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SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON: “NEW COMMUNITY” IN LEBANON’S CONFESSIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

Abstract: *The paper analyzes the Syrian refugee crisis in neighboring countries, mostly in Lebanon. Syria's neighborhood hosts currently about 5.5 million forcibly displaced Syrians who have fled the crisis since its onset in 2011. More than 3.4 million Syrians are registered in Turkey and around 2 million in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (World Bank 2016). According to the UNHCR (2017), the small Lebanese state hosts today around 1.5 million registered Syrians, making it the country with the highest number of refugees per capita (Yasmin 2022). How has Lebanon's political system dealt with the Syrian refugee issue and how have Syrian refugees – a new “non-core group”(Harris 2012) in Lebanon's society – interacted with the state's confessional configuration of power? How has Lebanon's political system framed and accommodated an external “minority” in the context of a refugee-producing conflict and how has the political discourse constructed the issue of large-scale displacement?*

The conflict in Syria between the government of Bashar al-Assad and various other forces, which started in the spring of 2011, continues to cause displacement within the country and across the region. At the end of 2018, Syrians continued to be the largest forcibly displaced population, with 13.0 million people living in displacement, including 6,654,000 refugees, 6,184,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) and 140,000 asylum seekers (Ferris, Kirişci, Shaikh 2013; UN OCHA 2016).

Keywords: *Syrian refugees, Lebanon, migration policy, integration, confessional political system, displaced persons*

Introduction

The conflict in Syria between the government of Bashar al-Assad and various other forces, which started in the spring of 2011, continues to cause displacement within the country and across the region. The refugee situation caused by the Syrian conflict is dire, and it has placed enormous strain on neighboring countries. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt host massive numbers of Syrian refugees, and Syrians have been seeking protection beyond these countries in increasing numbers since 2011.

To unravel Lebanon's politics of accommodation towards the Syrian refugees and understand how this politics have played out, the paper focuses on the policy structures that the Lebanese state has set in place on the one hand, and how Lebanon's public and policy spheres have framed the Syrian refugee issue on the other. After providing a general overview of Lebanon's political system and its refugee politics, we tried to describe the Lebanese government's policy frame towards large-scale displacement from Syria. We review the key policies that the Lebanese government has adopted from 2011 until 2018.

By the end of 2014, an estimated 7.6 million people were internally displaced and 3.7 million Syrians had fled the country since the conflict began (UN Population Division and UNHCR; OCHA 2015). During 2014, more than one million Syrians were newly registered as refugees in neighboring countries, bringing the total number of registered refugees in the region to 3,688,402 by year-end. As large as the number of newly registered refugees is, in a sense it underestimates the current crisis as it excludes the 117,590 Syrians who were awaiting registration at the end of 2014 (UNHCR, 2015), and de facto Syrian refugees who were residing in the region but who were not formally registered or awaiting registration (Fakhoury and Lynn Abi 2018, 43-53).

The Syrian conflict has placed enormous strain on its neighboring countries, with Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan shouldering the largest burden. By the end of 2014, Lebanon, a country of approximately 4.8 million people before the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis, hosted 1.2 million registered Syrian refugees, meaning that nearly one in every five people now living in Lebanon is a Syrian refugee (UN Population Division and UNHCR). As of December 31, 2014, Turkey hosted the largest Syrian population, with 1.5 million registered refugees; Jordan housed the third largest population with 622,865 registered refugees. In comparison, Iraq and Egypt accommodated a smaller yet substantial number of Syrians, hosting 228,484 and 137,812 registered refugees, respectively (Table 1).

Syrian refugees in Lebanon: politics of accommodation

Lebanon's system of politics is commonly framed as a power-sharing type of governance in which political offices and appointments are organized in accordance with confessional system. The legislature is divided between Muslim and Christian MPs, and the ruling cartel revolves around a tripartite structure, which consists of a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister and a Shia speaker of parliament. The institutionalization of religious representation in political life has evolved into the most prominent feature of nation-building since the National Pact of 1943. Though the Lebanese Constitution and the post-war power-sharing

agreement (commonly known as the 1989 Ta'if agreement (Hiro 2003, 364-365) state that deconfessionalization is the ultimate goal, there has been so far no serious policy frame that sought to address Lebanon's transition from political confessionalism.

