

**NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  
INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES**

**ՀՀ ԳԻՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱԿԱԴԵՄԻԱ  
ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏ**

**ARMENIA-CHINA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND  
PROSPECTS**

**PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC  
CONFERENCE DEDICATED TO THE 30th ANNIVERSARY  
OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA  
AND CHINA**

**7 APRIL 2022**

**N 1**

**YEREVAN- BEIJING  
2022**

**ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆ-ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆ. ՁԵՌՔԲԵՐՈՒՄՆԵՐ ԵՎ  
ՀԵՌԱՆԿԱՐՆԵՐ**

**ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԳԻՏԱԺՈՂՈՎԻ ՆՅՈՒԹԵՐ**

**ԱՊՐԻԼԻ 7, 2022**

**N 1**

**ԵՐԵՎԱՆ-ՊԵԿԻՆ  
2022**

*Ժողովածուն տպագրվում է ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության  
ինստիտուտի գիտական խորհրդի որոշմամբ*

Published by the decision of the Scientific Council of the Institute of  
Oriental Studies of NAS Republic of Armenia NAS RA

Armenia-China: Achievements and prospects. Proceedings of the  
International Conference: Yerevan, 2022. 48 p.  
Հայաստան-Չինաստան. ձեռքբերումներ և հեռանկարներ:  
Միջազգային գիտաժողովի նյութեր, Երևան, 2022: 48 էջ:

ISBN 978-9939-9012-7-5  
DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-7-5

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**Remarks by H.E. Mr. Fan Yong, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the Republic of Armenia**

It is a great pleasure to participate in this conference titled "30 Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and Armenia: achievements and prospects". First of all, on behalf of the Chinese Embassy in Armenia, I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to the organizers of this scientific event, the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, and wish this conference a complete success!

Yesterday was the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. The leaders of the two countries exchanged congratulatory messages, highly appraising the achievements of bilateral cooperation in various fields over the past 30 years, and pointing out the direction for the future development of bilateral relations. President of the Republic of Armenia Khachaturyan also visited our embassy in Armenia to congratulate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. During this period government departments and friendly groups of the two countries have held a series of distinctive celebration activities, fully demonstrating the profound historical accumulation and broad development prospects of the traditional friendship between China and Armenia. Today's conference is not only a grand exchange event for scholars from the two countries, but also an important event to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two sides have adhered to equal treatment, mutual respect, mutual benefit and win-win results, continuously deepened political trust and promoted mutually beneficial cooperation. The relationship between the two countries has continuously achieved new development and reached the best level in history. China has always firmly supported Armenia in pursuing a development path that suits its own national interests.

Looking forward to the future, the two sides should strengthen development strategies, accelerate the high-quality development of the joint construction of the "Belt and Road", continue to expand bilateral economic and trade cooperation, implement existing cooperation projects, and strive to promote and implement larger cooperation projects. Armenia has certain advantages in high-tech, innovation, medical care and other fields. China is willing to work together with Armenia to explore new growth points of cooperation and continuously enrich the practical cooperation between the two countries. We should actively promote exchanges in the fields of education, culture, and youth between the two countries.

It is gratifying that in recent years more and more people in Armenia, especially young people, learn Chinese language and understand Chinese culture. During epidemic China and Armenia have firmly supported each other and jointly made positive contributions to the international fight against the epidemic. China is willing to strengthen international cooperation with Armenia to jointly defend true multilateralism and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the two countries. Armenia is welcome to become an observer state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as soon as possible, and contribute more to maintaining regional security and development.

At present the world has entered a new period of turmoil and change. Under the new situation, the future development of China-Armenia relations faces new opportunities, as well as some risks and challenges. Thanks to the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia for organizing this conference. I hope that everyone will continue to safeguard the fundamental interests of the two countries, strengthen mutual friendship and confidence, and actively offer advices and suggestions for making new contributions in order to create a better future for China-Armenia relations.

**Remarks by H.E. Mr. Sergey Manasaryan, Ambassador of the  
Republic of Armenia to the People's Republic of China**

Today is a very important day, as we are all assembled here to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the People's Republic of China. Please, accept my congratulations on this occasion. I would like to seize the opportunity to thank our colleagues from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, and the Institute of Russian, European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for the work done during these months and to commend their tireless efforts that made this event happen. Special thanks to His Excellency Mr. Safaryan, Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia and Mr. Li Hui, Special Representative of the Chinese Government for Eurasian Affairs.

Due to restrictions caused by pandemic, the events dedicated to the 30th anniversary have been postponed in China, and today we have an opportunity to meet just online. Even in these conditions, the convening of such an event testifies to the high willingness of both the Armenian and Chinese sides to work together to deepen and foster relations. I will not say anything new if I once again emphasize what you have been repeatedly hearing from the Armenian side at different levels, reiterating that the strengthening and deepening relations with China are of high priority in the foreign policy agenda of the Republic of Armenia.

30 years ago, together with our Chinese colleagues, we started from scratch, and if we try to analyze the way that we have gone, the results will be very impressive. Our cooperation is characterized by a high-level political dialogue, our relations are dynamically developing encompassing economy, the spheres of culture, education, science, high technologies, tourism and etc. Almost in all areas we have very remarkable indicators. That speaks about our determination to further develop friendly relations between the two ancient civilizations that share a long history of friendship and cooperation since the ancient Silk Road. Although the Coronavirus has seriously harmed the regularity of our agenda, we still have many projects to be implemented and we remain steadily committed to develop our cooperation to a qualitatively new level. Today's conference is a very significant platform to summarize the

rich and wide agenda formed over the past 30 years, and to point out the opportunities of developing cooperation in this new situation.

I want to thank all the participants of today's conference. We managed to bring together today professionals, experts who will raise a wide range of topics starting from the different aspects of bilateral relations to the outlining the possibilities of cooperation within the framework of regional integration organizations. I hope that today we will have a very comprehensive discussion on the above issues and topics and wish all of us every success.

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**Turkey-China: peculiarities of changing relationship in the  
framework of Neo-classical realism and Turkey's new activism in  
Central Asia**

*In the topic the peculiarities of the transformations of Turkey-China relationship within the framework of Turkish foreign policy vision are analysed, as Turkey's foreign policy goes through very curious transformations in the last decade. Turkey-China relations have had their ups and downs, accompanied by permanent zigzags of pragmatism and distrust in the bilateral relations. In this regard to make a sense of Turkish-Chinese current relationship, it will be helpful to discuss some determinants driving current Turkish foreign policy that significantly shape bilateral relations. Turkish-Chinese relations are analysed in the analytical framework of the Neo-classical Realism theoretical approach, which merges the impact of internal and external factors on states foreign policy behaviour. Here will be presented the variables underlying current relationship in two levels of analysis - structural (international) and unit (domestic) level.*

*Structural level factors relate to the changes in the structure of international relations and transformations of international order, power distribution changes in the framework of which Turkey strives to find adaptive mechanisms. The first variable relates to the post-American or post unipolar world order, where rising multipolarity perspectives in the international structure have encouraged Turkey to broaden the scope of its geopolitical vision thus re-evaluating and building its relations with global powers like Russia, China in new modes that had previously been ignored. Turkey, in this regard, strives to get strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, trying to lessen its dependence from the West as much as possible in order to develop some kind of alternative strategies, building multifaceted and multilateral relations with the non-Western powers.*

Unit level variables underlying Turkey-China relations, first of all are economic and ideological factors. One of the most important determinants in bilateral relations is the economic field which is a high

priority for Ankara because Turkish economy is currently in trouble. Economic recession presents existential threat to the survival of the Turkish authorities. Currently, their first priority is to improve the economic situation by attracting as much as foreign direct investments as possible. By the end of 2021, total amount of Chinese direct investments in Turkey reached to \$4.5 bln, 70 % of which was attracted between 2017-2021. So, a pragmatic turn in the foreign policy of Ankara now is obvious. As showed the results of the public opinion survey (2021), most part of the Turkish society ranks Far East-China first place that Turkey has to give priority to in the economic sphere.

Another unit-level variable affecting on bilateral relations is authoritarian regime type in Turkey which stimulates to forge and deepen cooperation with such powers that gives manoeuvring opportunities in its foreign policy without any pressure for undemocratic track. Hence, the growing criticisms of Western democracy pushed Turkey to seek pragmatic collaborations with China, as Chinese policy of non-interference in domestic affairs is highly acceptable for Turkish regime.

