

THE TREATIES OF ALEXANDROPOL, MOSCOW AND KARS,
1920–1921, THAT CHANGED THE FATE OF NAKHIJEVAN*

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Introduction

After the end of the First World War, Turkish invasion and the formation of three independent republics in Transcaucasia amidst the Russian revolutionary chaos, defeated Ottomans and specially the Kemalists strived to transform this area into their eastern border. So, in 1920 their leader Mustafa Kemal ordered a massive attack of his Army on September 20, 1920; he demanded to occupy the Kars province until Kaghzvan. On November 7, 1920, the Kemalists entered Alexandropol (Gyumri), 120 km far from Yerevan. On December 2, 1920 the Republic of Armenia signed the Treaty of Alexandropol, losing enormous territories. By the article 2 of this Treaty Armenia «would not interfere in the administrative form» of Sharur–Nakhijevan, «and the administration of this zone could be under Turkish protection». By article 12 Turkey «assured the freedom of transit» between «Sharour, Nakhijevan, Shahtakht, and Joulfa via Iran, Makou and Armenia». The article 18 demanded to ratify this text during a month. Though this treaty had never been ratified, even by Turkey, the very fact of occupation of the bigger part of Armenia by the Kemalist army in common with substance of the agreement impacted greatly on the following Treaties of Moscow and Kars. The Treaty of Moscow was signed on March 18 (dated March 16), 1921, between Turkey and Soviet Russia. An independent and now Soviet Republic of Armenia had not been allowed to participate, together with Georgia and Azerbaijan. By the article III of the Moscow text, Nakhijevan was transformed into «autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, provided it would not cede this protectorate to the third State». On October 13, 1921, the Treaty of Kars had recorded in his article 5 an agreement between governments of Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, that Nakhichevan «forms an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan». After the crucial Turkish aggression of 1920, these diplomatic texts fixed and formalized

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strategic and geopolitical changes, that occurred in the region. In this study the author tries to show how the Nakhijevan, which had been a part of Armenia and had considerable share of Armenian population, was shaped into an autonomous administrative unit and transferred to Azerbaijan*.

In 1918–1920 this district witnessed invasions of three foreign forces (of the Ottomans and Kemalists, Entente Powers and Red Army) who had directly intervened in the Nakhijevan affairs. Russia's weakening in Caucasus after the October Revolution of 1917 and activity of the White Russian Volunteer forces (under General A. Denikin) in 1919–1920 together with support of European Allies led to fulfillment of the old British desire to place troops in this region.

For Armenia and native Armenians in Nakhijevan, which were about 41 percent of the population in 1914, this region was of vital importance. When the British appointed their Governor here on January 26, 1919, he was recalled as soon as on June 7 together with his soldiers because of British shortage of Army and political will in London to keep Nakhijevan under their control. Instead, they brought here the Armenian expeditionary corps and established on May 13 the Armenian Governor G. Varshamian as their successor. Meanwhile the Paris Peace Conference apprehended Nakhijevan as the segment of the former Erevan Gubernia and present Republic of Armenia and never qualified this region as a disputed territory. However, in March – September, 1918, the Ottoman Army despite hard defeats on the Western and Middle Eastern Fronts achieved effective successes in Western and Eastern Armenia, and in the Caucasus generally. It profited from unsuccessful rebellion of Nakhijevan Tatars on March 2–25, 1918, when the Muslim Council declared its independence¹; then the Ottomans seized Alexandropol on May 15, Nakhijevan on July 10–19 and Baku on September 15–18, 1918. All their campaign was aggravated with cruel military crimes against the civil population, including total destruction of villages and wholesale massacre of Armenians. From February 1918 till the Turkish aggression of 1920 Armenian areas were under permanent attacks of Ottoman–Kemalist troops.

The Republic of Armenia was in unstable conditions in 1918–1920. It was governed by the Social-Revolutionary, strongly Nationalist Dashnak party, who was evidently pro-Western and pro-Allied since the Mudros Armistice. Its Government zealously asked the Great Powers for provisions and military aid. Nakhijevan itself witnessed big riots on March 2–25, 1918, and July 20–

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¹ National Archives of Armenia, fund 314, register 1, file 163, folio 9 (following: NAA, 314/1/163/9); *Հոկտեմբերյանը. 2000, 79, Յուլի 2012, 78–79.*

25, 1919, a massacre of two Agulises on December 18–24 of the same year², and extensive skirmishes on July 14–25, 1920, organized by local Muslim

Council (who got orders from plural Turkish officers and subalterns on the spot, sent by the headquarters of the 11th Turkish Division at Bayazet, and were led by prominent Young Turks, resided in Baku). Thus, bloodshed was permanent. Native Armenians in Sharur–Nakhijevan districts were harshly oppresses, killed or displaced; they found themselves in a desperate situation. The Armenian troops tried in June–July of 1918, May–July of 1919, and July of 1920, to get back their homeland. Though they were near to success in 1920, they lost their diplomatic fight with the Red Army. On September 28 of the same year the Kemalists undertook the wide-scale aggression and the capital of the Republic of Armenia – Yerevan, was under attack. When the cities of Kars and Alexandropol were occupied on October 30 and November 7, the Government of Armenia signed on December 2, 1920, the Treaty of Alexandropol. It was very bitter, unjust and imposed the hardest terms.