In the wake of Lebanon's fifteen-year old civil war (1975-1990), the politics of confessionalism have become more entrenched in societal and political spheres (Haddad 2009, 398-416; Sami 1999, 97-116). In the context of a highly "confessionalized" political culture, minority groups and their leaders have voiced concerns over the design of policies and electoral systems that would marginalize them or affect their political representation (Mehanna 2017). Policy changes that would tamper with the confessional balance of power have conjured in this regard fears of community survival. Adding to this, policy-makers have been concerned with the extent to which the settlement and potential naturalization of refugee communities – such as the Palestinians who have fled to Lebanon since 1948 – could impinge on the formula of confessional power sharing. In the context of regional conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 2003 war in Iraq, Lebanon has refused to sign the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and has refrained from developing an asylum apparatus that would give legal status to displaced persons. In 2011, the year that has seen the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, notwithstanding small-scale protests, Lebanese citizens have been hesitant when it comes to advocating for full-fledged regime change unlike their Arab counterparts at the time. Though the Lebanese state has not succumbed to what is commonly portrayed as the "Arab Spring", the Syrian war and its spillovers have had considerable effects on Lebanon. One of these effects is large-scale displacement from the neighboring country.

At the outset of the Syrian conflict in 2011, Lebanon adopted an "open-door" and "non-encampment" policy towards forcibly displaced Syrians (Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015–15, 2014). Though Lebanon has never developed a formal asylum policy, several instruments have regulated the state's interactions with displaced nationals from Syria. First, Syrians fell under the jurisdiction of domestic immigration law detailed in the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country, and the 1993 Agreement for Economic and Social Coordination between Lebanon and Syria which guarantees freedom of movement of people and goods between the two countries (Mufti 2014). While Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it remains under the obligation of respecting the principle of non-refoulement and human rights principles embedded in the Constitution. Those instruments guarantee displaced persons their basic human rights (UNHCR 2015). Under the 1993

Syrian-Lebanese agreement, Syrians entering Lebanon would have to present valid documents after which they would be able to reside legally in Lebanon for half a year. Furthermore, they would have to pay a residency fee of \$200 (Human Rights Watch 2016). Consequences of arrest, prosecution or deportation await those who fail to renew their residency or who enter illegally (Reuters 2016; Clingendael Conflict Research Unit 2016)¹. Another instrument, which has regulated Lebanon's handling of the Syrian refugee issue, is the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the UNHCR and the Government of Lebanon. Under this MOU, Lebanon grants the UNHCR permission to conduct registration, documentation and refugee status determination as well as offer refugee assistance. It enables Syrians to access basic services and constitutes a precondition for the UNHCR to assess protection needs (Saghieh and Frangieh 2014). Since Lebanon is not a country of asylum, the UNHCR certificate of registration falls short of granting legal refugee status to displaced nationals.

As the number of refugees had reached one million by spring 2014, the Lebanese government vowed to adopt more restrictive policy procedures towards refugees and to enforce stricter border management practices. In June 2014, the government released a policy statement declaring its intent to deny the entrance of Syrians who are coming from areas that do not border Lebanon, “rescind” refugee status from those who have entered Lebanon for economic purposes or who have since travelled back to Syria and returned to Lebanon (UNHCR 2015). The statement also encouraged the creation of camps inside the Lebanese-Syrian border.

As a result, 16,000 Syrians had their refugee status revoked by UNHCR upon the request of the government (Ibid). In October 2014, Lebanon's Crisis Cell, established in February 2014 to deal with the refugee issue, announced a new refugee policy that centered around the following pillars: curb refugee entry into Lebanon except for “exceptional humanitarian cases”, encourage Syrians to return their country or relocate to others, adopt stricter security measures, strengthen the capacity of municipalities to count refugees and practice “municipal policing”, soften the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on host communities through a series of measures such as preventing refugees from illegal work and ensuring that refugee and development aid benefit both refugee and more disadvantaged Lebanese populations. Following the approval of the policy, the Cabinet adopted a series of regulations aimed at limiting the inflow of Syrian refugees and the pool of Syrians eligible for entry and renewal of residency in Lebanon. In May 2015, the

¹ Recent reports from Lebanon suggest mass arrests have been made, curfews imposed and vigilante-style attacks carried out against Syrian refugees.

