

**ON THE REPUBLICAN ORIGINS OF KEMALISM:
THE EARLY PHASE OF ITS EVOLUTION**

1. Framing the periodization of Kemalism

Kemalism, the governing philosophy of the Republican Turkey named after the founding father of Turkey Mustafa Kemal (1881-1938), remains a concept with widely debated definitions and contents. During the eight decades of its existence, the key philosophical arguments of Kemalism have constantly been reproduced through education and the public space. Those trends eventually led Kemalism willingly or not to dominate the social sub-conception of Turkish society thereby Kemalism was transformed into a cultural phenomenon. Irrespective of its questioning characteristics, it succeeded to shape the mentality and value system of four generations of Turks. It was never abandoned as a shelter of statehood, patrimony and protection. Now, we think it is worth revisiting the origins of the state ideology, to raise a few questions of its origins and shed light on few issues that remained uncovered until today.

Some widely-known observers¹ date the actual history of Kemalism back to the 18th century; mainstream observers are more moderate and go back to the 19th century and more particularly to the events of "*Tanzimat*" reformations (1839), while some authors are doing their best to find the roots of Kemalism in the constitutional undertakings of the 1870s. Kemal Atatürk himself claimed the year of 1919 as a departure point for the nationalist Kemalist movement, while others are more explicit on the date - 19 May, 1919, when Kemal landed in Samsun: meanwhile, some observers (Suna Kili, Niyazi Berkes, Mahmut Goloğlu among them) are clear on the date of Kemalism – October 23, 1923, a date which symbolized the distinct break with the past and thus marked the birth of an entirely new Turkish nation-state. Simultaneously, there are opinions proclaiming that the actual birth date of Kemalism is 1931, when it was incorporated into the official ideology of the RPP; or the year 1937 when it gained an official status and was included in the constitution of the state. Others are more candid and have metaphoric interpretation of it by claiming that Kemalism was born with the Republic and thereafter it was born and reborn with every single day of the Turkish state. In other words there is no consensus on the actual date of Kemalism, which simply means that this ambiguity allows for different styles of legitimacy pursued by various actors.

Along with these various approaches over the date of its inception, the term Kemalism itself lacked a clear definition and continues to do so. At the outset of the War of Independence under the stewardship of Kemal different expressions emerged like "the Kemalists", "the Kemalist movement", "the Kemalist

revolution", "the Kemalist Turkey" etc., which were in general empiric generalizations. Later, in the second half of the 1920s, when it became apparent that the "the Kemalist revolution" was not constrained only with the struggle for Independence, but also incorporated the internal affairs of the State, a new term "Kemalism" emerged, but that one also was primarily used as a synonym for describing the Kemalist revolution, certainly with bigger emphasis on its socio-economic concepts.

It is tremendously interesting that western and Turkish observers did not take into close consideration the Soviet attitude and studies concerning the origins of Kemalist ideology. This aspect is very interesting, which meanwhile requires us to treat the Soviet approach with utmost care, though. Soviet observers, journalists and scholars in the 1920s consistently reported to the Moscow administration about the development of the internal affairs in Turkey. Back in 1926 Konstantin Youst reported from Turkey about the revolutionary deeds of Mustafa Kemal, describing the overall atmosphere in the country, the attitude of people towards their leader. He gave the mythical image of Kemal, which according to him, was dominant by that time among the Turks. The personality of Kemal was equated with Christ, Mohammed, Buddha, Confucius as well as with Washington, Lincoln, Luther, Peter the First and Lenin.² Here Youst used the term Kemalism to refer the counter-revolutionary zeal of Kemalist elite's drive against the Pan-Turkic circles within the country.³ Thus, in his usage the frames and margins of the term remained imprecise and he most probably used that term to refer to the general spirit of togetherness prevalent among the Kemalists. Back in 1927, Irandoust (V. P. Osetrov) wrote his famous article "*The essence of Kemalism*" in the Communist party's official press.⁴ He describes Kemalism as an "authentic mass revolution", which was a specific type of Eastern revolution which followed the Western pathway. At the same time, he distinguished two characteristics of Kemalism which had made it a unique case; mainly its revolutionary and counter-revolutionary dimensions.⁵ Irandoust also envisioned the fate of Kemalism in the following way: "the future of Kemalism depends on its anti-imperialistic character, otherwise the possible compromise with imperialism would mean the crisis of Kemalism and its program".⁶ A year later, in 1928, the same author published another book to decode the main developments of Turkey,⁷ where he used plainer terminology to describe the agencies of the newly-founded state. He used the terms "Kemalist Turkey", "Kemalist movement", by pinpointing the revolution that had been carried out from 1918 to 1920 by "Kemalists", a rank-and-file of the ideological revolution.⁸ He also presented the dominant fashion among the Turkish observers to ascribe theoretical aspects to Kemalism.

