the condition that it would not predetermine the issue of the future borders of the Armenian State. The telegram emphasizes that the United States was not going to recognize de facto Armenia as long as its state border with Turkey was not finally determined¹⁸. On the same day, the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople Mark Lambert Bristol and the Allied High Commissioner for Armenia and the Caucasus, also the head of the Near East Relief, Colonel William Nafew Haskell was given a similar order¹⁹. Nevertheless, presented diplomatic documents show that the solution of the Armenian Question depended on signing a peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Turkey. And finally, the draft of the peace treaty with Turkey was definitively developed at first during London Conference of the **Allied Powers' Ambassadors in February–March, 1920**, then during San Remo Conference of the Supreme Council of the Allies on April 19–26, 1920. On April 23, the Republic of Armenia was de facto recognized by the U.S. Government²⁰. Shortly afterwards, the San Remo Conference approved the creation of a United Armenia continuing to connect the problems of its border with Turkey, in particular the problem of including Erzerum and Trebizond within the borders of United Armenia, with the issues of taking by the USA the mandate for Armenia and the arbitration of the Armenian–Turkish border²¹. It should be noted that the American party did not participate in the discussion of those issues due to its new political position. As mentioned above, on April 26, the Supreme Council

heads of Western Governments. The Council of Five consisted only of the French, British, U.S., Italian and Japanese foreign ministers, dealing with secondary matters.

¹⁷ See Makhmourian 2020, 375.

¹⁸ See Makhmourian 2020, 380–381.

¹⁹ See Makhmourian 2020, 382.

²⁰ See Makhmourian 2020, 389.

²¹ For the details of U.S. policy on Armenia's mandate, see Հովհաննիսյան 2019, 264–293.

addressed this proposal from San Remo to the U.S. Government and W. Wilson, taking into account the interests of his state in the Eastern problems, particularly in Armenia²². It is clear from the telegram addressed on May 17, 1920, to Ambassador H. C. Wallace on behalf of State Secretary B. Colby that W. Wilson had formally agreed to act as arbitrator delimiting the state border between Armenia and Turkey²³.

The Formation and Activity of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia. The Issue of Joining Kharberd Vilayet to the Republic of Armenia

In mid-July, 1920, the State Department began to select a team of experts for the assignment: the Committee for the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia. The Boundary Committee was presided by the Head of the West Asia Division of the U.S. Delegation to Paris Conference, Professor William **Westermann**; his key associates were the geographer of General James Harbord's Mission, Major of the U.S. Army Lawrence Martin and the member of the Division of the Near Eastern Affairs of the State Department Harrison G. Dwight. As the Treaty of Sèvres was signed on August 10, 1920, the Boundary Committee began its operation.

The guidelines adopted by the committee were to draw the southern and western boundaries of Armenia on the basis of a combination of ethnic, religious, economic, geographic, and military factors. The Committee had at its disposal all the papers of the American Peace Delegation and the Harbord Mission, the files of the Department of State, War, and Interior, and the cartological services of the United States Geological Survey. The economic and military-political factors were most important for the Committee in making their decisions.

After the rejection of Armenia's mandate by the U.S. Congress, the Arbitration Mission given to the U.S. President to draw the borders of the independent Armenian State was already the only legal-political tool by which W. Wilson could have contributed to a just solution of the Armenian Question. It is not accidental that in the note written on behalf of the United Armenian Delegation on July 14 and August 10, 1920, Avetis Aharonyan and Poghos Nubar were offering him to include Kharberd Vilayet in the Western Armenian territories

²² See Fuller 1936, 770; Makhmourian 2020, 391–392.

²³ See Makhmourian 2020, 397–398.

which were going to be handed over to the Republic of Armenia, considering the economic and political importance of that Vilayet for an independent Armenian State²⁴. A. Aharonyan was not even excluding the possibility of exchanging Kharberd for Trebizond, the feasibility of which was viewed with skepticism by the third Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Hamo Ohandjanyan. In the face of the imminent attack of the Turkish army against the Republic of Armenia, he was considering more realistic to expect financial assistance in the form of loans from the United States, being willing to hand over to the latter the Armenian railways, mines and a possible port under a peace treaty in return²⁵. It should be noted that both the Governments of the Allied Powers and the members of the Committee, upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia, were skeptical that Turkey would voluntarily withdraw its troops from the Western Armenian territories and hand them over to Armenia. In this sense, the U.S. **President's Arbitral Award was considered the only legal basis** and tool to influence the Turkish Government in this matter. At the same time, of practical significance was the note in the Arbitral Award, regarding the protection of the small Armenian population, having survived the genocide, from the threat of a new Turkish attack²⁶. In these circumstances, it was unrealistic to expect that in the Arbitral Award the Western Armenian territories to be handed over to Armenia could be larger than stipulated in the International Sèvres Treaty of the Peace.