At the unit level, the influence of ideological variables is not of secondary importance. Eurasianism or Eurasian vision started to significantly influence Turkish foreign policy. One can argue that some kind of ideological mixture has emerged, so called Islamic-Nationalistic-Eurasianist or so called "Islamic Nationalism" which started heavily reshaping the foreign policy of Turkey. In this regard, within the Eurasian vision of Turkish foreign policy, of course, China's importance is undoubtedly very high. But we also see some kind of "Turkish dilemma" or "pragmatism-idealism balance struggle" concerning to policy on China and Uighurs. In this ideological mixture in Turkey, Eurasianist segments promote bilateral relationship with China, as opposed to the nationalistic segments that constantly prioritize Pan-Turkic vision and political behaviour. These segments permanently drive a Pan-Turkic discourse, presenting Xinjiang issue in this context.

Dramatic events of 2020 in the South Caucasus as Azerbaijan with the help of Turkey launched an offensive war against Nagorno-Karabagh and its aftermath, gave a new impetus to Turkey's aggressive and ambitious foreign policy. Ankara tries to expand its hands further east into Central Asia, in the hope of forming an alliance with the other Turkic countries. The Second Karabakh War gave a new impetus to Turkey's interests to link with Central Asia. So, it is essential to evaluate Turkish

foreign policy in the framework of these regional geopolitics. Turkish nationalism and Pan-Turkism get new inspiration especially in 2020 and after the war, when the Turkish authorities intensified the discourse on the Turkic world. Ankara was inspired by the war outcomes to implement its ambitious strategy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The new level of military integration with Azerbaijan, new activism in Central Asia, and the inauguration of the Organization of Turkic states in 2021 are the visible markers of Ankara's new strategy. During the Karabagh war Turkey activated Central Asian dimension of its foreign policy, especially in defence and security fields. Turkish expert and academic circles were assessing the results of the Karabagh war just from the perspective of Turkey's strategy towards the Turkic world. Turkey's new strategy and activism accompanied by the Pan-Turkic discourse will have an impact on the reshaping of public perceptions and mood in Central Asia and Turkic communities. Extremist and terrorist Islamist groups, especially organizations like the "East Turkestan Islamic Movement", will benefit and will be encouraged by the glorification of the Turkic world narrative. Turkey's current assertive and robust power projection into Central Asia presents challenge to China. As, taking into account Turkey's ethnic-cultural leverage and recent military-political penetration into region, being inspired by the outcomes of the Karabagh war in 2020, can encourage Central Asian countries to distance their relations away from Russia and China

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## **IRAN'S MEMBERSHIP IN SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES**

Over the past two years, the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has been dynamically increasing in the process of neutralizing new regional threats and global challenges. The issue of admitting new members to the organization became more active for the founders in the context of the changing world order. At the Astana Summit on 9 June 2017, India and Pakistan became full members of the SCO, after receiving observer status in 2005 and starting their accession process in 2015. It is undeniable that Iran is one of the key countries whose membership in the organization has a primary importance, but it was dragging on for a long time. It was during Ahmadinejad presidency that Iran received observer status in the SCO in 2005 but farther two attempts of becoming full member were failed. In 2021, Iran made one-step closer to becoming a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), after 15 years it first applied. The admission process of Iran took a new breath in Dushanbe Summit of the Organization in September 2021. Full acceptance involves the signing of several agreements, which usually takes about two years. However, the point of no return has been defined and fundamental decision has been made. Islamic Republic could be considered as a full member of the SCO organization.

Refusal of the SCO to accept in the past was largely due to a number of factors in international relations. First, the countries of Central Asia were seriously afraid of Iranian ideological expansion. However, subsequent years Tehran showed ability to build constructive cooperation with the secular states, that he is guided by pragmatism and ideological expansionism is limited to some parts of the Middle East region.

Another factor was its emphasizing and uncompromising anti-Americanism, especially in the of M. Ahmadinejad presidency period. The latter at that time was interfering with the interests of both China and Russia. China in the 2000s and 2010s remained one of the key economic

partners of the United States and did not want the SCO to become a platform for agitation against the United States. During this period, Russia also still hopes for the normalization of relations with the West. Then the complicated geopolitical situation in US relations with Russia and China has significantly changed approaches. Relations between Moscow and Washington continue to deteriorate. China as a leading world power has turned from a stable partner into the main competitor to the United States. In other words, Iranian anti-Americanism today looks much more acceptable to the main founders of the SCO than 10-15 years ago.

The main trigger for Iran's admission to the SCO became the situation around Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops and the takeover of power by the Taliban. Moscow played a key role in accelerating the adoption process admitting. After a conversation with Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Nikolay Patrushev on August 11 Iranian counterpart Ali Shamkhani announced for the first time that the political barriers for Iran's admission to the SCO had been removed. After the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, the SCO states forced themselves in resolving the security threats emanating from Afghanistan, including terrorism and drugs. Iran's entry into the organization at this moment was an important factor- without Tehran, an effective Afghan settlement is hardly possible.

Other serious interpretations were the creation of alternative economic mechanisms for opposition to the dominant influence of Washington on the world economy and neutralization of consequences of the American sanctions. The current geopolitical situation predicts that China, like Russia and Iran, may face similar pressure mechanisms.

The approval of Tehran's application for membership in the SCO was also important in Iranian domestic political context. There were opinions in the expert community that the activation of the Iranian membership process to the SCO was the first significant foreign policy victory for the new Iranian president, conservative Ebrahim Raisi, who needs to demonstrate achievements against the backdrop of his predecessor's failures, reformist Hassan Rouhani.

However, it should be noted that after the failure of the nuclear agreement, H. Rouhani's team has already taken several steps to find alternatives to overcome the crisis in the Iranian economy. After Trump's decisive withdrawal from the nuclear deal on May 17, 2018, Tehran

signed an agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) on the establishment of a free trade area (FTA), which entered into force on October 27, 2019 for a period of three years. Then, at the end of H. Rouhani's presidency, on March 27, 2021, Iran and China signed an agreement on comprehensive cooperation for a period of 25 years. Anyway, E. Raisi is largely trying to prove himself as the antipode of H. Rouhani, whose last years have become one of the most difficult periods for the Iranian economy. After confident victory of E. Raisi in the elections in June 2021, the new president needed to justify his coming to power and showed the critical point for the Iranian "pivot to the East". It was not a coincidence that, the first foreign visit of Iranian president after his election was the organization's summit in Dushanbe. Iran's hardliner president, who did not come to New York for the United Nations General Assembly the week before, went to Dushanbe, Tajikistan for the SCO meeting. Thanked all eight-member states for allowing Iran to join the organization as a full member, Raisi said, that the world has entered a new era, hegemony and unilateralism are failing." Back in Tehran, he called SCO membership as a "strategic move."

The biggest impetus for accelerating Iran's full membership in the SCO were the war in Ukraine. The uncompromising confrontation between Russia and the West makes new adjustments on the SCO platform. Russia more than ever needs a sustainable partnership, not only in the field of security, but also in economic terms. Russia needs guarantees that its partners will not join to the Western sanctions. On September 14, 2022, at the SCO summit in Samarkand, the Islamic Republic signed a memorandum of commitment in the SCO. By which Iran undertakes to join the agreements and treaties of the SCO, including the founding charter of the organization and its Convention on combating terrorism, extremism and separatism. Iran's own interest in the organization meets its political interests. Despite the fact that the role of the SCO as an economic driver has not yet been fully developed, this structure will primarily contribute to Tehran's security cooperation and political rapprochement with the countries of the organization.

In its turn, with the advent of Iran, the SCO is turning into some kind of platform for dialogue between states with different views. It will allow them to address both security challenges in the region and develop alternatives for economic cooperation.



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## **THE RISING ROLE OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ARMENIA'S OPPORTUNITY**

The report aims to focus on analysing the influential role of Shanghai cooperation organization (SCO) in current international affairs, as well as consider Armenia's opportunities within the organization. In recent years Russia and China are creating new Asian-led organizations, institutions, economic and military cooperation initiatives, thus trying to bypass the major Western-led organizations. Moreover, Russia and China are now bringing India, Pakistan, Iran, and even Turkey on board with them as they pursue ambitious geopolitical and geoeconomic initiatives. Nowhere is this coming together of regional powers more apparent, than in SCO.

SCO started from solving boundary issues, grew from counter-terrorism cooperation, developed and deepened in political, economic, cultural, educational and other fields of cooperation, and gradually became a new model of multilateral cooperation. Main objectives of SCO are the followings - strengthening mutual trust and neighbourly relationship between the participating states; contributing to the efficient cooperation in the political, trade-economic, scientific-technical and cultural spheres, as well as in term of education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection, etc.; jointly safeguarding peace, security and stability in the region; fostering creation of democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order.