The Treaty of Alexandropol and Its Clauses on Nakhijevan

Military operations of the Turkish war against the Republic of Armenia (lasted from September 28 till November 18, 1920) ended with the defeat of Armenia. The government of Hamazasp Ohandjanian [(1873–1947) was the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia on May 5 – November 23, 1920] was obliged to accept harsh conditions of the ceasefire³. As far as the Armenian detachments stopped fighting, Delegation of their Republic, composed of former Prime Minister, former minister of the foreign affairs and deputy of the Armenian Parliament Alexander Khatisian, former minister of finances and justice, deputy of the Parliament Abraham Gyulkhandanian and assistant of the minister of interior, former Governor of the Kars Province Stephan Korganian was forced to sign at Alexandropol at 2:00 AM in the night from December 2 to December 3, 1920, the disastrous peace treaty. Under its terms Armenia renounced the Treaty of Sevres (article 10), her border was drawn far from the Western Armenia and expelled the whole Province of Kars in Eastern Armenia. Regarding the district of Nakhijevan, Erevan accepted that «administration of this zone should be under Turkish protection» (articles 2, 12)⁴.

On December 2, 1920, at 16:00, another important document known as «Legran–Dro Agreement» for Sovietization of Armenia was signed by Dro Kanayan and H. Terterian on behalf of the Armenian Government on one side, and Plenipotentiary of the Russian SFSR in Armenia Boris Legran on the other side. The Legran–Dro agreement was concluded before the Treaty of Alexandropol, that made the Delegation, negotiating there void of legal

² Հրապարակ. 2010, 153–158, 234–238:

³ Harutyunyan. 2009, 422.

⁴ NAA, 200/1/27/30–32; also: Harutyunyan. 2009, 130.

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lagh 8711 – Ararat station until the river Araxes, at the place where the river Karasou flows into Araxes. In the districts of Nakhijevan, Sharur and Shahtakht, where consequently the special administration would be established by the plebiscite, Armenia undertook not to interfere into regime of this administration, independently of its future form». Judging from the frontier, drawn by K. Karabekir at Alexandropol, the Mount Ararat symbol of Armenia and territories in between Van to Sevan lakes went for Turkey⁸.

On the other hand, article 12 stated that Armenia could not collect taxes from the transit goods, which would move from Turkey to Persia and Georgia and back. The Turkish Government in its turn «would ensure for Armenia free transit into Persia and Maku on the route of Sharur–Nakhchivan–Shahtakht and Julfa». Let's remark that the frontier of Nakhijevan, except for station of Ararat on the north-west, had been imported from the Treaty of Alexandropol into the following texts, concluded at Moscow and Kars.

G. Makhmourian had already recorded that the article 12 of the Treaty of Alexandropol fixed a duty-free transit for Turkish goods, moving in Transcaucasia into Georgia or through Sharur–Nakhijevan into Azerbaijan and Persia⁹. All the goods from Armenia into Turkey and vice versa should move without obstacles and both sides renounced their transit rights regarding all kind of transportation. Though it is comprehensible from the context, the author should underline that a duty-free transit was provided only for Turkish deliveries. Besides, Kemalists would become chief supervisors of these lines till the general treaty would be concluded.

Article 18 requires that «this treaty is subject to ratification within a month»¹⁰ by the Governments of two countries. We have already noted that neither Grand National Assembly of Turkey, nor the Parliament of Armenia had ever ratified this treaty. Since there was Legran–Dro Agreement of December 2, 1920, and a Bolshevik occupation of Erevan had taken place on December 6, the Treaty of Alexandropol was not recognized by the Soviet authorities and did not enter into the legal force. The newly established soviet Armenia Revolutionary Committee claimed categorically that it was invalid because at the last stage of the negotiations Dashnaks had already abdicated and delegated their powers to Bolsheviks¹¹.

One of the leading scholars on the topic, E. Zohrabyan refers to the important role of Turkey when it yielded the patronage to Azerbaijan on one condition: «Azerbaijan should pledge not to yield patronage to a third country». The Russian People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin objected that it was not serious to speak about the Turkish patronage over Nakhijevan, because the population's summoning the Turkish troops was not

⁸ Nassibian. 1984, 219; The Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2015, 19.

⁹ *Մարտնչություն. 2017, 237:*

¹⁰ *Մարտնչություն. 2017, 237:*

¹¹ Fleey and others 2018. 19; also: *Մարտնչություն. 2021, II–III:*

true¹². Zohrabyan concludes: «Alexandropol Treaty was not ratified and finally the obligation rested with the state which was not presented at the conference. However, his objections did not attain success and the final part of the provision on the transition of Nakhijevan under the patronage of Azerbaijan was formulated as follows: «on condition, that Azerbaijan should not yield the above protectorate to a third state», i.e. to Armenia»¹³.

Makhmourian also looks at political inefficiency of Armenia in regard to its dealing with Turkey generally and with the Nakhijevan issue in particular. Therefore, she shares the R. Hovannisian's conclusion that «the Treaty of Alexandropol ripped the last shred of hope from the Armenian delegation and showed that its calculation regarding the limits of Turkish expansion and domination has been entirely wrong»¹⁴.

The Clauses on Nakhijevan in the Treaty of Moscow

After the Treaty of Sevres, signed on August 10, 1920, the Bolshevik-Turkish relations verified. Although G. Chicherin insisted that the Turks cede Armenians some Western Armenian territory, Kemalists refused to discuss the issue of borders and insisted on a treaty of alliance without any reference to these Provinces¹⁵. According to George Bournoutian, the People's Commissar on the Affairs of Nationalities Stalin, who did not favor the Armenians, and Lenin, who was concerned about much greater issue of the wide revolution in the East, agreed. Shortly after the Sevres treaty, the Russians and Turks initiated on August 24, 1920, in Moscow a project of the bilateral Treaty¹⁶.