On August 6, 1920, a few days before signing the Sèvres Treaty, the British Government through its Ambassador to the USA Auckland Geddes inquired of the **U.S. Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby whether the President's decision as to** the boundaries of Armenia could be expected in the near future. On August 13, the Secretary of State gave a polite answer that the collection of pertinent data on this subject, and the examination and verification of various records, historical and cartographical, was a preliminary to the consideration of the main issue which required ample time. Then, as Article 89, Section VI, of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey provided that "Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting parties, agree to submit to the arbitration of the president of the United States, the issue of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia," the decision of

²⁴ See Makhmourian 2020, 403–404; Papian 2011, 213–215.

²⁵ See **Махмуриян** 2018, 476.

²⁶ See **Махмуриян** 2018, 478, 480.

the President would only follow the notification to him of the signed agreement of the interested parties²⁷. The U.S. President continued to work on the demarcation of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia with a calm and unhurried consistency, despite the activity of Armenian lobbying organizations operating in the United States, also the anxiety emphasized in the official documents addressed to W. Wilson about the frosty winter beginning in the Armenian Highlands early and its inevitable devastating consequences for the return of the Western Armenian refugees to their Homeland, especially in the absence of physical security guarantees for the Armenian population in the Western Armenian territories to be given to the Republic of Armenia²⁸.

The Full Report of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia was submitted to the Department of State on September 28, 1920, five months after the Allied Supreme Council's invitation to President Wilson. It consisted of 10 chapters (89 pages), 7 appendices (152 pages) and 5 maps. On October 18, 1920, the U.S. Embassy in Paris received a note from the Secretary General of the Peace Conference who forwarded herewith to the United States Embassy an authenticated copy of the treaty signed in Sèvres on August 10, 1920 between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and also drew the Embassy's attention to Article 89 of this treaty which confirmed that the determination of the frontier line between Turkey and Armenia would be submitted to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America who would also prescribe all expedient stipulations with regard to Armenia's access to sea and with regard to the demilitarization of the Ottoman territory adjacent to the said frontier. The U.S. Ambassador in France H. C. Wallace had transmitted the note to Washington for the Secretary of State B. Colby on the same day²⁹. The final stage of the work of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia – the editing of the Report, its completion and full compliance with the Sèvres Treaty, began.

At the same time, in October–November, 1920, the U.S. President and Government were closely following the Turkish–Armenian war, the defeats of the Armenian army, the territorial losses of the Republic of Armenia, the weakening of the Armenian statehood, the advancement of the Bolsheviks towards Armenia.

²⁷ See Makhmourian 2020, 412.

²⁸ See Махмуриян 2018, 475, 477–478.

²⁹ See Makhmourian 2020, 413–414.

They also regularly received the requests from H. Ohandjanyan, RA Ambassador to the USA Garegin Bastrmadjyan (Armen Garo), Catholicos of All Armenians Gevorg V Tphghisetsi to provide financial and food assistance to Armenia. The Armenian party couldn't expect more from the U.S. Government, as the latter didn't miss the opportunity to remind about the non-military, humanitarian nature of its policy towards Armenia³⁰. **Moreover, Armenia's international reputation was** damaged as a result of each request to the U.S. Government, because they were testifying the incompetence of Armenian leaders and their frivolous approach to maintaining independence of the state. It was not accidental that on November 11, 1920, the member of the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia H. Dwight presented such a comprehensive report on "The Question of Kharput", that put an end to discussions on handing over Kharberd Vilayet to the Republic of Armenia. The report was based on the comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of including Kharberd within the borders of Armenia. The predominant ethnic, economic and political ties of the Vilayet with the Mediterranean countries were grounded in it. Also the ineligibility of the U.S. President to make a decision going beyond the borders of the four Armenian Vilayets mentioned in the Sèvres Treaty without the consent of the Allied Powers was emphasized in the report³¹. It should be noted that the consideration of the U.S. humanitarian policy in the Armenian Question as a **reason for Armenia's** military defeat in the 1920 Turkish–Armenian war, is unfair, for the responsibility for that defeat falls on the RA Government with its short-sighted and careless policy.