UNHCR, at the request of the government, suspended all registration and started to “record” rather than “register” refugees with the aim of providing assistance and protection (Janmyr 2016, 58-78). Under the new regulations, as detailed in an Amnesty International Report “Syria: Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon”, Syrians were expected to meet stringent criteria to fulfill one of the following visa categories: “tourism, studying, transiting to a third country, medical treatment, embassy appointment and a pledge of responsibility” (Amnesty International 2015). The mentioned visa category entails that a Lebanese guarantor would have to sponsor the stay of a Syrian national. One additional category, dedicated to the “displaced”, is reserved to “exceptional cases under humanitarian criteria” (Ibid). In April 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOA) limited those exceptional cases to the following instances: unaccompanied children or children with a parent living in Lebanon, disabled persons with a relative in Lebanon, persons who need to be urgently treated in Lebanon, and persons to be resettled (UN Children’s Fund 2015). Like before, Syrians above the age of 15 had to pay a semi-annual renewal fee of \$ 200 to the General Security (GSO) (Janmyr 2016). Various reports show that the 2014 regulations have curbed Syrians’ freedom of movement within the country and have thrown displaced nationals into a “state of illegality”, impacting their access to services and healthcare. Many Syrians were not able to pay the registration fee or submit the required documents so that they can regularize their stay. Furthermore, the GSO applied across Lebanese localities changing procedures for admission and renewal of residency (Amnesty International 2015).

In the context of international pressure on Lebanon to improve its refugee practices and combine the refugee issue with a development strategy, Lebanon pledged during the 2016 Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London to revamp its approach to the refugee issue by temporarily waiving residency fees and reducing the number of required documents to refugee residency (Brussels conference 2017). A year later, the GSO published a decision to waive the annual renewal fee for Syrians if they met certain conditions, namely, if they have registered with UNHCR prior to January 1, 2015 or if they were granted residency status through the UNHCR certificate once in 2015 or 2016 (Immenkamp 2017). The significant progress notwithstanding, international organizations such as Human Rights Watch noted that this policy failed to include all refugee categories such as Syrians who are not registered with UNHCR or those who have obtained residency by means of a Lebanese sponsor, as well as Palestinian refugees from Syria (Ibid). Moreover, it was reported that the application of these new procedures was not consistent. The absence of an official directive by the GSO, interruptions

in the registration process and contradictory practices have thwarted the implementation of the new policy (Ibid).

Syrian refugee issue in Lebanon: narratives of instability and insecurity

Lebanon's refugee policymaking has made sure to frame forcibly displaced Syrians as "temporary" guests in need of assistance in the frame of the neighboring conflict. Still, acquiring a sharper insight into how the Lebanese state has interacted with the Syrian refugee issue requires not only accounting for the policy instruments but also for the discursive framing through which public and policy spheres have portrayed Syrian refugees as a new "community" that is extraneous to Lebanon's confessional political system. An analysis of surveys, national opinion polls, and political statements reveal that the Lebanese population, the media and politicians have by and large framed Syrian refugees as a threat to Lebanon's prosperity, social cohesion and stability. Conducted in May 2013, a national opinion poll entitled "Lebanese attitudes towards Syrian refugees and the Syrian crisis" shows that most Lebanese perceived the Syrian refugee issue to be a threat to security and stability (Christophersen, Jing, Thorleifsson and Tiltne 2013, 143-162). An analysis of two Lebanese newspapers, *As-safir* and *An-nahar* reveals furthermore that negative representations of the Syrian refugee issue have dominated the media discourse. Prevalent narratives represent the Syrian refugee presence as an economic burden, a terrorist menace to Lebanon's security as well as a threat to civil peace and its "fragile" confessional equilibrium (El-Behairy 2016). An additional narrative, which links refugees with the "re-ignition of a civil war", is rooted in the generalized belief that Palestinian refugee militarization was a contributing factor to the outbreak of the 1975 Civil war. Within this climate, parallels are drawn between the case of displaced Syrians and the "precedent" of the Palestinians during the Lebanese war (1975-1991).