Various scholars have different points of view regarding major issues of the organization. Some consider it as a "paper tiger", while others describe it with suspicion even as a counterweight to NATO. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to agree that SCO model of cooperation is an extremely important achievement in the practice of modern international relations. A fundamentally important feature of SCO is that

it is one of the few multipurpose international organizations built from the outset as a multilateral partnership, and this universal partnership model is emphasized in SCO Charter. This organization has already established itself as one of the most influential partners in modern system of international relations. A solid legal framework for its operation has been formed, and the mechanisms of multilateral cooperation have been successfully operating. The organization has established partnerships with states, international organizations and institutions that share SCO principles and values.

Actually, the exact number of SCO member states quite recently reached nine (Islamic Republic of Iran officially joined SCO during Samarkand Summit). The expansion of SCO is another issue that has been one of the most controversial in the organization for many years. The arguments "for" and "against" the expansion of SCO are well known, as well as the positions of member countries. This makes the question of SCO enlargement interesting not only in terms of practical policy, but also from the standpoint of scholarly research. In general, four problems need to be mentioned here - the problem of political culture of SCO and application of the principle of consensus; the problem of multiple formats of participation in SCO and preservation of monolithic nature of the organization; the problem of how to interpret the principle of openness; and the problem of global or regional role of SCO in world politics.

Still SCO is a young organization searching for its development path in a world brimming with challenges and threats. Yet, it has managed to make a worthy place for itself on political map in what, by historical standards, is a short period. The development of SCO may be viewed as one of the major factors leading to the whole scale transformation of international relations in the 21st century.

Former President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan delivered remarks during Ufa Summit at the course of the session of the Council of Heads of SCO states held on July 10, 2015. As a result, a number of documents had been adopted, including the decision on granting the Republic of Armenia status of SCO dialogue partner.

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are dialogue partners in SCO, however, the member states are looking into chances to grant them observer status. In this context Secretary General of the organization Ambassador Zhang Ming said the following: "As regards the issue of

granting observer status to Azerbaijan and Armenia, SCO member states are actively studying it. I am personally optimistic, although I cannot give an exact timeframe at the moment. Relations between the two countries are, of course, an important factor to consider. At the same time, SCO member states are unanimous in not bringing bilateral contradictions into the organization.”

The presidents of Eurasian economic union (EAEU) member countries decided to support the proposal to hold talks with China on partnership and cooperation. That could eventually serve as the basis for forming a new, large-scale trade and economic partnership with the participation of EAEU, China, SCO, and also ASEAN countries. Meanwhile, the project to link the EAEU and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could become a unifying factor of trade and economic integration throughout Eurasian continent, including South and Southeast Asia. EAEU ensures freedom for the movement of goods, services, capital, labour, and pursues a coordinated or unified policy in individual economic sectors. It is important to note, that the EAEU member states are Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and that all of them are part of the so-called “SCO family,” enabling them to use SCO mechanisms in their common interest.

In 2019 the Chairman of the Board of Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) Tigran Sargsyan and SCO former Secretary General Vladimir Norov discussed prospects for further cooperation between EAEU and SCO. Tigran Sargsyan emphasized importance of intensifying cooperation between EAEU and SCO emphasizing the fact, that three member states of the Eurasian Economic Union are also members of SCO, Belarus is represented as an observer, and Armenia as a dialogue partner. In addition, the parties have an important associated agenda which is aimed at sustainable, systematic and stable development of the region.

In the Greater Eurasian region, it is also important to coordinate efforts against terrorist threat. This area, with the involvement of Collective security treaty organization (CSTO), could become one of the pillars of the Greater Eurasian Partnership, thus creating a broad international antiterrorism coalition. Armenia is also CSTO member state.

Over past 20 years since SCO establishment in 2001, its concept of cooperation has been constantly enriched and developed, cooperation

mechanisms have been constantly improved, and the areas of cooperation have been expanded. SCO mechanisms provide an important guarantee for multilateral cooperation ahead. Indeed, the new type of international relations will serve as an important driving force for its multilateral cooperation vision, and we can conclude that SCO is fully capable of exerting greater influence and delivering greater results in the years to come.

As we noticed, Armenia also has opportunities in SCO that must be used, and our country needs to work more properly within the rising organization. Being a member of both EAEU and CSTO, Armenia is viewed as a member of “SCO family” as well. Close cooperation in terms of security within the CSTO and SCO Regional antiterrorist structure (RATS) in the one hand, and the great economic integration processes between EAEU and other Eurasian economic initiatives on the other, could open wide doors for small Armenia.

Especially nowadays, after 44 day war with Azerbaijan, as well as lasting regional instability, obscure and inconstant situation together with many security challenges, Armenia is obliged to implement more flexible diplomacy. One thing is obvious: Armenia has opportunities, and it must use existing relations and institutions properly under the high platform and rising status of SCO.

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DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-7-5

## **CHINA - GCC RELATIONS. MAIN TRENDS**

### **Key trends**

1. China has become a truly global power and is implementing multilateral, including the BRI, and bilateral projects in many regions of the world including the Middle East.
2. The Arab monarchies of the Gulf region have accumulated financial and economic might during the recent decades, and this power also has transformed their foreign policy towards a more ambitious and interventionist direction.
3. The realism theory of international relations argues that the international system defines the behaviour of the states. To address security issues, minimise the real and perceived threats, the countries build up their muscles to repel those threats. In this context, the Gulf Arab countries have been changing their attitudes from a more neutral stance to a proactive policy in international affairs.
4. While the United States remains a key ally for the Gulf Arab countries, the challenges emerging from the world order is inclining them to look for other options. In these terms, the relations between China and GCC countries and their future pose a certain interest for researchers.
5. This research looks into these relations from the viewpoint of Gulf countries and try to understand how they will benefit from it. The research discusses two dimensions: economy and security.

### **Economy and security issues in the Gulf region**

The main security issue for the most of Gulf region traditionally has been Iran. They are concerned about Iran's ambitions in the Middle East, its nuclear program, and possible improvement of relations with Western countries. The second one is the competition by other Islamic

fundamental ideologies in the region (The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance).

The main economic challenge is the ill-diversified economy and still large dependence on oil exports with their unstable and volatile prices. If the UAE in some sense has successes in diversifying its economy, the other states' achievements are still very modest.

### **A short background**

The territories of some Gulf States were under British patronage until 1970 and the UK was a dominant power in the region. With the collapse of the British colonial system and their retreat from Arabia, the US came to replace the British as the security guarantor of those countries. Nowadays it is a clear trend that Washington is losing its interest in the Middle East and before its possible retreating tries to reconcile and bring together its main allies in the region: the Gulf States and Israel, which signed the Abraham accords in 2020.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the world order widely called bipolar world and the start of unipolar order described by the almost unchallenged hegemony of the United States. However new powers have already emerged with their views about the future of the world.

In almost 30 years, China has successfully filled the gap between it and the US and has already become an almost equal economic power and the largest trade partner of most countries of the world. While China has established itself as a global power, in many regions of the world several local powers have ascended, as well. They try to affirm their influence in their regions and become more involved in regional affairs. One of these local powers is the collective of Arab monarchies often called Gulf Arab countries and especially the tandem of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. They have already introduced themselves as the new leaders of the Arab world in light of the fall and weakening of traditional leaders of the Arabs.

A scholar exploring the ongoing developments in Eurasia cannot skip the relations between China and the Gulf region and the future prospects of those relations. What defines those relations from the point of view of the Gulf countries is to neutralise possible economic, security, and political threats and challenges emerging from the very nature of the Middle East region. The two main perceived threats for the Arab

countries of the Gulf are neighbouring Iran with the historical rivalry and competition by other fundamental Islamic ideologies. Another possible challenge is the partial loss of interest in the region by their main security ally, the United States. Many scholars would agree that the US is refocusing its priorities on other regions of the world. If this happens, the competition to fill this vacuum will further strengthen.

### **The ongoing situation**

When one tries to understand the nature of the relations between two countries, one explores many aspects of them, including high-level political engagement, mutual visits, trade volumes, joint projects, military cooperation, etc. While some of those aspects already exist in the relations between PRC and Gulf states, they cannot be described yet as of strategic importance. Those relations are growing slowly, but persistently involving more and more fields of cooperation.

In terms of high-profile visits, the Saudi and other GCC leaders visited Beijing several times, and also received the leader of the PRC. Those visits are aimed at outlining the core directions of cooperation. King Abdullah after ascending to the throne paid his first foreign visit to China in 2006. He signed several major agreements on energy cooperation. President Hu Jintao made a reciprocal visit to Riyadh in April 2006. One of the recent high-profile visits between Saudi Arabia and China was in February 2019, when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited as part of an Asian tour.

In trade, China became the largest partner for the Gulf Arab countries. Over the past two decades, the rhetoric of Chinese leaders about the MENA region has been heavily focused on trade and economics: Chinese President Xi Jinping described it as “win-win cooperation”. For Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait China is the major trade partner, for the UAE’s trade China holds the second largest share.