Another, interesting component that Irandoust presented was the prevailing trend among the Soviet Communist revolutionaries to transform and project the Kemalist brand of revolution in China, by identifying the existing socio-political similarities in both countries. He went on to mention that rather interesting case is counter posed by another trend in the international mass media, particularly in the

Japanese media, which repeatedly applied the term "Kemalism" to generalize counter-revolutionary movements of the Chinese generals (Chiang Kai-shek and Phin Yui-sen), who, by acting under the guise of anti-imperialism, virtually serve the needs of the Chinese bourgeoisie⁹.

It is noteworthy, that in 1927 B. Ferdi described the CHP as the party of the Kemalist cause, which brought the national bourgeoisie to the power at the expense of forced measures directed against possible opposition forces¹⁰. Another Soviet observer of Turkey Kross wrote that by the end of the third decade within the Kemalist revolutionary circles a few factions emerged, which caused certain deviations from the general politics of the mid-1920s¹¹: the right wing (or pro-Western section) of Kemalism, which demanded more resolute involvement of the West in state-building of Turkey, but the financial crisis of 1929 had a negative impact on them; the Left demanded an expanded state role in the economy and the daily life of the country; the Pan-Turkist circles also were activated by initiating efforts to make Kemalism an official ideology and a scientific doctrine, establishing the Museum of Kemalist Revolution and the Institute of Turkism etc.; the Orthodox section required to rely upon the peasants and the Anatolian petty-bourgeoisie, as trustable resources for promoting the policy of nationalism, republicanism and laicism.¹² Ferdi also contended that after five years of independence the factions appeared within the ranks of the CHP as well, which was manifested in the increasing dissatisfaction of the masses, and a result more people were leaving the party than joining it.¹³ In 1927, Kitaigorodskiy coined Turkey "the kingdom of Kemalism",¹⁴ where the Kemalist ideologues were doing their utmost to defend the rights of the new bourgeoisie. In the spirit of the Communist party, he urged "the red diplomacy" of the Soviet Union to acknowledge the true face of Turkey for taking appropriate measures for insuring Turkey's loyalty towards the SU.¹⁵

It is generally agreed that for the first time, the word "Kemalism" began to be used in certain intellectual circles either in 1929 or in 1930. It is taken for granted that the year 1931 is the very year when six principles were made public. In reality, a few observers only refer to the fact that four out of these six concepts first appeared in October 1927 as part of "The president Gazi Mustafa Kemal His Excellency's Declaration of the General Principles agreed to in harmony at the Republican People's Party {3rd} congress"¹⁶. In this document, the Party declares itself to be "Republicanist, lâ-yık, populist and nationalist" (*Cumhuriyetçi, lâ-yık, halkçı ve milliyetçidir*).¹⁷ To put it more accurately, October 1927 is the date when Mustafa Kemal declared his insights and ideological visions for the future of Turkey. His famous speech, which lasted six days, served as a turning point for the ideological basis of the country. Again, as noted above, M. Kemal was feeling secure enough in 1927 not to push ahead these four ideas with the presumed intensity as he was feeling no threat whatsoever from any part of the socio-political reality and from the closely supervised society.

In any account, in the Turkish context the term *Kemalism*, with its ideological connotation and interpretation, might have been first used in 1929 and became widespread in the country. According to some observers Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was the first person who, in his column in the national daily "*Milliyet*", used that term. Others mention the language expert Ahmet Cevat as an initiator of that term in the "*Muhit*" journal¹⁸ or the name of the long time justice minister of M. Kemal, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, as another instigator of the term *Kemalism*¹⁹. The last two options are less realistic, since they date back at best to the beginning of the 1930s, which was too late for *Kemalism* to be coined. Some observers claim that shortly after the Menemen incident an intellectual figure wrote an article stating that the party should accept *Kemalism* as its principal ideology as with fascism in Italy and communism in Russia.²⁰ In 1930, Josef Washington Hall argues that it was westerners and interviewers of Kemal who "branded the movement "*Kemalist*", as if he were some rebel upstart. He [Kemal] resented the term as he did not intend to establish "*Kemalism*" but a new Turkey, nor did he wish to incite the resentment of the Nationalists".²¹

The reason for this endeavour to distinguish the date is that in 1922 a French author Michel Paillares published a book named "*Le Kemalisme: Devant Les Allies*"²², but it was the history of the rise of Mustafa Kemal and a detailed history of the Independence war. Some observers are referring to this monograph and its title which helped Kemal's allies in choosing the name for the RPP's ideology. Although we found no reference in the literature of the time, it is difficult to exclude a possible connection or association between them. Thus, we can assume that although the term *Kemalism* gained a widely-accepted currency in Turkey in 1929 at the latest, in the international milieu *Kemalism* had been in use for a long time for describing the ideological construction policy of the Turkish elite.