Lebanon's political elite, various political factions also have associated Syrian refugees with economic strains, terrorism and insecurity. At the outset of Syria's conflict, it is worth noting that the two camps that have dominated Lebanon's political scene throughout the last decade, commonly known as "the March 8"² and "the March 14"³ Coalitions, have held conflicting positions towards the Syrian conflict. "The March 8" coalition flagged the perilous nature of the uprising and defended the Syrian regime. Conversely, "the March 14" Coalition

² *"March 8 Alliance" coalition holds together Lebanon's pro-Syrian factions. The main forces are the Free Patriotic Movement, the Shii Hezbollah and Amal Movement.*

³ "March 14 Alliance" refers to an anti-Syrian coalition of parties and independents. The Alliance has become one of the most significant political coalitions in Lebanon, and it includes Christian Maronite, Druze and Sunni Muslim leaders.

denounced the Syrian regime's clampdown on the protesters (Fakhoury and Lynn Abi 2018, 43-53). In the first years of Syria's conflict, parties such as the Sunni current and Hezbollah, called on the Lebanese population to deal with the Syrian refugee issue from a humanitarian angle. Still, as the Syrian conflict became protracted, and in the context of increasing threats that Islamist factions from Syria have posed on Lebanese ground, political parties across the spectrum soon converged to develop harsher stances towards displaced Syrians (IMF Country Report No. 17/20, 2017). In recent years, key themes in Lebanese political discourse that have gained salience in politicians' statements are conflict diffusion and Syrian refugee militarization. The former Minister of Education, Elias Bou Saab, has for example expressed fear over the infiltration of radical terrorists among refugee populations. Lebanon's former army commander, Jean Kahwaji, has warned that Syrian settlements could potentially provide refuge for militant groups (Davison 2016). Similarly, Hezbollah MP Mohammad Raad argued that radical factions were drawing on Syrian refugee camps to recruit individuals to fight in Syria. Since the balance of power in Syria started tilting in favor of the Bashar al Asad regime, additional policy debates that have gained currency relate to the rejection of Syrian refugees' naturalization and to calling for their repatriation. In April 2016, the UN published a report entitled "In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants" calling on UN member states to multiply efforts for refugee resettlement (UN General Assembly 2016). The report argued that in cases where refugee return is not possible, refugee hosting states ought to provide refugees with a legal status and "examine where, when and how to afford the opportunity to refugees to become naturalized citizens". In Lebanon, policy-makers from various factions hurried to dismiss such a policy perspective. In a letter to Ban-Ki Moon, the UN Secretary General back then, Lebanon's Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil categorically rejected what he perceived as calls for the long-term settlement or naturalization of Syrians in Lebanon. He also called for their repatriation (Mencutek 2017, 1-45). In September 2017, Lebanon's current president Michel Aoun reaffirmed in his address to the UN General Assembly the state's categorical rejection of refugee naturalization. Arguing that the Syrian government has gained control of almost all its land and that the Lebanese state was unable to provide Syrian refugees with decent standards of living, he called for their rash repatriation and urged the UN to engage in developing refugee repatriation schemes instead of ensuring that refugees stay in camps (UN Assembly, UN News 2019). He also described any potential imposition of refugee naturalization on Lebanon as a "crime" against the Lebanese people. Similarly, in 2017, the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces Party, Samir

Geagaa, remarked that in a context of increasing tensions between Lebanese and refugee populations – and now that “military operations” have abated – it was time for refugees to return (Haboush 2017).