As of 2020, China replaced the EU as the Gulf Cooperation Council’s largest trading partner. Saudi Arabia was China’s top supplier of crude oil in 2021. The UAE has become an important platform for re-exporting Chinese goods into the region and Africa. GCC member states also work on linking their national development plans with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

China and the UAE signed \$3.4 billion contracts as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative aims to use the Port of Jebel Ali to

ship Chinese products to the world using the UAE's position as both sea and land trading hub.

As the main source of income for these countries is the oil sale, in some sense China has an irreplaceable meaning as one of the largest buyers of oil and gas. Saudi Arabia adopted program Vision 2030 aiming at diversification of its overwhelmingly oil dependent economy. This vision includes investments in non-oil sectors of the economy. In this case, the Saudis will need to bring foreign investments and technologies and they see China as an important partner in implementing of the program. The Saudi government has an ambitious plan to rise the share of non-oil exports up to 50% of its total exports.

The relations include military cooperation as well. China and Saudi Arabia have been collaborating on ballistic missile production since at least 2019, and not for the first time. China is selling its HQ-17AE air defence system to Saudi Arabia and drones to the UAE. Also, Chinese firms are becoming more involved in the ME region. In infrastructure, and technology China has a lot to suggest to its Middle Eastern partners. It is worth mentioning as well, that the two sides are elaborating Free Trade Agreement. Although this process is very slow, in recent years both sides show determination to conclude FTA finally, which will further boost the trade relationship between the sides.

### **Concluding remarks**

The Gulf Arab countries have serious intentions to diversify their economies, and for that purpose among others, they will need infrastructure projects. China has accumulated enormous experience in implementing infrastructure projects, both domestic and outside the country, building facilities, organizes production and supply chains. The Gulf region definitely will need this experience. Those countries will try to bring more Chinese investments.

While the US has no relations with Iran, China maintains and develops a partnership with Tehran. China has also close cooperation with Pakistan and has its own view about the future of Afghanistan. Thus, the Saudis may be interested in further developing relations with China and Beijing’s engagement in the region could help neutralise possible escalations in the region.

Nevertheless, it must also be said that both sides are still cautious. Taking into consideration the US - China competition and the fact that

the US remains the most important extra-regional partner of all the GCC countries, the GCC states will limit themselves in those aspects where it can bother Washington. China does not offer as many political and security commitments that the U.S. does. In the near future, it is more likely, that the Gulf states will resemble and accommodate Chinese models of development. Economy and trade will go first and politics will come after.

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## **ARMENIA CHINA RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CHANGING WORLD ORDER**

The world currently is shifting to a new era known as multipolar system in International Relations, which encounters elements of competition among superpowers and new set of cooperation and alliances. Since the beginning of the 90's, the unipolar world had emerged due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, it implied one-sided doctrine and rules to the world through neo-liberal market globalization, politics, and culture. Prominent ideologues such as Francis Fukuyama, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger and others have enthusiastically raised the concept of American supremacy and exceptionalism pointing upon its ability to be transformed to every part of the world through globalization and in some cases with military interventions.

Currently, with the decline of the West, national policy has been revealed with new image and forms in such countries where civilizations had played great role for centuries, religion and customs had been part of the daily life, unique identity, a reason for pride and patriotism as a tool for developing countries and in keeping the legacy of historical achievements alive. Furthermore, with the emergence of superpowers such as China, Russia, India, the Western global hegemony is under challenge. The era of unilateral world has come to an end, just as Chandra Muzaffar notes "There is no doubt at all that Washington helmed global hegemony is on decline. the repudiation of US economic dominance in Latin America; the economic ascendancy of China; and military reassertion of Russia have in different ways and to different degree, challenged Washington's power."

China's political philosophy "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" has been articulated clearly with president Xi Jinping's vision on the path of transforming China into a superpower. The two pillars of Chinese characteristics of its Ideology are socialism and Chinese national policy which has been amalgamated into Sinicized socialism. Moreover,

the philosophical aspect is the backbone of China's wisdom rooted in Confucianism that makes China hierarchical with strong social order and represents itself as the moral foundation of Chinese nation. The terms used in Chinese national ideology stresses on ethnic groups, civilization, social and cultural development, renewal of Chinese nation, history, and Chinese spirit. In other words, Chinese national policy prioritizes cultural awareness on language, customs, value and way of life.

**Armenian Chinese Relations in the current global condition:**

During the era of the Ancient Silk Road Armenian merchants have been one of the most active traders on the route. In 444-356 B.C. Armenians not only had important products from China, but also signed trade agreements with the Armenians that have been settled in China during that period. It is worth mentioning that the most astonishing time period of Armenian Chinese relations has been in 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries with the emergence of the "Armenian merchants' network" all the way from Far East to Northern Europe in that period when Macau port has been opened for international trade and the Armenian merchant Mateos Hovhannes had been considered as one of the wealthiest businessmen in Asia. A fascinating case is the community of Harbin that had been a new location for diaspora Armenians. The most famous Armenian enterprise is the Armenian Tatos restaurant built in 1901, located on the Central Avenue in Harbin, which functions to this day. Today, the Armenians in China are mostly located in Beijing, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Mostly own factories, business offices of export-import, university professors and students. The number of students are increasing in universities in Beijing and the Armenian Chinese Friendship School will accelerate the number of the students studying in China.

**Political Relations:** Interestingly, both Armenian and Chinese use similar slogans. The ARF party believes in "Socialism with national values", the Chinese Socialist party calls "Socialism with Chinese characteristics." Thus, it is evident that these parties could and should establish a format of cooperation; to have political exchange and develop the political relations between Armenians and Chinese in the multipolar world. We both want peaceful existence and to keep our national borders safe, living in dignity and to develop based on our cultural heritage without posing threat to others. Moreover, cooperation is essential to fight against terrorism and jointly secure our borders and the lives of our people. Terrorism could not be won with improving economic means

only, and there is no any method that negotiations with terrorists have brought peace in the world. A global coalition must be formed that could unite all countries that are under the threat of terrorism without any distinction if countries are big or small, because terrorism has no borders and has no specific language. A military cooperation between Armenia, China, Russia and Iran in our region is becoming an essential in the fight against terrorism that has reached to our region as well. We should build bilateral cross-border optical cable networks to expand information exchanges and cooperation. China's space program, C4ISR capabilities to keep Armenian borders safe from not only Turkish and Azerbaijani invasions, but also from terrorist groups infiltrating in the hybrid wars as it took place in Nagorno Karabakh war started by Azerbaijan.

**Social/ Smart power Relations:** The reason that I have brought the historical background of the Armenian Chinese relations is to show the uniqueness and the essentiality of enhancing people to people relations as the Chinese president Xi Jinping refers often to foster such relation, it is advisable to create joint think tanks where Armenian and Chinese experts jointly could set agendas related to national policies, economic development, social interactions, media cooperation etc. The Confucius Institute is a trademark of Armenian Chinese strong relations, opened in 2009 first in the South Caucasus. Since 2011 the number of students has risen 200 % it also has Chinese language Schools in 10 Armenian Schools, in three Schools in Yerevan the Chinese language is thought as a third foreign language. When in Armenia such global prestigious school develops, in US 10 American Universities had closed their Confucius Institutes due to political agendas forced by the US government. Lately there has been the translation and the publication of two essential books into Armenian.

**Economic Relations:** The current economic relations is positive under the crisis caused by the pandemic and the wars imposed on Armenia and Artsakh. Considering the free visa entry status, tourism must grow between the two countries. Although prior to the pandemic the number of the Chinese tourists extended to 60% in Armenia, there is the need for more media coverages in both countries for illustrating the touristic sites of both Armenia and China. Most of the Armenians for instance are unaware of the different regions of China. For example, not informed of the different touristic sites of Harbin and Hangzhou that are totally different from each other in terms of geography and cuisine. At the

same time, the majority of the Chinese are not aware of the historical sites and unique nature of Armenia. Furthermore, it is advisable to establish an Armenian Chinese bank in Armenia; taking into consideration the new financial policy of starting global trade in Yuan and at the same time the stable financial atmosphere Armenia has for more than two decades. Moreover, Armenian agriculture is seen the cleanest and most organic in the region. Thus, in this field Armenian and Chinese investors could benefit to export Armenian agricultural products into China, considering the existing Armenian wine exports to China. At last, the IT sector in Armenia is booming and District Studio has launched “Digital Silk Road” center that is eligible to create mobile and web apps for the Chinese platforms such as Wechat, Alipay for companies. Both Armenian and Chinese governments should work together to bring the future projects such as the creation of free economic zones, technology parks and universities with modern facilities being aware that Tsinghua and Beijing University are ranked in the top 20 globally, application of methods of Traditional Chinese Medicine. The Armenian, and Chinese people have indeed rich history. Our duty is to enhance people to people relations by integrating the Armenian and Chinese diasporas; through social and academic works, business developments and valuating our historical interactions to build a shared world as one family keeping in mind that without knowing each other well, it is not possible to achieve any positive outcome.