2. Narrowing the definitional framework

If we try to define *Kemalism* it will be as follows - *Kemalism* is the name given to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's and his Republican People's Party's (henceforth - RPP) political thought and practices and the persistently official and semi-official, hegemonic ideology of the Turkish Republic. Among the implicit and explicit goals of the ideological inception were apparent intentions of providing a clear, vivid, patriotism-infused guidelines of future goals of the Revolution, around which the population, the relatively untouched peasantry might be rallied. In other words, after a decade long purification of the official discourse, by the beginning of the 1930s, the time was ripe to popularise the basic assets of the *Kemalist* undertakings. The close disciples of Mustafa Kemal were certain that distinct bureaucratic elite is formed which would be capable of teaching the society the basic tenets of the new nation building project.

Prior to further elaboration of popularization policy of *Kemalism* the whole period of forming the ideological currents and the intra-elite struggle of the

end of 1920s and the beginning years of the 1930s should be critically evaluated. The international ideological currents also played not a secondary role in making Kemalism an ideological current capable of performing a certain mission. Among other factors the world economic crisis (or Depression) of 1929 and the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* - FRP), experiment in 1931 were pivotal in making Kemalism to come into final existence. "The Great Crash" pushed the government to undertake counter-measures to cope with it, which was interpreted as a fatal outcome of free enterprise – a brainchild of Western capitalism. The governing elite had the Soviet Union's case in mind, which escaped the crisis due to its state control mechanism and that case inspired them to incorporate key aspects of that model into certain areas of the Turkish economy. In 1930, the government became more outspoken about its intention to play a greater role in the economy.

The Turkish and Western scholars observing the Turkish revolution agree that the foundation and further evolution of Kemalism was a single-layered process and both Atatürk and his close allies had a clear vision of the role that Kemalism was going to play. In reality, a close scrutiny of the history of the 1930s reveals that even in the beginning there was no clear idea of "what type of Kemalism" they had in mind. A gradual succession of Kemal Atatürk from daily politics and the strife of the elite to fill the gap brought different currents of Kemalism into the surface. Hamit Bozarslan distinguished three characteristic phases of development of Kemalism from its earlier period onto the end of the 1930s. The first period, according to him, was the War of Independence (1919-1922) itself, the second one, going from 1922 to the end of 1930, was that of a "Janus-like" Kemalism, since it was at the same time nationalist and the bearer of a project of "Western civilization", the third period, 1930-1938, witnessed an openly and self-consciously anti-liberal and anti-democratic regime.²³

Ertan Aydın distinguishes three versions of Kemalism presented by a) conservative modernists as well as b) "*Ülke*" and c) "*Kadro*" journals, which left a considerable impact on the evolution of the Kemalist discourse.²⁴ Though the *Kadro* movement and the journal were considered as the sole source where the whole ideology of Kemalism 'was baked', the role of the "*Ülke*" journal or the *Ülke* version of Kemalism was downplayed. The "*Kadro*" journal was being viewed with suspicion both by the RPP's elite and eventually by Atatürk. The General Secretary of the RPP led the campaign against "*Kadro*" journal arguing against the claims of its leader Ali Karaosmanoğlu (who claimed that "*Kadro*" means an ideological cadre of the party, "a vanguard cadre"). R. Peker made clear to A. Karaosmanoğlu - that duty belonged to them. "*Kadro*" became associated with the Communist propaganda and eventually became less productive in terms of articulating ideological principles. Instead, R. Peker was adamant in founding the RPP's own journal, named "*Ülke*", which was to shape the ideology of the Kemalist regime. In February 1933, the journal "*Ülke*" came to life.²⁵ The zenith of the journal's preaching activity was February 1933 until August 1936, since

during this period “*Ülku* elite” was dominant in making the key ideological contents of the journal. Later, R. Peker’s role decreased, he retired from his position and the journal’s importance in disseminating revolution’s ideology became secondary.