Bournoutian explains the hard and sad conditions of Armenia in 1920–1921. He notes that Turkish-Russian cooperation, the US neutrality and European inaction led to Kemalist attack on Armenia in September, 1920. On September 29 the Turkish army entered Sarikamish and on October 30, 1920 captured Kars. On November 7 the Turkish troops under K. Karabekir entered Alexandropol and demanded that Armenia accept a truce based on the Brest-Litovsk boundaries¹⁷. Therefore, from October 8, 1920 onwards, the situation on the Eastern front of the Turkish–Armenian war together with Armenian borders at Nakhijevan were under the control of Kemalists. In 1921 Mustafa Kemal affirmed to K. Karabekir, that Turkish friendship with Russians should

¹² Պ ա լ յ ա ն. 1999, 445–447, Ջ ո Ն Ր ա Ր Յ ա ն. 2010, 424:

¹³ Ջ ո Ն Ր ա Ր Յ ա ն. 2010, 424, also: Махмурян. 2021, 24.

¹⁴ Մ ա խ մ ուր յ ա ն. 2017, 237, Hovannisian. 1996, 373; Махмурян. 2021, 26–27.

¹⁵ Bournoutian. 2006, 312.

¹⁶ Bournoutian. 2006, 312; the text of the project: Геноцид армян: ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества. 2003, 150–152; also: Махмурян. 2021, 18–19.

¹⁷ Bournoutian. 2006, 312. The seizure of Alexandropol was a violation of the Brest clauses itself.

not be broken and a good deal should be done with the Bolsheviks¹⁸. It is noteworthy, that in a later note to the Kemalist ambassador in Moscow Ali Fouad, dated April 8, 1921, when a Treaty of Moscow was already concluded and the Dashnak mutiny in Erevan did not finish yet, G. Checherin wrote: «In so far as the entire area of Alexandropol and Erevan is back under the control of Soviet Armenian Government, the time has come for the Turkish troops to withdraw beyond the boundary established under the Treaty of Moscow». And any mention of the text, parleyed at Alexandropol «is tantamount to the cancellation» of the Moscow bargain¹⁹.

The Red Army in the South Caucasus was gravely concerned about the Turkish invasion and as a result of its efforts, Kemalists were forced to withdraw their detachments from Alexandropol on April 22, 1921. Meanwhile, the ground for the next treaty of Kars with the Transcaucasian socialist and still independent republics was preparing. Armenians, who faced a difficult situation of the complete absence of the Allied troops (last British soldiers left Batum on July 9, 1920), did understand that this lack of power in the region would strengthen the Turkish–Bolshevik axis. So, on July 28, 1920, when the 28th Division of the 11th Red Army demanded the Armenian expeditionary detachment under General G. Shelkovnikian to withdraw and leave Nakhijevan under its control, he had to yield and to watch as Bolsheviks invited the 11th Turkish Division to return into the city of Nakhijevan. Only five days ago this contingent flew in panic on the other bank of Araxes under the pressure by Shelkovnikian. However, since July, 1920, the Republic of Armenia preferred not to fight with Bolsheviks and allowed the Red Army to enter Nakhijevan. Erevan had not enough manpower and weapons. However, it was possible to sign less disappointing and even quite acceptable peace treaty before the Turkish-Armenian war. That was not done owing to the pressure by the British High Commissioner H. Luke, who qualified such a possibility as a betrayal of Britain. Later on, Erevan had officially appealed to the League of Nations on October 6, 1920, but in vain²⁰.

In its turn, the Turkish delegation had completely profited in Moscow from the Armenian non-cooperation with Bolsheviks in politics. It constantly insisted there during the diplomatic conference of February 26 – March 18, 1921, on its annexation of Nakhijevan. The archival material reveals that even in January – February 16, 1921, Kemalists carried out intensive anti-Armenian propaganda among the Moslem population and forbade the Soviet Armenia with its refugees any communication or return into the district. Seven regular Turkish battalions under the future chief of the staff of the 11th Turkish Caucasian Division, Major Veysel Bey organized anti-Soviet mutinies in different parts of the region, including Nakhijevan. They aimed at

¹⁸ Ulchenko. 2015, 206.

¹⁹ Ulchenko. 2015, 206.

²⁰ Stavridis. 2015. – <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279556219> (retrieved 11. 12. 2021).

seizing power²¹.

When Alexandropol was captured by Turkish forces, Dashnaks still ruled Armenia. Then, British spread rumors in summer of 1921, that simultaneously with the Greek advance from the west, Bolsheviks were preparing to attack Turkey, too. Ambassador Ali Fuad informed his leaders from Moscow that British public opinion was urged to believe that areas along the Araxes, districts of Van and Mush would soon be allotted to Armenia²². And Turkey, profiting from its military gains, strived to consolidate the Treaty of Alexandropol before the Red Army could arrive. However, an expert in the Turkish Foreign Policy Sedat Laciner explained, why the main support to the Nationalists came from the USSR. It was because both sides «faced a common threat: the allied forces»²³. And the Bolshevik Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin later affirmed: «Our rapprochement with nationalist Turkey at that time was an act of self-preservation both for it and for us»²⁴.

Before the head of Turkish delegation, People's Commissar of National Economy Yusuf Kemal bey voyaged to Moscow to talk with Bolsheviks and especially with Stalin, he visited Mustafa Kemal on December 13, 1920. Yusuf Kemal asked him what to do if Russia would persist on Nakhijevan and got an answer: «Nakhijevan is the Gate of Turk, do whatever you can for this». When he returned home and made a report to Mustafa Kemal, he heard: «Nakhijevan protects our existence»²⁵.

Finally, on February 26, 1921, the most crucial Russian-Turkish diplomatic Conference had began, which continued till March 18. Their meeting was postponed, because two sides waited for information from the 3rd London Conference between Allies and Ottomans. This one was convened on February 21 – March 14; and an Armenian delegation of the bourgeois Republic had been heard on February 26 there. What depends on Moscow, the Armenian diplomats were invited by Chicherin, but the Kemalists rejected their participation²⁶. To reach desirable results, Yusuf Kemal addressed and met with Stalin. According to Zohrabyan, the latter had become the godfather of the Moscow treaty: «Vexed issues (the territorial ones in particular) were resolved through his secret negotiations with Turkish delegates rather than at the plenary sessions of the conference. In his letter to Chicherin (of March 6, 1921) Stalin later informed about the contents of his talks with Turks, ...stating firmly that “the greatest part of Batum region remains to RSFSR

²¹ NAA, 200/1/427/249–252 rev.; 275/5/183/122; *Զ ո Ն Բ Մ Բ Ե Դ Մ Ի*. 2010, 423, on the activity of the Turkish army see the memoirs: Veyssel. 1948; Karabekir. 1960, 413–414; Makhmourian. 2016, 351–352; Махмурян. 2018, 47.