W. Wilson's Arbitral Award

It was only on November 12, 1920, that **the Committee's Report** was finally delivered to the White House. Ten days later, on November 22, 1920, W. Wilson signed the final Report, as his arbitration award, titled: Decision of the President of the United States of America respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Armenia, Access for Armenia to the Sea, and the Demilitarization of Turkish Territory adjacent to the Armenian Frontier, attaching to it two maps of the Armenian–Turkish border and his confidential letter to the President of the

³⁰ See NAA, fund 200, register 1, file 249, folio 663–664, 688; **Махмуриян** 2018, 484–485.

³¹ See **Махмуриян** 2018, 486.

Supreme Council of the Allied Powers Jules Martin Cambon³². W. Wilson noted that demarcating the Turkish–Armenian boundary was based on the King–Crane and Harbord Missions’ arguments, according to which the territory of Armenia should have been enough to develop, but not too big. It was also mentioned that not the national and religious principles of local population distribution, but exclusively the economic factor has been adopted for the issue of including the territory of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis and Van Vilayets within the borders of United and Independent Armenia³³. In this sense, the Arbitral Award reflected the bitter reality – the Armenians had no ethnic-religious advantage in the four Western Armenian Vilayets to be given to the Republic of Armenia. Moreover, this document on the solution of the Armenian Question favorable for Armenians was signed, when the Republic of Armenia was losing the Turkish–Armenian war, and was going to accept the Bolshevik rule. By the peace treaty of Alexandrapol, signed on December 2, 1920, as a result of the war, Turkey occupied Surmalu, Sharur–Daralagyaz, Nakhijevan and Shakhtakhti; refused to compensate for the property, which the Armenians had lost as a result of extermination and deportation occurred during both that war and World War I; and forced Armenia to repudiate the Treaty Sèvres. Thus, Kemalist Turkey solved the Armenian Question in its own favorable way³⁴. Under these conditions, the Armenian State would not be able to independently ensure the economic and geographical unity of its territory, the protection of its border with Turkey. It is not accidental that on December 18, 1920, with the permission of the State Department the Arbitral Award was published in the American press.

Nevertheless, W. Wilson’s Arbitral Award is a fundamental international legal document on the solution of the Armenian Question. According to Article 81 of the 1907 Hague Agreement wherewith status is summarized and fixed, the Arbitral Award of the President of the USA upon the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia is an independent and permanent international legal document not related to the ratification of the Sèvres Treaty. It is also definitive, binding for the implementation of the countries that are part of the Arbitral Award, and their

³² Content of the letter see Papian 2011, 40–89; Makhmourian 2020, 416–422.

³³ See Makhmourian 2020, 416–418.

³⁴ For the details, see **Հոհրաբյան** 1997; **Հոհրաբյան** 2002; **Խուրշուդյան** 2002; **Սիմոնյան** 1991.

legal successors³⁵. The Arbitral Award of the President of the USA upon the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia is related to the Treaty of Sèvres only by Article 89 of the latter, according to which Belgium, Greece, Hejaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, The Serbo–Croatian–Slovenian State, Czechoslovakia and the countries party to the dispute – Armenia and Turkey, as ten new countries, have joined Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan – **the four Powers of the Allies'** Supreme Council. In this sense, the Treaty of Sèvres is merely an additional legal basis for an Arbitral Award of the President of the USA upon the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia, regardless of its ratification and implementation. The Arbitral Award is a final, binding, valid, inviolable international legal document for Turkey and Armenia, which not only reflects the developments taking place in the region at the time of the Award, but is relevant today and has a decisive practical significance for the solution of the Armenian Question³⁶.