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## **NEW TREND IN ENERGY GEOPOLITICS: SAUDI ARABIA – CHINA OIL RELATIONSHIP**

The decentralization of the energy geopolitics system is one of the new trends in the modern theory of geopolitics. Why do we call it the decentralization process and what does it mean? When the theory of energy geopolitics was created, there were only two centers of energy power: conditionally we can call them production and consumption centers.

In the 1970s, the Gulf region was the central axis of oil production in the world. About 75 % of proven oil reserves were concentrated in this region. The main oil exporting organization in the world was OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) a representative of Gulf countries in the international energy systems. During the same years, the share of the Gulf countries in the international oil markets was about 60 % and oil-consuming countries heavily depended on the OPEC members. The countries of the West were another center of energy geopolitics. The United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, and others were the primary oil consumers in the world, and they consumed more energy than the rest of the world together.

The Western countries created the International Energy Agency (IEA), which protects their interest in the struggle with OPEC and Gulf countries. The systems of energy geopolitics in the 70th are based on the competition between the two confrontations centers, which are production centers (the Gulf countries, OPEC) and consumption centers (the West countries, IEA). These two centers depended heavily on each other because they both needed each other. One needed stable oil supplier while others required large oil consumption markets.

That situation was called the classical system of energy geopolitics, but after the embargo of 1973, the stability in the system collapsed and it began transforming from so-called central systems to decentralizing

orders. After the embargo, scholars, and experts developed a new theory of energy security. According to this theory, the West needed to reduce its dependence on the Gulf countries, particularly on OPEC, and find new sources of energy. First, the Gulf countries had begun losing their roles as main oil exporters, and after all, the Western countries had begun losing their position as the main oil consumers in the world. The first decade of the 2000s saw a change in the system of energy geopolitics. The Gulf countries began to lose their dominant roles in the international oil markets in general and particularly in the West markets.

Non-OPEC countries shipped more oil to the Western markets than OPEC members did together. The US and the Russian Federation together produce crude oil equivalent to Saudi Arabia and its allies from the Gulf. Since 2014 the US has satisfied its oil demand in full and has begun exporting crude oil to the international markets. The European countries preferred to export crude oil from Russia, Canada, Norway, and other non-OPEC countries than from the Gulf. The Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia needed new markets and China's economic heyday changed the situation in the oil market. The Gulf countries and particularly OPEC members discovered a new, fast-developing energy market in the Asian Pacific. The situation in the energy markets began to change and China's economic growth shifted the balance of power in the energy geopolitics system from the West to the East. The Western powers began to lose their positions as the main oil consumers in the world.

Today, Asian countries are dominating in terms of energy consumption. China, India, South Korea, Japan, and other growing Asian economies need crude oil and other products more than the West does. The traditional energy geopolitics rules have changed, and the so-called two-polar competition systems have collapsed. Today, neither the West nor the East can dominate the energy market and there is a new decentralized system. While in the 1970s, the energy geopolitical systems were called two-polar, it has changed over time, and multipolar systems dominate in the world today.

The decentralized energy geopolitics system has influenced the Gulf countries and especially Saudi Arabia. The Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia have lost their economic and geopolitical advantage in the West markets. They needed new, fast-growing energy markets, which could replace traditional markets in the West.

Consequently, China and Saudi Arabia's relationship is fundamentally based on energy prospects and their interests are first and foremost about energy. China is trying to diversify its energy supply sources, but at the same time, it understands that it has no proper alternative to Saudi Arabia - one of the biggest oil-exporting countries in the world.

China's oil market has been growing for several decades since 1993, and it is one of the largest oil importers in the world. This situation has forced the two countries to create a special relationship with each other, and the cornerstone of that relationship is energy. They need each other; Saudi Arabia sees China as the largest and expanding oil market in the world, with good perspectives, while China sees Saudi Arabia as one of the biggest and most reliable oil suppliers in the world.

Thus, over the past two decades, the Sino-Saudi alliance has grown from a good relationship to a strategic partnership. This transition to strategic partnership is due to a systematic increase in Chinese energy market consumption on the one hand and Saudi Arabia's interest in finding a new and alternative market on the other hand. The Sino-Saudi strategic oil relationship has changed the energy geopolitical system in the world during the last two decades, and consequently shifted the center of energy power from the West to the East.

The axes of energy consumption are now passing through the Asia-Pacific region and more and more oil-exporting countries seek access to this region. Saudi Arabia is one of the first states among those seeking a stable stake in this expanding and most promising oil market in the world. However, the West continues to remain among the largest oil consumption in the world and the leader among them is the US. It means that the struggle for leadership between China and the US is continuing. One of the reasons why the new energy geopolitics system is called "decentralized" is because there is no single strong leader in the consumption market.

The struggle for oil production is another reason why the new energy geopolitical system is called "decentralized". While several decades ago 60 % of the oil was being produced in the Persian Gulf countries, today the situation is changing, and the Gulf countries' share of the oil production market is only 41.5 %. The Gulf and OPEC countries lose their oil advantage and non-OPEC countries led by Russia acquire a new possibility in this system.



Thus, the greatest change in the energy geopolitical system is due to the strategic relationship between China and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the decentralized system deprives anyone of the monopoly position in the system of the geopolitics of energy. However, the OPEC+ pact (Russia and co) has changed traditional ideas about oil-producing centers, strengthening them with the new oil export countries.

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### 《土耳其-亚美尼亚关系缓和动因与前景分析》

首先对中国和亚美尼亚建交30周年表示祝贺，也对我们来自亚美尼亚的朋友，特别是来自我们东方所的朋友表示欢迎！今天非常高兴有机会在这里跟云端相见，我记得2018年访问亚美尼亚和东方所的时候，美丽的亚美尼亚给我留下了非常深刻的印象，我期待着疫情之后能尽快重返亚美尼亚，能充分与老朋友们会见！

我今天跟大家分享交流的是《土耳其跟亚美尼亚关系》，我们知道最近土耳其跟亚美尼亚的关系出现了一种缓和的迹象，这里主要谈谈埃尔多安为什么向亚美尼亚伸出橄榄枝，为什么主动提出来要与亚美尼亚和解。

第一点我想谈的是给大家简单介绍一下亚美尼亚和土耳其关系最近最新的发展。就像我刚才说的，两国关系在最近一阶段出现了缓和的迹象。大家知道亚美尼亚和土耳其的关系因为历史的原因、现实的原因，两国一直没有建立正式的外交关系。在1993年的时候，土耳其还单方面关闭了与亚美尼亚的边界。在2018年、2019年的时候，由于足球外交，两国关系出现了缓和的迹象，甚至两国的总统还实现的互访，当时也出现了我们说要关系正常化的这样一个有可能出现的一个重大的突破。但是我们知道，由于总统的原因，特别是阿塞拜疆对土耳其施加的压力，当时这个缓和没有延续下来。

大家知道，在2020年，我们知道新一轮纳卡冲突爆发，土耳其和亚美尼亚关系跌入了新的低谷。但是很快，不到两年，从去年底以来，土耳其一再向亚美尼亚伸出橄榄枝，表示愿意跟亚美尼亚实现关系正常化，愿意开放跟亚美尼亚的边界。从今年1月份以来，两国频繁互动，双方特使在莫斯科举行了会晤。另外我们知道两国外长在土耳其举行了会面，这是我们说多年来首次两国外长直接的会面，我想这个都是两国关系的重要的积极的进展。两国从最新的，昨天传出来的，从布鲁塞尔传出来的消息，两国关系已经接近达成一个协议的这样一个状态了。建立关系正常化和开放边界，包括直航等一系列方面，接近达成这样的一个临界点了。我想如果两国能够实现建交的话，关系正常的话，我想这个突破不仅是两国关系的一个历史性的突破，我想对高加索地区，对中东地区的和平

与安全，地缘政治和国际关系都会产生非常大的影响。我这里想讨论的主要想分享关于埃尔多安为什么向亚美尼亚伸出橄榄枝，为什么要主动向亚美尼亚提出和解，有这样的需求。我想主要讲三个方面的原因：第一个方面的原因，我想也是最重要的原因，是土耳其内政外交的需要。大家知道，土耳其这两年埃尔多安政府面临非常大的国内外的压力，很明显的我们说，大家知道经济上，土耳其的经济形势这两年非常差。通货膨胀非常严重，货币贬值，再加上新冠疫情，土耳其跟西方的关系，导致国内投资的减少。经济上形势是非常差的，对埃尔多安政府压力很大。另外我们国内政治上也出现库尔德问题，我们知道从2015年以来，库尔德的问题越来越严重，另外一个就是反对派利用在国内的问题，向埃尔多安发起了挑战。另外一点就是外交上，大家也知道土耳其这两年在外交上采取了咄咄逼人的地区外交。干预主义的地区外交，不仅是从纳卡到叙利亚、伊拉克到利比亚，全方位的干涉主义的这样一个地区外交政策，还包括东地中海。所以实际上很大程度上，这几年土耳其的外交是相当孤立的，不仅跟美国欧洲的关系面临恶化，跟地区的国家关系，同沙特、阿联酋、埃及、以色列、希腊、塞浦路斯，包括亚美尼亚的关系也是全面恶化。