²² Ulchenko. 2015, 206.

²³ Laciner, Demirtepe. 2004, 72.

²⁴ Ulchenko. 2015, 203.

²⁵ Kemal. 1992, 5–6; also: Atnur. 1998, 369.

²⁶ Nassibian. 1984, 227.

while Kars region goes to Turkey». What concerns Nakhijevan, Stalin wrote that the last word on it «belonged to the government of Azerbaijan»²⁷. Azerbaijani Commissar of Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate and the chairman of the republican delegation B. Shahtakhtinsky also held long negotiations with Turks on behalf of Stalin and finally convinced them that all disputes on Batum and Nakhijevan «are useless»²⁸. A bit earlier, on December 13, 1920, Lenin had proclaimed to the member of Armenian Revcom A. Mravian and Armenian representative at the RSFSR S. Ter-Gabrielian, that he was prepared to provide their country with supplies and money, but he would not and could not fight for the inclusion of Kars in Armenia. Bolsheviks were «temporally compelled to sacrifice the interests of the Armenian labor classes to the those of the world Revolution»²⁹.

Thus, during the Moscow negotiations G. Chicherin also proposed to link an autonomous Nakhijevan to Azerbaijan. The Turkish delegates retorted that «Azerbaijan should not cede this responsibility to a third party» and that border of the district should be corrected by the three-lateral Azerbaijani-Turkish-Armenian commission (as it was fixed in Article III of the Treaty)³⁰. And though the Article XV envisaged that Bolsheviks bound themselves «to undertake necessary steps, required for the obligatory adoption» by Transcaucasian republics all the clauses, agreed in Moscow, the Treaty itself was signed on March 18, 1921 just between two parties: Turkey and Russia. The date of March 16 was put to cover the fact that at this day Bolsheviks had concluded a trade-political agreement in London, outmatching their Kemalists counterparts. According to the terms of the Treaty of Moscow, Nakhijevan was granted to newly Sovietized Azerbaijani republic.

The text of the Treaty had 16 articles and an appendix. Its Article III divided a part of the Armenian territory between two Turkish countries: Turkey on the eastern borders and the Republic of Azerbaijan on its western frontier³¹. The Russian delegation had affirmed that the demarcated border lines were designed in accordance with the wishes of Azerbaijan and were not under the supervision of Yerevan. Further, the frontier of Sharur-Daralagyaz had to be determined in accordance with the ethnic principle. It was also announced that if there would be changes of Armenian-Azerbaijani border lines, then the Armenia-Nakhijevan frontier could be regarded as temporary,

²⁷ *Զոհրաբյան. 2010, 423:*

²⁸ *Զոհրաբյան. 2010, 423:*

²⁹ Геноцид армян: ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества. 2003, 336–337; Great Britain, Foreign Office Archives, Public Record office. London, Class 371 Political: General Correspondence, 1919–1920, vol. 6266, doc. E1712, E2303, folio 23; see: Nassibian. 1984, 227; Somakian. 1992, 356–357; *Խաչատրյան. 2007, 117–118, Հակոբյան. 2010, 133–134:*

³⁰ Документы внешней политики СССР. 1959, 598–599; From War Economies. 2004, 32.

³¹ Hovhannisyán. 2004, 42.

on a condition, that such a modification would not violate the current Treaty. General interpretation had been that it would be very difficult to return the indigenous Armenian population in the region after the long warfare between these countries. However, the small correction of the Armenian–Nakhijevan border did take place in the Treaty of Kars.

From their side, Kemalists only stressed that they cared about their eastern borders which should be exempted from Armenian–Azerbaijani negotiations. At the request of Turkey, the most part of Sharur–Daralagyaz was integrated into Nakhijevan. And the Armenian–Turkish border stretched from the Mt. Kemurlu (3090) through the Mt. Sarayboulagh (8071) to the Station of Ararat³². The reaction of Yerevan to the Treaty was extremely negative. Commissar of the Foreign Affairs and the head of the non-participant Armenian delegation for Moscow negotiations Alexander Bekzadyan with his successor A. Mravian opposed it in February–March, 1921, strongly. They vigorously protested that Turkey persistently excluded the Armenian side from Moscow negotiations³³. Bekzadyan also raised the alarm for the next Treaty of Kars; and since he did not want to sign it, he applied for resignation and was replaced by Askanaz Mravian³⁴.

On January 28, February 7, April 15 and July 16, 1921, A. Bekzadyan, head of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee S. Kasyan and its member A. Mravian warned the chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) S. Ordzhonikidze that the violent practice and disrespect of the agreement, signed by B. Legran on behalf of the Russian Federation with Armenia on December 2, 1920, would result in rebellion. A. Mravian made an attempt to resign in February 1921, but his application was rejected. It has also to be mentioned that at a moment of their bargain, Bolsheviks in Kremlin and Kemalist of Ankara were

³² Документы внешней политики СССР. 1959, 599.