Conclusion

In 1917, entering world politics by demanding the autonomy of Western Armenia, and then defending the right of the Armenian people to self-determination, also the idea of the unity and independence of the eastern and western parts of Armenia, the United States was in no hurry to take concrete practical steps or commit any international legal obligation in that direction. This was explained not only by the inevitable financial, economic and military-political difficulties, arising from Constantinople–Anatolia–Western Armenia–Transcaucasia, the sharp contradictions between the United States and its European allies, but also by disagreement between W. Wilson and U.S. Congress in the context of aforesaid realities. In those conditions, W. Wilson and the officials supporting him, were simply powerless to fulfil his promises to resolve the Armenian Question, guided solely by the lofty ideas of humanity. Still, the rejection of the mandate for Armenia by the U.S. Senate on June 1, 1920, and then, the signing of the Arbitral Award of the US President upon the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia on November 22, 1920, meant that the settlement of the Armenian Question under the Sèvres Treaty was just a plan for the United States. The latter had neither a practical obligation, nor a desire to participate in **the implementation of that matter. Moreover, if the Sèvres Treaty and W. Wilson's**

³⁵ See Պապյան 2012, 30–31.

³⁶ See Մարության 2014, 115, 118–119; Պապյան 2012, 23.

Arbitral Award weren't enforced during the past century due to the imperfection of the current international legal system and the irreconcilable contradictions of influential states, then after the devastating war imposed on the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh Republic in September–November, 2020, one more problem was added to them: the most important factor of Armenian influential, active economic, military–political and ethnic force is missing.

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ԱՄՆ-Ի ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՐՑՈՒՄ ՍԵՎՐԻ ՊԱՅՄԱՆԱԳՐԻՑ ՄԻՆՉԵՎ Վ. ՎԻԼՍՈՆԻ ԻՐԱՎԱՐԱՐ ՎՃԻՌԸ

ՀՈՎՀԱՆՆԻՍՅԱՆ Լ.

Ամփոփում

Քանալի բառեր՝ Գլխավոր դաշնակից տերություններ, Հայկական հարց, Անկախ և Միացյալ Հայաստան, Սևրի պայմանագիր, Վուդրո Վիլսոն, իրավարար վճիռ, սահմանագծում:

1920 թ. օգոստոսի 10-ի Սևրի պայմանագրով ճանաչվեցին հայ ժողովրդի իրավունքները Արևմտյան Հայաստանի նկատմամբ, սակայն Անկախ և Միացյալ Հայաստանի ստեղծումը կախման մեջ դրվեց ԱՄՆ-ի կողմից Հայաստանի մանդատի ընդունումից ու հայ-թուրքական պետական սահմանագծման իրավարարությունից: Չնայած նախագահ Վուդրո Վիլսոնի ջանքերին, այդ հարցերում ԱՄՆ-ի քաղաքականությունը սահմանափակվում էր մարդասիրության գաղափարների վրա հիմնված խոստումներով:

1920 թ. հունիսի 1-ին Սենատը մերժեց ԱՄՆ-ի նախագահի առաջարկն ու «թաղեց» Հայաստանի մանդատի հարցը: Իսկ Հայաստանի ու Թուրքիայի

միջև պետական սահմանագծման վերաբերյալ իրավարար վճիռը Վ. Վիլսոնը ստորագրեց նոյեմբերի 22-ին, երբ Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը, որևէ աջակցություն չստանալով գլխավոր դաշնակից տերություններից, պարտություն կրեց 1920 թ. թուրք-հայկական պատերազմում և հարկադրված էր ստորագրել Ալեքսանդրապոլի պայմանագիրը, որով հրաժարվեց Սևրի պայմանագրից:

ПОЛИТИКА США В АРМЯНСКОМ ВОПРОСЕ ОТ СЕВРСКОГО ДОГОВОРА ДО АРБИТРАЖНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ В. ВИЛЬСОНА

ОГАНИСЯН Л.

Резюме

Ключевые слова: главные союзные державы, Армянский вопрос, Независимая и Объединённая Армения, Севрский договор, Вудро Вильсон, арбитражное решение, разграничение.

По Севрскому договору от 10 августа 1920 г. были признаны права армянского народа на Западную Армению, но создание Независимой и Объединённой Армении обуславливалось принятием США мандата на Армению и арбитражем армяно-турецкого разграничения. Несмотря на усилия президента Вудро Вильсона, политика США в этих вопросах ограничивалась обещаниями, основанными на идеях гуманизма.

1 июня 1920 г. Сенат отклонил предложение президента, тем самым закрыв вопрос о мандате на Армению. А арбитражное решение В. Вильсона относительно определения границ между Арменией и Турцией было представлено 22 ноября, когда Республика Армения, не получившая какой-либо помощи от главных союзных держав, потерпела поражение в турецко-армянской войне 1920 г. и была вынуждена подписать Александропольский договор, согласно которому отказалась от Севрского договора.