The topics of naturalization and refugee integration have acquired throughout Lebanon’s history contentious and highly conflictual implications. Such themes have conjured the memories of the 1975 Civil War in which the militarization of Palestinian refugees and polarizing debates over their “implantation” (*tawteen*) are thought to have exacerbated intra Lebanese tensions (MacQueen & Baxter 2014, 51-69). The mass displacement of Syrian refugees to Lebanon has triggered similar fears of impending “political collapse and civil conflict” (Ibid). Indeed, against such a backdrop, several politicians have approximated the current situation of Syrians to the protracted situation of Palestinians. According to this narrative, Palestinian refugee militarization during the 1975 Civil War remains until now an “unsolved” and “contentious” matter. In the 2014 Berlin Conference on Syrian Refugees, Lebanon’s Foreign Affairs Minister Gebrane Bassil criticized the Berlin Declaration for focusing more on obligation of the host state rather than on increasing international assistance. He furthermore compared the Berlin Declaration to the Cairo Agreement of 1969 (Hiro 2003, 102) – which gave more autonomy to Palestinian groups in Lebanon and which some deem to have contributed to the outbreak of Lebanon’s Civil War and triggered the involvement of external actors in Lebanon’s conflict. In 2015, during a meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni, Bassil again drew implicit comparisons with the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon stating that birth registrations of Syrians conducted by UNHCR and the Lebanese Social Affairs Ministry are “a prelude to imposing a new settlement reality” in which displaced Syrians are resettled in Lebanon (Aziz 2015). In a statement to the newspaper *As-safir*, Lebanon’s president Michel Aoun drew more explicit comparisons between the Syrian and Palestinian refugee issues while condemning what he perceived as the role of the UN in pushing for the naturalization of Syrian refugees. He argued:

“They kept telling us that naturalizing the Palestinians in Lebanon is only a scarecrow until their presence after tens of years became a rooted reality. [...] No one told us how they were going to return to their homeland, and now I am afraid that our land might be stolen in front of our own eyes to be used in solving the crises of others at Lebanon’s expense” (Naharnet 2016).

Let us to argue that contending political camps have challenged this narrative. Different politicians have exploited the issue of Syrian resettlement for their political gains. The insecurity spillovers of Syria’s war on Lebanese ground

have reinforced the widespread assumption that the risk of refugee insurgency and militarization posed actual threats to national security of Lebanon. Since 2014, cross-border fighting between Lebanon's army and radical groups from Syria, mainly fighters from the Nusra Front⁴ and the Islamic State who tried to infiltrate the Lebanese borders through Aarsal and Ras Baalbeck in North Bekaa intensified on several instances (Walsh 2017). In this context, Aarsal, a Lebanese border town, which hosts "tens of thousands of Syrian refugees", and Islamist militants arose as a major "security concern" (Ibid). In August 2014, fighting erupted between the Lebanese army and factions from Syria in the town of Aarsal, resulting in the death of 17 Lebanese security forces and the taking of 30 hostages. The episode, which was described as "one of the most serious spillovers" of Syria's conflict in Lebanon, ended with a ceasefire after which the Islamist militants retreated to "the outskirts of Aarsal" (Human Rights Watch 2017). The following years of 2014-2017 saw the eruption of several incidents across the Lebanese-Syrian border including suicide bombings targeting the Lebanese army, the capture of militants from Syria, and the raiding of Syrian refugee camps by the Lebanese army. In August 2017, after several battles, the Lebanese Army launched an offensive to expel Islamist factions from the Jurud Ras Baalbek and Jurud al-Qaa region. During this offensive, Hezbollah launched, with the support of the Syrian army, attacks on the area from the Syrian side of the border – even though both sides – i.e. the Lebanese army and Hezbollah – have denied coordination (Ibid). Fighting ended with a ceasefire after which hundreds of fighters and their families left Lebanon and returned to the province of Idlib in Syria in exchange for the bodies of eight Lebanese soldiers captured in 2014 (Chulov 2017). Within this climate, according to the Municipality of Aarsal, almost 10,000 out of the 60,000 Syrians in Aarsal returned in 2017 to Syria (Human Rights Watch 2017). The return of Syrian refugees amid such conditions provoked contentious debates. According to Human Rights Watch, most refugees reported that they felt "pressured" to return due to the "harsh conditions in Aarsal" including the inability to acquire legal residency, restrictions on mobility, and fear of arrests during army raids (Chulov 2017).