In the mid-1930s and in later decades the theoretical and empirical interpretation of Kemalism was trusted mainly to Recep Peker²⁶, Şeref Aykut²⁷, Naşit Kızılay²⁸, Şevket Sureya Aydemir²⁹ and a few others. In 1937, another proponent of the Kemalist ideology Tekin Alp published a book “*Le Kemalisme*”. He discussed the concept of a nation as well as principles of unity of language, culture and idea by considering them as necessary prerequisites for construction of new rational nationhood. He based himself on Ziya Gökalp’s distinction between culture (*hars*) and civilization (*medeniyet*).³⁰ He was born in Serez in 1883 as an Ottoman Jew and named as Moiz Kohen. Later in his life, he made friends among the circles of the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) including Ziya Gökalp. This relationship influenced all his life. Publication of “*Le Kemalisme*” should be considered as a reflection of his identity. That book was an important one from a few perspectives. Firstly, it has a conjectural value; secondly, it reflects the atmosphere of its era; and finally, it quotes the discussions about Kemalism. Besides, the arguments Tekin Alp put forward about nationalism, liberalism and secularism made it possible for us comment on the Kemalist ideology of the time. It is noteworthy, that he was not dealing with some vague prescriptions for political, economic and social development, but with a network of doctrinal options which had already been the subject of numerous official and semi-official exegeses.³¹ To him, Kemalism was no longer an uncertain term merely describing the revolutionary reality of the time, but an ideology which was in charge of the fate of Turkish nation and state. It designates the path that the Turkish nation-state needed to follow to achieve her goal.³² He went on to state that Kemalism was empowered by dynamics and vitality and there was no venue for dream and abstraction in Kemalism.³³

One of the main outstanding ideologues of Turkish transformation and in shaping the core Kemalist principles was Ziya Gökalp (1875-1924). He, along with his eminent companions like Mehmet Emm, Halide Edip (Adıvar), Mehmed Fuad (Koprulu), Ahmet Hikmet and Üsüf Akcura, initiated a large campaign in the 1910s to disseminate their visions of the Ottoman future based on nationalist ideologies and Islamic culture. Although their main vision was to establish Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism (the idea of uniting all Turkish peoples in the State of Turan) they envisioned chauvinistic and aggressive policy in attaining their goals. In the later years, some of their perspectives were incorporated both in the policy of the Young Turks and the Kemalist reformation. On the surface, Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism were rejected by Kemalists, who considered these ideas as lost causes and which were not in line with the then contemporary conditions of the world. Kemalists were deliberately trying to alienate themselves from those circles as unsuitable and as likely to bring discredit to them. Gökalp, by being deeply influenced by the French sociologist Durkheim, was the first of his ilk to initiate a concerted systemizing of

European elements with Ottoman Muslim civilization. He was particularly inspired by Durkheim's ideas on the supremacy of society over the individual, with the sole difference that Gokalp emphasized the "nation" rather than "society".³⁴

Abdullah Cevdet was also a distinguished figure in the late Ottoman and early republican period whose influence on Atatürk has been downplayed. In fact, F. Creel claims that significant elements of the Kemalist ideology have clear roots in the writings of A. Cevdet, and some outstanding features of the Kemalist ideology are historically inexplicable without reference to his ideas. Creel thereby questions the dominating theory of primacy of Gökalpism (his term) on Kemalism.³⁵ From September 1904 until November 1932 Cevdet published the journal "*İctihad*", first in Geneva, later in Cairo and then in Istanbul. In this journal he articulated a set of modernization and ideological visions, which later on were found, in one shape or another, in the deeds of M. Kemal. Creel asserts that way back in 1891 Cevdet first claimed the importance of abandoning Arabic script and Arab metaphysics, by stressing the need of having a Turkish language based on Latin script. He was concerned with the right type of educational systems, with the further existence of religious orders (whom Cevdet named "a bunch of blockheads"), with the right formula of economic restructuring.³⁶

3. The epoch of "High Kemalism"

By the mid-1930s, the principles of Kemalism which were described as techniques of finding out the truth, began to be loaded with substantive meanings. The major reforms had been completed but the objectives of "rapid economic development" and "reaching the highest level of contemporary civilization" had not been successfully accomplished. The military victory was too far in the past to reproduce the kind of legitimacy which was urgently needed by the government, for the people had not been mobilized into political administration. Movements of opposition—both legal and illegal—had been suppressed. In short, the government was now alone in its path, devoid of popular support.³⁷ Moreover, the rise in 1930 of the FRP which was an example of official-legal opposition, and the Menemen Incident, which was part of the illegal line of opposition, made the ruling party become even more isolated. The Turkish bureaucracy bore an outstanding role in making Kemalism a capable ideological current by transforming the Kemalist deeds, thoughts and ideas into a political manifesto and taking upon themselves the responsibility for carrying it out.

A close scrutiny of the Kemalist reforms suggests that at the very outset they encountered fierce opposition from various parts of the political and social spectrum and that style of statecraft has been deeply incorporated in the system of state building of Turkey. To put it simply, the whole discourse and the essence of the struggle was the official and oppositional interpretation of the Kemalist version of the Turkish transformation. Yet it is rather unproblematic to stretch the official interpretation of it, whereas the opposition's claims that the Kemalist version of

modernization and transformation should cease to exist by paving ground for alternative ideas and projects are gaining more legitimacy.