大家过去知道，土耳其是零问题的外交，但现在是在充满地区问题的外交，完全是逆转的。所以在这种情况下，土耳其的外交面临非常大的压力，特别是拜登上台之后，拜登和特朗普采取了对埃尔多安非常不同的政策，所以埃尔多安他面临着外交的压力，国际的孤立压力是非常大的。更重要的是土耳其在明年即将迎来总统和议会选举的大选，这两场选举都对埃尔多安的政治生命来说是非常关键的。一切为了选举，2023年的选举，所以他采取了一系列的措施，其中最重要的一个方面就是在外交上要全面缓和与地区国家的关系，所以大家看到了土耳其跟亚美尼亚的关系出现了缓和。大家也看到了土耳其跟以色列的关系，跟埃及的关系，跟阿联酋的关系，沙特的关系，都出现了缓和。上个月我们在以色列的总统还访问了土耳其，我想这是一个土耳其的缓和外交攻势当中很重要的方面，是土耳其和亚美尼亚的关系的缓和。我想这是第一点，是服务于内政，服务于2023年的选举。第二点是纳卡地区的形势或者亚美尼亚高加索地区的战略形势发生了很大的变化，土耳其认为这样一个地区形势，地缘政治格局的转换，在这个时候对土耳其是有

利的，它可以在此基础上跟亚美尼亚实现关系的正常化。在土耳其看来，我想有几个方面，高加索地区形势的变化。第一个就是2020年纳卡冲突之后，在土耳其看来，阿塞拜疆已经跟在亚美尼亚的角逐中已经占据了优势的地位，收复了曾经被亚美尼亚控制的部分的领土，所以对土耳其而言，1993年关于边界的理由到现在来说已经不存在了，因为亚美尼亚的领土又被阿塞拜疆拿走了。在短期内要想拿回来还是非常困难的。另外一点就是通过2020年的纳卡的冲突，土耳其直接出兵纳卡地区，帮助阿塞拜疆，并在这个地区谋求建立军事基地，实际上进一步强化了跟阿塞拜疆之间的战略合作。土耳其在高加索地区的战略地位，我们说战略优势进一步得到了强化。土耳其自己也认为这个对纳卡地区、对高加索地区它的主动权，它的对这一地区事务的主导权得到了很大的提升，发言权在增大，它的信心很大程度是在增强的。还有一个因素就是土耳其跟亚美尼亚关系也在发生较大的变化。我们在1993年当时的阿塞拜疆可以向土耳其施加很大的压力，但是现在因为是颠倒的关系，土耳其可以向阿塞拜疆施加更大的压力，土耳其在土阿关系中占据主导地位。阿塞拜疆变成了土耳其的一个小兄弟，在很多方面都要听土耳其的。我想这是土耳其对高加索和纳卡地区冲突形势的研判，总体认为是对土耳其有利的。在这个形势下，跟亚美尼亚恢复关系，土耳其可以在有利的条件下重新谋求这样的一个关系。

第三点就是我们说，由于经济上和建立战略通道的考虑或者需要，亚美尼亚和土耳其建立沟通波斯湾、沟通伊朗、巴基斯坦、中亚的战略通道当中，发挥很重要的作用。土耳其需要亚美尼亚，在东向的战略通道当中扮演更重要的积极的角色。我们知道土耳其跟以色列关系的缓和很重要的一个因素就是美国人不再支持东地中海的能源管线的建设，从而支持陆上的以色列跟土耳其的天然气管线的建设。现在又有乌克兰的冲突，未来的土耳其在东西的能源管线、能源走廊中的地位和它的交通战略枢纽的地位会进一步强化。同样在土耳其和亚美尼亚的关系当中，我想能源和交通的这样一个战略通道的作用也是非常突出的。我们知道这几年，去年一个很重要的地缘政治的变化，土耳其打造了一个所谓的突厥语国家联盟，在纳卡冲突之后，土耳其国内的一片舆论，一个声音就是土耳其终于打通了梦寐以求的突厥走廊。在这样一个基础之上，土耳其可以加快土耳其跟东亚、里海地区的能源走廊的建设，其实不

仅仅是一个能源走廊，大家知道看到土耳其跟全方位加强跟海湾国家的关系，跟巴基斯坦、伊朗的关系，多方位的交通走廊、能源走廊的建设。特别是在乌克兰危机之后，这样一个交通走廊的建设，战略通道的建设，它的重要性会越来越突出。而在这个其中，我想它要缓和与亚美尼亚的关系，重建跟亚美尼亚的，对于土耳其打造这样的一个能源和交通走廊，确立土耳其在能源和交通的枢纽这个国家战略来讲，有非常大的作用。亚美尼亚可以扮演这样的一个角色。这是我跟大家分享的这三个方面的主要的原因。关于前景，现在预测很难的，现在来看，短期看我想土耳其和亚美尼亚实现关系正常化，开放边界这方面，我想短期看还是比较乐观的。但是长期来看，土耳其跟亚美尼亚的关系还存在着一定的不确定性。

大家知道土耳其跟亚美尼亚的关系，之间的问题并没有解决，另外一个纳卡的冲突，纳卡问题也并没有得到解决，这两大因素。还有土耳其内政的发展，还有埃尔多安2023年的大选会是一个什么样的结果，这些都是不确定的因素，我们有待继续观察。

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DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-7-5*

## **ANALYSIS ON THE MOTIVATION AND PROSPECT OF TURKEY-ARMENIA RELATIONS**

The author discusses the issues of Armenian-Turkish relations after the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020. The report highlights several reasons for the interest, in particular on the part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the issue of resuming the Armenian-Turkish dialogue. Firstly, this is generally due to the foreign and domestic political issues of Turkey over the past two years, in particular the difficult economic situation of Turkey, associated with inflation and the reduction of foreign investments, the Kurdish issue, etc. Turkey's former diplomacy of "zero problems with neighbours" is now full of regional problems. The regional imperial ambitions of Turkey are manifested by interventionist ambitions from Nagorno-Karabakh to Syria, from Iraq to

Libya and to the Eastern Mediterranean. More importantly, in 2023 Turkey will hold presidential and parliamentary elections, which are very important for Erdogan's political longevity. By the 2023 elections, he has taken a number of measures, the most important of which is to facilitate relations with the countries of the region, including Armenia. Turkey helped Azerbaijan both in the military-political and diplomatic aspects in the war with Armenia and thereby strengthened its strategic position in the South Caucasus. The new status quo is generally beneficial for Turkey. In this situation, Turkey can more freely seek the establishment of relations with Armenia on favourable terms for itself. Next, Turkey's position in the East-West energy pipeline, energy corridor and its strategic transport hub will be further strengthened in the future against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, in the long term, there are still uncertainties in relations between Turkey and Armenia: the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has not been resolved and it is still uncertain what the results of the elections in Turkey in 2023 will be.