³³ See: Պապուկյան. 2012, 39: In common with this correct assertion, the author makes a number of gross mistakes regarding the Treaty of Kars. He ignores that Soviet Russia was internationally recognized since its multilateral agreement of March 1918; that Kemalist delegation participated in the London Conference of February – March 1921; that change of social conditions does not eliminate independence of any state including Soviet Armenia, which acted officially in Turkey and Iran and was recognized de jure by Germany in November 1922; that contrary to his comments, the article 3 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) explains: «The political existence of the State is independent of recognition by the other States». And at last, that territorial demands by Armenians in regard to contemporary Turkey means nothing but the casus belli in a situation when Armenia itself is not capable to preserve its physical security.

³⁴ Matiossian. 2019.— <https://thisweekinarmenianhistory.blogspot.com/2020/06/death-of-alexander-bekzadian-august-1.html?m=1> (retrieved on 07. 04. 2022); Yalanuzyan. 2021.— <https://envreport.com/raw-unfiltered/the-calamity-us-1921-treaty-of-kars/> (retrieved on 07. 04. 2022). This was one of the reasons of his execution during the purges on August 1, 1938. Also: Марукян. 2021, 9.

internationally not recognized authorities. The legal Government of Turkey acted at Constantinople and negotiated in these February-March, 1921, in London. And though Constantinople was occupied by the Allies, the Ottoman authorities were generally recognized and even invited Kemalists to cooperate with them in London.

Immediately after the Russian-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed in Moscow, Bolsheviks sent large quantities of arms and gold to Turkey to enable her fighting on the Western Front. 5 (or 4) million rubles worth amount of gold, equal to 10 million Rubles, had been also sent to the Turkish nationalists³⁵. An expert of the Turkish Studies from the Russian Academy of Sciences Natalia Ulchenko writes: «Soon after the first tranche was disbursed to Turkey upon the conclusion of the Moscow talks (in April, 1921), another 1.4 million Rubles was received by Turkey for the purchase of armaments from Germany. But, afterwards, the provision of aid was suspended»³⁶.

The young scholar M. Somakian offers an account of the results of the Treaty and states that is a clear example to what extent the Soviet government was prepared to assign territories to Turkey at the expense of Armenia. In his not so correct opinion, this Treaty gave a legal form to all territorial losses of Armenia. The Treaty of Sevres was declared invalid. Kars, Ardahan, Surmalu with Mount Ararat were left to Turkey and territory along the flow of Araxes was transformed into an autonomy subordinated to Azerbaijan. The author had recorded but not analyzed the fact that all this losses, fixed in the Treaty of Moscow, were agreed and decided for Armenian homelands while the country itself did not participate and had not been a signatory of this text³⁷.

Nakhijevan in the Treaty of Kars

One of the main routes to south Caucasus goes from Kars to Surmalu – Artashat (Kamarlu) – Ararat (Davalu) – Sadarak village and finally Nakhijevan along the rail road and River of Araxes. This was the main road for Ottoman Divisions and their military movements during the past centuries, to enter this region. After the Treaty of Moscow, Turkey was committed to send a delegation to the Transcaucasia to sign separate agreements with three Soviet republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, to confirm with them the clauses of the treaty, already reached in Moscow. The Kemalist government strived to consolidate territories, it recently taken. That's why the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Russia G. Chicherin sent a telegraph on March 24, 1921, to the Bolshevik Central Committee and warned that their counter-partners would try to extort additional concessions from the republics³⁸. Intensive negotiations with

³⁵ Ulchenko. 2015, 203.

³⁶ Ulchenko. 2015, 203–204.

³⁷ Somakian. 1992, 357–358; *Մարդասիրտ*. 1995, 189, 195:

³⁸ Геноцид армян: ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества. 2003, 475. A number of important details: *Հոգհհհհհհհհհհ*. 2021, № 4, XXI–XXII:

frequent visits to Moscow from Transcaucasia continued. In April Turkey tried to manage a separate conference with Azerbaijan, but failed. In August Yusuf Kemal had agreed to hold the conference on his territory, namely in Kars. However, K. Karabekir did not issue an invitation to Armenian authorities though later he fulfilled an official invitation.

The Treaty of Kars was a joint product of Russian Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists, and it was more than a mere duplicate of the Treaty of Moscow, elaborated by them. The text to be signed at Kars was the final phase in the process of handling the crisis, and on October 13, 1921, it drew and confirmed the Turkey's border with three republics concerned. The chief of the Turkish delegation had been General Kiazim Karabekir, Commander of the Eastern Front. The representative of his closest ally – Azerbaijani Socialist Republic, was the People's Commissar of the State inspection B. Shahtakhtinsky.

Armenia was represented by the People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs Askanaz Mravian and of the Inner Affairs Poghos Makintzian, Georgia – by the People's Commissars of Military Affairs and Navy Shalva Eliava and for the Foreign Affairs and Finance Alexander Svanidze. The Soviet Russia was represented by its Plenipotentiary in Latvia Yakov Ganetsky. 150 member of the Bolshevik delegation at Kars included secretaries and experts. The conference began on September 26, 1921 with a speech by K. Karabekir, who had declared: «When Turkey stood with all its forces up the tyrannical attack of the West, the Turkish nation saw that Great Revolution on the East; it shook the Soviet Russia by a movement, which had the whole-world significance»³⁹.

Y. Ganetsky on behalf of Soviet Russia declared that Turks and Armenians had put aside their enmity and hatred forever. «It is not the feeling of enmity that stir us now; we admire the heroic struggle of the diligent Turkish people for the freedom of its homeland». This people «will know, he has no enemies in the rear; and his neighbors feel deep sympathy towards his struggle against imperialism who wants to coerce the will of the nation», added A. Mravian⁴⁰. At that moment Kemalists supported the Russian Communist Revolution with their slogans and political discourse; they cleverly tried to convince the Kremlin that Mustafa Kemal, their leader, would continue the Soviet path in the East and Anatolia. When signing the final text, K. Karabekir said that «the Treaty of Kars was a star for all the peoples of the East, guiding them in the right direction». And Ganetsky replied: «This will allow them to ally with each other and drive the greedy imperialists out of the region»⁴¹.