An important question, which comes to one's mind is, why Atatürk did not develop an explicit ideology to defend and secure his achievement prior to 1931. Weiker takes a shortcut explaining two principle reasons: a) M. Kemal was a man of action concerned about the ends rather than means, b) in the 1920s the themes westernization and modernization were sufficient boosters for evoking emotional commitment.³⁸ Cagaptay argues that in the 1920s Turkey was busy trying to recover from the extensive warfare of the previous decade, when country had suffered tremendous demographic and material devastation, and Atatürk was more busy on establishing a secular Turkey, re-structuring political and physical shape of the country.³⁹ On the other hand, between 1920 and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial-group lines ran as a strong undercurrent among the architects of Kemalism trying to establish their own centre, and it remained as a fundamental – although often latent – issue of the Kemalist policy to the end of one party in 1950.⁴⁰ As we are aware, the second part of the 1920s marked the period of unprecedented cultural and social modernization reforms in Turkey. These measures were accompanied with injection of the idea that the new elite was the sole and the safest resort of the nation. With a certain degree of safety we can claim that during the 1920s the only idea that was capable of keeping the Turks together was a chauvinistic and a hazardous version of nationalism inherited from the later period of the Ottoman time and the Young Turks. In other words, Mustafa Kemal's victorious beginning and his subsequent measures were sufficient methodological and strategic tools for keeping the society cool and away from doubtful ideas. Though a close inspection of his actions and speeches after the 1924 alternative party adventure and the brutal suppression of the 1925 Kurdish rebellion reveal that he was striving to initiate an ideological campaign for granting more credits to his measures, but all in all, he was feeling powerful enough to continue without a properly elaborated ideological background. One may argue that modernization, laicism and westernization as kernels of early version construction for Kemalism were formidable tools for national consolidation, but in the late 1920s Mustafa Kemal realized that these three components were not satisfactory and productive to consolidate the society for keeping it together and united. It needs to be added, that a certain degree of dissatisfaction was also present in Kemal's approaches, in judgments concerning the society's appreciation towards all the reforms that he had done. To him, the society's feedback was not sufficient, and obviously he was expecting more in response to his decade-long sacrifices. To put it shortly, by the end of 1920s M. Kemal and the RPP elite realized that the Kemalist regime and their cherished revolution were highly unpopular across Turkey, which subsequently forced the responsible elite to take countermeasures to make the revolution more efficient. M. Kemal was adamant that his deeds during the War of Independence were sufficient reasons to be treated with due sensibility and the nation would follow his any word without questioning

their feasibility. These features enhanced the importance of creating an "autonomous" and "self-sufficient" ideological framework.

Although the 1930s marked the development and active propagation of Kemalism's ideological principles, the ideological quasi-discourses starting from the Tanzimat period (from 1839) had certain impacts on the shape of Kemalism. The subsequent waves of ideological currents like Pan-Turanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Ottomanism constituted a fertile ground for development and further empowerment of the Kemalist discourse. It is appropriate to cite Weiker who persistently argues that the seeds of the revolution were set in Atatürk's mind during the WWI, when he was analyzing the causes of the decline of Ottoman Empire and prospects of Turkey's future.⁴¹

The popular support for the short-lived Free Party and the Menemen incident, is believed, had significant impact on M. Kemal in a sense that they heightened his increasing concerns about popular unrest and disobedience. He decided to act on this by consolidating the RPP's hold on power after returning from his three-month tour of Turkey in 1930. "He arrived at the conclusion that this feeling arose from the fact that the people in general were insufficiently instructed respecting the principles of the RPP which alone guarded the revolutionary fervour, which alone could elevate the masses, and of which he himself was the head and from which the government was formed".⁴²

Kemal decided to initiate the restructuring of the government and putting particular accent on more radical wing of the RPP. On March 3, 1931, he sent a letter to the RPP asking for new elections. On March 10, 1931, Recep Peker, was appointed as the RPP's new Secretary General. On April 24th, the parliamentary elections were held, on May 4th the forth term of the Parliament held its inaugural meeting, on May 5th, İnönü's sixth government was formed. Kemalism became known as such at the RPP Congress, which was held in Ankara, between 9th and 16th of May, 1931. The Congress revised founding principles and in addition to the three vaguely defined principles of Republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik), Nationalism (Milliyetçilik), Populism (*Halkçılık*) adopted in 1927, three new principles were added - Etatism (*Devletçilik*) Revolutionism/Transformationism (*İnkılapçı/devrimçilik*) and Laicism (*Lâiklik*). The definitions of the first three doctrines were expanded with meticulously nuanced and heavy loaded ideological components. In a speech on 24 September 1931, Atatürk reiterated the six principles and backed the idea of building the future of the Republic based on them.