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## 《俄乌冲突背景下中国和亚美尼亚合作面临的机遇与挑战》

各位好！2018年我曾经访问过亚美尼亚，亚美尼亚的美丽风景和悠久的历史留下了深刻的印象，所以非常高兴，在中亚建交30周年之际谈一谈我对发展中亚合作一些看法。

我的题目是《俄乌冲突背景下中亚合作面临的机遇与挑战》。如果说新冠疫情是21世纪人类最大的天灾，俄乌战争无疑已成为21世纪最为惨重的人祸。疫情和战争给中国和亚美尼亚的安全、稳定和发展带来严重冲击。在此背景下，认真探讨中亚合作面临的机遇和挑战很有意义，首先谈机遇。

机遇是三个方面：第一点是中亚两国对俄乌冲突的立场很接近，两国均认为俄乌应按照国际法和联合国宪章以外交对话、谈判的方式和平解决两国存在的问题，反对美西方对俄实施极端制裁，两国可在双边、多边领域就如何解决俄乌冲突以及其他重要的国际和地区事务进行商讨和合作。这在当前尤为必要。

第二，当前形势下，国际社会心理战气氛浓厚，集团政治思维强劲，中国和亚美尼亚坚持独立自主和平外交，在地区和全球事务上不愿意选边站，由此都面临美欧以及他们的小伙伴的压力。

当然这个压力程度是不同的。中国作为一个大国，压力尤其艰巨，但是亚美尼亚也是承受一定的压力，在地区环境当中，特别是整体都支持对俄实施强硬政策情况下。在这种情况下，中俄两国加强协商以及相互支持和配合也是很有价值的。

在此要说一下，我们中方长期以来对亚美尼亚方面在台湾、香港、新疆问题上对我们的支持深表感谢。

第三条就是俄乌战争爆发后，包括亚美尼亚在内的广大非西方国家，将稳定国际环境、促进本国经济发展作为优先议题，而中国也是这样的。中国在应对疫情，积极参与解决俄乌冲突的同时，充分地挖掘本国潜力，充分地发展本国经济，试图通过这种方式为世界的和平与发展做出自己的贡献。

我们知道中国的抗疫对全球抗疫做出了很大的支持，效果是非常明显的。当然不仅仅是中亚方面的合作是多元的，我刚才讲了经济

合作，不仅是经贸层面，在旅游，刚才各位学者讲过的农产品，在医疗、教育、科学文化方面，虽然是规模量不是很大，但是发展潜力很大。我们相信这个机遇是我们下一阶段的着力点，推动双方进一步深化合作。

讲到机遇就要讲到挑战，挑战也是很明显的。

首先是俄乌冲突的走向还不明朗，美欧与北约与俄罗斯的对抗是长期性的，不管战争往哪个方向发展，反俄思潮很大意义上成为欧亚大陆的风向标。中国和亚美尼亚都是对俄罗斯友好的国家，两国开展的合作是在这个大的氛围和大的时空环境下进行的，阻力和压力是相当明显的。这是第一个挑战。

第二个挑战是俄乌战争并未改变美国反华的立场，美国在欧洲加大军事投入的同时，大力推进实施印太占，在这种情况下，中国首先要维护周边的安全与稳定，所以在发展与中东欧国家、高加索的合作方面暂时可能展缓步伐，随着形势的变化下一步推进。

亚美尼亚方面也有这种情况，由于疫情的冲击，俄乌冲突，还有地区环境的欧亚局势的发展，特别是他们跟俄罗斯经济的缜密合作，由此它要花很大的力度去解决国内的社会稳定，包括国家安全，它有可能也是短期内发展影响它开展对华合作的力度和步伐。

第三方面，随着俄乌战争的深度发酵，美西方干涉欧亚国家内政的手段可能趋向多元化，可能在地区或者是主要国家，在政治上纠结反美势力，经济上威胁或者采取制裁的手段，在舆论上散播中俄威胁论的信息和价值观。

在这种情况下，亚美尼亚作为地区国家一员，可能国内或者是民间当中有一些对中国和亚美尼亚开展合作的看法，可能会有一些影响，而且在开展合作的具体考量上面有一些微调和变化，但是这些都是我们首先是了解这个情况，然后下一步再试图解决。

第四方面的挑战是亚美尼亚我们都知道，和俄罗斯的经贸往来很久，关系很密切，有相当数量的工人在俄罗斯务工，对俄经济有较大的依赖性。俄罗斯目前经济下滑导致亚美尼亚的经济安全也受到一定的威胁，尤其是在出口贸易、侨汇、旅游业方面。

而中国也是因为多种因素，包括前面讲的疫情和战争，中国推进“一带一路”合作的步伐有可能会放缓，然后中国在欧亚大陆的投资有可能进入微调的方面，在这一方面来说，中亚双方需要挖掘更大的合作潜力，需要扩大合作领域，进一步发展双边的合作。

我还是对中亚合作的前景充满希望，我们处于一个微调期，只要双方共同努力，我们还有很大的发展空间的，我们还能够进一步推进双边去发展。从目前看，我认为双方可以做到四小点。

第一方面是政治沟通方面，这个是必要的，这一块也是非常需要的。

第二个是在贸易畅通方面，双方要开展市场调研，要挖掘难点，中方有必要挖掘亚经济发展中的痛点，看有没有发挥我们优势，助力双方共同成长。

第三方面在资金融通方面，中国方面应该来说总体资金情况还是良好的，亚有可能在资金链断裂或者是俄乌冲突，资金链方面有一些困境，我们可以适当利用亚投行、丝路基金方面看能不能为亚美尼亚经济发展做一些贡献。

第四个方面在民心相通方面，毕竟路途遥远，尽管两国的文化交流、民心互通有很大的进步，但是我们还应该加大力度，在舆论宣传、文化、教科文卫、人道主义援助各个方面多做一些工作，以促进中国和亚美尼亚的民心相通。

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DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-7-5

## **OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FACING CHINA- ARMENIA COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIA- UKRAINE CONFLICT**

The author discusses both opportunities and challenges of cooperation between China and Armenia within the lasting Russia-Ukraine conflict. Opportunities are threefold. First, the positions of two countries regarding this conflict are very similar. Both countries believe that Russia and Ukraine should peacefully resolve the problems only through diplomatic dialogue and negotiation in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations; meanwhile they both oppose the West's imposition of sanctions against Russia. Second, both China and Armenia insist on independent and peaceful diplomacy. Third, after the outbreak of the War, the majority of non-Western countries, including China and

Armenia, prioritized stabilizing the international environment, thus trying to make their own contribution to world peace and development. Besides opportunities, the author also mentions the main challenges. First, the direction of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is still unclear, and both China and Armenia are friendly countries to Russia. Second, Russia-Ukraine war has not changed anti-China stance of the United States. While the US has increased its military investment in Europe, it has vigorously promoted the implementation of the Indo-Pacific occupation. In case of Armenia, it has very close cooperation with the Russian economy. With the lasting Russia-Ukraine war, the West may tend to diversify its means of interfering in the internal affairs of Eurasian countries.

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### 《中国与亚美尼亚经济贸易合作的潜力与优先合作方向》

亚美尼亚历史悠久，文化灿烂。亚美尼亚地理位置十分重要，属于南高加索地区的枢纽位置。亚美尼亚独立以来，与世界建立了广泛合作关系，受到了世界广泛尊重。亚美尼亚与中国的合作具有平等、友好特征和互利互惠特点。

1992年4月6日，中国与亚美尼亚建交。中国是最早承认亚美尼亚独立并与其建立外交关系的国家之一；亚美尼亚一直将对华关系置于“外交优先发展方向”。迄今两国已签订了包括《两国政府联系公报》、《民用航空运输协定》、《中央银行合作协议》、《经济技术合作协议》等数十项合作文件。

2013年，中国提出“一带一路”倡议后，亚美尼亚官方积极响应，支持一带一路倡议。2015年，亚美尼亚时任总统萨尔基相访华，与中国国家主席习近平进行了会晤，两国签署了《关于进一步发展和深化友好合作关系的联合声明》，声明强调“共同建设丝绸之路经济带的倡议为两国开展全方位合作提供了新的历史机遇。双方将积极落实已签署的相关协议，共同推动丝绸之路经济带建设”。

建交以来，中国与亚美尼亚在经济贸易领域，尤其是投资领域取得了一系列成果，有些中国企业在亚美尼亚的投资合作很成功，得到了亚美尼亚政府和社会的积极评价。

例如在能源领域：中国黑龙江火电第一工程公司中标的亚美尼亚110KV变电站改造项目，金额达4000万美元；黑龙江火电第三工程公司与亚俄天然气工业公司总额达8639万美元的亚美尼亚拉兹丹电厂5号机组改造承包工程项目，标志中国企业在亚能源市场取得重大成果；

又如在通讯领域，华为公司已经成为亚美尼亚3G无线设备的独家供应商；中兴通讯与亚电信公司签署的无线本地环路CDMA网络框架合同，大大提升了亚美尼亚的电话和网络覆盖率。

中国已经连续多年稳居亚美尼亚第二大贸易伙伴、第二大出口及进口来源国。2021年中亚双边贸易额创14亿美元历史新高。亚美尼亚的高质量白兰地、葡萄酒等产品在中国已经打开市场。亚美尼亚“北南公路”、光伏电站等项目也正在进行中。

从经贸合作的潜力看，由于两国经济互补性很强，互利互惠合作的比较优势突出，因此，中亚在经济贸易领域的合作具有良好的机遇，前景非常广阔。

第一，作为全球第二大经济体，中国有着广阔的市场和充足的资金，以及国际合作的强烈意愿。亚美尼亚可以充分利用中国贷款或投资，促进国内经济发展，使中国与亚美尼亚经贸合作成为亚美尼亚经济增长的新动力。中国的“一带一路”倡议不会因为国际局势的剧烈变化而发生变化，将成为长期发展规划。中国与亚美尼亚可以在该倡议框架下开展长期合作。