Negotiations lasted almost three weeks. Although the Soviet delegation

³⁹ Геноцид армян: ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества. 2003, 475; Fleet. 2018, 144–145.

⁴⁰ Геноцид армян: ответственность Турции и обязательства мирового сообщества. 2003, 539–540. In: Fleet. 2018, 144–145 the citation is not quite correct.

⁴¹ Fleet. 2018, 144–145; also: Акopian. 2021, 108–109.

tried to restore at least Ani and Koghb (present-day Tuzluja) to Armenia, the Turks refused. The Treaty of Kars (October 13, 1921) resulted in nearly the same borders agreed to in Moscow, borders which currently separate Armenia and Georgia from Turkey. The only one improvement was a cession of 142 sq. km on the frontier with Nakhichevan⁴².

Thus, the content of the Treaty of Kars changed very little and repeated word by word provisions of the Moscow Treaty of Friendship, which was signed on March 18, 1921 by Turkey and Soviet Russia. The Treaty of Kars reaffirmed the establishment of the autonomous territory of Nakhichevan under the sovereignty of Azerbaijan, and delimited its boundaries, a small portion of which had been left undecided by the Treaty of Moscow and became a tiny cession to Armenia⁴³.

Under the article 1, compiled at Kars, the Transcaucasian parties renounced all international treaties previously negotiated between them, except the 1921 Treaty of Moscow⁴⁴. The current borders of the countries located in this region were re-examined now. In compliance with the Treaty of Kars, the government of Angora and its borders were recognized by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as by the Soviet Russia. Besides, as it follows from the article 2, Turkey agreed «not to recognize any international acts regarding Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are not recognized by the corresponding Governments of these countries, which are represented now by the Soviets» of these States⁴⁵. It means that Turkey had formally renounced the Treaty of Alexandropol, imposed on Armenia on December 2, 1920.

Article 5 defined Nakhichevan as an autonomous region under the patronage of Azerbaijan. This was agreed by all sides, although the Armenian delegation made not a single official speech, complaint or even remark during the Conference⁴⁶. However, the Treaty of Kars secured the political subordination of Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan and, as it stated by the Turkish author, secured this district against the Armenian influence or «threat»⁴⁷.

The diplomatic fight at Kars had confirmed that Bolsheviks could not hand over Nakhichevan to Armenians as they promised by the agreement of December 2, 1920. Thenceforth, the whole district, except its 142 sq. km, and its main city – named the “Gateway of the Turks” by Mustafa Kemal, was recognized in the border of Azerbaijan. Since Armenia was occupied by the Red Army at the time and officials of the Socialist Republic of Armenia could not make independent decisions, it was Moscow and some socialist officials

⁴² Bournoutian. 2006, 318; Հաղորդագրություն. 2010, 307, Հաղորդագրություն. 2011, 52, 56–58, Махмұрян. 2021, 28–29.

⁴³ Chichekian. 1967, 69. Also: Հովհաննիսյան. 2021, № 1, 20:

⁴⁴ Документы внешней политики СССР. 1960, 421; Yalanuzyan. 2021.

⁴⁵ Документы внешней политики СССР. 1960, 422; also: Fleet. 2018, 144–145.

⁴⁶ Հաղորդագրություն. 2010, 281:

⁴⁷ Gültekin Punsman. 2009, 4.

who agreed to the most hardest surrender. Thus the Treaty of Kars, signed on October 13, 1921, by the delegations of the SSR Armenia, Azerbaijani SSR, SSR Georgia and representative of the RSFSR on one side, and the delegation of Turkey (composed of two National Assembly delegates, one ex-assistant of the state-secretary for public labor and a plenipotentiary at Baku) on the other, formulated a text with regard to friendship that confirmed the status of Nakhijevan, previously specified in the Treaty of Moscow.

Emanuele Aliprandi believes that attaching Nakhijevan to Azerbaijan was strongly connected to the desire of Turkey to implement the Pan-Turkism strategy. He states: «We can conclude that at this particular stage of history, the ideas of pan-Turkism were partially implemented. A pro-Turkish realm was established on the Caspian shores and the strategically important Nakhijevan was entrusted to this realm. As examples of problematic areas, one can see Syunik, which interrupted direct communication between the Azerbaijani SSR, and the Nakhijevan autonomous oblast, as well as a small part of Iran, which interrupted direct communication between Nakhijevan and its metropolis – Turkey. These problems had been considered manageable and their solution was postponed»⁴⁸.

As a result, Turkey gained access to the Nakhijevan Autonomous Republic by swapping territories with Iran while Azerbaijan began to invoke the «corridor issue» in the framework of the Artsakh (Karabakh) conflict resolution. However, Armenia strongly resisted any possibility of conceding its sovereign territory to Azerbaijan for the creation a Pan-Turkic corridor. Though «with the establishment of Soviet regime, the previous method of pogroms and massacres in the region of Nakhijevan was replaced with a systematic and highly organized policy of displacement of the indigenous population. It was implemented by means of a purposeful and sometimes even undisguised program targeted not only at mainly ethnic, but also at socio-economic and cultural problems»⁴⁹, – records Aliprandi.

The Treaty of Kars unlike the previous Moscow treaty (between two parties) was signed by five sides: Turkey, Russia, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. And in both cases Turkey didn't let Bolsheviks to hand over Nakhijevan to Armenia. If it was not Turkish military intervention, Kars and Nakhijevan would have been kept by Armenia. Thus, Turkey rallied all sides to consolidate its eastern borders. Armenia was really empty-handed, Yerevan was occupied by the Bolsheviks, who were subjects of Moscow Communists, and Kars with Nakhijevan were occupied by Turkish and Red Armies. Socialists in Yerevan had few ground for brighter expectations.