In the 1930s, Recep Peker, along with other three key Kemalist ideologues, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur (1881-1980), Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk (1873-1976) and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, delivered speeches on a number of important topics at the Istanbul University. In their presentations, Bayur focused on Kemalism and foreign policy, Tengirşenk spoke on Kemalist economy, and Bozkurt presented a comparative analysis of the Kemalist and other revolutions and wrote in the newspaper to articulate on Kemalism.⁴³ On 16 October, Recep

Peker voiced the RPP's commitment to the basic principles at a conference, which he gave to university students in Istanbul, where he elaborated on a number of key issues concerning non-Muslims, ethno-religious shape of the nation, non-Turkish Muslims' position vis-à-vis the nation.⁴⁴ The 1931 decision of the RPP brought a new ideological imprint which leaned the system on authoritarian measures in contrast to the relatively free atmosphere of the 1920s. The RPP increasingly became the centre of power in the country as its organizations expanded in number and the drive to enlist more young people under its banner and to indoctrinate them with the new ideology was intensified. Thus, under Kemal's stewardship "a new era" was underway, which was coined "*Kemalism par excellence*".⁴⁵ The period of High Kemalism would last until Atatürk's death in 1938.

On October 28-30, 1933, as a part of active propaganda campaign launched by the RPP the Tenth Anniversary of the Republic was celebrated. Webster elaborates on this event by illustrating the mass-media coverage. The significant part of that event became the Anniversary brochure published by the General Executive Committee, bearing the single title "10". It contained 208 pages with a meticulous account of the attainments and deeds of the Kemalist regime commencing from the birth of the Republic reaching to the immediate events prior to the celebration. It also included extracts from the Atatürk's 6 day speech as well as the RPP's program principles. Webster thinks that the content of the brochure was calculated to inspire increasing faith and loyalty in all who read it.⁴⁶ The RPP adopted a flag of *Altı Ok* (six arrows) on a red background. The "arrows" have metaphorical interpretations suggesting the image of a projectile – Turkey – being shot through space and time, travelling swiftly and directly on a clear path, or on six clear paths, determined and launched by its grand marksman, Mustafa Kemal.

In 1934, Mustafa Kemal assumed the name Atatürk – *Father of the Turks* – bestowed on him by the National Assembly. Thus, his full name became, literally translated, "the Chosen, the Perfect, the Father of the Turks". On 9 February, 1935, the parliamentary elections were held, on March 1, İnönü established his seventh government and its program was approved after six days. Between 9th and 16th of May, 1935, the Forth congress of the RPP was held (which was the last one personally attended by Atatürk). During the congress key principles became plainer, which stated that "the main ideas that constitute the foundation of the program of the RPP" and a crucial distinction was added: it named the ideas as the "principles" of "Kemalism". "*The main lines of our intentions, not only for a few years, but for the future as well, are here put together in a compact form. All of these principles, which are the fundamentals of the Party, constitute Kemalism*".⁴⁷ During the congress the Secretary-General Recep Peker, announced that "*fundamental principles of the party will become the principles of the new Turkish state after the new party programme has been ratified*".⁴⁸ After the Congress Peker indeed emerged as a 'radical', his version of Kemalism has since been invoked by 'radical' Kemalists, civilian and military, as representing the 'true' Kemalist tradition. He also emerged as the "party ideologue" claiming to have the full

approval of Atatürk.⁴⁹ He also eulogized the head of the state and proposed to strengthen further the authority of the party.

The six principles were placed in the Constitution on February 5, 1937, by the law number 3115. Thus Article 2 of the constitution was amended to read: "The Turkish state is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Etatist, Laic and Revolutionary. Its official language is Turkish and its Capital is the city of Ankara".⁵⁰ The constitution did not either define or clarify the meaning of these terms. It is widely claimed that the implantation of Kemalism was attained in three stages: from 1931 to 1937 it was a program of the single party, in 1937 the six arrows were inserted into the Turkish constitution and Kemalism became officially the national ideology as well. Later on, in the 1943 program the doctrine was spelled in its current form ("Kemalism") and the arrow-born trajectory image of a "path" was added, a concept that permeates Kemalist discourse: "All these principles that are the foundations of the Party are the path of "Kemalism".⁵¹ Gasanova claims that the ideological system of Turkey consisted not of those "six principles", but also "four basics" – 1) motherland, 2) nation, 3) republic, 4) civil law.⁵²

By 1937 and 1938 when Kemal Atatürk was not actively involved in daily politics due to health deterioration problems, a total control over the socio-political and ideological realms of the Turkish nation was maintained. Although from 1925 till 1938 some 17 different rebellions were suppressed in various parts of the country a general stability in the country was a predominant trend. By that time the strong bureaucracy, empowered with a detailed knowledge of Atatürk's thoughts and Kemalist interpretation of worldly affairs, acquired a strong confidence and legitimacy to defend the deeds and all the achievements of the Kemalist revolution. There was no opposition in the country which was due to (and accompanied with) an unparallel personal charisma and authoritative power of Kemal Atatürk and the system that came into existence thanks to him.