第二，中国与亚美尼亚可以在交通、能源、农业、高科技等领域开展重点合作，特别是在基础设施建设领域，中国有很好的建设能力，中国企业可以多参与亚美尼亚在该领域的合作项目。交通基础设施合作对亚美尼亚经济有特别重要的意义。高科技合作也深受亚美尼亚欢迎，中国在这方面有自己的特色。

第三，中国与亚美尼亚在贸易领域还有很大潜力可以挖掘。亚美尼亚在酿酒和特色农产品领域有非常独特的资源，在中国可以有广阔的市场前景。旅游资源就更不用说，亚美尼亚的古老历史文化遗迹和独特风光，非常吸引中国旅行者，两国在绿色经济领域可以开展深入合作。另外，在医疗、卫生、教育领域，两国也各具特色，相互合作的潜力巨大。

在看到中国与亚美尼亚经贸合作前景的同时，也应该客观评价两国深入合作的一些困难因素，在未来合作中不断排除困难，使两国经济贸易合作不断上新台阶。

第一，目前受新冠肺炎疫情的阻隔效应，以及俄罗斯与乌克兰剧烈冲突的冲击，国际上的制裁与反制裁，导致国际分工和国际市场呈现分割状态，和重新分化组合的态势，这对中国与亚美尼亚开展合作带来了很大的困难和一些不确定性。中国与亚美尼亚合作需要拿出更多诚意和付出更多努力。

第二，亚美尼亚是欧亚经济联盟成员，与俄经济高度一体化，相关机制本身可能存在阻碍因素，尤其是在俄罗斯被西方极限制裁的情形下，两国开展更广泛合作的困难性可能更高，成本更大，理顺各种复杂关系需要时间。

第三，亚美尼亚目前处于改革的重要时期，市场环境已经越来越好，但是中国企业对亚美尼亚市场了解严重不足，企业投资顾虑

较多，加之语言和文化障碍，双方开展大规模合作的民间需求以及合作意愿还有待进一步提高。

第四，亚美尼亚与阿塞拜疆之间的领土争端，尤其是阿塞拜疆和土耳其的经济封锁，增加了中国企业在亚美尼亚的合作成本，这是目前较为突出的问题之一，有待两国企业想出更好的办法，增加中国与亚美尼亚的经贸合作量。

虽然中国与亚美尼亚在经贸领域的合作存在上述困难因素，但是两国可以深化合作的领域也很多，风险与机遇并存。两国政府和企业只要认真对待上述问题，消除不利因素，秉持平等、协商和互利互惠原则开展合作，尤其注重选择那些受双方欢迎，具有良好经济社会效益的效益进行投资和贸易合作，一定能真正把中国与亚美尼亚经贸关系的潜力充分释放出来，使之成为中国与亚美尼亚世代友好的坚实基础。

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DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-7-5*

## **THE POTENTIAL AND PRIORITY OF ECONOMIC AND TRADE COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND ARMENIA**

The author describes Armenia and China relations based on equality, friendship and mutual benefit. Armenia's geographical location is very important, belonging to the hub of the South Caucasus region. In 2013, after China proposed the "Belt and Road" initiative, Armenian officials responded positively and supported it. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations China and Armenia have achieved a series of achievements in the field of economy and trade, especially in the field of investment. Some Chinese companies have successfully invested in Armenia, which have been positively evaluated by the Armenian government and society. China has been Armenia's second largest trading partner and the second largest source of exports and imports for many years. The author believes that there is a real potential to deepen China-Armenia economic and trade relations, and it will become a solid foundation for the friendship between two countries from generation to generation.

**许涛，国务院发展研究中心欧亚社会发展研究所副所长**

## **《对提升中国与亚美尼亚人文合作的几点思考》**

昨天是中国与亚美尼亚建交30周年的日子，这是一个非常重要的时刻，30年来中国和亚美尼亚之间发展了非常好的合作关系，昨天中国国家主席习近平和亚美尼亚总统哈恰图良进行了通话，互致祝贺。在这个祝贺当中还专门提到了中国和亚美尼亚之间人文合作取得了非常重要的成就。

确实是这样，我也曾经去过亚美尼亚，包括孔子学院，包括汉语教学，也包括在中国的亚美尼亚语教学和亚美尼亚文化的研究。中国和亚美尼亚是两个历史文化非常悠久的国家，我们相互之间有很多值得互相学习的地方。随着两国的合作关系的进一步的发展和深入，我觉得现有的文化合作和交流的领域有必要继续提升和扩展。也就是说不应该仅仅局限在语言教学和传统文化的学习和研究上，我觉得应该有这样三个方面是值得我们关注、去思考的。

一个是在重大的学术领域当中进行更深入的交流。前面有几位学者已经提到，有这样的表述，就是现在的世界正进入一个空前的变革甚至是动荡时期，我们对世界包括对我们所处地区的观察和看法，还有判断，我觉得对我们未来发展双边关系和双边合作是一个非常重要的依据。无论是在中国所处的亚太地区还是亚美尼亚所处的南高加索地区，都处在这样的一个积极变革的时代，有很多的重要的变量，有很多重要的指标都在发生积极的变化。这对我们这些国家的稳定与发展意味着什么，对中国和亚美尼亚之间的合作和交流意味着什么。对发展“一带一路”框架下的合作意味着什么，我觉得是非常值得我们来进行研究和交流的。在两国学者深入研究和分析的基础上，交换观点，交换立场，我觉得对我们两国的政府间的合作关系，健康和巩固的发展是非常有意义的事情。这是我考虑到的一个方面。

另一个方面就是在国家的治国理政，在国家治理层面加深交流和合作。我注意到了在去年，在中国商务部和国家发改委，还有亚美尼亚政府合作之下，曾经举办了几个研讨班，有“一带一路”研讨班，也有区域经济发展研讨班。当然这里边我想有中国驻亚美尼亚使

馆做出的努力，也有亚美尼亚政府和相关的地方做出的努力。我觉得这是非常有益的尝试，当然我没有跟踪这个研讨班和它后续的效果怎么样。但是我觉得这是一个非常好的一个尝试。

在当今这样的一个时期，不仅是面临着复杂的国际环境，国内的治理也是出现了很多我们政府也好，还有学者也好，从来没有经历过的一些问题和一些变化。包括数字经济，包括数字社区，当然也包括我们现在面临的一些问题。比如说疫情的问题，还有就是当今世界上特别是我们相关的一些地区发生的一些热点、一些危机，可能会对我们的国家安全和国内的稳定带来哪些负面的影响。我觉得这都是值得我们深入研究和探讨的，也是值得我们相互之间进行交流、进行讨论的这样一些问题。我觉得对我们国内的稳定和发展都是非常有意义的事情。

第三个方面我觉得我们的人文交流与合作应该放眼后疫情时代，尽管在今年，在中国也好，还有在南高加索地区也好，疫情仍然是出现了一些变化，甚至是反弹。但是我觉得新冠病毒这个疫情早晚会过去，而疫情之后的世界，还有疫情之后的我们的国家治理，我们面临的问题，恐怕和疫情之前大不一样。

另外因为受疫情影响，我们两国之间的合作与交流受到了很大的限制，特别是人文合作，对人员的往来带来了非常严重的阻碍。所以有哪些非常重要的项目或者说有哪些创新的人文交流的项目，可以在疫情之后很快地展开。比如说旅游，比如说文化艺术的交流，比如说一些重要的研讨会等等。我们在疫情还没有结束的时候，我觉得我们双方都可以开始思考这个问题。

当然还有非常重要的一个领域，就是卫生健康合作，就是共同战胜疫情。尽管我们两国的国情不一样，我们两国的一些做法不一样，但是以人为本、生命至上，把人民的安全、把人民的健康放在第一位，我想这都是一致的。

所以我们有很多领域是值得我们进一步深入推动的，所以我想最主要的是这样三个领域。谢谢大家！

**Xu Tao**

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DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-7-5*

## **SOME THOUGHTS ON IMPROVING HUMANISTIC COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND ARMENIA**

The author discusses the peculiarities of China-Armenia cultural exchanges in the context of global challenges. China and Armenia are two countries with a very long history and culture. Two nations have a lot to learn from each other. With the further development and deepening of the cooperative relationship between the two countries, it is necessary to continue to improve and expand the existing areas of cultural cooperation and exchanges. It should not be limited to language teaching and the study and research of traditional culture. There should be three aspects that deserve attention and consideration. One is to conduct more in-depth exchanges in major academic fields. Another aspect is to deepen exchanges and cooperation at the national governance level in the country's governance. The third aspect, people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cultural cooperation should look at the post-epidemic era. The author highlights another, very important area of cooperation, too, the healthcare sector, despite the differences existing in this field in both China and Armenia.