Vladimir Lenin had already explained to Armenian Bolsheviks on December 13, 1920, that Moscow was forced to sacrifice their national

⁴⁸ Aliprandi. 2016, 30–31.

⁴⁹ Aliprandi. 2016, 30–31.

interests to the world revolution⁵⁰. And the socialists at Erevan knew very well that Lenin's slogans would have no place in the bloody geography of eastern Anatolia and Sharur–Nakhijevan. International revolution was not a solution in the objective reality of the borders built in the Transcaucasia. Though at that time, its establishment ended the bloodshed at a cost of saying goodbye to the vast historical lands, taken away from the native people without any encouraging perspective. Ottoman and Tsarist Russia were invaders to the south Caucasus since the 15th century. The artificial country Azerbaijan, established in 1918, was a part of enormous Persian ethnic and cultural areal with having no identity as Turk. On the other hand, Nakhijevan was an Armenian district with more than three thousand years of history and rich culture. It composed a unit of Armenian kingdoms or Principalities for prolonged periods, and had been subordinated to the Persian Empire with extensive social, economic interaction and bloody wars. In the 19th century Nakhijevan belonged to Erevan province in the Eastern Armenia and had no history with the Turkish immigrants. Therefore, dividing this land between Turkey and Azerbaijan was purely pragmatic had no logical substantiated historical, geographical base and justification.

Conclusion

In less than one year, in the Post–First World War, three Treaties imposed to Armenia and changed the fate of Nakhijevan in favor of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The first was the detrimental Treaty of Alexandropol that was signed in 2 December 1920 between the First Republic of Armenia and the Turkish Government and had never been ratified by either side. Armenia was defeated at the war, unleashed by Kemalists and ceded more than half of its territory including Ardahan–Kars and Nakhijevan to Turkey. Armenia also accepted temporary Turkish jurisdiction over Nakhijevan. The second was fully and quickly ratified Treaty of Moscow which was signed between Turkey and Russia (with Armenian absence) on 18 March 1921. In the Treaty of Moscow Bolsheviks (without any Armenian participation) handed over the Nakhijevan to Azerbaijan. Third Treaty of Kars was signed on October 13, 1921 (between five countries including Armenia), it was also properly ratified by all sides and confirmed the previous agreement and borders with Armenia in Nakhijevan.

Armenia did not take the initiative in these three contracts. It gained no concessions and even lost any influence in the Nakhijevan region. Owing to all these treaties Armenia lost Nakhijevan, because Turkey had the upper hand on the ground. Moreover, during the signing of all three documents the axis of Kemalists-Bolsheviks cooperation was extremely strong. We do consider that

⁵⁰ Though R. Kazanjian notes that the Bolshevik elite in Moscow did abandon this slogan from December 1920 on, since considered it henceforth to be the castles in the air (К а з а н д ж а н. 2006, 135).

the Treaty of Moscow was the last chance for Armenia to get some territories from the Turks though Bolsheviks were under the strong pressure of Kemalists. Besides, all three treaties were concluded when the western part of Armenia, half of its eastern part and Nakhijevan were under the occupation of Turkish Nationalist and Bolsheviks (Red Army) troops.

The Treaty of Moscow was more important of the documents under consideration because it confirmed and institutionalized fragmentation of the Armenian motherlands. In the Treaty of Moscow the only logic behind of these fragmentations was “military occupation” of Armenia by the Turkey and “the logic of Force” that was it. The Treaty of Moscow that changed the historical destiny of a nation, had no other geographical and territorial rationality. Finally the Treaty of Kars, signed on October 13, 1921, was word by word duplicate of the Treaty of Moscow. So, the bilateral text of Moscow was more important than the text, asserted at Kars, because the first one elaborated and fixed the details of the Nakhijevan’s separation on paper.

The Treaty of Kars was not only a ceremonial show that Turkey intended to impose its victory. It had also confirmed the clauses of the Moscow text. Although the Armenian Bolshevik representatives were one part of the signatories at Kars, this document was hated and not accepted later by the Armenian public. This contract could extinguish the fire of racial tensions and the danger of interventions by its neighbors as long as the Soviet iron shadow remained over the area. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union it can be seen that ethnic conflicts and border disputes have risen again.

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ՄԱՋԻԴ ՔԱՐԻՄԻ (Իրան)

Ա մ փ ո փ ու մ

Բանալի բառեր՝ Նախիջևան, Շարուր, 1920 թ. Ալեքսանդրապոլի պայմանագիր, 1921 թ. Մոսկվայի պայմանագիր, 1921 թ. Կարսի պայմանագիր, Հայաստան, բոլշևիկ, քեմալական, Ադրբեջան, Կարմիր բանակ:

1918–1921 թթ. մի կողմից Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը, մյուս կողմից՝ Թուրքիան ու նորաթուխ Ադրբեջանի Հանրապետությունը դարձել էին ազգամիջյան և տարածքային հակամարտությունների ասպարեզ: Հակամարտությունը թե՛ ժաջրեց դեռևս 1917 թ. տեղի ունեցած ռուսական հեղափոխությունների առաջացրած քաոսն ու 1918 թ. մարտի 26-ին սկսած օսմանյան ներխուժումը երկրամաս՝ Բաքվի գրավումով:

1918 թ. մարտի 2–25-ին Նախիջևանում տեղի ունեցավ Մահմեդական ազգային խորհրդի անհաջող խռովությունը, 1919 թ. հուլիսի 20–25-ին՝ այդ խորհրդի գինված հարձակումը Երևանի վարչակազմի վրա ու հայերի զանգվածային կոտորածը, իսկ դեկտեմբերի 18–24-ին՝ Վերին ու Ներքին Ազուլիանների ոչնչացումը: 1920 թ. հուլիսի 14–25-ին ՀՀ բանակը իրազործեց արագ ու հաջող ռազմարշավ՝ գավառում իր ինքնիշխանությունը վերականգնելու նպատակով: Այդուհանդերձ, Ադրբեջանի սերտ համագործակցությունը քեմալականների և դաշինքը բոլշևիկների հետ 1920 թ. հանգեցրին Հայաստանի դեմ իրականացրած պատերազմի: Հարձակման հետևանքով ռազմակալվեց Հայաստանի Հանրապետության մեծ մասը՝ ներառյալ Ալեքսանդրապոլ քաղաքն ու Նախիջևանի գավառը:

1920 թ. դեկտեմբերի 2-ին ստորագրվեց Խորհրդային Հայաստանի և ՌԽԴՄՀ կողմից չճանաչված ու չվավերացված Ալեքսանդրապոլի պայմանագիրը, որի 2-րդ հոդվածով Նախիջևանը լրացվեց Շարուր գավառամասով ու կազմեց նոր շրջան՝ Թուրքական «Հովանավորությունը»։ Դրանով արդեն ՀՀ կառավարությունը պարտավորվեց չմիջամտել վերջինիս կառավարմանը։ Այնուհետև՝ 1921 թ. մարտի 18-ին, Ռուսաստանի և Թուրքիայի միջև կնքված Մոսկվայի պայմանագրի 3-րդ հոդվածով այս ընդլայնված շրջանը որակվեց որպես Նախիջևանի մարզ՝ ինքնավար տարածքի կարգավիճակով ու Բաքվի ենթակայության ներքո, պայմանով, որ դրա իրավասությունը չփոխանցվի երրորդ կողմի։

Այսպիսով, անդրկովկասյան հանրապետությունների և Թուրքիայի միջև Ռուսաստանի մասնակցությամբ 1921 թ. հոկտեմբերի 13-ին կնքված Կարսի պայմանագրի 5-րդ հոդվածով (լինելով Մոսկվայի պայմանագրի հոդված 3-ի նմանօրինակը) Նախիջևանի մարզ դառնալն ու նրա նոր կարգավիճակը վավերացվեց Խորհրդային Հայաստանի կողմից։ Ի տարբերություն Մոսկվայի պայմանագրի՝ Կարսի պայմանագրով Նախիջևանի մարզից 142 կմ² չափով փոքր զիջում նախատեսվեց ՀՍԽՀ-ի օգտին։ Իսկ բուն երկրամասը, միշտ լինելով Հայաստանի երկրամաս և 1914 թ. ունենալով 41 % հայ բնակչություն, ենթարկվեց Խորհրդային Ադրբեջանին՝ իբրև նորակազմ ինքնավար միավոր։

Մաջլիդ Քարիմի – ԵՊՀ արևելագիտության ֆակուլտետի իրանագիտության ամբիոնի ասպիրանտ։ Գիտական հետաքրքրությունները՝ Նախիջևանը XVII–XIX դարերում, Նախիջևանի տեղանունը, 1905–1921 թթ. հասարակական-քաղաքական զարգացումները, իրանալեզու ազգությունները Բաքվի իշխանության ներքո։ Հեղինակ է 1 մենագրության և 3 հոդվածի։ Karimmj@yahoo.com

АЛЕКСАНДРОПОЛЬСКИЙ, МОСКОВСКИЙ И КАРССКИЙ ДОГОВОРЫ 1920–1921 ГГ., ИЗМЕНИВШИЕ СУДЬБУ НАХИДЖЕВАНА

МАДЖИД КАРИМИ (Иран)

Резюме

Ключевые слова: Нахиджеван, Шарур, Александропольский договор 1920 г., Московский договор 1921 г., Карсский договор 1921 г., Армения, большевик, кемалист, Азербайджан, Красная армия.

В 1918–1921 гг. Республика Армения с одной стороны и Турция с новообразованной Республикой Азербайджан – с другой, стали ареной межнациональных и территориальных конфликтов. Данный конфликт усилил хаос, созданный еще российскими революциями 1917 г. и османское вторжение в край, начавшееся 26 марта 1918 г. и сумевшее захватить Баку.

2–25 марта 1918 г. в крае произошел безуспешный мятеж Мусульманского национального совета, 20–25 июля 1919 г. – его военное нападение на ереванскую администрацию с массовой резней армян, а 18–24 декабря –

уничтожение Верхнего и Нижнего Агулиса. 14–25 июля 1920 г. армия РА осуществила быстрый и успешный поход для восстановления ее суверенитета в этом уезде. Вместе с тем, тесное взаимодействие Азербайджана с кемалистами и его союз с большевиками привели к войне 1920 г. против Армении. В результате агрессии была оккупирована большая часть Республики Армения, включая г. Александрополь и Нахиджеванский уезд.

2 декабря 1920 г. был подписан непризнанный и нератифицированный Советской Арменией и РСФСР Александропольский договор; по его ст. 2 из Нахиджеванского уезда и Шарура как части другого уезда составили новый район, под турецком «протекторатом». Тем самым уже потерявшее полномочия правительство РА обязывалось не вмешиваться в управление этой территорией. Затем ст. 3 русско-турецкого Московского договора от 18 марта 1921 г. назвала этот расширенный район Нахиджеванской областью, подчиненной Баку, с тем, чтобы его полномочия не передавали третьей стороне.

Наконец, ст. 5 Карсского договора от 13 октября 1921 г., подписанного между республиками Закавказья и Турцией при участии РСФСР (являясь повторением ст. 3 Московского договора), зафиксировала Нахиджеванскую область и ее новый статус Советской Арменией. В отличие от Московского договора, Карсский текст предусматривал уступку в 142 км² из состава Нахиджеванской области в пользу ССРА. Сам же край, постоянно служивший частью Армении и имевший в 1914 г. 41% армянского населения, был подчинен Советскому Азербайджану в виде новообразованной автономной единицы.

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