The personal charisma of Atatürk was the only obstacle for the bureaucratic intelligentsia to further promotion of state structuring a transient state desired by Atatürk. With the death of Atatürk no obstacles remained and as Lewis argues "... authoritarian and paternalistic mode of government degenerated into something nearer to dictatorship as the word in commonly understood".⁵³ Alkan has concluded that in the later period of Atatürk the elite's outlook changes, and in conjunction with the emphasis placed on the principles of the revolution, liberal tendencies tended to disappear'.⁵⁴

Conclusion

Thus, we can safely assume that from the commencement of Kemalism until the death of Atatürk, the debate revolving around the key principles of Kemalism had undergone continuous evolution. In the early years of the 1920s the parameters of the ideological construct of the newly founded state still remained imprecise. Later on, in the late 1920s and by the beginning of the 1930s, the M.

Kemal himself and his close associates acknowledged that the spirit of the revolutionary zeal eroded and new incentives were needed to mobilize the society around the common goals. In the 1930s, a new era emerged in Turkey – the epoch of the “High Kemalism”. In that phase Kemalism was loaded with heavy ideological principles which became unceasingly dominant in the later decades. Meanwhile, by the mid-1930s it became clear that besides the narrow elite-approved version of Kemalism there were various versions of Kemalisms (movements like “Kadro”, “Ulku”, republican-conservatism), each developed on rather conflicting terms and principles as partial ideological representations of an all-encompassing process of Turkish transition to modernity. Even nowadays, interpretation of Kemalism by hard-core Kemalists hinges on the perception of the 1930s with its complicated contentions and perilous repercussions. It is therefore, the complex and systematic study of Kemalism’s evolution is a significant necessity for fathoming the true essence of the Kemalist discourse in Turkey.

REFERENCES

- 1 Bernard Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey, Second Edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1968; Roderic Davison, Turkey: Short history, Walkington, The Eothen Press, 1981; Feroz Ahmad, The making of modern Turkey, New York, Routledge, 1993; Eric Zürcher, Turkey: A modern history, London, I.B. Tauris & Co, 1993
- 2 Константин Юст, Письма из Турции: Новые пути и их смысл, *Красная новь*, Госиздат, Ленинград, 1926, no. 5, с. 174
- 3 Юст, 1926, с. 184
- 4 Ирандуст, *Сущность Кемализма*, За партию, Орган Средне-Азиатского Бюро ЦКВКП (б), “Правды Востока”, Ташкент, 1927, no. 2, с. 62-69
- 5 Ирандуст, 1927, с. 63-64
- 6 Ирандуст, 1927, с. 68
- 7 Ирандуст, Движущие силы кемалистской революции, М.-Л., 1928
- 8 Ирандуст, 1928, с. 5
- 9 Ирандуст, 1928, с. 6
- 10 Ферди Б., Эволюция Кемализма: от национальной революции к диктатуре буржуазии, *Стутник Коммуниста, IV год издания, Партийный общественно-политический двухнедельник*, МК ВКП (б), 1927, no. 10 (43), 31 Мая, с. 32
- 11 Кросс Т., 1930, Внутреннее положение Турции, *Международная жизнь*, НКВД, Москва, no. 7-8, с. 57-66
- 12 Кросс Т., 1930, с. 59-61
- 13 Ферди Б., 1927, с. 35
- 14 Китайгородский П., Заметки о кемалистской Турции: Причины победы национальной революции в Турции, *Большевик, “Правда”*, Москва, 1927, no. 18, 30 сентября, с. 50
- 15 Китайгородский П., 1927, с. 48, 50