In spite of Lebanon's deteriorating security situation since 2014, clashes between Syrian refugees and Lebanese groupings have been seldom reported. Still, tensions have occasionally erupted, fueling anti-refugee sentiment and triggering fears of domestic polarization over the refugee issue. On July 18, 2017, after four Syrians detained by the Lebanese Army following a refugee camp raid had died, Syrian and Lebanese activists called for a demonstration in Beirut criticizing the

⁴ The Nusra Front is an Islamist rebel group fighting the Bashar al Asad regime.

harsh treatment of Syrian refugees on the part of the Lebanese government. No sooner was the refugee solidarity demonstration announced than some Lebanese groupings rushed to call for counter-protests in support of the Lebanese army. That day, the Lebanese Interior Minister, Nohad Machnouk, banned all protests, citing the necessity to preserve peace and security (Human Rights Watch 2017). The standoff resulted in a plethora of statements calling for the return of Syrian refugees.

Conclusion

Lebanon's politics of accommodation towards the Syrian refugee issue can be best described as "half-hearted". The Lebanese state and its various political factions have chosen a "half-hearted" refugee policy, flagging the manifold dangers that the integration and settlement of "displaced Syrians" would pose to Lebanon's political sociology. Lebanon's "half-hearted" refugee politics cannot be separated from the historical background of "nation-building" that the Lebanese state and society have embarked on. As Lebanese have not emancipated themselves from the politics of confessional representation that many consider the source of their divergences, their "nation-building" path has remained intricately tied to a politics of exclusion. This politics necessitate the framing of external "non-core" groups as a threat to the country's confessional balance, peace and coexistence of minorities.

While the legacy of Lebanon's confessional "nation-building" is crucial to understanding how Lebanon has dealt with the Syrian refugee issue, additional factors weigh in. Since 1976, Syria had been a major military player in Lebanon until the departure of Syrian troops in April 2005 in the light of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's slaying. Moreover, once the Civil War ended in 1990, the international community gave the Syrian regime green light to act as a "guardian" regulating Lebanon's domestic and foreign affairs. In the context of Lebanon's contradictory relations with Syria, public and policy spheres have rushed to politicize the Syrian refugee presence. In addition, the securitized framing of the Syrian refugee issue needs to be contextualized within Lebanon's political dilemmas and interest-based policy aspirations. In the context of Lebanon's model of politics, which encourages confessional rather than national agendas, Lebanese political factions have used the issue of Syrian refugees as an important item in their setting and political programming agenda. Christian parties such as the Free Patriotic Current and the Lebanese Forces have rejected the potential naturalization of Syrian refugees with a view of branding themselves as protectors of Lebanon's and regional minorities. Hezbollah has linked the issue of refugee militarization

with its broader geostrategic strategy to back the Syrian regime and defend Lebanon against the Sunni Islamist threat. Moreover, in an international context, which has lacked solidarity in refugee sharing, Lebanese policy makers' portrayal of the Syrian refugee presence as a burden has had strategic goals: confirm Lebanon's international position as a non-asylum country while extracting concessions from the international community in terms of aid.

Though a securitized refugee policy has prevailed, refugee representations within civic, public and academic spheres have not been monolithic. There is a plurality of "counter-narratives" that have contested the general view that Syrians pose a threat to Lebanon's security, civil peace and social cohesion (Muller 2017). Civic and community-based organizations in addition to knowledge-based communities have emerged as key challengers to the dominant portrayal of the refugee issue. In collaboration with international organizations, civil society have sought to alter the dominant securitized discourse, and expand on the narrative of peaceful coexistence and "trust building" between refugee and host populations (UNESCO Office in Beirut 2016). Academics have sought to generate "fact-based" knowledge to counter anti-refugee "inflammatory rhetoric", showing for instance that it is the Syrian war rather than Syrian refugee presence that have had a negative impact on Lebanon's economy. Such narratives have emerged as "counter public spheres" that have questioned the dominant view that refugees constitute a threat to Lebanon's economy and political sociology. They have however had no significant consequences on Lebanon's "asylum policy".




Table1. UNHCR. 2014. Statistical Online Population Database, data extracted December 15. www.unhcr.org/statistics/populationdatabase; UNHCR 2015a.

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