- 16 Tunçay Mete, T.C.'nde Tek-Parti Yonetimi'nin Kurulması (1923-1931) (The founding of the Single Party Regime in the Turkish Republic), Istanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1981
- 17 Lâîyik is an older spelling of *laik*, the adjectival form of laikik.
- 18 Giritli İsmet, The superiority of the Kemalist ideology over dogmatic ideologies, A handbook of Kemalist thought, Atatürk Research Center, 2001, p. 125
- 19 Kieser Hans-Lukas, , An entho-nationalist revolutionary and theorist of Kemalism: Dr. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt (1892-1943) in *Turkey beyond nationalism*, ed. by Kieser Hans-Lukas, I.B. Tauris, London – New York, 2006, p. 26
- 20 See Ali Naci (Karacan), “Rusya’da Nasıl Komünizm İtalya’da nasıl Fasizm varsa Bizde Kemalizm olmalıdır”, İnkılap, 2 Des., 1930
- 21 Josef Washington Hall, *Eminent Asians: Six great personalities of the New East*, D. Appleton and Company, New York and London, 1930, p. 296
- 22 Paillarès Michel, “Le Kemalisme: Devant Les Allies”, Constantinople, Paris “Bosphore”, 1922
- 23 Bozarslan Hamit, Kemalism, westernization and anti-liberalism, in *Turkey beyond nationalism*, ed. by Kieser Hans-Lukas, I.B. Tauris, London – New York, 2006, p. 29
- 24 Ertan Aydın, Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary ideology in the 1930s: The Ülku version of Kemalism, 1933-1936, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 5, 2004, p. 55
- 25 The word Ülku means “ideal” in English. Atatürk named the journal Ülku. In the first issue of the journal, Atatürk sent his congratulations stating, ‘I am expecting from Ülku auspicious products in disseminating our general ideal (öz ulkumuzu).
- 26 Recep Peker, İnkılap dersleri notları, Ankara, 1936
- 27 Şeref Aykut, Kemalism, Istanbul, Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitap Evi, 1936
- 28 Naşit Kızılay, Atatürk (Felsefe gözüyle), Ankara, 1955
- 29 Şevket Sureya Aydemir, Tek Adam, cilt 1-3, Ankara, 1963-1966; 1966-67, İkinci Adam, cilt 1-2
- 30 Tekin Alp, *Le Kemalisme*, Paris, 1937, p. 251
- 31 Paul Dumont, The origins of Kemalist ideology, in ed. Atatürk and the modernization of Turkey, J. Landau, 1984, p. 25
- 32 Tekin Alp, 1937, *Le Kemalisme*, p. 13
- 33 Ibid, p. 14
- 34 On Ziya Gökalp, see Taha Parla, The social and political thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1985
- 35 Frank Creel, Abdullah Cevdet: a father of Kemalism, Journal of Turkish Studies, n. 4, 1980, p. 9
- 36 Ibid, p. 10-17

- 37 Sefa Şimşek, "People's Houses" as a Nationwide Project for Ideological Mobilization in Early Republican Turkey, *Turkish Studies*, v. 6, no. 1, 2005, p.74
- 38 Weiker Walter, Political tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free party and its aftermath, Leiden, Brill, 1973, p. 221
- 39 Çağaptay Soner, *Crafting the Turkish Nation: Kemalism and Turkish Nationalism in the 1930s*, PhD Yale University, unpublished dissertation, 2003, p. 66
- 40 Metin Heper, Center-Periphery as a concept for the study of social transformation, 2006 p. 306
- 41 Weiker, 1973, p. 221
- 42 BCA 490.01/34.142.1. Atatürk'un Seyahat Notları, (Atatürk's travel notes), 17 November 1930. BCA 490.01/34.141.2. Atatürk'un İkinci Seyahat Notları, (Atatürk's second travel notes), 17 November 1930 in Çağaptay's dissertation, p. 65
- 43 Uyar, *Sol Milliyetçi Bir Türk Aydını*, and *Tan*, 27, 28, 29 May 1935
- 44 Recep Peker, RPP Programinin İzahı (Explanation of RPP's program), Ankara, Ulus Matbaası, 1931, pp. 3-16, in Çağaptay, 66/337,
- 45 Çağaptay, p. 66
- 46 Donald Webster, The Turkey of Atatürk, Social process in the Turkish reformation, The American Academy of political and social science, Philadelphia, 1939, p. 184
- 47 CHP, Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutulgası, Ankara 1935, s. 1
- 48 CHP, Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutulgası, Ankara 1935, s. 45
- 49 Ali Fuat Borovali, Kemalist tradition, political change and the Turkish military, Unpublished dissertation, Queen's University, 1985, p. 84 - 85
- 50 Program of the People's Party of the Republic, Adopted by the Fourth Grand Congress of the Party, May 1935, p. 308 (Official translation), in Donald Webster, 1939, The Turkey of Atatürk, Social process in the Turkish reformation, The American Academy of political and social science, Philadelphia, p. 163
- 51 CHP, *Programı*, İstanbul ve Ankara, 1943
- 52 Гасанова Э. Ю., Об идеологических основах кемализма и их современном толковании в Турции, *Народы Азии и Африки*, АН СССР, "Наука", Москва, 1968, no. 3, с. 28
- 53 Bernard Lewis, The emergence of Modern Turkey, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 304
- 54 Alkan Turker, "Turkey: Rise and decline of political legitimacy in a Revolutionary regime", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 4, 1980, p. 46